Alison Elizabeth Corbel & Anor v Nigel Henry Golding [2026] EWHC 2069 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 2069 (Ch)

Case No PT-2024-000783

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date 27 July 2026

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE PAUL MATTHEWS

Sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between

MR NIGEL HENRY GOLDINGDefendant/

MR HUGH CUMBER of Counsel appeared for Claimants/Applicants

The Defendant/Respondent appeared in Person for in person

JUDGMENT

(As approved)

If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.

2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.

Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864 DX 410 LDE

Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com

Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com

HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS :

[1]This is an application to commit Mr Golding, the defendant, for contempt of court, primarily in relation to an order of Marcus Smith J of 9 June 2026, but also in the context of two earlier orders, one of Deputy Master Bowles on 29 January 2025, and another of Master Brightwell of 10 September 2025. All three required the defendant to deliver up the original will of his late mother, Yvonne Golding, and associated documents relating to the estate.

[2]There are, in fact, two applications for contempt before the court. One was issued on 13 March 2026, and was intended to deal with failure to comply with the order of Master Brightwell. The second was issued on 13 July 2026, and was a kind of “sweeping up” operation. It also brought into play an alleged failure by the defendant to comply with the order of Marcus Smith J of 9 June.

[3]The evidence filed on behalf of the applicants is quite voluminous. But I can say here and now that the defendant has not filed any evidence in opposition. However, he did make a written response to the original Part 8 claim in the context of which these applications are made. I will come back to that. The applicants’ evidence in relation to the first contempt application was first of all set out in a witness statement of Timothy Burt. But then subsequently this was put into an affidavit dated 5 June 2026.

[4]In relation to the second contempt application, we have first of all an affidavit from Emily Day of 9 July, another affidavit from Timothy Burt dated 1 July, an affidavit from the process servers, Jane Gregory of 2 July, Michael Pettitt of 9 July and two from Philip Smith, both dated 2 July. Finally, there is a second affidavit from Emily Day, dated 17 July, concerning service of the various orders.

[5]The context is that a claim was made under CPR Part 8 in September 2024 for the removal of the defendant as the executor of his mother’s will. Details of the claim were given in that claim form. It was supported by witness statements of the first and second claimants made in August 2024. The defendant filed the acknowledgment of service form in October 2024, and provided a written response to the claim in December 2024.

[6]In that response, and indeed before me today, Mr Golding emphasised, as he put it, an agreement that he said he had made with his parents to buy a share, a one quarter share, in their home for £75,000. This was money needed by them to repay the interest-only mortgage which they had taken out when they had acquired it. needless to say, the will in question does not deal with this agreement, and neither would I have expected it to do so. It is a standalone transaction, and it is something of which Mr Golding will have to prove the existence if he is to succeed in keeping the one quarter share that he claims. But that is for another day. It is not a matter for me to deal with on this occasion.

[7]The matter came before Deputy Master Bowles in January 2025. I think originally it was to be a directions hearing. But Deputy Master Bowles decided that there was no need to have directions because the evidence was complete, and so he simply went ahead and effectively held a disposal hearing. He removed the defendant as the executor of his mother’s estate, and substituted his siblings. He also made the order which is in question today. That is that the defendant should within seven days deliver up the original will of the testatrix to the claimants’ solicitors and within 28 days should send all other documents concerning the testatrix’s estate to those solicitors.

[8]This order was not complied with. Mr Golding has told me today that he did not comply with it, firstly because he was concerned about what he called the “cognitive state” of Master Bowles, and also because he was preparing an appeal against Master Bowles’ decision. However, that appeal went nowhere, because Michael Green J subsequently made an “unless” order, requiring the defendant to prepare a bundle or lodge a bundle by a certain date. But this did not happen, and the consequence was that the appeal was struck out. As I have told Mr Golding sitting here today, I cannot go behind that. So far as I am concerned today, therefore, the order of Master Bowles remains valid and effective.

[9]Next, there was an order made on the papers by Master Brightwell in September 2025. This did not involve a hearing. However, it did involve notice being given in the terms of the order that, because it had been made without a hearing, it was open to any party affected by it to apply to set it aside. That order contained an order for the defendant effectively to deliver up both the original will and any other documents concerning the testatrix’s estate to the claimants’ solicitors in much the same form as the order of Deputy Master Bowles. That order, unlike the order of Deputy Master Bowles, had a penal notice attached. It was also not complied with.

[10]Subsequent to that, on 13 March this year the first contempt application was issued by the claimants. This was based on the alleged breaches of the Bowles and Brightwell orders by the defendant.

[11]The contempt application came before Marcus Smith J on 9 June 2026. He first of all dealt with the question of the delivery up of the will and other documents. He ordered the defendant by 7 July to deliver up the original will and any other documents concerning the testatrix’s estate to the claimants’ solicitors. That order too had a penal notice attached. He also listed a further hearing of the contempt application for 27 July, that is to say today. Originally it was intended to be heard before him, in fact it is now before me. Thirdly, Marcus Smith J gave permission to the claimants to serve the defendant not only with his order and future documents, but also to re-serve the order of Master Brightwell, by alternative means of service, that is by email, by first class post and by putting through the letterbox at his home address. Once again, the defendant did not comply with the orders.

[12]On 13 July, the claimants issued the second contempt application based primarily on the order of Marcus Smith J, but also on the orders of Deputy Master Bowles and Master Brightwell.

[13]The first thing that I bear in mind in dealing with this application is that it is an application to commit a person for contempt of court. It is therefore one on which I must be satisfied of the relevant elements to the criminal standard of proof, and not the civil standard. What must be established to the criminal standard, and this is laid down in a number of cases, is: first of all, that the defendant knew of the terms of the order; secondly, that the defendant acted or failed to act in a manner which involved a breach of the order; and, thirdly, that the defendant knew of the facts which made his conduct a breach.

[14]As I say, there are a number of cases on this in the books. They were recently discussed by Miles J in a case called Business Mortgage Finance 4 Plc v Hussain

[2022] EWHC 449 (Ch)

at [39], whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in

[2023] 1 WLR 396

at [96]. Each of the three elements to which I have referred needs to be proved to the criminal standard. This does not mean that every fact, or piece of evidence itself must be proved to the criminal standard.

[15]I bear in mind also that the defendant has a right to silence. He is not required to incriminate himself, and there must, of course, be a high level or high standard of procedural fairness. In that regard, I bear in mind that the defendant is a litigant in person. He is not a trained lawyer, although he is able to express his thoughts and put across his ideas. I do not expect the same precision from the defendant as I would expect from a trained lawyer, but, as I think I mentioned during the hearing, our law gives no special dispensation from procedural or substantive rules to litigants in person, except in very limited circumstances. That was laid down relatively recently by the Supreme Court in a case called Barton v Wright Hassall LLP

[2018] 1 WLR 1119

[16]So I turn to consider the first of the three elements, the defendant’s knowledge of the terms of the order. First of all, the defendant was actually in court with Deputy Master Bowles when he made his order on 29 January 2025 to deliver up the original will and the other relevant documents.

[17]There was an order in the same terms made by Master Brightwell on the papers on 10 September 2025. Of course, there was no court hearing and the defendant could not, therefore, be in court. But that order, with a penal notice endorsed, was served by first class post on 3 February 2026 (sic). Now, that was not in accordance with the rules because, generally speaking, unless the court has made an order providing for alternative means of service, documents concerned with contempt of court matters must be personally served. However, as I say, there is evidence that that was, in fact, sent to the address of the defendant.

[18]Then, thirdly, the same order was made again by Marcus Smith J on 9 June 2026. Again, the defendant was not in court, but there was a penal notice endorsed on the order. The second affidavit of Emily Day dated 17 June 2026 gives the clear evidence that this order was served by the alternative means permitted by the order of Marcus Smith J. So on that basis, I am entirely satisfied that the defendant had knowledge of the terms of the order.

[19]The second element of which I have to be satisfied to the criminal standard is that there was a failure to act which constituted a breach of the orders. Each of the orders was quite clear the defendant was to deliver up the original will and other documents connected with the deceased’s estate. It is clear that none of those documents has been delivered up. There has been, in effect, no attempt to comply by the defendant.

[20]It may be that the defendant thought that his negotiating power would be stronger for his claim to have a one quarter share of the property from the lifetime transaction if he refused to co-operate with the orders of the court. That may or may not be true, I do not know. But all I can say is that I am satisfied that there was a complete failure by the defendant to comply with the orders, and that that constituted a breach of them.

[21]I may say that there is one part of the order of Marcus Smith J with which the defendant has complied to and that is to his credit. He was ordered to come to court today, and he has come to court today.

[22]The third matter of which I must be satisfied is that the defendant knows of the facts which amount to the breach of the orders. The defendant knows that he has not provided the documents required by those orders. So I am satisfied to the criminal standard of each of the three elements of the contempt of court alleged against him. That concludes my judgment on the question of liability. The next question which I will discuss with the parties is the question of sentencing. (Hearing continues)

[23]I now have to consider what sentence to pass in respect of the contempt of court of which I have found the defendant guilty. As Mr Cumber, on behalf of the claimants, has said, rule 81.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides for various powers of sentence of the court in these circumstances. The court can pass a sentence of imprisonment with a maximum of two years, the court can impose an unlimited fine, and the court can make an order confiscating assets. There are other orders that the court may make, too. If a sentence of imprisonment is passed, the court can suspend it so that it does not come into operation unless a condition is breached, for example, or some further contempt is committed.

[24]Generally speaking, in assessing the sentence the court must consider the possible purposes of the sentence. There are two main purposes. One is the punishment of the contemnor, the defendant in this case. This not only punishes for a wrong done, but also has the deterrent effect of making others think twice before behaving in the same way. Not to punish in such circumstances would act as an incentive to others to behave in a similar way, because they would think that nothing was done to the earlier contemnor, so that nothing should happen to them.

[25]Secondly, there can be an incentive given in the sentence for compliance, so for example, the order might be suspended or made subject to a condition or something like that. In Lightfoot v Lightfoot

[1989] 1 FLR 414

,which was a freezing order case (and they are at the serious end of the spectrum), Lord Donaldson MR set out a summary of the relevant principles. But those principles are, as I say, given in the context of a breach of the disclosure requirements of a freezing order and so are not necessarily in point in relation to the present case. I was also referred to the decision of Jackson LJ in JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko

[2011] EWCA Civ 1241

[26]Generally speaking, in considering a sentence for contempt the court has regard to the Sentencing Council guidelines, as set out in the case of Attorney General v Crosland

[2021] 4 WLR 103

at [44]. That requires the court to look at two matters in particular. The first is the culpability of the defendant in doing the wrong done, and the second is the harm caused by the wrong done.

[27]Here, there is significant culpability. There have been deliberate, repeated refusals to comply with very simple obligations, to hand over a will and some other documents. There has been no compliance, and this is clearly at the worst end of the spectrum. So far as the level of harm caused is concerned, this is not, I think, the most serious harm caused. But it is still significant, because a refusal to comply with orders of the court strikes at the administration of justice in this country. In its own small way, it is an attack on the rule of law.

[28]So, what I must do, I think, is begin with focusing on what I might call a provisional sentence, a starting point, so to speak, bearing in mind the degree of culpability and the level of harm caused. I bear in mind also that there is, if it is a case of imprisonment, a statutory maximum of two years. Cases of failing, blatantly failing, to comply with court orders are generally regarded as deserving of a custodial sentence. Taking into account the seriousness of the culpability and the significant harm, I would expect a provisional sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment.

[29]Are there any aggravating factors? Well, this is not a case where there was only one order. There were, in fact, three of them one after another so that the defendant had three opportunities to comply with the order. He did not comply with any of them. No sufficiently good reason has been put forward for non-compliance. There certainly were no excuses in law.

[30]Are there any mitigating factors? The defendant is a litigant in person, but I cannot regard that as a mitigating factor. The defendant tells me he is aged 70, but age in itself is not a mitigating factor. He evidently suffers from serious hearing loss, but neither is that a mitigating factor. He is also, he tells me, very concerned that his sisters are trying to defraud him and, in particular, to prevent him taking the one quarter share which he says he purchased. That is something which may explain his refusal to comply with the orders of the court. But it does not in any way mitigate the seriousness of what he has done in refusing to obey the order of the court.

[31]I ask myself next whether a custodial sentence is necessary in this case, or whether it would be possible to punish this by way of a fine or a community sentence. In my judgment, this is a case where a custodial sentence is necessary, because of the attack on the rule of law and the administration of justice. So, I must consider, in the light of the aggravating factors, and the lack of mitigating factors, what is the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. In my judgment, it is seven months.

[32]The next question is whether I should suspend the custodial sentence. The important thing here, I think, is that in a case of this kind of civil contempt where the will and other documents need to be lodged with the court or, at any rate, with the applicants for probate, the important thing is to persuade the defendant to comply with that order. I do not think, therefore, that merely suspending a custodial sentence is likely to assist. What I do think is possibly more likely to assist in achieving the object is to make the sentence conditional.

[33]What I will therefore do is this. I will sentence the defendant to seven months’ imprisonment, unless by 4pm this Friday he delivers up the documents referred to in the order of Marcus Smith J, that is to say the original of the will of his late mother, and the other documents concerning the estate of his late mother which he has in his possession. That is the sentence of the court.

[34]I have to tell you, Mr Golding, that you have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. You do not need permission in order to do so, because this is a sentence passed for contempt of court. But it is up to you, if you wish to avail yourself of that, to make the necessary arrangements. As I say, at the moment you have until Friday at 4pm to do what has been ordered, otherwise a warrant will be issued for your attest. You will be picked up by the police, and you will be taken to prison to serve your sentence. Is there anything else, Mr Cumber? (Hearing continues)

[35]I am asked to make an order that the defendant pays the costs of both of the contempt applications, on the indemnity basis. to be summarily assessed by me, together with an order that any costs which are not paid by the defendant should be charged on his share of the estate of his late mother. Mr Golding says to me that such a costs order is not justified. In particular, he refers to the fact that he, on his case, paid £75,000 to enable the discharge of the mortgage on the property owned by his parents in return for a one quarter share of the property. He also tells me that he has spent more than £300,000 over the final years of his parents’ lives in order to support them, but in neither case did his sisters contribute to that. So he considers it unfair if he has to pay the costs.

[36]The rules on costs are very clear; they are well known. Costs are in the discretion of the court, but if the court decides to make an order, then the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will pay the costs of the successful party. In other words the loser pays the winner’s costs, but the court may make a different order. The court will take into account all the circumstances of the case, and may make any of a range of orders.

[37]In the present case, I am quite satisfied that I ought to make an order relating to costs. Litigation is expensive, and, where litigants are forced to come to law in order to vindicate their rights, then it is usually the case that a costs order ought to be made. In the present case, the successful party is the claimants’ side, and the unsuccessful is the defendant. So, the operation of the general rule would lead me to order the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs of both of the applications.

[38]Is there any good reason, or any reason at all, for me to make a different order? I do not think that the matters to which Mr Golding refers, even assuming that they are proved to be true, and I am not, of course, deciding those matters now. They will have to be dealt with on another occasion in other litigation, because they are no part of this litigation. This litigation is quite self-contained. If Mr Golding wishes to prove his one quarter interest in the property by reference to a contract of sale of that one quarter in return for £75,000, then he will have to do so in suitable proceedings for that purpose. The fact that he has spent a large amount of his money, if that is so, on his parents during their last years and his sisters contributed nothing, if that is so, does not change matters for the purposes of the costs order in this case.

[39]So, in my judgment, the general rule should apply and the defendant must pay the costs of the claimants of both of the applications. As for the basis of assessment, the normal way of looking at the basis of the assessment of costs, is to ask whether the conduct of the paying party was “out of the norm”. In my judgment, in this case it was. The absolute refusal of the defendant to comply with the orders of the court, on no fewer than three occasions, amply justifies the view that this is a case where costs should be awarded on the indemnity basis.

[40]Since the hearing before me has lasted less than a day and the earlier hearing before Marcus Smith J was a short one, I think it is sensible, and saves costs and time and avoids further delay, if I summarily assess those costs now. In addition, given the attitude which the defendant has displayed towards his sisters, I will assume that it is unlikely that any order for costs will be paid by the defendant. Therefore, I will order that any costs ordered to be paid which are not paid by the defendant should be charged on his share of the estate. So I will now turn to the question of summary assessment. (Hearing continues)

[41]Mr Cumber has pointed out to me that my judgment on costs referred to the two contempt applications and did not refer in terms to the application for a copy will to be approved in the absence of the original will. That was an oversight on my part. I did intend to deal with that. There is no reason for distinguishing between the successful applications in contempt and the successful application in relation to the copy will. In my judgment, the costs which I have ordered should apply just as much to the latter application as to the former. (Hearing continues) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com