Hasbro Consumer Products Licensing Limited & Anor v Công ty TNHH Đầu tu Công nghe và Dich vu Sconnect Viet Nam & Ors [2026] EWHC 1957 (Ch)
[2026] EWHC 1957 (Ch)Case No IL-2022-000010IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST (ChD)Venue The Rolls Building 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane London EC4A 1NLDate Monday, 27 th July 2026
Before
MR JUSTICE RICHARD SMITH
Between
(1) HASBRO CONSUMER PRODUCTS LICENSING LIMITED(2) ASTLEY BAKER DAVIES LIMITEDClaimant(1) CÔNG TY TNHH ÐÀU TU CÔNG NGHE VÀ DICH VU SCONNECT VIET NAMalso known as SCONNECT CO. LTD.(a limited liability corporation incorporated under the laws of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam)(2) SCONNECT MEDIA LLC(a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America)(4) MANH HOANG TADefendantMR GWILYM HARBOTTLE (instructed by Brandsmiths) for Claimants for THE DEFENDANTS did not appear and were not representedAPPROVED JUDGMENT(Consequentials)Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDEEmail: info@martenwalshcherer.comWeb: www.martenwalshcherer.com
INTRODUCTION
[1]On Friday last week, I oversaw the consequentials hearing which followed my judgment ([2026] EWHC 1546 (Ch)) on the claimants’ successful summary judgment application on their sound recording copyright claim against the defendants (Judgment). Although they elected not to attend the summary judgment hearing itself, the defendants did attend the consequentials hearing by a Vietnamese-speaking representative, Ms Ngoc Do Thi Bich, and an interpreter, Ms Anh Nguyen, who interpreted her submissions into English.[2]In addition to the defendants’ skeleton argument, I also received from them shortly before the hearing a further note which I had managed to digest and have since revisited. I am grateful to the defendants’ representative and claimants’ counsel for their helpful written and oral submissions which I have taken into account when considering this further ruling, albeit I do not reflect here every argument or point that was put.[3]I should add that the defendants also served a further witness statement from Mr Ta, now his seventh, concerning a disputed factual issue on the sound recording copyright claim. The claimants initially objected to the admission of that evidence, albeit indicating at the hearing itself that such further evidence, in fact, made no difference to the question of the consequential relief arising from my findings in the Judgment. BACKGROUND[4]The background to this matter is set out in some detail in the Judgment and I do not need to repeat it here, save to note that the copyright infringements I have found concern sound recordings in the form of audio clips used by the claimants in Peppa Pig animation videos, then copied from those videos and communicated by the first defendant in its own Wolfoo animation videos.[5]As the person directing the first defendant, I also found the fourth defendant, Mr Ta, liable for the same infringements to the extent that they occurred post-issue of the claim. REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES[6]The infringements I found were established by reference to what the claimants describe in their pleading as a representative sample of a much larger corpus of Wolfoo videos, exceeding 30,000 in number. The claimants’ evidence, particularly that of Ms Sevdali from April 2024, explains how that representative sample was randomly selected across different types of recording, whether English language, foreign language, uploaded post issue or uploaded on an unknown date.[7]I found the sound recording copyright claim to have been established by reference to the claimants’ evidence, including the factual evidence from Mr Weir, who used spectrogram analysis, confirmed by the expert, Mr Foster, as a recognised sound engineering technique. That evidence matched Peppa Pig sounds from Peppa Pig videos with the corresponding sounds on the randomly selected sample of Wolfoo videos. Those sounds had themselves originated in the claimants’ underlying audio clips in which, as I also found, the relevant copyright subsists.[8]The extent of the infringements found with respect to the samples was as follows:-(i) For the pre-issue sample of 92 English language Wolfoo videos, the infringement rate was 100% (bar one non-infringing trailer), with 1175 matches established in total. The claimants say there are likely to be many more matches had more than three been tested for.(ii) For the post issue sample of eight English language Wolfoo videos, there was a 100% infringement rate (again bar one shorter video), with 51 matches established in total.(iii) For the foreign language videos, 57 out of the 75 sample Wolfoo videos contained matches, with 331 established in total. Again, the claimants say that there are likely to be many more matches had more than one been tested for.[9]The claimants’ analysis confirmed matches corresponding to 67 Peppa Pig sounds in total.[10]I have set out these aspects of my findings again because the relief sought by the claimants at the consequentials hearing was not limited to the sample of Wolfoo videos found to contain matching sounds but, based on those videos being representative of the larger corpus, extended to any video featuring Wolfoo which was available online.[11]As a preliminary matter, it appeared to be suggested by the defendants that it was not open to the claimants to seek such relief, my findings of infringement limited to the sample Wolfoo videos only. Such a suggestion would be wrong. Although I found infringement to the extent of the confirmed matches, the question of the extrapolation of that sample to the larger corpus was expressly canvassed at the summary judgment hearing in both written and oral argument. As I explained in the Judgment, I deferred the question of the scope of relief, including injunctive relief necessary to protect the claimants’ copyright in the audio clips, to the consequentials hearing. I did so for two reasons: first, to ensure that the question of relief could be considered more meaningfully in light of my actual findings; second, to afford the defendants the opportunity to make their own related observations. Having made my findings in the Judgment, the representative sample issue now arises pointedly as a consequential matter and I have received further written and oral argument on it from both sides.[12]As to the substance of that issue, there is no doubt that the claimants pleaded in some detail, particularly at paragraphs 30.5A and 30.5B of the amended particulars of claim, that the Wolfoo videos analysed were representative samples only. They also pleaded further the inference based on the infringements of the representative sample I have found that all Wolfoo videos infringed the claimants’ copyright enjoyed in the audio clips, alternatively that all or substantially all of the English language Wolfoo videos pre and post-issue are infringing and that it is more likely than not that any given foreign language Wolfoo video is also infringing. The claimants’ position in this regard is clearly set out, together with their explanation of why such inferences are appropriate here, including that it would not be proportionate to examine all Wolfoo videos in addition to the confirmed matches.[13]The defendants say for the purpose of this consequentials hearing that they have set out in their pleading the nature of their case on whether the infringement extends beyond the sample Wolfoo videos. As to this, I have considered the complaints at paragraph 20 of the amended defence that any attempt to extend the claim beyond the specific Wolfoo animations in issue is abusive because the court will be unable to make any assessment of infringement in relation to other videos and the denial (at paragraph 25) that is open to the claimants to extend the claim generally in relation to any Wolfoo animation which has not been identified. However, I agree that these are generalised assertions which do not engage with the claimants’ detailed case that the sample Wolfoo videos selected are representative of the larger corpus, nor the inferences which the claimants seek to draw from the matches found.[14]The defendants further plead at paragraph 25 of the amended defence that the methods for identifying the alleged infringements are inherently subjective and unsound, including reliance on aural comparison and on Mr Weir’s analysis of audio clips cut from YouTube videos rather than from any original works. However, this does not address the representative sample question and I have already rejected in the Judgment the defendants’ different arguments about methodology.[15]The defendants also repeat their denial that copyright subsists in the audio clips at all. This is said to negate every ‘downstream’ inference of infringement. However, this is again a different point which I have also rejected in the Judgment. It does not advance the current debate.[16]There is no doubt that the defendants were fairly and squarely on notice of the nature and purpose of the representative sampling undertaken by the claimants in relation to the sound recording copyright claim and the inferences sought to be drawn therefrom. Although the extrapolation to the wider Wolfoo corpus following my findings of infringement is evidently of greatest concern to the defendants, there has been no meaningful or substantive engagement in their pleading with this aspect beyond, at most, limited and generalised complaint, let alone any attempt at an explanation as to why the sample might be said not to be representative, nor why the inferences could not be appropriately drawn from the established matches with that sample. As such, having failed to set out the nature of their case on these matters, I agree that the defendants must be taken to have admitted the claimants’ related allegations by operation of CPR, Part 16.5(5).[17]However, even if that were not the case, based on the evidence of Ms. Sevdali, I am satisfied that the sample chosen for each of the different categories of Wolfoo video has been appropriately randomly selected and that it is genuinely representative of the Wolfoo corpus as a whole. I am also satisfied that it would have been entirely disproportionate in this case for all 30,000 plus Wolfoo videos to have been analysed. Appropriate inferences can properly and safely be drawn based on the evidence of Mr Weir and Mr Foster and my related findings of infringement with respect to that sample. The defendants have no real prospect of successfully contending otherwise.[18]Indeed, in relation to the sample of English language Wolfoo videos, the trailer and short video apart, the match rate is 100%. Moreover, the total number of matches is very high. Given the limited number of matches being tested for in the pre-issue English language videos, that number is very significant indeed and underlines the confidence in the analysis and the extent of infringements here. The defendants have no real prospect of successfully resisting the inferences sought to be drawn by the claimants with respect to the English language videos.[19]As for the foreign language videos, even though the match rate is somewhat lower, approximately 75%, it is still very high, as are the number of matches achieved. That is again particularly so given the limits of the testing undertaken. Although an injunction in respect of all foreign language Wolfoo videos will result in the take down of videos for which Mr Weir did not find a match, further expensive investigations into whether particular foreign language Wolfoo videos infringe would not be proportionate. Nor, in my view, would they be required. On the basis of the compelling evidence that has been presented despite the understandable limits of that analysis, I am satisfied that such infringements would be made out were a more extensive analysis to be undertaken. As such, the defendants have no real prospect of successfully resisting the inferences drawn by the claimants with respect to the foreign language videos either. DECLARATORY RELIEF[20]Turning then to the relief sought by the claimants, I start with the substance in the body of the order and the question of declaratory relief, working from the claimants’ updated version from 9th July. As a preliminary matter, I believe that such relief will have utility in this case, not least with third parties in connection with the taking down of infringing videos and that it is appropriate to record the defendants’ infringements in a declaration.[21]As to the form of that declaration, this is framed in the claimants’ draft by reference to Schedule 1, which identifies at paragraph 1 “[a]ny video which includes Peppa Pig Sounds (as listed in Schedule 3 to this Order) or other sounds copied from the soundtracks of Peppa Pig videos.” Paragraph 2 to Schedule 1 then refers specifically to the Wolfoo videos matched by Mr Weir listed in Schedule 3.[22]The Peppa Pig sounds have been compiled from among those first recorded on the audio clips, as have then been listed by the claimants for the purpose of these proceedings and the related sounds analysed by Mr Weir. As such, any Wolfoo video containing a Peppa Pig sound listed in Schedule 3 will obviously have infringed the claimants’ copyright in the audio files. I therefore agree it should be the subject of the declaration.[23]As for “other sounds copied from soundtracks of Peppa Pig”, given the evidence as to how sound for the Peppa Pig videos is compiled from the audio clips produced by the claimants, I am satisfied that a declaration in such terms is also appropriate.[24]As for the declaration itself in the body of the order, I am content with paragraph A. The defendants seek to limit it to matches found by Mr Weir but this appears to be out of concern that it encompasses all Wolfoo videos. However, the proposed declaration is not framed in those terms and, as I have explained, it is appropriate for it to cover the Peppa Pig sounds and other sounds from Peppa Pig sound tracks.[25]I am also content with paragraph B, save that I agree that the words “and/or would infringe” should be removed which do not seem appropriate for declaratory relief. I understand that this is not resisted by the claimants. Moreover, the first “which” as it appears on the third line of paragraph B should, I think, be replaced with the word “the”. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF[26]As for the injunctive relief sought, again working from 9th July version, paragraph 1 seeks to take down all Wolfoo videos online at the date of the order on the basis that they all infringe having regard to the infringing representative samples.[27]Paragraph 2 prevents the future creation or uploading of Schedule 1 videos, namely those containing Peppa Pig sounds or other elements of Peppa Pig soundtracks in any Schedule 2 country, those countries being party from time to time of the relevant conventions or treaties mentioned in the Judgment as well as the list of matching videos found by Mr Weir.[28]Paragraph 3 prohibits procuring or authorising the acts prohibited by paragraph 2.[29]As for injunctive relief generally, I was referred to the general principles summarised in Copinger at paragraphs 24-231 to 24-238 in the following terms:-(i) Remedies must be fair, equitable and not unnecessarily complicated or costly but also effective and dissuasive.(ii) In considering whether an injunction is appropriate, regard has to be had to the defendants’ human rights. The defendants are not to be deprived of their possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The claimants say that the injunction sought here would be in accordance with the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.(iii) As a general rule, an injunction should be granted in an intellectual property case.(iv) An injunction is unlikely to be granted if the infringement is technical or unlikely to cause real damage if it recurs. Here, the claimants say that the infringement is far from technical and will cause real damage, the parties being competitors and the claimants believing that Wolfoo is unsuitable for Peppa Pig’s audience.(v) An injunction is unlikely to be granted if there is no likelihood of repetition. Here, the claimants say that there is a clear likelihood of repetition, not least because infringing videos have remained on YouTube despite the defendants being on notice and the defendants have sought to conceal their infringements by moving infringing videos from one YouTube channel to another. Nor have the defendants offered undertakings.(vi) The tendency of the court is not to refuse an injunction on the grounds of delay alone. The claimants say that, although this case has taken some time to come to a final hearing, there has not been unwarranted delay in any event.[30]The defendants’ essential position is that any injunction should be limited to only those Wolfoo videos matched by Mr Weir. Relief extending to the whole corpus would be disproportionate and it would leave the defendants exposed to penal sanction for accidental breach. Indeed, unconnected and unauthorised third parties are said to have uploaded Wolfoo videos to their own channels.[31]The defendants also say that they have, in fact, previously attempted to take down 3,000 Wolfoo videos falling outside the scope of the claim, a matter of conduct said to be relevant to the court’s discretion in the matter. They also add that the matched videos have been removed and the defendants will undertake not to upload them again. Finally, the territorial scope is said to be too broad, giving rise to issues of proportionality and enforceability, the proposed order even automatically extending to countries later acceding to the relevant international conventions.[32]As to whether injunctive relief should be granted here, I am in no doubt that it should. As shown by Mr Weir’s analysis, even with its limits, the sound recording copyright infringement has been prolific. It has also been long-standing. Despite the claimants first contacting them in 2020 and commencing proceedings in 2022, I am of the view that the defendants have not responded appropriately. Again, as I have noted in the Judgment, they have raised a litany of complaints and matters which they say fall to the claimants to prove but they have engaged in limited fashion, both on the substantive claim and on the summary judgment application itself, in the meantime continuing to communicate Wolfoo videos in further infringement of the claimants’ copyright.[33]As to the suggestion that the defendants have taken down more than 3,000 videos, the defendants do assert between their amended defence and Ta 6 that YouTube has taken down 3,000 Wolfoo videos and the defendants themselves more than 600. However, as the claimants have explained, the related evidence was not satisfactory and falls short of a sound basis for declining or curtailing the injunctive relief sought. Although a figure of 3,000 has been cited, a take down list was not provided until November 2025. Moreover, this identifies only 2,392 videos limited to the March to October 2022 period. Only 13 of those are said to be identified in the list of 91, apparently English language, videos and the position with respect to other videos in this and the other categories sampled is unclear. None of the related take downs appear to relate to sound copyright infringement. It also appears that the defendants have resisted, and continue to resist, these take downs and that most are still under review.[34]As for the suggested voluntary take down, although Mr Ta said in Ta 6 that the defendants have undertaken a comprehensive review and removal of arguably infringing material, they have not identified the relevant videos. They do acknowledge in their amended defence 66 videos which they say were created by Mr Khoa but have not indicated whether these have been taken down. I agree with the claimants that the position presented by the defendants in this regard is thoroughly opaque.[35]Finally, the defendants rely on Ta 7 and the suggestion that the 70 videos moved to other channels were not moved by them but uploaded by third parties without their authority. The claimants acknowledge that the correct figure is in fact 34, not 70 as they had indicated at the summary judgment hearing. However, they also say that Mr Ta’s related evidence is again unsatisfactory: first, the channels to which these videos were moved appear to be official channels, not third party channels; second, Mr Ta says that the defendants have caused unauthorised Wolfoo uploads to be removed but they have apparently not done this with these 34 videos. The claimants say that this makes little sense; third, Mr Ta’s reliance on these moves between channels taking place between 2020 and 2021 does not advance their position, those dates postdating the claimants’ letter before action, if not the commencement of these proceedings.[36]I agree that it is unsatisfactory that the defendants only now respond to this aspect of the summary judgment evidence at the consequentials hearing, rather than in the context of the application itself when they had every opportunity to do so. I also agree that the evidence fails to explain the position properly. In any event, as I have also explained in the Judgment, there is further compelling evidence from Mr Lee as to the defendants’ continuing uploading of videos after the issue of these proceedings, as to which, I did not discern any serious challenge from the defendants.[37]I also agree that the suggestion that the proposed injunction would be difficult to enforce was not well made. The defendants would simply be required to take down those videos within the scope of the injunction and instruct their personnel not to use Peppa Pig soundtracks.[38]However, I also accept that the defendants should not be responsible for channels not controlled by them. That said, the defendants’ proposed revised language contains ambiguities as to who might be in ‘control’ or what is an ‘account’ and I agree that it is too narrowly drawn. I also agree that, if such an exception is to be made in the defendants’ favour, they need to provide information as to those channels which they do control and to keep the claimants updated in that regard.[39]I also agree with the defendants’ overarching point that the order should be limited to the first and fourth defendants. That is now provided for in the claimants’ latest draft.[40]Finally, I also agree that limited undertakings belatedly offered by the claimants are insufficient and, given the history of this matter, could not be safely relied on even if they had otherwise been adequate on their terms.[41]In the circumstances described and having regard to the general principles indicated above with respect to the grant of injunctive relief and given the extent of the infringements found in the representative samples across all categories, I have decided that the take down relief sought by the claimants would be just and appropriate in this case and that this should extend to all videos featuring Wolfoo at the date of this order.[42]As for the territorial scope, this is targeted to the countries in Schedule 2. These are essentially the members from time to time of the EU and those countries which are parties to the treaties mentioned in the Judgment. There was some contention about the “from time to time” language and whether that was appropriate. However, given that the injunction imposes ongoing obligations, I consider that it is.[43]In conclusion, I accept the claimants’ language at paragraph 1.1 in their 9th July revised draft. The timing of the take down in paragraph 1.1 shall be by 4 p.m. seven days from today’s order.[44]That draft also contains the provision of the verified list of controlled online outlets in paragraph 1.2 to be updated on a monthly basis under paragraph 1.3. The defendants expressed concerns about the burden and commercial risks associated with disclosure. I do not accept that the provision of this information is burdensome and I do consider it is required properly to police the order. Moreover, as the claimants say, the information cannot be used by them save for the purpose of these proceedings. Again, I accept the claimants’ wording from the 9th July revised draft. The paragraph 1.2 information must be provided by 4 p.m., 14 days from today’s order. The defendants sought a longer period for compliance but I did not consider this necessary. They will have that information readily to hand and they have been alive to this aspect of the order for some time.[45]Likewise, I accept the claimants’ language at paragraph 2 with respect to the non-creation, non-uploading or non-communication of infringing material, with the addition of language along the lines discussed on Friday prohibiting the re-uploading of videos the subject of the take down element of the injunction which addition I understood to be agreed.[46]I also accept that there should be the further prohibition in paragraph 3 against the procuring or authorising of the actions prohibited by the paragraph 2. I consider this necessary to give full effect to those prohibitions but I also accept that this should take on board the defendants’ point that this does not prevent the defendants from using or making their own recordings made independently of Peppa Pig soundtracks.[47]Paragraph 4 is the requirement to deliver up the materials or articles in the defendants’ possession, the use of which without the claimants’ consent would breach the order. The defendants’ main point concerns the scope of the injunction but I have already decided that issue in the claimants’ favour. The defendants also objected to the delivery up order potentially including publicly available Peppa Pig videos in their possession. However, the claimants are correct when they say that the downloading by the defendants of Peppa Pig videos from YouTube would be unlicensed. Given the infringements I have found, and the risk of further infringement, I agree that such material should fall within the scope of the delivery order, even if it has not been established that it has been copied by the defendants or used in Wolfoo videos.[48]Paragraph 5 concerns the provision of a witness statement confirming compliance with this order. I did not understand this to be contentious. That statement must be provided within 21 days.[49]Paragraph 6 concerns the provision of a publicity order. The defendants say, relying on Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd v Apple Inc [2012] EWCA Civ 1339, that the purpose of such orders is to act as a supplementary deterrent to future infringers and to contribute to the awareness of the public at large but that such an order must be no more than proportionate and is not to be used to make a party grovel or simply to lose face. Having considered the terms of the proposed notice, I am satisfied that its publication is appropriate, its terms being measured, factual and informative and its effect not to punish or make the defendants grovel, rather than to avoid confusion in the marketplace by explaining in succinct terms why the Wolfoo videos have been taken down. Such a notice must be posted within seven days.[50]Paragraph 7 is a standard provision for an inquiry into loss or damage or an account of profits, which I agree should be included. The defendants were concerned that this should be limited to the matched Wolfoo videos but I have already found that the infringement went wider than that. They were also concerned about apportionment of such loss given that the claimants’ alleged infringement comprised only the sound recordings, the Wolfoo videos (and the corresponding revenue) encompassing many elements beyond that. Although I follow the defendants’ point, the terms of the order are limited to the acts of infringement I found and they do not prevent the defendants making this argument in the course of any inquiry or account should the claimants elect to proceed with one.[51]Paragraph 8 concerns the provision by way of witness statement of preliminary information to enable the claimants to decide whether to pursue the inquiry or account. I did not understand this to be contentious in principle. There was the overarching point about the extent of the Wolfoo videos implicated but, again, I have already decided that point in the claimants’ favour.[52]There was also concern on the part of the defendants that this provision should be subject to confidentiality protection. However, as I said earlier, and as applies here as well, the collateral use by the claimants of the information provided would not be permitted, such that I do not consider that any further such protection is necessary.[53]The defendants also requested a carve out in respect of information no longer available to it but, again, I did not consider it necessary. The defendants should provide the information as best they can. They must do so within 42 days of this order.[54]I did not understand paragraphs 9 and 10 concerning the claimants’ election between an inquiry or account and the potential for further information for that purpose to be contentious. I adopt the claimants’ language from the 9th July draft. COSTS[55]Having been successful on the summary judgment application, the claimants should have their costs of that application. The defendants suggested there should be an issues based order to reflect the claimants’ suggested failure on the whole corpus case and the limiting of Mr Ta’s liability at this stage to post-issue infringement. I reject those arguments. The claimants have succeeded on their case as to the whole corpus and I found the fourth defendant liable, even if not to the same temporal extent as the first defendant. The claimants have clearly been successful overall.[56]The claimants seek summary assessment and have provided a schedule of their costs of the application. However, I do agree with the defendants that, although ultimately the hearing only occupied half a day of the court’s time, it was scheduled for much longer and this is reflected in the costs claim of more than £500,000 which it would not be appropriate summarily to assess. I agree that there should be detailed assessment but I also consider it appropriate for a payment on account of that sum to be made.[57]As to the level of that payment on account, I consider that the defendants should have a short period in which to make any written observations. The defendants will therefore have seven days from today in which to make such observations, limited to three pages. The claimants will then have seven days thereafter within which to respond to those observations, limited in the same manner. I will then make my decision as to the level of payment on account on the papers.[58]I am satisfied that the costs of the copyright infringement claim should be paid by the defendants to the claimants as well, to be the subject of detailed assessment if not agreed. There shall also be a payment on account, the level of which shall be determined in the same manner as the application costs. PERMISSION TO APPEAL[59]The defendants seek permission to appeal on five different grounds. I consider each briefly.[60]Ground 1 concerns the relief extending to the whole corpus of Wolfoo videos which, if ordered, it is said would exceed the summary judgment actually granted and rest on inferences the court did not adopt as findings. This ground is not, for reasons I have already indicated, well made. It was clear from the summary judgment hearing and the Judgment itself that there was to be further consideration of the scope of relief in light of my findings on the evidence, including the effect of the representative sampling. The defendants have not meaningfully engaged with that issue. Having considered the parties’ related arguments, the court has concluded that the defendants have no real prospect of successfully resisting the pleaded inferences drawn by the claimants.[61]Ground 2 concerns a suggested dispute of fact in light of the evidence of Mr Ta in Ta 7 that the defendants were not responsible for moving the 70 - in fact 34 -videos to a different YouTube channel. There are two difficulties with this ground: first, if the defendants had wished to maintain that there was a triable issue, it should have done so in response to the related evidence of Mr Lee for the claimants, not following Judgment; second, the point would have made no difference to the court’s finding in any event. The defendants say that this was the sole evidential basis for the post-issue finding. It was not. The court also had regard to Mr Lee’s further evidence that the defendants uploaded new infringing material for a significant period after mid-2020, including after issue of this claim. That evidence was not challenged. Given Mr Ta’s admitted role in directing the activities of the first defendant, the finding of knowledge of post-issue infringement was therefore inevitable.[62]Ground 3 concerns the use of expert evidence on the summary judgment application. The defendants again had the opportunity to file their own expert evidence and to challenge Mr Weir’s methodology and Mr Foster’s related expert endorsement. The defendants chose not to do so and there is no basis to suggest that either was inappropriate or unreliable.[63]Ground 4 concerns the court’s finding of cogency as to the chain of title based on documents which were partially redacted. The defendants say that the same documents will fall to be considered on other aspects of the case and that this is a compelling reason for the adequacy of the documents to be considered on appeal. I disagree. No meaningful challenge to title has been put forward. No compelling reason is advanced.[64]Ground 5 concerns the court’s application of the presumption of similarity. Such application was fair and reasonable here in circumstances in which the defendants did not indicate any material differences between the laws of the UK and other relevant jurisdictions.[65]Accordingly, none of the grounds of appeal has a real prospect of success and there no compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. I refuse permission to appeal.[66]If the defendants do wish to renew their application to the Court of Appeal, they should do so within 21 days. The defendants sought 42 days for that purpose. Although they are unrepresented and based outside the UK, given the calibre of their written submissions, their speed of production and their command of English law and written English, they will have no difficulty meeting that deadline, if so advised. STAY OF EXECUTION[67]I am also asked relatedly to stay the enforcement of any take down order pending any further application for permission to appeal. A proposed appeal does not automatically operate as a stay of the order below (see CPR, Part 52.16). There have to be solid grounds for a stay, usually in the nature of some form of irremediable prejudice were this to be refused. The court will balance the interests of the parties or the potential harms caused to them by the grant or refusal of the stay. In this case, there is no doubt that the ongoing infringement of the claimants’ copyright in the sound recordings would continue to cause them harm. The defendants are competitors and the claimants have justified and evidenced concerns that the continued use of Peppa Pig sounds in Wolfoo videos would cause them significant harm.[68]Set against that, the defendants say that the effect of that take down notice would be irreversible. However, that contention is again unevidenced. The defendants do rely on prior evidence served in opposition to prior applications with respect to costs but the court has already concluded that such evidence was not sufficiently cogent. That position has not improved on this application for a stay. A stay of execution is therefore refused. OTHER MATTERS[69]Finally, the defendants had suggested certain amendments to the penal notice and recitals in the draft order. In light of my above findings, I am satisfied that the claimants’ proposed wording should stand. - - - - - - - - - -