Espire Infolabs Limited v Amit Mohan Sharma [2026] EWHC 2061 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 2061 (Ch)Case No IL-2025-000193IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECHANCERY DIVISIONBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ChDVenue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 04/08/2026
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE JARMAN KCSitting as a judge of the High Court
Between
ESPIRE INFOLABS LIMITEDClaimantAMIT MOHAN SHARMADefendant
Mr Michael Hicks (instructed by Pennington Manches Cooper LLP) for ClaimantThe Defendant represented himself and appeared by video linkHearing Hearing dates: 21 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 4 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................HIS HONOUR JUDGE JARMAN KC

HHJ JARMAN KC:

[1]The Claimant applies for summary judgment on its claim against the Defendant, or alternatively that his defence and counterclaim be stuck out. The claim is for breach of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties on 4 July 2025 by the misuse of confidential information. Interim injunctions were obtained in November 2025. The Claimant now seeks a continuation of those injunctions, repayment of sum which it has paid under the agreement, and permission to apply for assessment of damages if so advised.[2]The background, which is largely undisputed, can be shortly stated. The Claimant provides IT services, and one of its customers is a private members club in London. In May 2025 the Claimant employed the Defendant as a project manager on 6 month probationary period and seconded him to undertake project work at the club, which included access to personal data of members including addresses, bank and payment card details. On 30 June 2025 the Claimant told the Defendant that this secondment would end on 18 July 2025. Shortly after being so informed, the Defendant responded that he had copied the personal data of some 55,000 members of the club, which he said he would reveal unless he was paid £150,000.[3]As a result, the parties negotiated and entered into the settlement agreement, under which the Claimant (referred to as the employer) agreed to pay the Defendant £15,000 on signing and £35,000 within 7 days (this total is referred to as the termination payment) and £1,000 for legal advice if he required it.[4]The taxation of the termination payment was expressly provided in clause 4 as follows:
“4.1 The parties agree that the Termination Payment is not a contractual payment. The parties believe that £30,000 of the Termination Payment can be paid without deductions for tax and national insurance contributions as it is within the £30,000 threshold within the meaning of sections 402A(1) and 403 of ITEPA. The remainder will be subject to income tax and national insurance contributions. 4.2 The Employer makes no warranty as to the taxable status of the Termination Payment and you shall be wholly responsible for any income tax and/or any employee national insurance contributions arising in respect of the Termination Payment…”
[5]Clause 5.4 provides:
“In the event that you breach any term of this Agreement including but not limited to the delivery up obligations at clause 6, the confidentiality obligations at clause 8 … you agree to indemnify and keep indemnified the Employer … for any losses suffered by the Employer and/or its … customers …. (including legal and professional fees) and … the Termination Payment or any part of it (save for statutory entitlement to notice or redundancy pay) shall become immediately repayable to the Employer as a debt.”
[6]In return, the Defendant by clause 6.1 agreed, in relation to confidential information as therein defined, to return and delete the same, not to make copies, and to cooperate with inspection of his devices.[7]The Defendant agreed by clause 8.3 not to make anyderogatorystatements or publish confidential information about matters concerning the Claimant. By clause 8.5 each party agreed not to make media statements about one another or about the termination of their relationship. The Defendant agreed by clause 8.6 not to disclose or use any confidential information belonging to the Claimant and by 8.7 not contact any of the Claimant’s employees, customers or clients at any time.[8]On the same day that the agreement was signed, the Claimant paid £15,000 to the Defendant, who then returned its laptop and confirmed by email that any data belonging to the Claimant or its client had been completely deleted. His personal devises were examined by an expert instructed by the Claimant who ensured that such data had been deleted.[9]About a week later the Claimant paid £27,000, which completed the termination payment but subject to a deduction of emergency tax. Up until this time, the outcome for the parties looked promising. However, the Defendant disputed the deduction of tax. On the 21 July 2025 he sent emails to the club threatening to release its confidential information and also emailed some club members. In an effort to appease him, the Claimant paid him the deducted tax of £6916. This initially appeared to have the desired effect, as the Defendant emailed the next day to say the matter was closed and that no-one would hear from him.[10]That position was short-lived. From 25 to 31 July, he sent numerous emails to the club, its members, the Claimant and the press. On 26 July in an email to the club and to the Claimant’s solicitor he included this:
“My commitment and confirmation with a proper settlement that ensures I am satisfied with the 1st offer you make not that I am forced to accept in parts, reduced payments, leaving my to take actions that I am taking now. They tried to be clever and breached their own agreement with delay in payment. Eventually, the impact is pretty bad on both ends. I don't want to happen, anything bad for us both… For settlement, I leave it to you how much you value your each client for (£100, 200, 500) I've 55000 out of 208k+ that is 25% of your clientele! I am looking for no less than seven figures settlement. And I'd appreciate the draft number soon please, over the weekend and settlement on Monday. Also, an apology for treating me like garbage while in employment of [the club].”
[11]The solicitor replied that he had no instructions to make an offer but asked for evidence of what information he had on the clubs’ members. In reply the Defendant sent screenshots of payments and a list of addresses of members of the club, saying there was a lot more where those came from.[12]The Claimant relies on three of the emails from the Defendant as example of his activity during this period, each of which he copied to the club and the Claimant’s solicitor.[13]On 28 July he wrote to two members. One email included the following, and the other was in similar language:
“I suggest to take this public asap, your address and other sensitive details are leaked and [the club] is trying to cover this... You’re going to be listed as a rich person in your neighbourhood for all kind of people.. Your personal safety, security and of family has been breached [the club]... See attached, [the club] leaked this ..”
See attached, [the club] leaked this ..”[14]On 31 Julyhe emailed some media organisations and began with “Dear Media people.” He listed high profile members, stating “[The club], in their employment, gave me unsolicited access to very high profile and elite clients, across the globe, list of some clients, below.” He said that he was treated like garbage and asked for help, adding that he could provide “every evidence.”[15]On 7 August the club reported the Defendant to the police and the following evening he was arrested and detained overnight. His personal electronic devices were seized. On the 11 August he emailed the Claimant’s solicitor and the club saying he had deleted all data.[16]The Defendant does not dispute that he sent the emails referred to above. After his arrest matters went quiet for a while, but in October the Claimant decided it needed ongoing protection because of what it saw as his broken promises as outlined above. On 9th of that month a claim form was issued, and draft particulars of claim were sent to the Defendant with a without prejudice letter in the hope that the matter could be dealt with by consent. Negotiations continued but without resolution. Some three weeks later, further emails were sent. Several were from an email address with the name “fromsoho,” which the Defendant accepts he used, to IT companies saying that very soon they and other leaders would be shown how “your leading peer has managed to resolve a serious data breach conflict for one of their prestigious clients.”[17]On 3 November and the following two days he sent text messages to the Claimant’s solicitor, the first of which included this: “I am not breaching any agreement. As mentioned, we’re all in this together. Your client is a much criminal as I am in this, and you know that. I am now sincerely looking for a resolution only. I have learned my lesson. I need the police case dropped with no further action and provide me with 310k (265 + 45k income tax penalty). Not asking for any other delusional compensation or in 7 figures but my own savings that I cannot get or afraid to get from India”.[18]The next message referred to the Claimant’s financial forecasts, and said that tomorrow, when clients and competitors get to know even minor details “of what has happened, I think [the Claimant] will need to revise their forecast!” The third stated that its client list was not public but that he had it.[19]On 6 November, from an email address he had used before, he informed the Claimant “I am waiting to move forward on basis of mutual agreement. I do not wish to highlight to 200+ past or existing clients, competitors anything that must not be.”[20]On 12 November injunctions were granted on a without notice application by the Claimant preventing breaches of the agreement and this was renewed on a inter parties basis some two weeks later.[21]Mr Hicks, for the Claimant, submits in support of the summary judgment application, that there are clear documented breaches of the agreement by the Defendant as shown in the emails and text messages set out above and summarised below. i) Retaining and failing to delete details of the club’s members and the Claimant’s other clients contrary to clause 6.1; ii) Emailing news organisations with derogatory statements on the club in breach of clause 8.5; iii) Threatening to use personal data of the club’s members contrary to clause 8.6; iv) Contacting customers or clients of the Claimant in breach of clause 8.7.[22]He submits that as a result of the clear breaches the Defendant is liable to repay £50,000 to the Claimant as a debt and to indemnify it under clause 5.4. Further the injunctive relief granted should be continued. He submits that the test for summary judgment is clearly made out, and if so, there is no need for him to rely on the alternative of strike out.[23]These are set out in CPR 24.3. The court may grant summary judgment on a claim or a counterclaim or both if— “(a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial”.[24]These principles were considered by Lewison J (as he then was) in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) and approved by the Court of appeal in AC Ward & Sons v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098 at [24].[25]It is clear from the Defendant’s defence, his witness statement in response to this application, and his oral submissions to me on the application, that he does not dispute entering into the agreement or sending the emails or texts summarised above. He told me that he disputes sending some emails from August onwards, although it was not entirely clear which ones. However, as Mr Hicks submits, it is abundantly clear from the content of the emails and texts relied upon by the Claimant in this application, that they form a consistent flow with details that hang together.[26]Rather the defence focuses on the lack of ongoing risk and procedural matters which do not go to whether breaches have been made out. The counterclaim pleads as follows. “16. The Counterclaim arises out of the Claimant’s conduct before, during, and after termination of the Defendant’s employment and the manner in which proceedings have been pursued thereafter. 16A. The Counterclaim is advanced in tort and/or breach of statutory and common law duties including:a. Negligence and/or breach of duty of care in the handling of confidential information and employee data;b. Abuse of process arising from unreasonable and oppressive litigation conduct;c. Harassment and/or oppressive conduct causing psychiatric injury;d. Breach of implied contractual duties and/or wrongful conduct arising out of the Defendant’s employment and termination.”[27]The counterclaim continues:
“17. The Claimant’s actions have caused the Defendant significant financial loss, reputational damage, and psychiatric harm. Once the Defendant’s affidavit evidence was served, the proper procedural course was an application for directions under CPR 32. The Claimant has chosen not to pursue that route. 18. The Claimant pursued urgent civil relief while knowing: a. The Defendant’s devices were in police custody. b. The Defendant had sworn non-possession. c. The Defendant was medically vulnerable as evidenced by contemporaneous medical records. 19. The Claimant’s conduct amounts to an abuse of process within CPR 3.4(2)(b), consisting of repeated extra-procedural demands following sworn compliance, rather than pursuing clarification or relief through the Court. Such conduct improperly shifts the burden onto a litigant in person, circumvents judicial supervision, and undermines the finality of sworn evidence.”
[28]In his oral submissions before me, the Defendant submitted that the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement are disputed. He suffered bullying and harassment throughout his employment, and the fact that the Claimant agreed to pay such a large sum of money supports that. Reasons why the agreement was entered into can only be dealt with at trial and not by a mini trial on such an application. Moreover, after the agreement, the harassment continued, and the Defendant lists the numerous contacts and attempted contacts by the Claimant and its solicitor, sometimes many times a day. He said that he had to block his phone. He does not have all the evidence because of the police seizure and that is another reason why a trial is necessary. Further, there is an ongoing dispute over the Claimant’s performance of the agreement.[29]Mr Hicks’ response to that is that what happened before the agreement is irrelevant. The whole point of the agreement, as its name suggest, was to resolve disputes between the parties. The unarticulated noncompliance by the Claimant with the agreement is not pleaded and cannot relieve the Defendant of his obligations thereunder. The agreement clearly set out that the Claimant made no warranty about the taxation of the termination payment, but the deducted tax was paid without obligation to attempt to bring an end to the matter. The medical records of the Defendant show anxiety and depression in August and in December, but there is no suggestion that the Defendant was unfit to enter the agreement or was unduly pressurised into doing so.[30]I accept Mr Hicks’ submissions. I cannot see, even with proper amendment, that the defence or counterclaim has a real prospect of success or that there is some other compelling reason for a trial. The agreement was a detailed agreement arrived at between the parties in the context of issues between them as to the termination of their employment relationship and in providing detailed provisions to govern future conduct. What the Defendant was required to do and not to do was clearly set out. The position in relation to the taxation of the termination payment was clearly set out and plainly support the Claimant’s stance on such taxation. The Defendant does not go so far as to say that the agreement does not bind him, nor is there any justification for any such conclusion. The emails and texts relied upon by the Claimant show clear breaches on that part of the Defendant, and a clear basis for the repayment of the termination payment.[31]Insofar as the counterclaim relies on causes of action before the agreement was signed, in my judgment it is doomed to fail. Insofar as it alleges abuses of process or harassment of an ongoing nature, there is no evidential basis for it. It was clearly reasonable, in light of the emails and texts which the Defendant was sending and his demands for further money, for the Claimant to contact him and to attempt to do so with a view to putting an end to such clear breaches of the agreement. The Claimant at times accepted his assurance that all relevant data had been deleted, only to find that he was then still using customer and client data. He repeated this after his arrest, and matters did go quiet for a time. However, after the decision to commence proceedings, which was clearly reasonable in my judgment, the Defendant resumed his demands for money and threats to misuse confidential information, this time focused on other clients and competitors of the Claimant.[32]Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Claimant is entitled to summary judgment for the repayment of the termination payment and continuing injunctive relief. Mr Hicks initially asked for this to be permanent, as the agreement’s provisions are permanent. However, in my judgment the grant of a permanent injunction requires clear justification and here a cooling off period is more proportionate. Mr Hicks suggested a period of four years with a provision that the Defendant could apply to discharge and I accept that.[33]There was discussion about other clauses in the Claimant’s draft order included in the bundle. The Defendant was concerned that some of the noncontact provisions may prevent him seeking other employment and Mr Hicks agreed to insert an exception allowing him to do that. The Defendant also took exception to requirements for him to file further affidavits as he has already done so pursuant to the November orders. Issues remain about whether that was in full compliance with the order, but Mr Hicks clarified that what the Claimant really needs to know now is how the Defendant retained customer data of the club and client and competitor data of the Claimant. He agreed to restrict the required affidavit to these specifics. The Claimant wishes to reserve the right to seek an inquiry into damages, and the revised draft order should require that any such application should be made within a modest timeframe.[34]I am grateful to Mr Hicks and to the Defendant for their focussed assistance. It was agreed that a draft minute of order agreed as far as possible should be filed within 14 days of hand down of this judgment, together with written submissions on any matters which cannot be agreed, which will then be dealt with on the basis of such submissions.