Uniper UK Limited v Joshua Barter & Ors [2026] EWHC 2044 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 2044 (Ch)

Case No PT-2025-000739

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

PROPERTY TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)

Venue Rolls Building, Fetter Lane

London, EC4A 1NL

Date 23 July 2026

Before

MRS JUSTICE BACON

Between

UNIPER UK LIMITEDClaimant

JOSHUA BARTERDefendant

SAM WILLIAMSDefendant

IAN JOHNSONDefendant

LUKE BADHAREEDefendant

PERSONS UNKNOWN WHO ENTER OR REMAIN UPON ANYDefendant

PART OF THE LAND AT THE RATCLIFFE-ON-SOAR POWERDefendant

STATION (AS DEFINED IN THE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM)Defendant

WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE CLAIMANTDefendant

ADAM ROSENTHAL KC (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer LLP) for Claimant

for The Defendants did not attend and were not represented

APPROVED JUDGMENT

[1]This is the hearing of the claimant’s application dated 30 June for the renewal of an interim injunction granted by Mellor J on 30 July 2025. The injunction was granted to restrain acts of trespass and nuisance on the site of a former coal-fired power station at Ratcliffe-on-Soar by two groups of trespassers who in broad terms are, firstly, named defendants as well as persons unknown who have entered the land for the purpose of what is referred to as urban exploration and, secondly, travellers who are also in the category of persons unknown, who have previously entered the land for the purpose of setting up encampments.

[2]Mellor J reviewed the evidence before him as to the trespass on the land by both the individual defendants and others whose identities are unknown, and reviewed the evidence of specific incursions on the land which caused a substantial amount of loss and damage to the site. He considered that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favour of granting an order in the terms that he did for a period of 12 months. That order gave the claimant permission to apply to extend or vary the order, which it is now doing. The claimant is seeking to extend the order for a period of 24 months, on the basis that the risk of damage to the site and risk of more general trespass on the site has not changed.

[3]The main authority relied on by the claimant in support of the renewal of the injunction is the judgment of Ritchie J in HS2 v Persons Unknown

[2024] EWHC 1277 (KB)

. At §32 he said that the relevant question was: “… to determine, on the evidence, whether anything material has changed. If nothing material has changed, if the risk still exists as before and the claimant remains rightly and justifiably fearful of unlawful attacks, the extension may be granted so long as procedural and legal rigour has been observed and fulfilled”.

[4]Starting with the procedural matters, Mellor J permitted substituted service of the order of last year in various ways including by sending Facebook messages to three of the four named defendants, sending an electronic copy of the documents by email to a person connected with the second named defendant, uploading a copy of the documents to the claimant’s website and attaching relevant notices to the locations marked on the map at Schedule 2 to the order of Mellor J. I have before me evidence from Mr Graeme Robertson, the solicitor in the firm of Herbert Smith with conduct of the matter, who provided evidence that the order was indeed served in the way required by the order of Mellor J. The evidence of Mr Robertson also explains and provides evidence of service of the present application using the same means – in particular, service of the application on the named defendants by the same means and also by posting the application on the claimant’s relevant website, as well as attaching notices physically at various locations on the relevant land.

[5]The next thing to consider is whether anything material has changed since the order was made. In that respect again, the claimant relies on witness statements from Mr Robertson, as well as John Deakin, who is the site stewardship team leader employed by the claimant with responsibility for the site. It appears that there have been no recorded incidents of trespass by either traveller incursion or by urban explorers since the order of Mellor J. That does not mean that the risk of incursion and/or damage to the site has now diminished. Rather, the claimant invites the court to draw the inference that the injunction is serving its purpose and has deterred unauthorised entry to the site. I accept that that is an appropriate inference to draw, given the evidence of the continued risks to this sort of site and indeed this specific site.

[6]In that regard, in relation to urban explorers, there is evidence that the urban explorer community remains interested in the site. The evidence of Mr Robertson records three incidents between August and October 2025 where individuals were observed by the claimant’s security or CCTV near the entrance to the site. The evidence of Mr Robertson also indicates that all of the named defendants are still urban explorers who retain an interest in accessing sites of this sort. Indeed, the fourth named defendant has in an exchange of emails with the claimant’s solicitors expressly sought permission to access the site for particular purposes. Mr Robertson also refers to a Facebook group called Abandoned UK, which shows an ongoing interest by the urban explorer community in disused power stations generally and in this power station site specifically, as evidenced by a June 2026 post of a picture of the site.

[7]In relation to travellers and other persons unknown, while there is no specific evidence of ongoing interest in this site, that of course does not mean that the risk of entry by travellers and other persons unknown should be discounted. The evidence before Mellor J was that the travellers who were present on the site were seeking to and did remove copper and various other materials from the site. Mr Robertson refers to recent evidence of further unknown persons removing copper from a site very near to the power station site. He also notes that the claimant suffered a break-in in April 2026 at a construction site for a project located approximately 70 miles from the power station site, which involved theft of copper and damage to the site. On that basis, the claimant says that there is an ongoing risk of persons unknown as described in the order entering the site in order to steal copper and other materials from the site, justifying the maintenance of that part of the order.

[8]The evidence before me, I am satisfied, shows that the risks found by Mellor J to exist justifying the grant of the interim injunction remain, even though there is no evidence of attempted entry by persons unknown since the order was made. In addition to the evidence regarding the continued interest of urban explorers in this kind of site, it appears from the evidence that this type of site continues to be susceptible to unauthorised entry for the purposes of theft of copper and other materials. I am therefore satisfied that there is an ongoing concern justifying the maintenance of the order of Mellor J, and indicating that the considerations that applied at the time that his order was granted continue to apply now.

[9]The final question is the period for which the order should be granted. As I have noted, the claimant seeks the continuation of the order for a period of 24 months. The background to that is that the decommissioning process of the power station is ongoing. Planning permission has been obtained for its demolition, and demolition is expected to begin next year, continuing until around 2029/2030. The claimant will therefore be concerned to exclude trespassers from the site for at least the next three or four years.

[10]Mr Rosenthal has drawn my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers

[2023] UKSC 47

, §225, which indicates, in the circumstances of that case, that the period for an injunction should be strictly and proportionately time limited: “We have considerable doubt as to whether it could ever be justifiable to grant a Gypsy or Traveller injunction which is directed to persons unknown, including newcomers, and extends over the whole of a borough or for significantly more than a year. It is to be remembered that this is an exceptional remedy, and it must be a proportionate response to the unlawful activity to which it is directed. Further, we consider that an injunction which extends borough-wide is likely to leave the Gypsy and Traveller communities with little or no room for manoeuvre … injunctions of this kind must be reviewed periodically … and in our view ought to come to an end (subject to any order of the judge), by effluxion of time in all cases after no more than a year unless an application is made for their renewal”.

[11]As Mr Rosenthal said, the express context of that conclusion was that this was a borough-wide injunction by a local authority against the gypsy and traveller communities. As Sweeting J noted in 1 Leadenhall GP Limited v Persons Unknown

[2024] EWHC 854 (KB)

, §10, where gypsy and traveller injunctions were sought by local authorities, there were particular reasons for limiting the injunctions to a period of a year. He did not, however, consider that the Supreme Court was intending to lay down any wider temporal limit for other cases.

[12]I agree. I do not consider that the Supreme Court’s comments in the Wolverhampton case should be regarded as setting a maximum time limit for interim injunctions granted against persons unknown in quite different contexts. In the present case, a private landowner is seeking an injunction to restrain trespass on its land, while the site in question is in the process of decommissioning, with demolition works due to start imminently, with the consequence that the site is particularly dangerous for trespassers (as Mellor J noted in his judgment). In a case such as this, the policy considerations are quite different to those with which the Supreme Court was concerned in the Wolverhampton case.

[13]In circumstances where, as I have been told, the demolition is likely to be ongoing for a number of years, it seems appropriate to extend the order for the period of two years sought. On the evidence before the court, it seems likely that, at the expiry of that period, a further order will need to be sought to preserve the situation until the end of the decommissioning and demolition work on the site. I do not, however, need to consider that further at this stage; it is sufficient to say that I consider two years to be an appropriate period for the order to be granted now.

[14]I will therefore make the order in the terms sought. ---------------