Importers Service Corporation & Anor v Mario Aliotta & Ors [2026] EWHC 1969 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1969 (Ch)Case No BL-2024-001799
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (Ch D)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 29 July 2026
Before
MR SIMON GLEESON
Between
(1) Importers Service CorporationClaimants(2) ISC Europe LimitedClaimant(1) Mr Mario AliottaDefendants(2) Aliotta Holdings LimitedDefendant(3) Mrs Collins Macleod AliottaDefendant(4) Mr Thomas Colin SleaterDefendant(5) Mr Trevor John WhiteheadDefendant(6) Oakwood Property Solutions LimitedDefendant
Peter Head (instructed by Simkins LLP) for ClaimantsMr Aliotta (in person) for in personMrs Aliotta (in person) for in personRachel Sleeman (instructed by LFC Law) for Fourth to Sixth DefendantsHearing Hearing date: 22 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 29 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR SIMON GLEESON

Mr. Simon Gleeson :

[1]This judgment addresses the consequential matters arising from the hand-down of my judgment of the substantial issues in this case on 9 March 2026 (the “Substantive Judgement”). I adopt in this judgment the defined terms set out in the Substantive Judgment, and references in square brackets are to paragraph numbers in that judgment unless otherwise stated.[2]The Substantive Judgment determines an application made under s.423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to reverse a number of transfers of assets made by AH to some of its co-defendants. These applications were ancillary to an action brought by ISC against Mr Aliotta for (inter alia) recovery of what were alleged to be secret profits made by him (the Main Action).[3]There are a number of substantive issues to be addressed. However, there is a significant preliminary issue, which arises in respect of Mr Aliotta’s participation in this hearing. 1. Mr Aliotta’s Standing[4]Mr Aliotta appeared in person at the main hearing, which took place between 23 and 29 January 2026. It was only discovered some time after that hearing that he was at the time of the hearing the subject of a bankruptcy petition filed by HMRC on 19 November 2025. As a result of this, shortly after the hearing, on 16 February 2026, he was declared bankrupt. The petition was therefore pending during the trial – a fact of which Mr Aliotta had failed to inform the court or the other parties. It would therefore have been theoretically possible for me to make an order staying the proceedings (see s. 285(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA”)). However, no such application was made, and in the context I would have refused any such application had one been made.[5]Because Mr Aliotta has now been declared bankrupt, the automatic stay created by s.285(3) IA is now in effect. This stay has two limbs – first, it prevents any creditor having any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt, and second, it prevents the commencement of any action or other proceedings against the bankrupt. The second of these is not relevant here, since both this action and the Main Action were commenced before the date of the bankruptcy. The first, however, needs to be considered.[6]The order applied for in this ancillary action is an order under s.423 that certain transfers of shares in the Company that Mr Aliotta caused AH to make prior to the bankruptcy be reversed. This is not an order made against Mr Aliotta – it is an order made against the recipients of the shares, and it compels them to return them to AH (which remains in the ownership of Mr Aliotta). It is not a remedy against the property of the bankrupt, since the essence of a s.423 order is that it relates to property which has been transferred to a third party. I therefore do not think that Mr Aliotta is restricted in his conduct of this action by s.285(3).[7]There is, however, one aspect of the matters with which this hearing is concerned which is affected by s.285(3), that being the decision as to costs. Any costs award in respect of Mr Aliotta’s conduct of these proceedings will inure to his bankrupt estate, and therefore, as set out in Heath v Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421, he has no standing to make submissions in respect of any such order, since from his perspective the matter is res inter alios acta.[8]At the start of this consequentials hearing Mr Aliotta also asked for permission to represent D2 and D3 – as he had in the main hearing. In that hearing I gave him permission to represent D2 (as its sole director) but declined to permit him to represent D3. I did however say to him that I would consider any representations which he had to make as regards the position of D3. In this hearing the position was different. Section 11(1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 makes it an offence for an undischarged bankrupt to act as a director of, or directly or indirectly to take part in or be concerned with the promotion, formation, or management of a company, save without leave of the court. Section 11(2) states that for these purposes “the court” is the court which adjudged an individual to be bankrupt. I was therefore unable to accede to Mr Aliotta’s request to make representations on behalf of D2. I was also not prepared to permit him to represent D3, but she provided written submissions in her own name for this hearing, and I do not consider that she suffered any detriment by reason of this ruling. 2. Costs[9]There is – unsurprisingly – considerable dispute as to the proper order for costs to be made in this matter. The Claimants say that they are the successful party, and that under CPR 44.2(2), “the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party…”. They also remind me of the line of authorities recently confirmed by Singh LJ in the Court of Appeal in Dr MN v NHS Foundation Trust L [2026] EWCA Civ 71 to the effect that “a party may be awarded its costs even where it has only succeeded on part of its claim” ([92] and [97]).[10]The problem with this argument – as the Defendants reasonably point out – is that the Claimants’ application was for orders reversing two sets of transactions. They succeeded in one application but failed in the other. The Defendants therefore say that they have failed in half their claim, and therefore cannot argue that they are entirely successful. Against this, the Claimants point out that the Defendants produced a number of arguments aimed at justifying the transactions, all of which I rejected. In effect I held that the 2025 Transactions were a collusive effort engaged in by Mr Aliotta and the Fourth to Sixth Defendants for the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of the Claimants. The only reason why the Claimants did not obtain the order which they sought was that I held that the 2025 Transactions should be viewed as comprising a single economic transaction, and that viewed in that way the amount received by D1 was not in fact an undervalue relative to what he had transferred. Given this, the Defendants success in showing that the second transaction was not in fact at an undervalue was for them no more than a tabula in naufragio, and the Claimants were entirely successful in substance in defeating the arguments put forward against them.[11]A second point made by the Claimants in respect of costs is that, in determining whether a costs order should be made in full, I should have regard to the conduct of the parties. The basis for this submission is CPR 44.2(4), “in deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court will have regard to all the circumstances, including:”(a) “the conduct of all the parties”;(b) “whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful”; and(c) “any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply.”[12]In other words, they say that conduct points go not merely to the basis of assessment but to the correct order for costs in principle. They point out that I made a finding of fraud against Mr Aliotta, Mr Sleater and Mr Whitehead in connection with the backdated board minutes, which had been created pursuant to a “collusive agreement to misrepresent the facts of a transaction” (at [29]). They also point out that this deceit was only uncovered by the Claimants shortly before trial, which suggests that it was the intention of the Defendants to give false evidence at the trial if the deceit had not been uncovered. They therefore argue that even if I were prepared in principle to make an issues-based or percentage-based costs order, applying some discount to their claimed costs, I should take the Defendants’ conduct into account in deciding whether or not to apply such an adjustment, and that that conduct militates against the application of any such discount. I agree with this point.[13]I therefore hold that that the Claimants were the successful party as regards the action as a whole, that they are entitled to their costs on that basis, and that no discount should be applied. This claim lies in principle against all Defendants. 3. Liability for Costs as Between Defendants[14]A separate issue is raised by the Defendants as to the relative liability between them for costs. There are two separate applications here – one by the Third Defendant, Mrs Aliotta, and the other by the Fourth to Sixth Defendants. Both of these applications start from the same point – that the persons concerned are in fact victims of Mr Aliotta’s wrongdoing, and should not be penalised in costs as a result of having been caught up in that wrongdoing.

The Fourth to Sixth Defendants’ Case

[15]These Defendants make a number of submissions. The first is that all of the Defendants in this case cannot and should not be treated as jointly and severally liable for the same costs because different costs have been incurred by the different Defendants, and the Claimants have incurred different costs in relation to those different Defendants. Thus, for example, it is suggested that the Fourth to Sixth Defendants should not be ordered to pay any costs in respect of correspondence with the solicitors for the First to Third Defendants, since the Fourth to Sixth Defendants were separately represented. Their position is that they should not be required to pay costs incurred by the Claimants which solely relate to parties other than themselves.[16]Second, the Fourth to Sixth Defendants agree that questions of conduct should be taken into account in determining who should pay what costs. My Substantive Judgment records that the Fourth to Sixth Defendants were “swindled” by Mr Aliotta in respect of the shareholders’ agreement and the original allocation of shares in the Company. Also, they submit that it is Mr Aliotta’s dispute with the Claimants which has dragged them into this claim, and that that should be taken into consideration when considering where the balance of any responsibility for payment of costs to the Claimants by the Defendants should lie.[17]Third, they say that there are certain identifiable costs which should be excluded in any event. These are the Claimants’ costs of introducing the January 2025 transactions, including their application to amend the Particulars of Claim to refer to these transactions, the costs of amending the pleadings to include the 2025 Transactions, and the costs of expert evidence (which was required when leave to amend to address the 2025 Transactions was given). The basis of this argument is that since the Claimants failed in their challenge to these transactions, the Fourth to Sixth Defendants should not be required to pay these costs.

The Third Defendant’s Case

[18]The Third Defendant’s position is that she is the successful party as regards the only issue which directly concerned her. She was brought into these proceedings for one purpose; that being to obtain an order that the 2025 Transactions be reversed and that she return or account for 64 shares in the Company. No such order was made. She therefore argues that she should not be liable for costs – indeed she suggests that she should recover her costs.

The Claimants’ Case

[19]The Claimants entirely reject these arguments. They say that in connection with party conduct, I should have regard to what Sales J said in 4Eng:
“At the other end of the spectrum, however, if the transferee has taken property knowing that it was transferred to him by the transferor for a relevant purpose, and has sought to further the fraudulent design by lying to the transferor's creditors to shield the property against their claims, the justice of the case will be very different. Then it may well be appropriate to make orders against the transferee to protect the creditors to the fullest extent…”
[20]As regards the Fourth to Sixth Defendants, the Claimants say that throughout this litigation they made common cause with Mr Aliotta, including advancing arguments in defence of the transactions that Mr Aliotta did not advance (for example the argument that Mr Aliotta cannot have been intending to harm ISC because he had not been dissipating his assets more generally). Mr Head, for the Claimants, points out that it would have been perfectly possible for the Fourth to Sixth Defendants at any stage to have taken a neutral stance on the matter, agreed to abide by the court’s decision as regards Mr Aliotta’s intentions, and to have avoided liability in that way. Instead, they have spent significant amounts of time and money seeking to defend Mr Aliotta’s actions in transferring the shares. He also notes that the basis of the Fourth to Sixth Defendants’ argument that they were not involved in the early stages of the litigation is in part a result of the fact that they failed to engage in any pre-action correspondence with ISC (including failing to respond to the Letter of Claim that was sent on 4 October 2024, over two months before the claim was issued). Under CPR 44.2(5)(a), the relevant conduct of the parties for costs purposes includes: “the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol”.[21]I think that it is clear that in practice the Fourth to Sixth Defendants did make common cause with Mr Aliotta in order to seek to defend the transfer of the shares to them by presenting it as not having been intended to put assets beyond the reach of the Claimants. They failed on that issue, and that issue was the primary issue in this litigation. They should therefore be jointly and severally liable in costs with Mr Aliotta.[22]The position as regards Mrs Aliotta is more complex. Mrs Aliotta was a necessary party to the proceedings, since the effect of the entry into the share register of the company was to render her legally the owner of the shares, (regardless of the position in equity). Her position in the action (to the extent that she can be said to have had one) was that she was not the equitable owner of the shares, but that they were owned for third parties (either for her children, or for the transferor). Her involvement was therefore merely as part of the chain of transmission of legal title which resulted in the transfer of the shares to the Fourth to Sixth Defendants. Because of this no relief was sought directly against her save for a finding that the shares which had been transferred to her for no consideration were transferred by her for no (or inadequate) consideration.[23]The Claimants say that Mrs Aliotta made common cause with Mr Aliotta in this regard. In one respect this is clearly true – Mrs Aliotta’s evidence was that she had no idea what was happening, and that she simply signed those documents which her husband put in front of her. However, at no point was any case put forward by Mrs Aliotta herself, and she was not represented at trial (I refused to allow Mr Aliotta to represent her, although I accepted that I would hear any representations which he wished to make as regards her position).[24]I do not think that Mrs Aliotta can be said to have been successful, since her only positive suggestion – that the shares were held on trust – was rejected. However, it is equally clear that no order is to be made against her. Given this, and the minimal nature of her participation in the actual hearing, I make no order for costs as between her and the Claimants. 4. The Basis for Assessment of Costs[25]The Claimants seeks costs on the indemnity basis. That is for the same reasons given above in relation to the Defendants’ conduct - CPR 44.2.20 provides that “…in a given case, party conduct will have a dual relevance, first as to the exercise of the court’s discretion under r.44.2(1), and secondly, as to the question whether costs ordered to be paid should be assessed on the indemnity basis (r.44.3(1) and r.44.4(3)(a))...”[26]The test when considering whether to order indemnity costs is whether there is something in the conduct of the parties or other particular circumstances of the case (or both) which take it outside the norm: Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 879, clarified by Waller LJ in Esure Services Limited v Quarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595 to reflect “something outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings”. The Claimants say that fabrication of fraudulent evidence for the purposes of deceiving the Claimants’ solicitors – with a view, it is to be inferred, to trying to avoid the claim being brought at all – is conduct significantly beyond the norm, and is sufficient to warrant an order for costs on the indemnity basis.[27]Mr Aliotta does not resist the award of indemnity costs against himself or AH (which in this regard was simply his vehicle), but argues that such an award should not be made against Mrs Aliotta. For the reasons given above this point does not arise, but I would be inclined to agree with him in any event.[28]The Fourth to Sixth Defendants resist the award of indemnity costs against them on the basis that the fabrication of the board minutes was instigated by Mr Aliotta, not by them - all they wanted was to ensure they received the shares which Mr Aliotta had swindled them out of. They also say that at this point the Claimants were not in litigation with them. I do not accept this argument. The basis for the finding that conduct has been reprehensible is not the fabrication of the minutes themselves, but the fact that all those involved in their creation attempted, almost until the commencement of this action, to conceal the fact that they had been falsified. It seems to me to be axiomatic that those who engage in an endeavour to mislead the court by providing evidence which they know to be fabricated and seeking to conceal the fact of the fabrication should pay costs on the indemnity basis.

Two Further Items

[29]Mr Aliotta made a late application on 22 January 2026 which was refused. Mr Aliotta is solely liable for any costs attributable to this application, although it seems unlikely that these costs will be significant.[30]More substantial are the costs of the Claimants’ application under CPR r.25.1 for a preservation order in relation to the shares held by the Fourth and Fifth Defendants following their discovery of the 2025 Transactions. The facts of that application were that, having discovered the existence of the 2025 transactions, the Claimants sought undertakings from the Fourth to Sixth Defendants to the effect that they would not deal with the shares until this action was determined. Those Defendants refused to give binding undertakings, and offered contractual undertakings. The Claimants refused this and issued an application for injunctive relief, at which point the Fourth to Sixth Defendants agreed to give binding undertakings in the terms sought.[31]The Fourth to Sixth Defendants argue that the fact that the terms of the undertakings actually agreed were somewhat different from those originally demanded means that this issue should be taken to be a “score-draw”, such that each party should bear their own costs. I disagree. I think the fact that the Claimants had made their initial request after discovering the existence of the 2025 Transactions entirely justified them in seeking to protect their position by requiring binding undertakings, and I think that the offer of contractual undertakings in response was equivalent to a rejection of that request, since such undertakings would not have protected the position of the Claimants but merely given a right to damages of questionable worth. Consequently I think the Claimants should have their costs of this application, to be assessed on the standard basis. 5. Interest on costs[32]The Claimants seek an order (in standard terms) that the Defendants pay interest on its costs incurred at the time that they were incurred at 1% over Bank of England base rate from time to time. The Defendants say that, since costs are only due when they are ordered to be paid, only post-judgment interest should be paid, since there is no pre-judgment obligation in existence.[33]CPR 44.2(6)(g) confers a broad discretion to award interest on costs. In Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2014] EWCA Civ 363, Sharpe J said that the purpose of interest is “to compensate a party who has been deprived of the use of his money, or who has had to borrow money to pay for his legal costs”. The Court’s relevant discretion is “at large”, and involves a “general appraisal” of what is reasonable [at 50]. It follows from this that interest on this basis should be awarded in respect of costs incurred by the successful party from the moment that such costs have been billed and paid, since prior to that point the client has not been “deprived of the use of his money”. I think that that principle should be applied in this case, and I agree that the Defendants should pay interest on this basis. 6. Payment on Account[34]CPR 44.2(8) creates a presumption that a paying party should pay a reasonable sum on account where costs are ordered subject to detailed assessment. However, “what amounts to a reasonable sum will depend on all the circumstances” [32]. In Excalibur Ventures [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm), Clarke LJ said at [23]:
“the chief [factor] is that there will, by definition, have been no detailed assessment and thus an element of uncertainty, the extent of which may differ widely from case to case as to what will be allowed on detailed assessment. Any sum will have to be an estimate. A reasonable sum would often be one that was an estimate of the likely level of recovery subject, as the costs claimants accept, to an appropriate margin to allow for error in the estimation. This can be done by taking the lowest figure in a likely range or making a deduction from a single estimated figure or perhaps from the lowest figure in the range if the range itself is not very broad.”
[35]In cases where costs budgeting has occurred, Mellor J’s judgment in Lifestyle Equities CV v Royal County of Berkshire Polo Club Ltd [2024] Costs LR 449 provides a recent example of the correct approach: i) One starts by estimating the costs that would be awarded on detailed assessment. That must take into account the impact of CPR 3.18 (costs budgeting on the standard basis) [57(iii-v)]; ii) In Thomas Pink v Victoria’s Secret [2015] Costs LR 463, 90% of the budgeted costs should be awarded, to reflect the “vagaries of litigation and things that might occur”. In MacInnes v Gross No. 2 [2017] EWHC 127 (QB); [2017] 2 Costs LR 243, Coulson J held (at [28]) that a 10% deduction for the purposes of a payment on account was “the maximum deduction that is appropriate in a case where there is an approved costs budget”; iii) The above guidance does not hold for incurred costs recorded by a Precedent H [57(x)]. Those have not been approved by the court: a greater discount is due to reflect that lack of pre-approval, as per Cleveland Bridge v Sarens [2018] EWHC 827 (TCC). Mellor J therefore applied the percentages of 90% for budgeted costs and 80% for incurred costs [64]. He then made deductions to a round figure on the basis that the exercise is “not an exact science.”. I regard this approach as being clearly correct.[36]The Claimants’ budgeted costs are £618,833.82 (the figure contained in the Precedent T dated 27 January 2026). This was made up of £165,544.14 incurred costs, plus budgeted costs as per Master Kaye’s order of £327,375 plus additional costs in the varied costs’ budgets of £125,914,68 agreed in January 2026. The Defendants therefore say that the Claimants total costs of £809,507.66 are £190,673.84 in excess of the £618,833.82.[37]The Claimants seek a payment on account pursuant to CPR 44.2(8) of £646,263.78. They calculate this as the sum of(a) 90% of their budgeted costs to the extent that they have been incurred - that is £383,706.87 and(b) 70% of their other incurred costs of £375,081.29 – that is, £262,556.90.[38]The Fourth to Sixth Defendants oppose this, primarily on the basis that an order for payment on account which exceeds the amount of the Claimants’ incurred costs, the approved budgeted costs and the varied costs’ budget is clearly excessive.[39]I think that as regards the budgeted costs I have no alternative but to order the payment of 90% of the budgeted amount. However, I agree that the substantial uplift in total costs requires detailed assessment. I therefore order that the payment on account should be 90% of budgeted costs and 60% of other costs – that is, £383,706.87, plus £225,048.77, for a total of £608,755.64. Conveniently, this results in an interim payment which is less than the budgeted costs amount. 7. Permission to Appeal[40]Mr Aliotta and the Claimants apply for leave to appeal.[41]The test for granting permission to appeal is set out under CPR 52.6(1), namely where:(a) the court considers that the appeal would have a real prospect of success; or(b) there is some other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.[42]The Claimants say that an appeal would plainly have a real prospect of success – and also (in relation to Ground 9 – the joint account point) that there is a compelling reason for an appeal to be heard, since the question is important as a matter of public policy.

The Claimants’ Grounds of Appeal

[43]The Claimants’ first Ground of Appeal is that they say that I erred at para 156 of my Substantive Judgment in finding that Re M C Bacon Ltd [1990] BCC 78 (to the effect that the value of the consideration received by the debtor must be considered from the debtor’s perspective) was not applicable in a claim under section 423 (MC Bacon being a decision under s.238 IA 1986). This is an inaccurate characterisation of my findings. As I explained in [155], what I held was that, in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Invest Bank, where a series of transactions are entered into simultaneously between the same parties, and the overall effect of those transactions is that a seller parts with ownership of an asset in exchange for the receipt of a benefit, the transactions should be considered together as a single economic transaction.[44]Ground 2 is concerned with the identification of the ‘debtor’ in the 2025 Transactions. I found [at 141] that Mrs Aliotta was the absolute owner (both legal and equitable title) of the 64 shares that were transferred pursuant to the 2025 Transactions. Mrs Aliotta was therefore “the person entering into the transaction” (i.e. the definition of ‘debtor’ under section 423(5) IA 1986) for the purposes of the 2025 Transactions. However, this is irrelevant. Mrs Aliotta was part of a chain of transfers by which the shares were transferred by AH to the Defendants – she received the shares for no consideration, and passed them on for no consideration – in other words, she parted with the securities on the same terms as those on which she acquired them. That cannot, by definition, be a transaction at an undervalue.[45]Ground 3 is concerned with the finding in para 142 of the Substantive Judgment that “I must treat the economic ownership of the shares as being vested in AH, and therefore in Mr Aliotta”. It is not disputed that this is correct as a matter of fact, since I found that Mrs Aliotta had no independent agency as regards these transactions, and simply acted on the instructions of Mr Aliotta, who in turn acted for the benefit of AH. It is not clear what this ground of appeal seeks to establish.[46]Ground 4 alleges an error of fact, i.e. the finding at para 154 of the Substantive Judgment that “Aliotta Holdings was a single-owner company which was, in effect, an economic agent of Mr Aliotta”. In fact, Mr Aliotta only held 70% of the shares in AH (see para 4 of the Substantive Judgment). This is said to have been a material error of fact to the extent that it was the basis for the finding that AH was Mr Aliotta’s economic agent. However, it was accepted that Mr Aliotta was the sole guiding mind of AH, and the 30% holders were in effect nominees for him. This ground, even if established, would not affect the reasoning or the conclusions reached in the Substantive Judgment.[47]Ground 5 concerns the finding at para 156 of the Substantive Judgment that for the purposes of the 2025 Transactions, “the debtor and the third party are economically the same”. The Claimants say that Mr and Mrs Aliotta are not economically the same, and neither are Mr Aliotta and AH. This is a challenge to a finding of fact, and is unsupported by evidence.[48]Ground 6 restates the point that I should not have considered the composite transaction entered into by the parties as a whole (summarised at [150]), but should have separated out the specific element relating to the transfer of the shares and disregarded the other elements. I reject this for the same reason that I reject it in respect of Ground 1.[49]Ground 7 concerns a dispute as to whether the £165,000 of value delivered to Mr Aliotta under the 2025 Transactions consisted of shares in AH or a direct interest in a property owned by Mr Aliotta. I am unable to see how this is in any way material to the decision reached.[50]Ground 8 simply restates the argument that I was wrong to consider the 2025 Transactions as a single economic transaction, but should have disaggregated them. I reject this for the reasons I give above in relation to Ground 1.[51]Ground 9 is concerned with the joint account point. The Claimants say that this raises an important point of principle, namely whether for the purposes of a claim under section 423, monies received into a joint account held by a debtor with a third party are to be taken into account in determining the consideration received by the debtor.[52]I held at para 148 of my Substantive Judgment that such monies are to be taken into account, observing that the payors/transferees would be discharged from their payment obligations if they paid monies into such an account having been directed to do so.[53]The Claimants say that this is an irrelevant consideration for the purposes of a claim under section 423. The basis of their position is that where a person receives money into a joint account, their creditors received nothing, because they are unable to enforce against monies in a joint account: see Hirschon v Evans [1938] 2 KB 801. Accordingly, they say that for the purposes of a claim under section 423, receipt of monies into an account held jointly by the debtor with another person does not constitute “receipt of monies by the debtor”. The fact that the payors are discharged from their payment obligation when they pay into a joint account does not alter that.[54]I accept that where a person has a joint bank account with another, money paid into that account does not become immediately and wholly part of their estate. This is because the account holders are joint tenants of the balance held in the account, each having an undivided share. I think the receipt of money into a joint account for the benefit of one of the co-owners of that account can simply be disaggregated into a payment received by the relevant co-owner and a simultaneous vesting of the amount received into the joint names of the account holders [148]. The second part of this transaction may be challengeable under s.423, but I cannot think that it can be the case that if a man sells property worth £100 for £100, and receives that £100 into a joint account, that that transaction is therefore challengeable under s.423 as a transaction at an undervalue. For this reason I reject the application made on this ground.

Mr Aliotta’s Grounds of Appeal

[55]Mr Aliotta applies for leave to appeal on three grounds. The first of these grounds is in relation to my decision to reject his late application, made on the first day of the trial, to admit further evidence in support of the “Children’s Trust” argument. I rejected this application for the reasons set out in [116-117]. He says that this evidence, if admitted, would have been probative of his case, and he therefore asks for leave to appeal (in effect) my decision not to admit it. I reject this application.[56]The second ground is in relation to my findings as regards his intentions with respect to the 2025 Transactions. I set out at [132] the specific part of his own evidence which I considered to be highly probative of his actual intentions. He argues that I have taken this extract from his cross-examination out of context, and that, when considered in the light of the rest of his evidence, these particular exchanges do not in fact support the conclusion which I reached. He therefore says that I have reached a conclusion which is at variance with the evidence. I have two things to say about this. First, that this was not the only evidence available to me as to the First Defendant’s intentions, and it was not the sole element probative of his intent. Second, I have considered the wider context put forward in his submissions, and it does not seem to me that they undermine in any way the finding which I reached. I therefore also decline leave to appeal on this ground.[57]The third ground is in relation to my finding that the transaction was motivated by a desire to put assets beyond the reach of the Claimants. Mr Aliotta’s argument on this ground is that since the discussions in relation to the 2024 Transactions began nearly a year before the Main Proceedings in fact commenced, I could not have properly made this finding. I explained the basis for my finding at [133-137] of the Substantive Judgment. I regard this as an application to appeal a finding of fact, and therefore reject it.[58]There is no application for leave to appeal from the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Defendants. 8. Other Issues[59]The Claimants have asked for an extension of time until 10 August 2026 of the time for them to file an Appellant’s Notice, and this is not opposed by the Defendants. I am prepared to grant this extension.[60]Finally, there seems to have been some confusion as to the terms of the Consent Orders dated 13 June 2025. These provided that the Fourth and Fifth Defendants agreed that they would not “until judgment following the conclusion of the trial or further order of the Court (whichever is earlier)” dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of the shares respectively held by them in the Company, unless they had given the Claimants’ solicitors at least 30 days’ prior written notice of such acts, explaining the nature of the proposed acts, and the reasons therefor. It was suggested to me that the hand-down of my Substantive Judgment in this action was a “judgment following the conclusion of the trial”, and that this order had therefore lapsed. This is incorrect. When I handed down my Substantive Judgment, the hearing was adjourned – as is normal practice – to give counsel time to consider what further applications they wished to make as regards the form of the order to be made, costs and leave to appeal. The consequentials hearing, and this judgment, therefore constitute a continuation of the trial, which has not yet concluded, and will not conclude until a final order is made. The Interim Order is therefore still in effect, and will remain so until the final order is made.