Mohammed Hassan El Haddad v Khulood Abdulla Hassan Al Rostanami & Ors [2026] EWHC 1885 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1885 (Ch)

Case No CA-2021-316;CA-2021-323;BL-2019-001262

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)

Venue The Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane, London

Date Tuesday, 21 July 2026

EC4A 1NL

Before

MR. JUSTICE RAJAH

Between

MOHAMMED HASSAN EL HADDADClaimant

KHULOOD ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

HASSAN ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

MARWAN ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

WAFA ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

BADREAYA ABDULRAHMAN DR AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

HASNA ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

NAJLA ABDULLA HASSAN AL ROSTANAMIDefendant

HABIB MOHAMMED SHERIF ABDULLAH AL MULLADefendant

DR. MOHAMMED HASSAN EL HADDAD appeared In Person as the Respondent for in person

MR. STEPHEN MORIARTY KC and GILES ROBERTSON appeared on behalf of Defendants 1 to 7.

MR. THOMAS OGDEN appeared on behalf of Defendant 8

Approved Judgment

Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd

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[1]This is Dr. Haddad's application for me to recuse myself from hearing the substance of D1-7’s application to extend an ECRO against him, which expires tomorrow, by three years.

[2]The application is made on the basis that I should recuse myself because of apparent, rather than actual, bias. The test for apparent bias is whether the fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased. So said, the House of Lords in Porter v Magill

[2002] 2 AC 357

[3]The gist of Dr. Haddad's unhappiness is that I am the named judge under the ECRO, to whom almost all of his applications for permission come and most, but not all, of his applications have been refused by me. This includes applications for permission to appeal my decisions under the ECRO. I can understand Dr. Haddad's frustration at the closed loop in relation to applications to appeal my decisions, but as I have explained in the reasons for my order of 28 January 2026, that is built into the ECRO process and the terms of this ECRO and protecting the finite resources of the court includes protecting the finite resources of the Court of Appeal.

[4]In any event, that is, I think, a matter which really goes to the question of whether, if a decision is made which goes against Dr. Haddad, there should be permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the basis that there is some sort of closed loop in relation to applications which are built into the ECRO process. On a question of whether I should recuse myself for bias, this point does not give rise to a perception of bias to a fair minded observer. If the ECRO process is unfair, then that is something which will have to be addressed in some way, but it is not suggestive of bias on the part of the judge to the fair minded observer.

[5]Dr. Haddad says that the defendants’ legal teams are making false allegations. He says an example is that they say that there is no fresh evidence to show that matters which were relied upon by Mr Justice Zacaroli in his judgment were untrue, and that itself is not true. He says he can have no fair hearing today because, I have in the past, he says, accepted their submissions.

[6]I have certainly said in the past in relation to one application at least, that I did not think that there was any fresh evidence in relation to the matters which were relevant to that application but Dr. Haddad's point today is rather more sweeping. I certainly don't recall accepting anything which I had been told by lawyers on behalf of the respondents, rather than relying upon my own assessment of looking at the underlying documentation and concluding that there was nothing fresh for the purposes of the application I was dealing with.

[7]Nevertheless, Dr. Haddad says I am “blocking” fresh evidence and I have got it wrong. He says that that fresh evidence will show that he has been badly treated and that the ECRO was obtained on false facts. If I have made a mistake, then the remedy is to appeal. This, however, brings us back to Dr. Haddad's closed loop submission. Nevertheless, if on Dr Haddad’s premise, I have genuinely made a mistaken decision without realising that it is mistaken, I do not think a fair minded informed observer would consider that I was biased.

[8]The next point which Dr. Haddad relies upon is that when this matter was first referred to me by the Listing officers, I suggested that it should be listed before me because of my familiarity with it and I suggested a one hour time estimate. Dr. Haddad suggests that the time estimate suggests prejudgment on my part. I am afraid I don't agree. I did not know what the parties' time estimates were at that stage. I did not know that Dr. Haddad was suggesting that it should take days rather than hours. It seemed to me that a hearing of this nature raised limited issues, which is whether it is appropriate to extend an existing ECRO and, if so, by how long. Whatever the decision, it did not seem to me that such a hearing should be a long one and that it could and should be a short one.

[9]Subsequently, when I was told about the difference in view between the parties as to the time estimate, the time estimate was increased by me to half a day and I have indicated that if necessary, I will sit for the rest of today to deal with this case, if that time is required. I don't think a fair minded and informed observer would conclude that the initial one hour time estimate was evidence of some sort of bias or prejudgment.

[10]There is a complaint that Allen & Overy suggested to listing that their application should be heard by me because of my familiarity with the case. Dr. Haddad suggests that a judge being allocated cases because he is familiar with them will give rise to a perception of bias in the fair minded observer.

[11]Two points which are relevant to this case emerge from Otkritie International Investment v Urumov

[2014] EWCA Civ 1315

. Firstly, the judge's familiarity with the background to a case is an advantage, not a disadvantage, for the litigants and the court process in terms of costs and efficiency. Another judge would be made as familiar as the first judge, but at an increased use of time, cost and judicial resource. With that familiarity that judge would be no more biased than the first one.

[12]The second point to make is that although, if there is a doubt as to whether to recuse, the judge should recuse, the judge should resist the temptation to recuse simply because it is more comfortable to do so when criticised. That course leads to litigants being able to select their judges by playing the system and choosing to criticise the judges they do not want to hear their cases.

[13]So it does not seem to me that the fact that I am familiar, from my experience as the assigned ECRO judge, is in itself evidence of bias or partiality. It does not seem to me that the fact that A&O suggested that that familiarity was a reason why the case should be listed to me was anything other than in accordance with the court's policy and approach as to the best use of resources and it is not evidence of bias or partiality in favour of Allen & Overy, if that is the implicit suggestion.

[14]For all of those reasons, it seems to me that I must refuse to recuse myself and I should carry on and hear the next applications which Dr. Haddad wishes to make in relation to this hearing. (For continuation of proceedings please see main transcript)

[15]These are Dr. Haddad's other applications - his Application A from 7 July, he says part of his Application B from 7 July, and his Application C from 15 July. They are essentially an application that this hearing should be adjourned and that directions should be given for answers to be given by the defendants to a schedule called RPA31, which has been produced by Dr. Haddad. That is a schedule which sets out a series of assertions of factual matters and issues which Dr. Haddad says form the the backbone of Mr Justice Zacaroli's judgment and which were false. The schedule contains references to the material which Dr. Haddad relies on to show that the facts relied upon by Mr Justice Zacaroli were false.

[16]Dr. Haddad says this is something which has to be resolved before the ECRO can be dealt with. His reason for that when I pressed him was that he says it will show that the original ECRO should not have been made. That is the misconception which underpins Dr. Haddad's applications. The questions which are raised in the RPA31 go to the crux of the gripe or grudge to which Dr. Haddad has against the system. They all stem from the fact that Mr Justice Zacaroli made a decision which he did not like and he maintains was based on allegations and assertions by the defendants and their lawyers which he says were false. He has tried to pursue that claim in the Court of Appeal and been rebuffed, then again before Fancourt J, and been rebuffed. The remainder of the pursuit of that claim is what remains of the Chancery proceedings against D1 to 8, which are currently in abeyance because they have not been served on D1 to D8. There is an outstanding application by Dr. Haddad to amend again. Having previously attempted to amend and been refused permission to make an application to amend by me, he is now proposing to amend the claim against D1 to D8 again so that he can pursue that claim against D1 to D8.

[17]The misconception is if it turns out that the claim is proper already arguable or the amendment is properly arguable, then that does not make any difference to the question of whether or not the ECRO was properly made. The ECRO, as I have observed already to Dr. Haddad, was originally made because of Dr. Haddad's unreasonable reaction to the Zacaroli judgment, which resulted in a short space of time in some four totally without merit findings being made against him in relation to his application to Zacaroli J to recuse himself, in relation to a renewal application which he made to Males LJ and in relation to a yet further application to renew the application for permission to appeal which came before Popplewell LJ.

[18]It was Dr. Haddad's conduct which gave rise to the original ECRO, not the underlying judgment of Mr Justice Zacaroli (as he then was).

[19]This is an issue on which I have already made a decision on 8 June 2026. I said it then in connection with Dr. Haddad's application to have his amendment application dealt with before the ECRO that “Dr. Haddad's witness statement appears to assume that if the application for permission to apply to amend is granted, and perhaps also that if the application for permission to amend is also then granted, that this somehow undermines the totally without merit orders that have been made to date. I cannot see how that can be right. The totally without merit findings since the ECRO was made have related to a range of different issues in applications made by Dr. Haddad, (e.g. to appeal to the wrong court an order made by an ICC judge, or to renew an application which has already been refused) by different judges (e.g. Fancourt J, ICC Judge Mullen and myself). They are not affected by what happens to Dr. Haddad's latest attempt to amend.”

[20]Dr. Haddad said I should , nevertheless, give him an opportunity to address me on the substance of the points which he wants to make in RPA31, saying that the scales would fall from my eyes if he was allowed to do so. I invited him to pick his three best points and he has taken me through his schedule. I think it is fair to say he did not take the invitation to pick his three best points, but he made a number of substantive points by reference to the schedule and without taking me to any of the underlying material, and he says that the false facts will show that the Zacaroli judgment was obtained by fraud.

[21]The first point to make about that is this, if it is relevant to anything, is relevant to the application to amend in the Fraud Claim. The issue which will arise there in relation to the Fraud Claim is whether permission under the ECRO should be given to allow the application to amend to continue. That will depend upon whether it raises properly any new case and, if not, whether the old case raises anything which was not considered and rejected as unarguable by Fancourt J. It is fair to say that Dr. Haddad seeks to marginalise the decision against him by Fancourt J when he was invited by Fancourt J to make his best points in relation to the alleged fraud as saying that that was “a side thing” and not the main issue which was before Fancourt J. Whereas, Mr. Moriarty and Mr. Ogden say that the issues which Dr. Haddad wants to raise in relation to the fraud were all canvassed fairly before Fancourt J because the claims against D1 to D8 are parasitic on the claims, or the allegations of fraud, which were then being made against D9 to D14. They say this is simply a continuation of a refusal to take no for an answer and really it appears to be an attempt to turn every hearing into a rehearing of the fraud issue, which is Dr. Haddad's personal bugbear and concern.

[22]It seems to me that if there is any merit in the points which Dr. Haddad is making about the allegations of fraud, then they are relevant and will be considered if or when the application or amendment of the Fraud Claim is considered by the judge (probably me) under the ECRO deciding whether permission should be granted under the ECRO for it to be made. That will depend upon whether the ECRO is extended. If there is merit in the points which are being made, then permission under the ECRO will be granted if the ECRO is continued. If the ECRO is not continued, permission will not be required at all. Dr. Haddad will be able to make his application. So it doesn't seem to me that it is essential to resolve these issues, these fraud issues, before the extension application is heard.

[23]Dr. Haddad, I should say, makes a number of points against Mr. Moriarty in particular. He says that he can't reply to Mr. Moriarty's submissions, which took him by surprise, but it is fair to say that Mr. Moriarty simply took me through one A&O letter which had been sent to Dr. Haddad in relation to proposed amended pleading, and took me through Dr. Haddad's schedule, RPA31. So it is difficult to understand why Dr. Haddad thinks he has been taken by surprise or that he can't respond to it. To the extent that he feels this is because he is a litigant in person, that is unfortunate, but it is the role of a litigant, whether in person or represented, to be ready to respond to points which are fairly raised on the material which is before the court, and these are all matters which it is Dr. Haddad who is trying to make relevant to these proceedings, not the defendants.

[24]A very serious point which Dr. Haddad made was that Mr. Moriarty was lying to me in his submissions. I have invited Dr. Haddad to make that point good and he has attempted to do so by taking me to parts of the transcript which are referred to in his witness statement. We have spent some time on that issue. Let me just say, rather than explaining, or trying to explain the points which Dr. Haddad was making, that he could not make that submission good and I am not satisfied from what I have heard that there was any merit at all in the assertion which fell so easily from Dr. Haddad's lips that leading counsel was lying to the court. I will say no more about it now.

[25]That means that the application will continue and I will carry on now to consider the application to extend the ECRO. (For continuation of proceedings please see main transcript)

[26]On 19 July 2023, Popplewell LJ made an Extended Civil Restraint Order against Dr. Haddad. That ECRO expires tomorrow, 22 July 2026. The first to seventh defendants have applied for a three year extension of the ECRO. The eighth defendant supports that application. Dr. Haddad opposes it.

[27]Under CPR 3.11 and 3C, Practice Direction 3C, 3.1, the court may grant an ECRO to restrain a person from making any claim or any application in any specified court which concerns any matter involving or relating to, or touching upon, or leading to, the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of an identified judge where that person has persistently issued claims which are totally without merit (“TWM”). A TWM threshold condition requires three or more TWM claims or applications. That is a necessary condition for making an ECRO, but is not necessarily sufficient in itself. An ECRO is designed to prevent a person from abusing the court's process, to protect other parties from harassment, oppression and the incurring of unnecessary time and expense, and to protect the integrity of the court process and the proportionate and efficient administration of justice, including a fair allocation of the court's resources.

[28]Such an order does not preclude a person's access to the courts to properly pursue properly arguable claims or applications in an appropriate manner, and it is not a breach of Article 6 rights. Rather, it provides a filter to such access in advance and is proportionate, if and because the previous conduct of that person suggests that there is a real risk that without it there will be claims or applications which have the effect I have identified, which it is the purpose of an ECRO to avoid.

[29]The court may extend the period of an ECRO if it considers it appropriate to do so, but by no more than three years on any given occasion, that is PD3C, paragraph 3.10. Although the test is different for an extension to an original grant, the question is ultimately the same: is it necessary to protect litigants from vexatious litigation against them and/or to protect the finite resources of the court from vexatious waste, see Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v Gray

[2019] EWCA Civ 1675

[30]The background to this application is this. In 2019, a claim was issued by Dr. Haddad, which I will call “the Partnership Claim”. In the Partnership Claim, Dr. Haddad alleged that in 2002 he had entered into a business partnership with the first defendant, Ms. Khulood, with whom he had been in a personal relationship. Some of the partnership assets were alleged to be vested in the second to seventh defendants. Ms. Khulood and the second to seventh defendants are members of the Al Rostamani family, which I am told is a prominent family in the UAE with significant business interests in the region. The eighth defendant is not a member of the Al Rostamani family. He was Ms. Khulood's Dubai lawyer.

[31]Following a hearing in May of 2021, Zacaroli J (as he then was) handed down judgment on 7 July 2021, which set aside an order which had granted Dr. Haddad permission to serve the partnership claim out of the jurisdiction. In doing so, Zacaroli J stated that:

"Had it been necessary to do so, I would have found that not only was Dr. Haddad in breach of the obligation to provide full and frank disclosure on his application for service out, but that the evidence was positively misleading and that these failings were the result of deliberate conduct, as opposed to accidental omission."

[32]Dr. Haddad applied to Zacaroli J to recuse himself from hearing his application for permission to appeal and when this was inevitably refused, he advanced 66 grounds of appeal, which included that the judgment was obtained by fraud of the defendant's expert witness of UAE law, Mr. Aidarous, and that the judge was apparently biased. Dr. Haddad sought to appeal the decision of Mr Justice Zacaroli but was refused permission to appeal by both Mr Justice Zacaroli and by Males LJ. Accusations of dishonesty, including dishonesty by the solicitors and leading and junior counsel who represented D1 to D8 in the proceedings before Mr Justice Zacaroli, had been raised in the skeleton argument in support of the application to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal. Males LJ directed a hearing to consider whether there was any proper basis for these allegations. That hearing took place on 24 June, 2022.

[33]At that hearing Dr. Haddad's counsel, Mr. Baki, whose name appeared at the bottom of the skeleton argument, and I quote from Males LJ:

"Apologised publicly for the allegations of dishonesty contained in the skeleton argument."

[34]Males LJ noted that he:

"Wished to make clear that on the basis of the evidence before the court, those allegations have no substance whatsoever and should never have been made."

[35]On 23 February 2023, Dr. Haddad issued a further claim against D1 to D8 and a further six defendants, who were the English lawyers acting for D1 to D8 in the partnership proceedings. I will refer to this further claim as the Fraud Claim. On 27 April 2023, before serving his claim form in the Fraud Claim, Dr. Haddad applied to the Court of Appeal for his application for permission to appeal to be reconsidered under CPR rule 52.30, and for Males LJ to recuse himself from considering it on the basis of apparent bias. That application was dismissed by Popplewell LJ on 9 June 2023.

[36]Dr. Haddad then applied to Popplewell LJ for him to reconsider his decision on the basis of a further witness statement. That application was dismissed as being totally without merit on 19 July 2023. By this stage, Dr. Haddad had acquired a TWM finding for Mr Justice Zacaroli in relation to the recusal application, two TWM findings from Males LJ as well as the TWM finding by Popplewell LJ.

[37]Popplewell LJ made an Extended Civil Restraint Order against Dr. Haddad in terms which made serious criticism of Dr. Haddad's approach in making spurious or unsupported allegations of dishonesty and refusing to "take no for an answer" from the courts.

[38]The day before the ECRO was made, Dr. Haddad had issued a further claim against Ms. Khulood in the Kings Bench Division. That is KB-2023-003059, and I will refer to that as “the KBD claim”.

[39]I turn to the events since the ECRO was made.

[40]It seems there was a yet further application by Dr. Haddad to reopen Males LJ's refusal of PTA (permission to appeal), which was dismissed as TWM by Popplewell LJ on 10 October 2023.

[41]The Fraud Claim came before Mr Justice Fancourt when he struck out the claim against the legal representatives of D1 to D8 (i.e. D9 to D18). He did that following a five day hearing in January 2023, on the basis that firstly, no claim lay against D9 to 18 because they enjoyed immunity from suit as lawyers. Secondly, the allegations of dishonesty and fraud by D9 to D18 were improper, had no reasonable basis, should never have been made, and were abusive and vexatious. And thirdly, the fraud claim was a concealed attempt to appeal the conclusions of Mr Justice Zacaroli's judgment which the Court of Appeal had rejected on three separate occasions. Mr Justice Fancourt certified the claim as TWM on the basis that it should never have been brought, it made the most serious allegations against professional people without any foundation who had immunity from suit in any event.

[42]I refused Dr. Haddad permission to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal Mr Justice Fancourt's decision. I did, however, give him permission to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal my decision, but the Court of Appeal dismissed that application for permission to appeal.

[43]Dr. Haddad is currently seeking to amend the Fraud Claim and to pursue this claim against D8 and D1 to D7.

[44]So far as the KBD claim is concerned, D1, Ms. Khulood, has applied to strike out the KBD claim. A hearing of the strike-out application has been adjourned, I am told, until the Michaelmas term.

[45]Something else which has occurred since the ECRO was made is that Dr. Haddad was declared bankrupt on 31 June 2025. ICC Judge Mullen dismissed Dr. Haddad's application to set aside a statutory demand made by D1 to D7 as totally without merit. He said: "I am afraid to say that the conduct of Dr. Haddad throughout this application and during the course of submissions, has been scattergun and prolonged and on occasions almost impossible to follow… The reality is that this application, like the proceedings it follows, appears to be an example of Dr. Haddad refusing to take no for an answer.”

[46]ICC Judge Greenwood made a bankruptcy order against Dr. Haddad and observed that Dr. Haddad's case “was nothing more than a further impermissible attempt to appeal or relitigate the question decided by Zacaroli J”. I gave Dr. Haddad permission under the ECRO to appeal the bankruptcy order, not least because I harboured some doubt as to whether the ECRO “bit” on an appeal of a bankruptcy order against Dr. Haddad. That application for permission to appeal was refused on paper by Mr Justice Leech. When Dr. Haddad renewed the application at an oral hearing, it came before Mrs Justice Joanna Smith, who refused the application, observing:

"It has been said before that Dr. Haddad has refused to take no for an answer. He has continued that approach."

[47]Turning then to the applications which have been made under the ECRO, the nominated judges to whom Dr. Haddad must apply for permission under the ECRO to make an application are myself and Mr Justice Bright. At an early stage, I directed that Dr. Haddad should make any application for permission to make an application in relation to the KBD claim to Mr Justice Bright, and that all other applications should be made to me.

[48]Ms. Hanna's witness statement, filed on behalf of D1 to D7, has analysed the applications which Dr. Haddad has made under the ECRO. In the 32 months since the ECRO was made, Dr. Haddad has sent over 30 notices pursuant to PD3C, paragraph 3.4, and has made at least 19 applications. I note that there isn't full agreement as to precisely how many applications have been made, and of course sometimes an application notice contains more than one application, but there are at least 19. Of those applications, 16 have been determined and ECRO permission has been refused in whole or in part in eleven of them. Four of them were certified by me as totally without merit. That brings the tally of totally without merit findings since the ECRO to seven when one includes those made by Popplewell LJ, Mr Justice Fancourt and ICC Judge Mullen.

[49]Of the seven occasions when ECRO permission was granted to Dr. Haddad, apart from applications to vary deadlines for the service of documents, all those which have been determined have been unsuccessful. This includes permission to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal my decision under the ECRO to refuse Dr. Haddad permission to apply for permission to appeal the Fancourt J decision. That was refused by Asplin LJ. It also includes permission to apply for permission to appeal the bankruptcy order against him, which as I have said was refused on paper by Mr. Justice Leech and then by Mrs. Justice Joanna Smith when it was renewed.

[50]Of the applications which have been refused, one significant theme has been Dr. Haddad's determination to continue to pursue litigation against D1 to D7 and D8. I will give one example. Mr Justice Fancourt struck out the fraud claim against D9 to D18 as totally without merit. I have held that there is no material distinction between the claims that have been struck out against D9 to D18 and the remaining claims against D1 to D7 and D8, which have not been determined. However, Dr. Haddad has made repeated attempts to keep the claim alive by amending it. By order dated 10 November 2025, I refused Dr. Haddad permission to amend the claim form and particulars of claim on the basis that the claims against D1 to D8 were not properly arguable and were vexatious. Dr. Haddad then sought permission to appeal that order on 11 grounds, all of which were dismissed by me as totally without merit by order dated 29 January of 2026. I stated, at that point, that as matters stand there appears to be no viable claim against D1 to D8 to serve out of the jurisdiction, assuming jurisdiction could be established. Permission under the ECRO will not likely be given to permit any claims, however repackaged, which are in substance the same as those struck-out by Mr Justice Fancourt. The claims against D1 to D8 appears to be at an end. However, undeterred Dr. Haddad issued a yet further application on 15 May 2026, after the ECRO application had been made, to amend the claim form and particulars of claim in the fraud claim. That application has been adjourned pending this hearing.

[51]Ms. Hanna's evidence is that in correspondence Dr. Haddad has threatened a new claim against D1, although it is not clear what this claim is or whether it is proposed to be brought in the courts of this country. Mr. Ogden says, and has taken me to documents or correspondence to show, that Dr. Haddad has made threats to D8's lawyers of taking steps in relation to what he says is their dishonesty. Proceedings against them are not specifically mentioned in the correspondence that I was taken to, but the tenor of the threats suggest that proceedings are not far from mind. And I keep in mind that the ECRO may be a significant reason why they have not yet been brought.

[52]I have observed in the past, as have most of the judges who have dealt with Dr. Haddad, that his applications, evidence and skeleton arguments are overlong, selective and often inaccurate and misleading and also often extremely difficult to follow. I make this point because the defendants complain that even with the protection of the ECRO, Dr. Haddad's approach is expensive and time consuming for them to deal with, and I observe that it already absorbs a significant amount of the court's finite resources. However, the position would be exponentially worse if there was no ECRO, and no check of proper arguability on an application which Dr. Haddad would like to make.

[53]Dr. Haddad makes in his skeleton argument and in his witness statements a number of points, but it is very difficult to distil from the points which he makes something which is of real relevance to the question of whether or not the ECRO should be extended. A very significant theme of Dr. Haddad's submissions relates to the Fraud Claim, which itself relates back to his primary grievance, which is that the order which was made by Mr Justice Zacaroli was (he says) wrong because (he says) the judge was misled. The Fraud Claim itself is an example of Dr. Haddad refusing to take no for an answer.

[54]As I have already explained, when dealing with Dr. Haddad's application for an adjournment for further exploration of the Fraud Claim, that is not something which is relevant to the question of the continuation of the ECRO. The underlying premise that the ECRO would not have been made if there was some merit in the underlying Fraud Claim is flawed, for reasons I have already explained. The ECRO is a reflection of Dr. Haddad's conduct in relation to orders which had been made regardless of whether those orders were rightly made or should now be set aside.

[55]In any event, the question of amendments and whether they should be made in relation to the Fraud Claim, and the application which he makes in his Application C for further information to be provided in relation to the allegations of false statements are matters which are to be considered with the proposed amendments on paper if the ECRO is extended. I have already said that I will adjourn Application C to be considered with the application to amend. I ought perhaps to have said that I will dismiss that part of Application C which invited me to not determine D1 to D7's application to extend the ECRO until after I had determined Application C. That part of Application C is dismissed. It is totally without merit for the reasons already given in relation to application A. I do not think that should count as a separate determination or finding of totally without merit.

[56]Dr. Haddad, at points, seem to suggest that part of that further exploration is relevant to the question of whether or not the TWM findings that have been made should have been made. I have already said it doesn't seem to me that that can possibly be right, and I have explained why, not just today, but also in the order which I made on 8 June of this year. But in any event, totally without merit findings which have been made are conclusive (see Nowak v Nursing and Midwifery Council

[2013] EWHC 1932 (QB)

at paragraph 67). They are conclusive at least unless they are set aside on appeal. None of the totally without merit findings in this case have been set aside on appeal. In any event, the existence of totally without merit findings is simply part of the background to be taken into account in determining whether an extension to an ECRO is necessary to protect litigants and the court from future vexatious litigation.

[57]Dr. Haddad says in relation to his applications for an adjournment, and also in relation to his recusal that his Article 6 rights are engaged, the short answer to that is that the ECRO regime is compatible with article 6, for which see Nowak paragraph 60-62.

[58]Dr. Haddad has a further point that the eighth defendant should elect, effectively, whether it is submitting to jurisdiction or not. The position in relation to the eighth defendant is that it did not submit to jurisdiction in the proceedings before Zacaroli J. He maintained he had not been served in those proceedings and he participated under protest. He then made an application for an ECRO, and that was determined by Popplewell LJ to be an application which he could properly make without submitting jurisdiction. He now seeks to support D1 to D7 in their application to extend the ECRO. On the face of it, it's not obvious why that would amount to a submission to jurisdiction for any other purpose other than the application to extend the ECRO. However, whether or not D8 had submitted or not is something which is determined by the court by reference to what D8 has done. If there is an argument that D8 has submitted to jurisdiction, that is something which Dr. Haddad can seek to argue at some point and the court can determine it, if it is relevant. But there is no question of D8 having to elect in this court to submit or not submit. If I make an order of some kind in relation to this application against D8, then it will be binding upon D8 because for it has at least submitted to jurisdiction for the purposes of D1-7’s application which it supports. Quite what the relevance any of this has to the application I have to decide, namely whether the ECRO should be extended is, like many of Dr. Haddad's submissions, elusive.

[59]Dr. Haddad has also said that his Article 6 rights are engaged by the fact that he has not had an adjournment, and that he has been unable to therefore reply to evidence which has been filed. Several short points can be made on that. One is that I have already dealt with the application for an adjournment. To the extent that these points were not raised by Dr. Haddad then, it is too late now.

[60]Secondly, the directions for the service of evidence has been a conventional one, in which the applicants serve their evidence, the other parties answer and the applicants have the right to reply. The applicant should not be introducing new issues in evidence by way of reply. That is the conventional position. That is the directions which were given. Dr. Haddad says he should have a right to reply to the evidence filed in reply. He has at no point attempted to explain why, or what it is in the Applicant’s reply evidence which is new or which has taken him by surprise, and which he couldn't deal with or anticipate in his evidence in answer. He has not produced draft evidence as to what he wants to say, which he had not been able to say in his evidence in answer. He has had a right today to make the points which he wants to make in submissions. But I have yet to hear any good reason why there needs to be a further round of evidence. So there doesn't seem to be anything in that point.

[61]That is about as much as I can make of the points Dr. Haddad has made as to why an extension should not be granted. It was Mr. Moriarty's submissions that nothing which Dr. Haddad said in his submissions had any bearing on the question of whether the ECRO should be extended. There was some force in that submission.

[62]In summary, looking back over the background which I have set out, the history shows that Dr. Haddad's conduct, since the ECRO was made, has continued to be highly vexatious and abusive and that he continues to refuse to take no for an answer. He has persistently issued applications since the ECRO which are totally without merit. It also shows that the ECRO has been effective in protecting litigants and the court from full-blown applications which are not properly arguable. It also shows that Dr. Haddad has no intention of stopping and wants to continue to try to pursue the existing claims and is threatening new ones. There is therefore purpose in extending the ECRO, so that there is an appropriate check that Dr. Haddad's proposed applications and claims are, in fact, properly arguable.

[63]I am satisfied from this history that it is appropriate for the ECRO to be extended for three years. I am satisfied that this is necessary to protect litigants from vexatious proceedings by Dr. Haddad and that it is necessary to protect the court's finite resources from waste. So I will extend the ECRO by three years from the date upon which it expires. Just for clarity, there will be no gap between the expiry of the ECRO and its extension for three years. It will be seamless, so that effectively the period of the ECRO will continue from now until three years from the 22nd. (For continuation of proceedings please see main transcript)

[64]It seems to me that the application, which has been made by D1 to D7, has been caused by Dr. Haddad's conduct since the ECRO was made and that is why it has succeeded. It also means that on the usual approach, which the court takes to costs, that Dr. Haddad has lost the application and the applicants have won. There might be something to be said in favour of there being no order for costs, if Dr. Haddad had not opposed the application, but in fact he has fought this application tooth and nail. He has issued a number of applications, which have been clearly intended to push this application off unto another date, so as to delay a decision on whether it should be extended. Initially it seemed that that was intended to create a lacuna, or a gap, between the date when the ECRO expired and the date when a further adjourned hearing was heard. By the end Dr. Haddad was, in his documentation, accepting that there could be a holding order to keep the ECRO going until that adjourned hearing. But nevertheless, this is not a case in which Dr. Haddad has simply not opposed an application. This is an application which is caused by his conduct and this is an application which he has fought tooth and nail and lost.

[65]The starting point, therefore, is that he should pay the costs of the application. He says he needs time to consider that application and he asks for one week. There is no justification for an adjournment. This is the costs of the application, which has been made, which Dr. Haddad has come prepared to fight, and has fought all day. If he loses it, he needs to be ready to deal with costs. It is simply not acceptable, whether he is a litigant in person or not, to say he is not ready to deal with the normal issues which arise when an application like this is being dealt with.

[66]Further the application itself has been trailed in the skeleton argument by Mr. Moriarty. It has been trailed that he will not just seek costs, but he will seek it on an indemnity basis and by Mr. Ogden that he will seek the costs of the application. It seems to me that the starting point, that Dr. Haddad should pay the costs, is also the ending point and I will order him to pay the costs.

[67]The question of whether it should be on an indemnity basis turns upon whether his conduct is out of the norm. In that regard, it is relevant that I have dismissed an application to recuse myself, which is an application he has made against at least four judges. I have dismissed today as totally without merit his application to discharge the ECRO even though it expires tomorrow, coupled with his application to adjourn this hearing until that application to discharge was heard on a later date after the ECRO had expired. That application seems to me to be part of Dr. Haddad's attempt to string this application along.

[68]I can see that the consequence of the way in which Dr. Haddad has approached the application will have caused a huge amount of costs to be incurred. This was, when I looked at this without seeing any of the correspondence between the parties, something which I thought could be dealt with properly within one hour, but here we are having started at 10.30 am, at 3.35pm in the afternoon and it seems to me that a lot of the responsibility for that lies on Dr. Haddad's shoulders.

[69]I am satisfied that this is conduct which is out of the norm and I will therefore make the award for costs on the indemnity basis. - - - - - - - - - - - (This Judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Tel No: 020 7067 2900. DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com