Balvir Singh Pardesi v Gurdeep Pardesi [2026] EWHC 1846 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1846 (Ch)

Case No CH-2026-000081

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND & WALES

CHANCERY APPEALS (ChD)

ON APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF HHJ SAUNDERS DATED 9 MARCH 2026

Venue The Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane

London, EC4A 1NL

Date Monday 22 June 2026

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE ADAM JOHNSON

Between

BALVIR SINGH PARDESIAppellant

GURDEEP PARDESIRespondent

Sharaz Ahmed for Appellant

Aaron Walder (instructed by Naylor Solicitors LLP) for Respondent

Approved Judgment

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[1]I am concerned this morning with an order of his Honour Judge Saunders dated 9 March 2026 by which he awarded the Claimant, now Respondent, some £358,000 comprising rent and interest in respect of two investment properties, one called 48 Ryefield Avenue and the other called 20 The Larches.

[2]As to costs, His Honour Judge Saunders required the Defendant, now the Appellant, to pay indemnity costs and made an order for an initial payment of £110,000 on account.

[3]The Appellant, who is the Respondent’s father, has made an application for permission to appeal which is still to be resolved, and in the meantime has made an application for a stay of execution of the Order made below pending the outcome of the appeal.

[4]The Appellant’s Notice at section 11 contained only a generalised statement of the grounds said to support a stay. This was as follows:

“The Appellant seeks stay of the execution of the Order pending outcome of the appeal. It is submitted that the Appellant has a real prospect of success in this appeal and it is pivotal to impose a stay on the execution of the order pending the determination of the appeal, as the outcome of the appeal is likely to have a material impact on both the judgment and the quantum of the judgment sum. The enforcement of the order being appealed pending outcome of the appeal would risk depriving the appeal of its practical effect. The appellant would be compelled to comply with the court order which is subject to challenge. It is submitted that a stay is required to preserve the status quo and to ensure that the appeal is not rendered nugatory. In considering the balance of justice the court is invited to weigh the respective risks of injustice to the parties. It is submitted that the Respondent faces no substantial or identifiable prejudice that cannot be adequately compensated, whether by way of interest or otherwise, in the event that a stay is granted. By contrast, there is a risk of irremediable harm to the Appellant if a stay is refused. In all the circumstances, the balance of convenience plainly favours the grant of a stay. The potential injustice to the Appellant in refusing a stay outweighs any prejudice that may be occasioned to the Respondent by its grant.”

[5]That application was refused by Marcus Smith J on the papers. He considered that the generalised grounds were not sufficient to warrant any stay. He said as follows in his written Reasons at paragraph 2, referring to the points set out in section 11 of the Appellant’s Notice:

“… These … are too general to enable me to understand why a stay would prejudice the appellant. It is said that unless a stay is granted the appeal would lose all ‘practical effect’. It is not explained why this is so. Equally, it is asserted that the respondent will not be prejudiced by a stay. There is an inevitable prejudice in keeping the respondent from the judgment they are entitled to; and the assertion of no prejudice is again not explained.”

[6]The Appellant now seeks to revisit that ruling at the present hearing. The Appellant’s counsel has served a Skeleton but the Appellant has provided no evidence as to his financial situation or means. I emphasise that I have not been addressed this morning on the merits of the appeal. As I have mentioned, the permission application is still pending and will need to be determined separately, most likely by another Judge. For the purposes of this application I am prepared to assume that the appeal is at least not fanciful.

[7]The law as to stays pending appeal is well settled. Both parties in their Skeletons have referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hammond Suddards Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd

[2001] EWCA Civ 2065

. Clarke LJ in that case said at paragraph [22] that the essential question is “whether there is a risk of injustice to one or both parties” if a stay is granted or refused. He further said that three considerations are ordinarily relevant:(a) if a stay is refused, what is the risk that the appeal will be stifled;

(b) if a stay is granted and the appeal fails, what is the risk that the Respondent will be unable to enforce the judgment; and

(c) if a stay is refused and the appeal succeeds, what is the risk that the Appellant will be unable to recover sums paid out in the meantime?

[8]Taking these considerations in turn I would comment as follows.

[9]To begin with, will the appeal be stifled? The Appellant’s submission is simply that, absent a stay, he may be subject to immediate enforcement action before his challenge to liability can be resolved by means of the appeal. It seems to me, however, that on principle and authority it is not enough to make such a general submission in the absence of clear evidence as to an inability to pay. The idea of an appeal being stifled contemplates that the Appellant is simply unable to comply with the Order made and thus may be driven into bankruptcy, or otherwise unable to pursue the appeal effectively if the Order is complied with. In order to make good a submission of that type an Appellant must put forward evidence as to his means and must show that he cannot pay. The evidence, it seems to me, must be full and frank so a complete and clear picture is given. Clarke LJ said the same thing in the Hammond Suddards case where he commented as follows:

“[An Applicant] … which seeks to stay orders obtained after a lengthy and fair hearing must produce cogent evidence that there is a real risk of injustice if enforcement is allowed to take place pending appeal.”

[10]Generalised submissions are not enough even in a case where the figures are substantial. In any case here, the evidence at trial was that the Appellant, although now retired, has property investments which should be sufficient to allow him to comply with the Order made. Mr Ahmed, in his careful and helpful submissions, quite properly did not seek to suggest otherwise. He did not seek to submit to me that the Appellant does not have the ability to pay, only that, given the overall context, refusing a stay would not be a fair outcome. Given that, I do not feel able to conclude that there is in fact a risk of the appeal being stifled.

[11]I turn then to the other factors mentioned in the Hammond Suddards case. For similar reasons, neither do I consider that those factors require a stay to be imposed in this case.

[12]The Appellant’s main argument is that there would be prejudice to him in being required to pay now, because if His Honour Judge Saunders’ Order is later set aside or varied, he will then be left to try and recover the sums paid over from his son, the Respondent, which he says may be difficult in the context of an ongoing and it seems rather bitter family dispute. The Appellant acknowledges that there is some prejudice to the Respondent in being kept out of his money pending the outcome of the pending appeal, but says that can be addressed in a number of ways.

[13]First, he says that if the Respondent successfully defends the appeal he will be entitled to accumulating interest to compensate him for not having use of the money in the meantime. Second, he says that the Respondent’s position can be secured: he offers an undertaking not to dispose of or charge any of his own one-third interest in 48 Ryefield Avenue, one of the investment properties in issue. Third, the Appellant has offered to make an immediate payment into Court of £25,000. Fourth, the Appellant says that his application for permission to appeal could be expedited.

[14]I acknowledge that this approach has some attraction and admire the ingenuity of Mr Ahmed for having proposed it. It also recognises that the proper task for the Court in a case of this kind is to balance the risk of injustice to the Appellant against the risk of injustice to the Respondent.

[15]In my opinion, however, the balance in this case is firmly in favour of requiring compliance with the Order the Court has already made. I say that essentially for the reason already mentioned above. The evidence supports the view that the Appellant can afford to comply with that Order. If he can pay, then the proper starting point is to say that he should, absent some good reason. There is no injustice in that outcome because the ordinary expectation is that Orders of the Court made after a trial should be complied with. Compliance is not optional, even if there is a pending appeal.

[16]I am not persuaded that there is much in the point that if the appeal is successful, it may then be difficult to unwind any payments made in the meantime. The point is essentially mere assertion. There is no clear evidence supporting it. True, there is no direct evidence from the Respondent as to his means and the Appellant was critical of the fact that, for example, there is no schedule of the Respondent’s assets. However, that is not to say that nothing is known about the Respondent’s assets. Again, I understand it is clear from the proceedings below that he has a half-interest in 20 The Larches and a one-third interest in 48 Ryefield Avenue. Moreover, I do not think the Appellant can fairly criticise the Respondent for the fact that he has not provided more detail when the Appellant himself has failed to put his own cards face up on the table by serving evidence as to his own means. He is the Applicant and it was up to him to make the first move.

[17]I take the point that the Respondent will be entitled to interest, but that is not a complete answer because the promise of interest paid in the future is not the same as having money in your pocket today. Being kept out of money that the Court has already said you should have is a source of prejudice and, as Mr Ahmed conceded in his Skeleton Argument, it is real prejudice. That was an entirely appropriate concession to make.

[18]Moreover, in this case the prejudice would arise from the Appellant’s failure to comply with an Order which he is capable of complying with. I accept of course that there is some risk that the Order may be overturned or varied on appeal; but equally, a possible outcome of the appeal is that the Order will remain as it is. In my judgment, in the circumstances of this case, the potential unfairness to the Respondent given that possibility outweighs the risk of any unfairness to the Appellant in requiring the Order to be complied with now, which is what one would ordinarily expect to happen.

[19]For all those reasons the Appellant’s application for a stay of execution is refused. - - - - - - - - - - - (This Judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com