Tibor Matyas v Peter Daniel & Ors [2026] EWHC 1368 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1368 (Ch)

Case No PT-2025-000384

Case No PT-2024-000430

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

CHANCERY DIVISION: PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST

Venue Rolls Building, Fetter Lane,

London, EC4A 1NL

Date 5 June 2026

Before

Upper Tribunal Judge Andrew Scott sitting as a deputy High Court judge

TIBOR MATYAS

Claimant

Between

PETER DANIEL (AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF HUAN LIU)

PU LIU

DE HENG LIU

XUAN RONG YANG Defendants

Aidan Briggs (instructed directly) for Claimant

Timothy Evans (instructed by Collyer Bristow) for Defendant (1)

for Defendants (2) to (4) did not appear

Hearing Hearing dates: 23 and 24 April 2026

Written submissions: 1 May 2026

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 5 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

.............................

Upper Tribunal Judge Andrew Scott sitting as a deputy High Court judge:

[1]These proceedings concern the life and death of Mr Huan Liu, a clothing designer who was born in China and who later moved to London. While living in London, Mr Liu took the English name of “Chris”, and I refer (with no intended disrespect) to him as Chris. Chris died on 10 April 2017 at the age of 47.

[2]The claimant is Mr Tibor Matyas. Mr Matyas says that he was Chris’s life and business partner: he claims that they lived together as if they were a married couple and operated both personally and professionally as a single indivisible unit where income and property were shared jointly in equal shares.

[3]At the time of Chris’s death, Chris was the sole registered proprietor of two separate properties, namely– i) 41 Kinetica Apartments, London E8 2FE together with an associated car parking place (“Kinetica”); and ii) Flat 4, 13 Atkins Square, London E8 1FA (“Atkins Square”).

[4]He was also the joint owner of 37 Thornbury Close, London N16 8UX (“Thornbury”), which was bought with Mr Matyas as joint tenants.

[5]Chris’s will left Kinetica to his brother (Mr Pu Liu) and his parents (Mr De Heng Liu and Ms Xuan Rong Yang) and Atkins Square to his brother, his parents and Mr Matyas in equal shares. The residuary estate was left to Chris’s parents. The will appointed Mr Matyas and Mr Pu Liu as executors but, following a long and fractious legal dispute, the administrator of the estate is Mr Peter Daniel, who was appointed by this court.

[6]In these proceedings, Mr Matyas– i) claims that he has a 50% beneficial interest in both Kinetica and Atkins Square; and ii) makes a claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) for reasonable financial provision for his maintenance and also seeks permission to issue the claim out of time.

[7]The claim for a beneficial interest in the two properties is resisted by Mr Daniel but Mr Daniel took a position of neutrality in relation to the 1975 Act claim. Chris’s brother and parents (all of whom are resident in China) are also defendants to Mr Matyas’s claim but took no active part in the proceedings. This was on the basis that the protracted litigation in the case had exhausted their financial resources.

[8]The litigation in relation to Chris’s estate has been very long and very expensive. Mr Matyas has, as a result of the litigation, accumulated debts of (as estimated by Mr Briggs on behalf of Mr Matyas) about £440,000 at the time of the trial: the vast bulk of these debts represent costs orders made against Mr Matyas. Chris’s estate would, absent the litigation, have been substantial: on the assumption that Kinetica and Atkins Square fall wholly within the estate, it would have had a value in excess of £1million as at the trial. But the litigation means that the net value of the estate has been almost entirely consumed by costs. If, as Mr Matyas contends, he is beneficially interested to 50% of the properties, the estate would in fact be insolvent.

[9]However, as I explain below, I do not consider that Mr Matyas does have any beneficial interest in either Kinetica or Atkins Square. I also consider that his 1975 Act claim fails for four separate reasons. I have sought to deal with matters as exhaustively as possible in this judgment and I sincerely hope that this decision will finally put matters to rest and allow Chris’s family and Mr Matyas to move on with their lives.

[10]The remainder of this judgment falls into two Parts: Part A will deal with the beneficial interest claim and Part B will deal with the 1975 Act claim. Although there is an overlap in some of the evidence relating to the two separate claims, I have structured the judgment so as to make separate factual findings in considering the two different claims, referring wherever relevant to findings made elsewhere in the judgment. I deal with the protracted litigation concerning the administration of the estate in Part B.

[11]I thank both Counsel for their very helpful submissions. In particular, I should give special thanks to Mr Briggs, who represented Mr Matyas through Advocate on a pro bono basis and did so with considerable clarity and skill. PART A: CLAIM TO BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN PROPERTIES The law on common intention constructive trusts

PART A: CLAIM TO BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN PROPERTIES

[12]The key principles relating to claims to a beneficial interest in a property are to be found in the speeches of Lord Walker and Lady Hale in the leading House of Lords case of Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 A.C. 432. They can be summarised as follows– i) the burden is on the party alleging that the beneficial ownership of a property differs from its legal ownership to prove that allegation ([56]), a point elaborated on by Lady Hale at [68] in a manner relevant to this case: “The burden will therefore be on the person seeking to show that the parties did intend their beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests, and in what way. This is not a task to be lightly embarked upon. In family disputes, strong feelings are aroused when couples split up. These often lead the parties, honestly but mistakenly, to reinterpret the past in self-exculpatory or vengeful terms. They also lead people to spend far more on the legal battle than is warranted by the sums actually at stake”; ii) in deciding whether that burden has been met, the court must “ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual, inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of their whole course of conduct in relation to it” ([60]); iii) in deciding whether the beneficial ownership differs from the legal ownership, and, if so, what the true beneficial ownership is, the court looks to identify the common intention which the parties must, in light of their conduct, be taken to have intended ([62]); iv) where there is an express agreement as to the beneficial ownership, “however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms may have been”, the court will give effect to it ([5], [25]); v) the presumption of a resulting trust based upon the parties’ financial contributions is not a rule of law, merely a consensus as to the most likely inference of fact to be drawn in the absence of any evidence to the contrary ([60]); vi) sole, or joint, liability for the mortgage on the property is not determinative of the parties’ beneficial interests: it is merely one factor to be taken into account ([67]); vii) many more factors than financial contributions may be relevant to divining the parties’ true intentions (see [69]): viii) the claimant must have acted to their detriment in reliance upon the common intention so as to justify the intervention of equity ([19] and [124]); and ix) the principles apply whether a property is registered in a sole name or in joint names ([31] and [65]).

[13]The reference to an express agreement between the parties was considered by Waite J in Hammond v Mitchell

[1991] 1 WLR 1127

where, in relation to the formulation of claims to a beneficial interest in more substantial assets such as property or investments, he said this at [1139]– “The primary emphasis accorded by the law in cases of this kind to express discussions between the parties (“however imperfectly remembered and however imprecise their terms”) means that the tenderest exchanges of a common law courtship may assume an unforeseen significance many years later when they are brought under equity’s microscope and subjected to an analysis under which many thousands of pounds of value may be liable to turn on fine questions as to whether the relevant words were spoken in earnest or in dalliance and with or without representational intent. This requires that the express discussions to which the court's initial inquiries will be addressed should be pleaded in the greatest detail, both as to language and as to circumstance.”

[14]So far as detrimental reliance is concerned, the relevant case law was exhaustively considered by Lewison LJ in Hudson v Hathway

[2023] KB 345

. I consider the following authorities discussed and approved by Lewison LJ in that case to be most relevant to this case.

[15]In Grant v Edwards

[1986] Ch 638

, Nourse LJ said that where it is established that the claimant made contributions referable to the acquisition of the property “such expenditure will perform the twofold function of establishing the common intention and showing that the claimant has acted upon it”.

[16]In Gillett v Holt

[2001] Ch 210

Robert Walker LJ said at [232]– “The overwhelming weight of authority shows that detriment is required. But the authorities also show that it is not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.”

Outline of the submissions made on behalf of Mr Matyas

[17]Mr Briggs, on behalf of Mr Matyas, advances the claim to a 50% beneficial interest in Kinetica and Thornbury as follows.

[18]He submits that not only were the finances of Mr Matyas and Chris closely intertwined but – critically – they did not reflect the legal structures (except in the case of Thornbury). The thread running through the entirety of Mr Matyas’s case is that he and Chris were a couple who shared every aspect of their finances and paid no attention whatever to whose name bank accounts were in or whose name appeared on the title of a property.

[19]In particular, Mr Briggs submitted that– i) Chris and Mr Matyas had two businesses with apparently different shareholdings but, in fact, both were operated as joint ventures in which each of them had an equal say; ii) household expenses were paid partly from an account held in their joint names and partly from Chris’s credit card of which Mr Matyas was an additional cardholder; iii) Mr Matyas had an unlimited power of attorney to access and use the funds in Chris’s UBS account held in his sole name; iv) in general, monies moved very fluidly between the various accounts held by Chris and Mr Matyas; and v) the properties registered in Chris’s sole name (Kinetica and Atkins Square) were dealt with in the same way as Thornbury (held in joint names): for example, Mr Matyas was authorised to arrange lettings for Atkins Square in the same way as he did for Thornbury.

[20]It is, so says Mr Briggs, “overwhelmingly likely” therefore that, in the case of all three properties, the funds were supplied from Chris and Mr Matyas’ joint business ventures. It is also said to be striking that the differences in legal title between the three properties is not reflected in the funding of the purchase or their usage– i) Kinetica was originally purchased as tenants in common even though the funds appear to have come exclusively from Chris’s family; ii) the transfer of Kinetica into Chris’s sole name had no impact on its joint occupation by Chris and Mr Matyas; and iii) the purchase of Thornbury was indistinguishable from those of Kinetica and Atkins Square as to the source of funds and its ultimate usage.

[21]In these circumstances, Mr Briggs submits that Mr Matyas’s explanation of the agreement and understanding between him and Chris was more likely than not. There was, in the case of Kinetica, clear detriment in Mr Matyas agreeing to a transfer of the title to the property out of his and Chris’s joint names, as well as in the use of their joint funds for the purchase. And, if that is accepted, it makes a similar understanding in relation to Atkins Square “overwhelmingly likely”. Factual findings Witnesses and approach to evidence

[22]Mr Matyas was, of course, the key witness and was subject to a lengthy (but fair) cross-examination by Mr Evans. For large parts of the hearing, Mr Matyas was frustrated or defensive in his responses, tending towards the argumentative or combative in exchanges with Mr Evans. His explanations were often long-winded and self-exculpatory. He was consistent throughout in expressing unconditionally his belief that his life with Chris was one of complete unity where every part of their business or personal life was shared and where legal documentation (whether as to shareholdings in their companies or as to the names in which property were held) was regarded as a mere bagatelle or, indeed, as some kind of joke. None of this mattered so far as Mr Matyas was concerned.

[23]I am prepared to accept that this might have been his belief but much of this case depends on the extent to which it was also Chris’s belief. When presented with contemporaneous documentary evidence suggesting a different version of events, Mr Matyas routinely dismissed the evidence as not reflecting the true position. And yet, at the same time, it was clear from some of the same evidence that Mr Matyas was intensely comfortable with detail, was aware of his legal rights and, at times, pursued complaints or grievances in a steely-eyed, determined way.

[24]Mr Matyas was also ready to accept that there had been times in the past when he had been dishonest in his approach to certain matters or failed to take seriously legal obligations imposed on him. There were, at least, three instances:(1) claims for single-occupancy council tax were made in circumstances where this was inconsistent with his version of events;

(2) Mr Matyas failed to notify the DVLA of what Mr Matyas claims was his residential address (Kinetica); and

(3) Mr Matyas filed accounts of CL Design UK Ltd until November 2021 in Chris’s name.

[25]While I would not accept Mr Evans’s suggestion that Mr Matyas was a fantasist, I do consider that this acknowledged lack of honesty tends to undermine both the credibility and reliability of Mr Matyas as a witness.

[26]Overall, I found Mr Matyas to be an unconvincing and unreliable witness. Once it was stripped to the core, much of Mr Matyas’s evidence amounted to simple assertions of his life with Chris: these were recollections of events at least nine years after Chris’s death (and in some cases relating to events of 20 years ago) that were often in direct contradiction of the contemporaneous documentary evidence or represented an account of affairs that strained credulity, notably in relation to the (alleged) highly remunerative and life-changing agreement with a major Chinese fashion house in relation to which, apart from Mr Matyas’s testimony, there was no other evidence.

[27]This is, in my view, a case where the well-known vulnerabilities of witness recollection so cogently set out by Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd

[2013] EWHC 3560

at [16] to [21] are to the fore. In that case, Leggatt J summarised at [22] how he would approach the evidence in that case– “In the light of these considerations, the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses’ recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This does not mean that oral testimony serves no useful purpose – though its utility is often disproportionate to its length. But its value lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which cross-examination affords to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge the personality, motivations and working practices of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the witness recalls of particular conversations and events. Above all, it is important to avoid the fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has confidence in his or her recollection and is honest, evidence based on that recollection provides any reliable guide to the truth.”

[28]Although that was directed at a commercial case, I consider that, in the light of the unreliability of Mr Matyas as a witness, the surer guide to determining the facts in this case lies by reference to the documents and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from known or probable facts. True it is that these need to be tested by reference to the oral testimony given by Mr Matyas; and that is what much of this judgment is concerned to do. However, if virtually all of the documentary evidence is said, as it was by Mr Matyas, to be close to a work of fiction (when it was inconsistent with his case), it does, in my view, tend to undermine the credibility and reliability of Mr Matyas’s witness testimony taken as a whole.

[29]Mr Daniel gave a witness statement in support of his defence to the claim but was not cross-examined on it. Mr Pu Liu made a short witness statement (not subject to cross-examination) for the purposes of these proceedings but the statement was not relied on by either party to any material extent, and I do not consider it takes matters further.

[30]Mr Matyas also relied on other witness statements but the evidence is more relevant to Mr Matyas’s 1975 Act claim and I discuss it in Part B of this judgment.

Fashion businesses

[31]Chris came to London in 2003 to study fashion at the London College of Fashion. He was a clothing designer and he began working together with Mr Matyas in womenswear design. In his skeleton argument, Mr Briggs described Chris as the creative side of the businesses and Mr Matyas as the management and sales side of the business. In my view that is a correct description of the position although, in his cross-examination, Mr Matyas made for the first time a claim to be a designer as well. In my view, the evidence as a whole is not, however, consistent with that claim.

[32]Initially, the businesses were unincorporated. They were operated from a design studio at Unit 3 Maun House, 1 Dunn Street, London E8 2DG (“Dunn Street”). The studio was also used as residential premises by Mr Matyas until the acquisition of Kinetica. It is less clear whether Dunn Street was also used by Chris as a residence. Dunn Street remained in use as business premises for the businesses.

[33]In July 2005 in order to obtain “matched” enterprise funding, a company, Chris and Tibor Limited, was formed as an English private company of which Chris and Mr Matyas were shareholders. In his witness statement of 27 February 2026 (“2026 witness statement”), Mr Matyas explained that he had, with no involvement from Chris, obtained “matched” funding from the East London Small Business Centre. Among other things, this included drafting a business plan and presenting the case before an HSBC committee. Chris was not involved “as his focus remained on the creative side of the business”.

[34]Chris and Mr Matyas were directors of the company. The initial shareholdings were 70% for Chris and 30% for Mr Matyas. Mr Matyas’s shareholding was later increased to 50% (and it remained at 50% at the time of Chris’s death). Mr Matyas’s explanation for the change in the shareholdings was that “it reflected nothing substantive, because in practice our understanding, contribution, and mutual benefit had never differed, that it was a joint life and business no matter what” ([7] of his 2026 witness statement).

[35]In his cross-examination, Mr Matyas, when asked why the shareholdings were changed, answered that there was no reason for the change:

“it was a laugh; to carry on as a joke; it was not relevant to our relationship”

. He did, however, say that it was Chris’s idea that the shareholdings should be changed. I would accept that part of Mr Matyas’s evidence that it was Chris who initiated the change. I have no basis on which to determine why Chris considered that the shareholdings should be changed but, in my view, it is wholly at odds with the seriousness with which (judged by the documentation as a whole) Chris went about his business life to consider that a change of such a kind was, as Mr Matyas put it, a joke or a laugh.

[36]The filed accounts for Chris and Tibor Limited show that, in its first four years of trading (2006 to 2009), it recorded a turnover of between £27,057 and £114,616. Its most profitable year was 2009 when it recorded a profit of £18,863. For that year, directors’ remuneration was recorded in the accounts as £10,800. However, rather than taking monies out as salary, Chris and Mr Matyas let amounts accrue to them as loans in their capacity as directors: credits to the directors’ loan accounts for 2009 were recorded as £47,333 in favour of Chris and £12,873 in favour of Mr Matyas.

[37]After 2009, the turnover for the company was not recorded for four of the six years before Chris’s death. For 2012 it was recorded as £15,123 and for 2013 it was recorded as £232,019. For the years from 2010 to 2015 inclusive, the accounts showed that liabilities exceeded assets by at least £48,000. Indeed, the company had been insolvent on a balance sheet basis since July 2008. Accordingly, although under Chris’s will his 50% shareholding in the company passed to Mr Matyas, it had no value at that time.

[38]A second company, CL Design UK Ltd, was incorporated in November 2006, with Chris as director and Mr Matyas as secretary. Chris was throughout the sole shareholder. The name of the company also seems to reflect a difference in ownership from the existing company: Chris and Tibor Limited (jointly owned) included both names of the shareholders whereas CL Design UK Ltd has no identifiable reference to Mr Matyas and the initials preceding “Design” would appear to be a reference to Chris Liu.

[39]The reason given by Mr Matyas for the incorporation of CL Design UK Ltd is central to his claim for a beneficial interest in Kinetica.

[40]The story begins with a Chinese Presidential visit to the United Kingdom on 8 November 2005. It was, according to Mr Matyas, as a result of this visit that Chris and Mr Matyas were approached by a Chinese fashion brand – which Mr Matyas said in cross-examination was called “Yishen” but the name of the company had not been previously identified – to provide consultancy services for £150,000 per fashion “season”, namely, £300,000 per year.

[41]In his 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas said at [9] that “Chris took primary responsibility for the Chinese consultancy work due to his language skills and his understanding of the relevant cultural context”. And later in that witness statement he said at [17]:

“we assisted [the large Chinese fashion company] in developing collections that would appeal to the high-end international fashion market—an area in which we had been well-established. Chris’s Chinese heritage and language skills provided a distinct advantage in this professional collaboration.”

[42]In his cross-examination, Mr Matyas claimed that Yishen was interested in how fashion operated in the Western world and was designing or proposing collections and art work. When it was put to him that it was Chris who was doing this, Mr Matyas’s response was that he had worked for Burberry as a graphic designer and he had “fantastic” drawing skills. He also said (in re-examination) that he was part of the process from the very beginning and had been part of the team that went to China although he later acknowledged that Chris had said there was no need to accompany him on every trip.

[43]As Mr Matyas puts it in his 2026 witness statement, it was “due to tax and structural uncertainties arising as the Chinese consultancy arrangement developed” that CL Design UK Ltd was incorporated. Precisely what these tax and structural uncertainties were was not properly explained by Mr Matyas. The most that was said was that accountancy advice was given to the effect that invoices should be issued to Yishen by a company. The reason why the existing company, Chris and Tibor Limited, was not used was a preference for that company to be used for Western clients. The new company, CL Design UK Limited, was said to be for Chinese clients.

[44]The strong implication here is that the consultancy arrangement was with CL Design UK Ltd. But that was not said in terms in any of Mr Matyas’s witness statements and, in his cross-examination, he said that, so far as he knew, Yishen did not enter into a contract with CL Design UK Ltd. Indeed, even though the alleged accountancy advice had seemed to focus on the issue of company invoices, Mr Matyas accepted in cross-examination (after initially being a little evasive) that no invoices were ever produced for Yishen. No contract has been produced with Yishen either. In fact, there is no documentary trace of any kind to any business done by Yishen involving either Chris or Mr Matyas.

[45]It is convenient at this point to note what the company accounts had to say about the performance of CL Design UK Ltd. As at the date of Chris’s death, CL Design UK Ltd had no value. It had ceased trading in 2015. It had been insolvent on a balance sheet basis from the beginning: the minimum amount by which its liabilities exceeded its assets was £65,000. Its annual turnover never exceeded £65,064. From 2007 to 2013, amounts between £67,000 and £118,000 were shown as standing credit to the director’s loan account in the name of Chris.

[46]It is evident, therefore, that CL Design UK Ltd did not benefit from any commercial arrangement there may have been with Yishen. And nor did Chris and Tibor Limited.

[47]Moreover, if there was a Chinese consultancy agreement, none of the monies were paid directly to any bank account for which statements are available. It is possible that monies might have been paid into the UBS account. This account (discussed in more detail below) was opened on 21 December 2006, shortly after the alleged agreement with Yishen had been entered into. But there are no statements for that account to verify this.

[48]Mr Matyas asserted that, throughout their time together, both he and Chris made equal contributions to their businesses. He claims that Chris did not have any independent business ventures. When asked why Chris was the sole shareholder of CL Design UK Limited, Mr Matyas said that it “was not serious for me or Chris”. He also included as an exhibit to his 2026 witness statement under the heading “CL Design UK Ltd – Tibor’s business too” various email exchanges that were intended to show that Mr Matyas was the business owner of CL Design UK Ltd or, at least, was involved in the running of the company beyond his role as secretary. Mr Briggs even went so far as to say in his skeleton argument that these showed dealings with the Chinese consultancy contract; but the documents relied on do not bear this out and Mr Matyas confirmed that none of the emails related to the consultancy project with Yishen.

[49]Rather, they showed Mr Matyas undertaking mainly administrative functions such as dealing with arrangements for make-up and hair stylists, checking whether items were in stock, seeking to make arrangements for showing collections and obtaining details for buyers. These functions do go beyond those performed by a company secretary but there is little in them to suggest an involvement in the strategic decision-making of the company or in the creative side of the business. I do not accept the submission made by Mr Briggs that there was no clear delineation between the two companies. The most that the evidence shows is that Mr Matyas performed relatively modest management functions in CL Design UK Ltd beyond those associated with a company secretary.

[50]For instance, in an email of 23 April 2008 from Chris, there was a reference to the fact that “Tibor is helping for sales”. There was also a reference in the same email to how “Tibor and I juggling two businesses at the same time”. In fact, that reference to the juggling of two businesses is the high-water mark of evidence contained in the documents to show that the businesses of Chris and Tibor Limited and CL Design UK Limited were carried on as a single joint enterprise.

[51]A large number of the emails in the exhibit relied on by Mr Matyas related to a legal dispute that CL Design UK Limited was having, which demonstrated (and was confirmed as such by Mr Matyas in cross-examination) a close interest taken by Mr Matyas in legal procedure and associated technical matters. The relevant emails also confirmed that the contract which was the subject of the legal dispute had been signed by Chris and that it was Chris who had the most up-to-date information about the case.

[52]In other emails, Mr Matyas was certainly promoting the business of the company but the way in which it was done emphasised Chris as the creative inspiration. For example, in an email of 19 December 2007 to Frida Petersson, Mr Matyas said this– “This collection is the re-launch of Chris Liu womenswear. AW0809 is the 1st season with the new design team and sales strategy. Chris Liu is the british answer of 3.1 Philip Lim. The previous womenswear collection was sold to Maria Luisa Paris and Harvey Nichols in Hong Kong. On the other side Chris is the designer of a very successful accessory label called Chris&Tibor.”

[53]Viewing the evidence as a whole, my view is that it is more likely than not there was no agreement with Yishen. The company was said to be a large Chinese fashion house but there is no documentary ‘footprint’ of any agreement with it involving Chris or Mr Matyas: no contract, no invoices, no emails and no other documents of any kind. The reason given for the incorporation of CL Design UK Limited is not credible. It was said to be linked to the fashion consultancy agreement but no monies ever went to CL Design UK Limited. The alleged need for corporate invoices is inconsistent with the fact that it was accepted by Mr Matyas that no invoices were ever made out naming CL Design UK Ltd as the provider of consultancy services. The tax and other unarticulated “structural” reasons for the company’s existence are not properly explained.

[54]Even if there was an agreement with Yishen, I consider it is most unlikely that Mr Matyas had any direct involvement in it. The most that I would accept is that he might have accompanied Chris in visits to China. It was Chris who was the fashion designer, not Mr Matyas. CL Design UK Limited was Chris’s company. He was the sole shareholder and the sole director of that company. Mr Matyas provided some support in relation to its running but the value of the company did not relate to his efforts. He was the man in charge of the details, the man who helped out with sales, the man who promoted the company and who ensured that its bills were paid. The entrepreneurial value in the company belonged to Chris. The legal structure reflected this.

Bank accounts and financial arrangements

[55]It was claimed by Mr Matyas that he and Chris arranged their finances together. In fact, Chris had various accounts in his sole name for which statements are available, namely– i) an HSBC account ending 4941 (premier savings); ii) an HSBC account ending 1490 (current); iii) an HSBC account ending 1898 (savings); and iv) a UBS Zurich account ending 9669.

[56]Chris also had an HSBC credit card for which Mr Matyas was a secondary cardholder. As the credit card was in Chris’s name, it was he who was responsible for paying the balance (and a failure to do so would have affected his credit rating).

[57]There were movements of monies between Chris and Mr Matyas from Chris’s sole HSBC account, including at least one (on 31 May 2011) described as a payment of a personal loan (£10,000) with a portion of that (£2,500) repaid on 20 July 2011. Mr Matyas’s explanation for this was that it was to fund a foreign exchange account.

[58]On 1 December 2014 there was a payment of £500 from Mr Matyas into Chris’s HSBC bank account, which was repeated in the following months until at least 1 December 2016. But there were also payments of £500 (from the Lloyds joint bank account) into Chris’s sole account. On the same day as these payments were made, there were payments made out of the Lloyds bank accounts for the same sum (£500) into an account in the name of Mr Matyas for which no statements were available. There was no explanation given by Mr Matyas as to why these payments were made other than the fact that Chris and Mr Matyas needed money as the UBS account was reduced to zero.

[59]The rent payable in respect of Atkins Square was paid into Chris’s sole HSBC bank account out of which the mortgage was paid and also the credit card of which Mr Matyas was a signatory.

[60]The UBS account was opened on 21 December 2006. There are no statements available for the account. Mr Matyas said in cross-examination that he thought that the bank statements were at one time in the studio (Dunn Street) but they must have been lost or destroyed.

[61]Chris gave Mr Matyas a power of attorney over the account the terms of which were unrestricted. But it is clear that Chris did not mean it to be for everyday use by Mr Matyas. On 24 July 2007 Chris gave a hand-written note to Mr Matyas, saying that he had given him a power of attorney over the UBS account “for you to access UBS saving urgently” and repeating the same point later in the note in these terms:

“I have authorised you to access funds in case urgent”

. Although he accepted that the note given to him was accurate, Mr Matyas said in cross-examination that he “didn’t pay any attention to this”, querying “what is urgent anyway?”. However, in my view, Chris meant what he said in respect of the use of the UBS account: its use was to be limited to urgent cases only.

[62]Chris and Mr Matyas had the following joint accounts– i) a Lloyds Bank joint account ending 5760; and ii) an ASB Financial Markets Deposit account ending 7382.

[63]The Lloyds account was set up for the purpose of receiving rents payable in respect of Thornbury. The statements for that account showed that outgoings in respect of Thornbury were made out of the account. Payments were made out on a regular basis separately to Chris and Mr Matyas.

[64]The ASB Bank is a New Zealand bank. The account was opened on 4 January 2012 with an initial deposit made by Chris of £80,000.79. The money was still there on 31 March 2012 but nothing further is known about this account. In particular, Mr Matyas could not in his cross-examination explain why the account had been opened in joint names.

[65]Mr Matyas had the following sole accounts– i) a NatWest current account ending 0882 opened on 24 February 2003 for which no statements are available for times when Chris was alive; and ii) a NatWest savings account ending 9786opened 1 July 2004 that remains operative.

Kinetica

[66]Before explaining the events leading up to the purchase of Kinetica, it is necessary first to set out some detail about payments made out of Chris’s sole HSBC accounts which related to China.

[67]On 5 April 2006 a payment of £20,000 was made out of Chris’s sole HSBC account to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. On 3 July 2006 a payment of £70,000 was made out of that account to Chris’s mother at the Bank of China. In fact, between April 2006 and January 2007, Chris transferred £170,000 to members of his family in China. Some of this money was, according to Mr Matyas, used to purchase a property in Chris’s father’s name in Chengdu in China. Initially, the idea was that the property should be acquired as an investment. Despite Mr Matyas’s alleged interest in this (as it was said to be sourced from his joint income), he had – on his own account of events – no say when Chris agreed to acquire the property in his father’s name even though this was not Chris’s preference. Mr Matyas claims that the funds were said to derive from the consultancy agreement but, as I have explained above, I do not accept that there was such an agreement. The provenance of these funds is, therefore, not known.

[68]The purchase of Kinetica also involved the movement of monies from China. The property was purchased in cash without the need for a mortgage.

[69]In October 2009 Chris and Mr Matyas jointly instructed Gilbert Turner Coomber on the purchase of Kinetica and associated parking space. On 6 November 2009 contracts were exchanged in their joint names but a decision was later made (in March 2010) for the property to be held only in Chris’s name.

[70]Between March and May 2010 members of Chris’s family (principally Mr Pu Liu and Dai Yu Tong, who was his wife) transferred £274,892 to Chris’s HSBC bank accounts. A payment in the sum of £313,445 was subsequently made to GTC out of Chris’s sole HSBC account. On 18 May 2010 the purchase of Kinetica and associated parking space completed (for a price of £335,000). However, the property was mistakenly transferred to both Chris and Mr Matyas to hold as beneficial tenants in common.

[71]So far as the funding of the purchase was concerned, in his witness statement of 26 September 2024, Mr Matyas said that “the funds for our home (Kinetica) came from Chris and my company by a circuitous route”. The reference to “my company” must be to Chris and Tibor Ltd but it is clear that the company in fact had no involvement in the purchase.

[72]It was said by Mr Matyas that the Chinese consultancy fees were paid into Chris’s sole UBS account. The monies in that account were, according to Mr Matyas, then transferred to Chris’s brother and parents in China, who then paid the sums to Chris’s HSBC accounts. At [32.5] of his 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas simply noted that this circular movement of funds was necessary because “we did not wish to create a direct link between the UBS account and the UK transaction”. No explanation, let alone a satisfactory one, was given by Mr Matyas about this. He was asked about these arrangements in his cross-examination but was similarly unforthcoming about why matters were structured in this way. A typical response was that the link between the UBS account and Chris’s HSBC accounts was avoided because “it felt the best thing to do”.

[73]I have already found that the evidence does not bear out the existence of any Chinese consultancy. The evidence shows that the money to buy property came from a bank account held solely in Chris’s name with funds that came from members of his family in China. But the true source of the funds is, to put it at its lowest, obscure.

[74]The plan that the property should be held in joint names was developed only when Chris and Mr Matyas first met the conveyancing solicitors: see [34] of Mr Matyas’s February 2026 witness statement. They had not discussed it beforehand. In the meeting it was Chris who expressed his desire for it to be in joint names. Mr Matyas said that “I didn’t need my name included, but he was quite confident about it and instructed the solicitor to proceed with the purchase as joint owners”.

[75]But that plan was altered when, on 10 March 2010, Mr Matyas emailed GTC to inform them that “we have decided now that the flat will be only on [sic] Chris name 100%”.

[76]The issue was, according to Mr Matyas, the fact that Chris’s parents could not understand why the purchase was to be in joint names when Chris “was covering 100% of the purchase price”. The family was unaware of Chris’s personal relationship with Mr Matyas, and Mr Matyas says that Chris had not been open about his sexuality. Accordingly, Mr Matyas’s evidence was (at [40] of his 2026 witness statement) that Chris “asked me to allow the property to be registered in his sole name so that his family would stop questioning him. He assured me that this wouldn’t change anything about our home; it would still belong to both of us, and we would continue to share everything as always. That explanation was enough for me, and I informed the solicitor that my name would no longer be on the legal title moving forward.” He went on to say in his statement that “at no point did I intend to relinquish my rights or beneficial interest in the property”.

[77]I am not prepared to accept that explanation. As mentioned above, it is unclear why members of Chris’s family were involved in the purchase. But they were involved and, not unreasonably in the circumstances, they did not understand why, if only Chris’s money was being used, the property was being purchased in joint names. As Mr Evans submitted, much the most obvious answer to that – if Mr Matyas is right that the true source of funding was the Chinese consultancy – was an explanation that the funds were Chris’s and Mr Matyas’s.

[78]The error concerning the names in which the property was held was identified by GTC, who then wrote to Mr Matyas in November 2010 seeking to rectify it.

[79]In his 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas explained how he thought that compensation might be payable in respect of the mistake (describing his view in cross-examination about this as “strong”) but noted that Chris was not interested in this and instead “wished to finalise the position without delay”. Mr Matyas said that, once he understood the pressure Chris was experiencing, he signed the transfer “promptly” or “without delay”: see [31] and [32.16] of his 2026 witness statement.

[80]The documents do not bear this out. For example, in an email of 6 January 2011, Mr Matyas made a number of points to Bethan Owen of Kingsley Napley LLP (who had been instructed to deal with the matter) and to Chris, including a request for a “paragraph stating that they would compensate me unlimited [sic] in case of any disadvantage because I supply my signature following their advice”. In the same email, Mr Matyas made it clear that he wanted an accountant or a “third party property lawyer” to confirm that his “status as a first-time buyer is not affected with [sic] this issue”. Chris emailed Bethan four days later in these terms:

“Tibor Matyas obviously does not want to sign any documents on GTC’s negligence. This is dead end right now. It is jeopardise our relationship. I am very exhausted with the situation. I do not want any delay on LR transfer any longer. What would be alternative option succeed the transfer without Tibor Matyas’ signature?”

What would be alternative option succeed the transfer without Tibor Matyas’ signature?”

[81]Bethan and Chris exchanged emails on 21 and 23 January 2011 in which it was clear that an application to court for rectification was being contemplated as the only way to unlock the dispute given that Mr Matyas was refusing to sign the TR1. A number of other options were explored, including a surrender and re-grant of the lease. A TR1 providing for the title to be transferred into Chris’s sole name was prepared and signed by Chris. However, Mr Matyas raised concerns about the tax consequences of the transfer and asked for an indemnity from GTC.

[82]In the meantime, Chris and Mr Matyas moved into Kinetica and service charge demands were issued in their joint names. They also jointly applied in January 2011 to the Land Valuation Tribunal for an assessment of the service charges. Despite Mr Briggs’s submission about this (suggesting a ‘looseness’ in the way Chris and Mr Matyas regarded the ownership of the property), the explanation, in my view, is a much simpler one. Until the legal ownership was changed, it is not at all surprising that formal matters (such as the issue of the service charge and the bringing of proceedings in respect of it) were conducted in what were then the correct legal names.

[83]It was only on 4 April 2011 (nearly six months after GTC wrote to Mr Matyas) that title to Kinetica and the associated parking space were transferred into Chris’s sole name by a TR1 in which, having ticked box 8 that the transfer was not “for money or anything of a monetary value”, the following was set out in box 11 under “Additional provisions”, having first described the parking space and Kinetica as the Car Park Lease and the Lease respectively:

“11.1 The Car Park Lease and the Lease were granted in error to both Liu Huan and Matyas Tibir [sic] when in fact the Car Park Lease and Lease should have been granted to Huan Liu in his sole name 11.2 This transfer is rectifying the title and confirming that the legal and beneficial interest is held by Huan Liu in his sole name. 11.3 For the avoidance of doubt Tibor Matyas confirms that the Property should always have been held in the sole name of Huan Liu. 11.4 Tibor Matyas confirms that he has not encumbered the undivided share in the Property and has not received notice of any incumbrance upon Huan Liu’s share of the Property.”

Thornbury

[84]Chris and Mr Matyas did, however, buy a property in joint names about 18 months after Kinetica had been transferred into Chris’s sole name.

[85]On 16 November 2012 contracts were exchanged for the purchase of Thornbury by Chris and Mr Matyas. Howes Percival acted on their behalf. On 7 December 2012 the purchase was completed for a price of £302,500. The property was transferred to Chris and Mr Matyas as beneficial joint tenants. There was a joint mortgage with HSBC.

[86]Transfers totalling £115,000 were made by Mr Pu Liu to Chris’s HSBC bank account in September and October 2012. These funds were then paid to Howes Percival.

[87]In other words, the purchase of Thornbury was funded in the same way as Kinetica: cash was transferred from Chris’s HSBC bank accounts into which monies were paid from China. Mr Matyas said in cross-examination that monies were paid out of the UBS account, which was funded from the Chinese consultancy. For the same reasons as given above, I do not accept that.

[88]There is no suggestion in the Thornbury conveyancing file of any financial contribution from Mr Matyas. Mr Matyas was taken through some of the documents in the conveyancing file in his cross-examination and he admitted that he was paying close attention to the transaction and had “probably” or had “likely” read the lengthy contract report and mortgage documents. I accept Mr Evans’s submission that the purchase of Thornbury demonstrates that Mr Matyas clearly took an active interest in the documentation and the legal process when he was acquiring rights in property.

[89]Thornbury was acquired as an investment and was let to tenants. At some point in 2013 Chris and Mr Matyas opened the joint Lloyds bank account. Rent was initially paid into Chris’s HSBC account but later rental payments were made into the joint account. The account was used to make mortgage payments and deal with utility bills, council tax and other costs associated with the property.

[90]Mr Matyas explained in his witness statement that he handled 99% of the property management, rental and maintenance. It is, therefore, of no great surprise that a tenancy agreement for the period 12 December 2012 to 12 June 2013 was in the name of only Mr Matyas; and I would note that this was the only tenancy agreement to which I was referred, suggesting that no others were available. I would not accept that this shows that Chris and Mr Matyas saw formal arrangements as of no significance or that their lives were so interchangeable that one could act for the other. The more likely explanation was that Mr Matyas was in charge of all of the practical arrangements relating to Thornbury.

Atkins Square

[91]In late 2013 Chris reserved an off-plan property in Atkins Square. Chris was the sole client of the conveyancing solicitors, DKLM LLP. The property was to be acquired as an investment and let to tenants.

[92]On 7 October 2013 Chris’s brother, Mr Pu Liu, transferred £40,000 to Chris’s HSBC account. He later signed a letter confirming this was a gift towards the purchase. Contracts were exchanged on 20 March 2014 for a price of £365,000. An initial deposit of £6,031.03 was paid by Chris out of one of his HSBC accounts.

[93]Between November 2014 and January 2015 Mr Pu Liu provided a further £110,000, which was then paid to DKLM before completion of the property in January 2015. The purchase was made in Chris’s sole name. There was a mortgage in Chris’s name of £239,245 from the Mortgage Works plc, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary and the specialist buy-to-let division of the Nationwide building society.

[94]Apart from the mortgage money, the purchase of Atkins Square was funded in the same way as Kinetica and Thornbury. In his February 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas says that, although the funds from the Chinese consultancy contract had reduced, there was still sufficient capital for a further buy-to-let property (namely, Atkins Square). As I have already explained, I am not satisfied that there was a Chinese consultancy contract.

[95]There is no suggestion in the Atkins Square conveyancing file of any contribution from Mr Matyas. Unlike Thornbury (held jointly by Chris and Mr Matyas), there was no joint account set up to receive the rents or pay the mortgage and other costs associated with the property. The mortgage was instead paid out of one of Chris’s HSBC accounts and the rent was paid into a different HSBC account held by Chris.

[96]Mr Matyas also said that he did not recollect any detailed discussion about Atkins Square being held in Chris’s name: “it is possible that he asked whether I wished my name to be included on the title. If so, it would have been consistent with my approach at the time not to focus on formal documentation” (see [50] of his 2026 witness statement). Mr Matyas simply claims that there was a common understanding between him and Chris that this was a joint investment for their joint future.

[97]In his cross-examination, Mr Matyas asserted that the property did not need to be in joint names. He explained in his February 2026 witness statement that, at the time of the purchase of Atkins Square, he was short of time as their business activities were extremely demanding:

“I was responsible for sales, public relations, production, staff matters, legal issues, the management of the Paris showroom, collaborations with other brands, and the day-to-day running of both our business and our existing rental property”

. In his cross-examination, he confirmed that he did not read the purchase report for the property.

[98]Mr Matyas went on to note at [64] of his 2026 witness statement, in relation to the two buy-to-let properties (Thornbury and Atkins Square), that “although legal title arrangements varied, this reflected administrative or lending considerations rather than any separation of beneficial ownership between us”. No explanation was given by Mr Matyas as to what the administrative or lending considerations were and why this ought to affect the title in which the properties were held.

[99]Mr Briggs claimed in his skeleton argument that funds towards the purchase of Atkins Square were also provided by Chris and Tibor Ltd but the basis for the assertion was a letter to the mortgagee in which it was said that monies from the company had been released to Chris as a partial repayment of his director’s loan account.

[100]On 19 January 2015 Chris wrote a letter of authority to “the easyProperty Crew” in respect of Atkins Square, saying that:

“I am the owner of the above flat and I hereby give my permission to Tibor Matyas to manage the property”

. As per those arrangements, Mr Matyas then dealt exclusively with the tenants.

Chris’s will

[101]Chris first made enquiries (on 18 April 2011) about making a will shortly after the title to Kinetica was transferred into his sole name. In his email of 18 April 2011, he asked Bethan Owen (of Kingsley Napley LLP) whether she could draw up a simple will in relation to “my” property (Kinetica and the parking space) with the beneficiaries to be his brother and parents.

[102]In the event Chris did not make a will at that time. He returned to the issue on 5 February 2015 – a couple of weeks after buying Atkins Square – when he had a discussion on the telephone with Martin Tolhurst Partnership in which he gave the following instructions about his will (as recorded in an attendance note)– i) he confirmed that he had three properties: Kinetica and Atkins Square in his sole name; and Thornbury as a joint tenant with Mr Matyas; and ii) he confirmed that, in making his will, he understood to whom he should have regard.

[103]His instructions were that the whole of his estate should be left to his parents but, on 1 May 2015, Chris gave further instructions about his will by email– i) he asked for “my” residential property (Kinetica) to go to his brother and parents; ii) he asked for his buy-to-let property (Atkins Square) to go equally to his brother, his parents and Mr Matyas; and iii) he noted that, as he was a joint tenant with Mr Matyas of Thornbury, there was no need for the will to make specific provision about it.

[104]On 28 May 2015 Chris executed his will reflecting his instructions of 1 May 2015– i) his brother and Mr Matyas were appointed as his executors; and ii) he gave all his estate to his parents and his brother except he gave to Mr Matyas a 25% share in Atkins Square and all his shares and holdings of a capital nature in Chris and Tibor Limited.

[105]In his cross-examination but not in any of his witness statements, Mr Matyas said that Chris’s family “forced” him to have a will. So far as this was a suggestion that Mr Matyas knew about the will, I do not accept that. The witness statement and all the other events surrounding the making of the will tell a different story. It is also the case that, in his closing submissions, Mr Briggs referred to the fact that Mr Matyas was unaware of Chris’s investigation into making a will in 2011 and was not aware of the will that Chris made in 2015. Discussion

[106]In the light of my factual findings, I have little hesitation in deciding that Mr Matyas has no beneficial interest in either Kinetica or Atkins Square.

[107]Mr Matyas’s case rested on the existence of an express understanding between Mr Matyas and Chris that the properties were to be owned jointly or on the financial contributions he made jointly to the purchase of those properties as a result of the allegedly joint income earned from the consultancy with Yishen.

[108]In my view, the facts are clear: there was no such understanding between Chris and Mr Matyas in respect of Kinetica; and Mr Matyas did not make any financial contribution to its purchase. In his cross-examination, Mr Matyas said at times that the understanding between him and Chris was “silent”. In my view, the proper characterisation was that the “understanding” did not exist. The contemporaneous documentary evidence points firmly in one direction only. The TR1 in which Mr Matyas expressly confirmed that he had no beneficial interest in Kinetica cannot be wished away in the manner in which Mr Matyas has done in these proceedings. It is telling, in my view, that Mr Matyas did everything that he could to prevent the TR1 from being executed in the face of the very clear desire of Chris to secure that the title to Kinetica was transferred into his sole name. It is also of note that Mr Matyas was at pains to get legal reassurance that the change in title for Kinetica would not affect his future status as a first-time buyer: Mr Matyas was, at the material time, well aware that he had no beneficial interest in Kinetica.

[109]Mr Matyas made no financial contribution to the purchase of Kinetica and, whatever the reason for Chris’s initial decision – and it is of note that it was Chris’s decision alone and that Mr Matyas, on his own account, had been surprised that it had been raised by Chris in the manner it was for the first time in an initial meeting with solicitors – that the property should be held in joint names, it is evident that, at the time of completion, the title to the property should reflect the financial contributions, namely that it was 100% Chris’s property. The contemporaneous discussions about a proposed will of his at the time of its purchase are consistent with that. Kinetica was accurately described by Chris as his property. He described it in the same way in his discussions with solicitors leading up to the will he then did execute in May 2015.

[110]I do not accept the explanation put forward by Mr Matyas that the ownership was changed because of pressure from Chris’s family. As Mr Evans submitted, if (which I do not accept) it was the case that Mr Matyas had made a financial contribution to the purchase of Kinetica, it is not credible, in my view, that this joint financing of the property could not have been given to Chris’s family as a reason for the title being in joint names.

[111]Mr Matyas’s claims that the businesses carried on by the two separate companies (Chris and Tibor Ltd and CL Design UK Ltd) were joint in all respects is, in my view, not established by the evidence. Chris was the sole director and shareholder of CL Design UK Ltd and, while Mr Matyas did perform functions for that company beyond those of a company secretary, the reality was that Chris was, as I have found above, the creative influence behind the company. The legal arrangements reflected the substantive reality that this was Chris’s company alone.

[112]I also do not consider that the financial arrangements between Chris and Mr Matyas were as unified or intertwined to the extent asserted by Mr Matyas. Each had separate bank accounts. The only joint account they had (ignoring the New Zealand account in relation to which nothing is known after it was originally set up with funds provided solely by Chris) was, on advice from their accountants, established solely for administrative simplicity in managing the one property that they clearly did jointly own (Thornbury). Mr Matyas was a card holder for Chris’s credit card but that is of little relevance, in my view, to the central submissions on which Mr Matyas’s claims to beneficial ownership rest: it is not evidence of a common intention that Kinetica or Atkins Square should be owned jointly.

[113]Similarly, the fact that Mr Matyas was given a power of attorney over Chris’s UBS account does not assist Mr Matyas’s beneficial interest claim. All that shows is that, in cases of urgency only, Chris was content to allow Mr Matyas to access the funds in that account.

[114]The purchase of Thornbury in joint names was said by Mr Briggs to show that Chris and Mr Matyas were indifferent to the way in which the legal title to properties was held. I consider that the opposite is the case.

[115]The purchase of Kinetica was funded solely by Chris. The monies for the purchase came from Chris’s sole bank account. By contrast, Thornbury was bought as a buy-to-let investment property and a joint account was set up expressly for the purpose of managing the income receivable, and the expenses payable, in respect of the property. As Mr Evans submitted, Mr Matyas paid particularly keen attention to the documentation leading up to the purchase of Thornbury. That difference is, in my view, explicable because Mr Matyas stood to benefit from its purchase in the way that he did not from the purchase of Kinetica.

[116]The subsequent purchase of Atkins Square was also funded solely by Chris. The monies again came from Chris’s sole account. As was the case for Kinetica, Chris described Atkins Square as his property in discussions with the solicitors leading up to his will executed in May 2015. These discussions were, moreover, held within weeks of the purchase of Atkins Square.

[117]On his own account, Mr Matyas was somewhat indifferent to the way in which Atkins Square was purchased. As Mr Evans submitted, the obvious explanation for this (and the one I accept) is that Mr Matyas had no beneficial interest in the property. Indeed, Chris said as much in a letter sent to the managing agents of the property (referred to at [100] above): plainly, Chris did not consider at the time of purchase that Atkins Square was to any extent owned by Mr Matyas otherwise he would not have needed to give him permission to manage the property.

[118]It is true that Mr Matyas did then manage Atkins Square in the same way as he managed Thornbury. But it does not follow from this that the ownership of the properties was intended to be the same. The relatively modest managerial functions performed by Mr Matyas also do not represent any substantial detriment for Mr Matyas.

[119]In my view, the evidence shows that, in their relationship, it was agreed that Mr Matyas should be charged with the administrative aspects of life. Chris’s focus was on being a successful fashion designer, on being its creative inspiration. He was likely, in my view, to have neither the time nor the inclination to assume responsibility for managing the two buy-to-let properties. By contrast, Mr Matyas had both.

[120]In short, I consider that the way in which Chris described his ownership of Kinetica, Thornbury and Atkins Square in his instructions for his will on 1 May 2015 reflects the true position. Kinetica and Atkins Square were Chris’s properties and no-one else’s. By contrast, Chris was well aware that Thornbury was a different case: it was held by him and Mr Matyas as joint tenants, and, consequently, the will did not need to make any provision about it.

[121]For all of the above reasons, I dismiss Mr Matyas’s claims to have any beneficial interest in Kinetica and Atkins Square. PART B: THE 1975 ACT CLAIM Introduction

PART B: THE 1975 ACT CLAIM

[122]As I shall explain in more detail below, if Mr Matyas is to succeed on his 1975 Act claim, each of the following must be shown– i) that Chris was domiciled in England and Wales; ii) that Chris and Mr Matyas lived in the same household as a married couple or as civil partners; and iii) that Chris’s will had failed to make such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for Mr Matyas to receive for his maintenance.

[123]In addition, Mr Matyas must seek the court’s permission to bring a late application.

[124]I deal below with each of those requirements in that order. Before doing so, it is convenient to set out some of the key provisions of the 1975 Act as well as Mr Matyas’s financial needs and resources as at the date of the hearing.

Outline of main provisions of the 1975 Act

[125]Mr Matyas makes an application under s. 1 of the 1975 Act for an order under s.2 of that Act on the ground that the disposition of Chris’s estate made by his will “is not such as to make reasonable financial provision” for Mr Matyas.

[126]A precondition for the making of an application is that the deceased dies domiciled in England and Wales (see the opening words of s.1(1) of the 1975 Act) and that the applicant falls within a category set out in s.1(1)(a) to (e) of the 1975 Act. Mr Matyas is basing his application on paragraph (ba) which (as that paragraph was in force at the time of Chris’s death) refers to a person to whom subsection (1A) or (1B) applies. I note that Mr Briggs had been relying on the text of s.1 of the 1975 Act as it stood at the time the application was made (the same text as at the date of the hearing): in that text, subsection (1B) has been repealed. I do not consider that anything turns on the differences between the text of s.1 of the 1975 Act at those different times.

[127]Whichever text is considered, Mr Matyas must, for the whole of the period of two years ending immediately before the death of Chris on 10 April 2017, have been living in the same household as Chris as if they were a married couple or civil partners.

[128]As Mr Matyas is relying on s.1(1)(ba) of the 1975 Act, what is meant by “reasonable financial provision” is determined by s.1(2)(b), namely: “such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance”.

[129]Section 4 of the 1975 Act provides that an application for an order under s.2 of the Act “shall not, except with the permission of the court, be made after the end of the period of six months from the date on which representation with respect to the estate of the deceased is first taken out”. And it is confirmed by the words in brackets at the end of the section that “nothing prevents the making of an application before such representation is first taken out”.

Outline of Mr Matyas’s claim

[130]At the time of the hearing, Mr Matyas’s only source of income was the rent from Thornbury (£44,000) but that will end once the property is sold through auction. On the assumption that Kinetica will have to be sold, Mr Matyas estimated that he would need about £46,250 as living expenses comprising the following components– i) costs for, and in connection with, renting a two-bedroom flat of £30,200; ii) costs in connection with a car of £2,850; iii) costs in connection with his dog of £3,800 (including £1,200 for vet bills and £2,100 for kennels); and iv) personal expenses of £9,400 (including £1,200 on clothing and £1,200 on mobile and internet subscriptions).

[131]In addition, Mr Matyas had estimated debts at the time of the hearing of £439,711 comprising– i) personal unsecured debts of £75,000 at least £20,000 of which had been incurred to fund his legal costs in proceedings relating to Chris’s estate; ii) costs orders in favour of Mr Pu Liu of £162,000; iii) costs orders in favour of Mr Daniel of £156,382; and iv) inheritance tax (IHT) due in respect of Thornbury of £46,329.

[132]Mr Matyas has been relying on income from Thornbury to meet his expenses. He said in the hearing that he had also worked as a chef for the 3-star Michelin chef, Clare Smyth. In his February 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas says at [90] that he had always been an entrepreneur but that launching a new business would be unfeasible if he was homeless and lacked the basic necessities. In his cross-examination, he said that the only alternative to being an entrepreneur would be to take on low-paid jobs, which would then reduce the time he needed to establish a business. He also referred to the restrictions on work faced in looking after his elderly dog.

[133]The reason he gave for needing a two-bedroom flat was he required the second bedroom as a possible office or for use by a potential lodger to augment his income. The requirement for Chris to be domiciled in England and Wales The law

The requirement for Chris to be domiciled in England and Wales

[134]The core principles relating to domicile are set out in the 16th edition of Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws at Chapter 6, Section 2: B:

“Rule 12: Every independent person can acquire a domicile of choice by the combination of residence and intention of permanent or indefinite residence, but not otherwise. Rule 13: Any circumstance which is evidence of a person’s residence, or of his intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in determining whether he has acquired a domicile of choice in that country [...].”

[135]The propositions of law of relevance to this case include the following, which I take from Kelly v Pyres

[2018] EWCA Civ 1368

at [33]:

“i) The domicile of origin remains of great importance and is said to be “more tenacious” than other forms of domicile. As Dicey put it at [6-031] “it is more difficult to prove that a person has abandoned his domicile of origin than to prove that he has abandoned a domicile of choice”. ii) There is a presumption that a person continues to be domiciled in the country in which he is domiciled. The burden of proof is on the wife to demonstrate that she has lost her domicile of origin, the standard of proof being the ordinary civil standard. Cogent and clear evidence is needed to show that the balance of probabilities has been tipped regardless of whether the issue is the acquisition, or loss, of a domicile of choice. iii) The statements of people claiming or disputing a change of domicile must be treated with caution unless corroborated by action consistent with the declaration. The court will view evidence of an interested party with suspicion. iv) A person can acquire a domicile of choice by a combination of residence and the intention of the person of permanent or indefinite residence but not otherwise. v) Residence for a short period of time, even a few days, may be sufficient to establish a domicile of choice. The length of residence is not important in itself. […] vi) Whilst the residence does not have to be long it has to be with the intention of permanent or indefinite residence. vii) Residence without intention or intention without residence will not do to establish a domicile of choice.”

[136]The nature of the intended permanent residence was set out by Lord Westbury in Udny v Udny (1869) LR 1 Sc & D 44:

“there must be a residence freely chosen, and not prescribed or dictated by external necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands of creditors, or relief from illness; and it must be residence fixed not for a limited period or particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation.”

[137]In Ramsay v Liverpool Royal Infirmary H.L (Sc)

[1930] AC 588

Lord MacMillan said this at [597]: “But residence alone is not enough. The real question in the case is whether this prolonged residence in England was accompanied by an intention on the part of the deceased to choose England as his permanent home in preference to the country of his birth. The law requires evidence of volition to change. Prolonged actual residence is an important item of evidence of such volition, but it must be supplemented by other facts and circumstances indicative of intention. The residence must answer a qualitative as well as a quantitative test”.

[138]In Re Fuld’s Estate (No3)

[1978] P 675

Scarman J set out three points at [684F-685D] that are relevant to this case:

“(1) The domicile of origin adheres unless displaced by satisfactory evidence of the acquisition and continuance of a domicile of choice; (2) A domicile of choice is acquired only if it is affirmatively shown that the propositus is resident in a territory subject to a distinctive legal system with the intention, formed independently of external pressures, of residing there indefinitely. If a man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated contingency, e.g., the end of his job, the intention required by law is lacking; but, if he has in mind only a vague possibility, such as making a fortune (a modern example might be winning a football pool), or some sentiment about dying in the land of his fathers, such a state of mind is consistent with the intention required by law. But no clear line can be drawn; the ultimate decision in each case is one of fact - of the weight to be attached to the various factors and future contingencies in the contemplation of the propositus, their importance to him, and the probability, in his assessment, of the contingencies he has in contemplation being transformed into actualities. (3) It follows that, though a man has left the territory of his domicile of origin with the intention of never returning, though he be resident in a new territory, yet if his mind be not made up or evidence be lacking or unsatisfactory as to what is his state of mind, his domicile of origin adheres….”

[139]In Barlow Clowes International Limited v Henwood

[2008] EWCA Civ 577

, Arden LJ observed at [14]:

“Given that a person can only have one domicile at any one time for the same purpose, he must in my judgment have a singular and distinctive relationship with the country of supposed domicile of choice. That means it must be his ultimate home or, as it has been put, the place where he would wish to spend his last days.”

[140]The concept of the relationship being “singular and distinctive” brings with it the notion that, as Dicey puts it at [6-042], the intention “must be directed exclusively towards one country”.

[141]In Agulian v Gyganik

[2006] EWCA Civ 129

Mummery LJ said this at [53] as to what must be done to satisfy the court that a person has abandoned a domicile of origin and acquired a domicile of choice:

“All the cases state that a domicile of origin can only be replaced by clear, cogent and compelling evidence that the relevant person intended to settle permanently and indefinitely in the alleged domicile of choice.”

Factual findings

[142]Despite its importance in determining whether the court has jurisdiction to determine Mr Matyas’s 1975 Act claim, the evidence in relation to Chris’s domicile at the time of his death was very limited.

[143]Chris was born in Urumqi, Xinjiang in China on 30 April 1969. He went to Xi’an university in 1988. Further detail about Chris’s relationship with his country of birth is given in Mr Pu Liu’s witness statement for the 2019 administration claim. In that statement, Mr Pu Liu gave some important factual background about the links Chris maintained with China (and his brother and parents), namely: i) while they were at university, Chris and his brother always went home to spend time together in China during the winter and summer holidays; ii) after Chris went abroad, Chris maintained close contact with his family by mail, telephone, video and family visits; iii) in 2010 and 2013 Chris’s parents went to London to spend a few months with him and Chris’s brother and his family also spent the summer vacation in 2013 with Chris and his parents; and iv) Chris came back to Chengdu in the spring of 2015 to spend the festive season (in accordance with Chinese custom) with his family.

[144]I have also set out above, in determining the beneficial interest claims, the extent to which Chris continued to have links with his family in China in the way in which the purchase of Kinetica and Atkins Square was funded. Although the precise reasons for the involvement of his family in the purchases of the two properties is obscure, it is clear that monies were ‘routed’ via China. I also accept that Chris made arrangements for the purchase in his father’s name of a property in Chengdu in China. It is also the case that Chris spent time travelling to China on what appears to have been a regular basis.

[145]Before Chris came to London in 2003, he had spent a significant amount of time in New Zealand. There was, however, little direct evidence given about his time there. Of most relevance is the evidence given by Ya-Fen Huang in her witness statement (dated 11 January 2020) in which she explained how she met Chris at the Waikato University of Auckland in New Zealand in 1997. She described the challenges she and Chris faced “in our daily life, making New Zealand our home”. She introduced Chris to her ex-husband, Gareth Jones, and explained how Chris was made to feel part of her family, which included Mr Jones’s mother, Marina, who treated Chris “as her second son”. Ms Huang noted that Marina and Chris grew really close and have kept in contact with each other after Chris left New Zealand.

[146]Chris found work with a New Zealand knitwear community. Ms Huang explained that she knew Chris was gay and formed a “loving and long-lasting relationship” with Matthew. Their relationship ended in 2002 when Chris decided he wanted to take his study further in fashion and study in London. Matthew wanted to stay in New Zealand but Chris and Matthew remained friends and saw each other whenever Matthew was in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in Europe.

[147]While in New Zealand, Chris obtained a New Zealand passport (although no information has been given as to when this was done or the circumstances leading up to it). What we do know is that Chris renewed his New Zealand passport on 20 September 2012.

[148]We also know that Chris established a joint account with a New Zealand bank in the same year (2012) in which he renewed his New Zealand passport.

[149]In the annual return for CL Design UK Ltd given on 7 November 2015, in the information given about Chris as its only director, the United Kingdom is stated as the state/country in which he was usually resident but Chris’s nationality was given as a New Zealander.

[150]When Chris first made enquiries (on 18 April 2011) about making a will, in response to questions about his domicile, Chris replied (by the addition of text on 20 April 2011 to questions in an email sent to him the previous day) that he had dual nationality (New Zealander and British) and that Kinetica was “bought under my New Zealand passport”. He then went on to say he “currently” lived in the United Kingdom.

[151]As explained above, Chris did not make a will at that time but returned to the issue on 5 February 2015. In a telephone discussion with Martin Tolhurst Partnership at that time he was recorded as saying he had been divorced in New Zealand about 15 years ago and was “from China”.

[152]At the time of his death (10 April 2017), Chris had a United Kingdom passport, which had been issued on 5 January 2010. As explained above, he had interests in properties in London. The evidence presented to me is consistent with Chris’s usual place of residence being in London. It is also clear that he carried on businesses in England and Wales. And he had also studied in London, which was the reason why he left New Zealand.

[153]Very little evidence was given about the extent to which Chris was integrated into British society. But Mr Matyas said at [20] of his February 2026 witness statement that: i) Chris communicated effectively in English; ii) Chris actively participated in the electoral system; and iii) Chris was socially integrated into England.

[154]I accept Mr Matyas’s evidence in those respects. But I also note that Chris chose to use cancer facilities to manage his illness in Germany rather than use the NHS in England. While I would not want to overstate the significance of that, it does, at least, tend to suggest that the way in which Chris regarded England, and one of the institutions most closely associated with it, differed from many of its citizens who are domiciled in England and Wales.

[155]Mr Matyas also claims that he was domiciled in England and Wales, which, through his relationship with Chris, also strengthened Chris’s connections to England and Wales. I accept that Chris and Mr Matyas were in a relationship with each other (the nature of which I discuss further below) but, on the evidence before me, I am not prepared to accept that Mr Matyas was domiciled in England and Wales. Mr Matyas was born in Hungary and appears to have a domicile of origin in Hungary. It may be that he has acquired a domicile of choice in England and Wales but there was no evidence led in this case by reference to which I can reasonably infer that Mr Matyas has abandoned Hungary in favour of England and Wales as his domicile.

[156]It was also said by Mr Briggs that, given his sexuality, Chris was unlikely to return to China. I do not accept that. It seems to me that this was an assertion underpinned by little evidence and relying on largely unsubstantiated claims made about the attitude of Chinese society as a whole to a person’s sexuality.

[157]In dealing with the IHT account in respect of Chris’s estate, Collyer Bristow had been proceeding on the basis that Chris was domiciled in England and Wales. However, as was explained in the relevant witness statements, Chris’s domicile was of no relevance in determining the IHT payable: his estate consisted exclusively of property with a United Kingdom situs.

[158]Mr Matyas also claimed in his 2026 witness statement that Chris “fulfilled his tax obligations as someone who was domiciled in England and Wales”. However, no tax self-assessments were produced. I am prepared to accept that Chris was resident in the United Kingdom for the purposes of income tax and capital gains tax in the years leading up to his death (although I should make it clear that there is little direct evidence about this before me).

[159]But Chris’s domicile is of no relevance in determining his income tax or capital gains tax liability unless he had foreign income or foreign property. Although it is clear that he did have a UBS account held in Switzerland, that is the extent of the evidence about foreign property for the purposes of these proceedings. In particular, it is not known how much money was in that account or how much interest (income in other words) was earned. Nor is it known whether the account was referred to in any of Chris’s self-assessments. Finally, I note that, at the relevant times, it was a choice for a taxpayer resident in the United Kingdom whether or not to make a claim to rely on their domicile outside the United Kingdom so as to reduce the tax payable in respect of foreign income or property. The fact that a claim has not been made does not, by itself, say anything about a person’s domicile.

[160]Accordingly, I do not accept the claim made by Mr Matyas in his witness statement that Chris fulfilled his tax obligations as an individual domiciled in England and Wales.

Discussion

[161]It is clear to me that the facts as set out in relation to Part A of this decision show that Chris continued to maintain a significant number of ties with China throughout the time he lived in London. He had strong relationships with his family in China and spent time there. Although it is somewhat ambiguous, Chris described himself as “from China” in his discussions about his will in February 2015: there was no qualification that he was “originally” from China or a similar indication that he had abandoned China. Indeed, viewed in the round, the evidence suggests to me that Chris was someone who was proud of his Chinese heritage.

[162]It is also clear to me that, as a minimum, Chris continued to have a strong relationship with New Zealand. He had renewed his New Zealand passport (which was current at the time of Chris’s death), had considered it of relevance to say that Kinetica had been purchased under his New Zealand passport, and, in a telling entry in the 2015 annual return for CL Design UK Ltd, had actually given his nationality as a New Zealander. He had also referred to himself as being a New Zealander when enquiring about making a will for the first time in April 2011. The evidence of Ya-Fen Huang also makes it clear that Chris had strong personal and emotional connections to persons in New Zealand.

[163]I accept that Chris had connections to England and Wales through his businesses and property in London and through the relationship he conducted there with Mr Matyas. Chris also had a United Kingdom passport. But, beyond those matters, there is, as I set out above, little other evidence evincing an intention of Chris to spend his dying days in London rather than New Zealand or China.

[164]Indeed, Chris said, in his discussions about his will in 2011, that he “currently” lived in the United Kingdom. That is, in my view, a strange self-description of someone who intends to live in England and Wales indefinitely. I do recognise that this was evidence in 2011, four years before his death. Nonetheless, there is little evidence since that time to show that he had subsequently regarded England and Wales as his permanent home.

[165]The law is clear that a domicile of origin is “more tenacious” than other forms of domicile. Residence is not enough. There must be a singular and distinctive relationship with the supposed domicile of choice. To displace a domicile of origin requires clear, cogent and compelling evidence. In my view, the evidence before me is none of those things. Moreover, so far as there is evidence suggesting that Chris might have lost his domicile of origin, the evidence is, as a minimum, inconsistent with Chris’s intention being “directed exclusively” towards England and Wales. Chris’s ties to New Zealand remained very real.

[166]Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I do not consider that Chris had, at the time of his death, acquired a domicile of choice in England and Wales. Requirement to live in the same household as a married couple or civil partners The law

Requirement to live in the same household as a married couple or civil partners

[167]Mr Matyas needs to show that, throughout the two-year period ending with Chris’s death, he was not only living in the same household as Chris but was doing so as a married couple or as civil partners.

[168]What constitutes living in the same household was considered by HH

Judge Norris QC in Churchill v Roach [2003] WTLR 779 where he said this:

“It is, of course, dangerous to try and define what ‘living in the same household’ means. It seems to me to have elements of permanence, to involve a consideration of the frequency and intimacy of contact, to contain an element of mutual support, to require some consideration of the degree of voluntary restraint upon personal freedom which each party undertakes, and to involve an element of community of resources.”

[169]In Gully v Dix

[2004] EWCA Civ 139

, the Court of Appeal, in a judgment given by Ward LJ, said at [24]:

“… [two people] will be in the same household if they are tied by their relationship. The tie of that relationship may be made manifest by various elements, not simply their living under the same roof, but the public and private acknowledgment of their mutual society, and the mutual protection and support that binds them together.”

[170]The issue was further considered by the Court of Appeal in Kotke v Saffarini

[2005] 2 FLR 878

, which was concerned with different legislation (the Fatal Accidents Act 1976) but which considered what it means to live in the same household as husband and wife. Potter LJ, giving the judgment of the court, endorsed what was said by Woolf J in Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission

[1982] 1 All ER 498

in which Woolf J commented favourably on the criteria set out in the supplementary benefits handbook.

[171]Potter LJ held at [36] that, in any case where it falls to be decided whether two people are living together as husband or wife in the same household, the following factors (two to five in the list of six factors in the handbook) fall to be considered equally in relation to the question whether a household itself exists, namely: the stability of the relationship; the presence or absence of financial support; the question of sexual relationship; and the question of children. The sixth factor referred to in that list (relevant to living together in the same household as husband and wife) was “public acknowledgement”.

[172]The requirement to live in the same household “as husband and wife” was the subject of analysis by Lewison J in Baynes v Hedger

[2008] EWHC 1587 (Ch)

, [2008] 2 F.L.R 1805 (a decision upheld on appeal at

[2009] EWCA Civ 374

). At [123] and [124] Lewison J referred to the decision of Evans-Lombe J in Southern Housing Group Ltd v Nutting

[2004] EWHC 2982 (Ch)

, which was an appeal from a decision of the Recorder, who considered the following questions were all relevant to the question as to whether or not two persons were in a relationship of husband and wife: a) have the parties openly set up home together? b) is the relationship an emotional one of mutual lifetime commitment rather than simply one of convenience, friendship, companionship or the living together of lovers? c) is the relationship one which has been presented to the outside world openly and unequivocally so that society considers it to be of permanent intent? d) do the parties have a common life together, both domestically (in relation to the household) and externally (in relation to family and friends)?

[173]On appeal, Evans-Lombe J said this at [17] about those four indicia:

“Having regard to the authorities it does not seem to me, with respect, that the fact that question (a) can be answered in the affirmative is indicative of a "spousal" relationship. That answer could have been given in relation to students sharing lodgings. The recorder himself did not treat an affirmative answer to question (d) as being so indicative. I agree with him. Without a lifetime commitment at least at some point in the relationship there is no sufficient similarity to marriage. There are many ways in which a marriage relationship can be described but it seems to me that the test prescribed by the recorder at paragraph (b) subject to the qualification in paragraph (c), that the relationship must be openly and unequivocally displayed to the outside world, is an entirely adequate test and one which is consistent with the authorities.”

[174]Lewison J in Baynes v Hedger said at [125] that “given that both a marriage and a civil partnership are publicly acknowledged relationships, I respectfully agree that the qualification in paragraph (c) is essential”.

[175]It is worth noting here what was said by Ward LJ in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Amicus Horizon v Mabbott

[2012] EWCA Civ 895

(a case concerning the succession to an assured tenancy) about the Nutting indicia:

“As far as indicia go, it seems to me that those are certainly good enough but, as the recorder had observed, human relationships are complex and varied and thus I would not, for my part, regard that list as necessarily comprehensive; the facts are always varied and the facts must always be taken into account as they present themselves from case to case.”

[176]But what is, in my view, nonetheless clear from the above authorities is that, in order to be regarded as living as a married couple or civil partners, it is essential that that the relationship must be openly and unequivocally displayed to the outside world so that society considers it to be of permanent intent. This was also the formulation adopted at [26] of Amicus Horizon as the critical test: it had to be shown that the relationship was “one of mutual lifetime commitment and was open and unequivocally displayed to the outside world”. That is, after all, consistent with the core notion of what a marriage is: see Lord Millett describing a basic feature of marriage as “an openly acknowledged relationship” and how “its essence consists of a public acknowledgement of mutual commitment” at [79] of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza

[2004] UKHL 30

Factual findings

[177]Mr Matyas gave evidence about his relationship with Chris. I accept the evidence he gives in so far as it relates to the existence of a loving relationship with Chris. Beyond his own testimony, his witness statement contains little other evidence in relation to his relationship with Chris such as the extent to which it was intended to be a lifelong one or the extent to which it was a publicly acknowledged relationship (for example, in relation to their dealings with public authorities or the way they presented their relationship to business associates or friends).

[178]Mr Matyas did, however, rely on witness statements provided by Michael Oliveira-Salac, Dr Friedrich Migeod and Ya-Fen Huang, which I consider in turn. None of these witnesses were cross-examined.

[179]Mr Michael Oliveira-Salac gave a short witness statement on 26 February 2020. He had known Chris and Mr Matyas through his work in the fashion industry and he subsequently became friends with them both. He said that he had first met Chris and Mr Matyas in 2003, and Chris introduced Mr Matyas to him as his boyfriend and business partner.

[180]Mr Oliveira-Salac described the nature of their relationship as follows:

“Throughout the period I have known them, Chris and Tibor presented themselves as a committed couple who were very much in love. In both professional and personal contexts, they conducted themselves as a unified partnership.”

[181]He concluded by expressing his own view that they always appeared to him “as married in every meaningful sense – in the way they lived, worked, and supported each other”.

[182]However, I note that nothing was said about the frequency with which Mr Oliveira-Salac met both Chris and Mr Matyas. Moreover, the passage of Mr Oliveira-Salac’s witness statement describing the friendship was focused on business matters, namely:(1) Chris and Mr Matyas updated Mr Oliveira-Salac regularly about their business activities, projects and ambitions within the fashion industry;

(2) Mr Oliveira-Salac occasionally introduced opportunities or contacts to them informally (including to Mr Oliveira-Salac’s husband, who worked for Harrods); and

(3) Mr Oliveira-Salac allowed them to use his showroom space for meetings and events.

[183]The overall impression given by Mr Oliveira-Salac is of a predominantly business relationship albeit one where the parties were friendly with each other.

[184]Dr Friedrich Migeod (who specialised primarily in treating cancer patients) gave a witness statement on 23 February 2026. Chris was an in-patient of Dr Migeod’s cancer facility in Germany on several occasions in 2015 and 2016, receiving treatment over the course of several weeks on each occasion he stayed at the facilities. Mr Matyas consistently accompanied Chris and “never left Chris’s side during their time at the clinic”. During this period, Dr Migeod described the conversations he had with Chris and Mr Matyas from which he said it was clear that they had been in a loving and committed relationship for many years. Chris had introduced Mr Matyas as “his life and business partner” when Mr Matyas first met Dr Migeod.

[185]Ya-Fen Huang gave a witness statement (dated 11 January 2020). Ms Huang was aware of Chris’s relationship with Mr Matyas in 2003 and saw how much they loved and cared for each other. Her visits to London after 2003 became less frequent but she often spoke to Chris on the phone. She said that she hardly ever saw him in person and that her friendship was not one of daily or regular contact anymore. She referred in particular to a Christmas holiday in 2011 spent with Chris and Mr Matyas in which she noted that their relationship was stable and loving. However, there is nothing more said by Ms Huang about the relationship between Chris and Mr Matyas. It would appear that there were no more personal visits after 2011.

[186]In his witness statement for the 2019 administration claim, Mr Pu Liu explained his, and his family’s, understanding of Chris’s relationship with Mr Matyas: i) once Chris’s parents were made aware of Chris’s illness (in October 2016), they immediately went to see him, spending the last 5 months of his life in London looking after and caring for him; and ii) according to Mr Pu Liu, Chris always said to him and his parents that his relationship with Mr Matyas was as a business partner and that Mr Matyas had lived with Chris in the spare room to save the company’s expenses: it was only after Chris’s death that any mention was made of a personal relationship with Chris (even when Chris’s parents stayed with him in 2010 and 2013).

[187]When Chris first made enquiries (on 18 April 2011) about making a will, in response to a question about his marital status, Chris said that he was “not married not partnered”.

[188]When he returned to the making of a will on 5 February 2015– i) Chris described Mr Matyas as his “business partner”; ii) he gave Mr Matyas’s address as Dunn Street; and iii) Chris described himself as single.

[189]In his instructions of 1 May 2015 to his solicitors in respect of his will, Chris again gave Dunn Street as the address for Mr Matyas, which was reflected in the will that was executed on 28 May 2015.

[190]In the instruction form given to Howes Percival for the purchase of Thornbury, Mr Matyas gave his address as Dunn Street while Chris gave his address as Kinetica. The different addresses were stated in the contracts for the purchase of the property that were exchanged on 16 November 2012. When asked about this, Mr Matyas said that was done to reflect the address for his driving licence, which he did not feel he needed to change. That is despite the fact that there is a legal requirement to ensure that the address shown as the residential address for the holder of a driving licence is accurate.

[191]In his 2026 witness statement, Mr Matyas explained at [24] (in a passage concerning Thornbury) that, while he could not locate the statements, the liability to council tax “may have been in [Chris’s] name or mine, but likely not in both” before going on to note that “Chris (we) preferred the single-tenant discount for all properties (Kinetica, Thornbury, Our Dunn Street office, and later Atkins)”.

[192]As explained above, both Chris and Mr Matyas maintained separate bank accounts. The sole joint bank account related to Thornbury. Mr Matyas was a cardholder for the credit card held by Chris in his name. Chris also gave Mr Matyas a power of attorney over his UBS account although it was clear that this was intended by Chris to be used only in the case of urgency.

Discussion

[193]In my view, it is helpful to consider, in the particular circumstances of this case, whether, as a compendious phrase, Chris and Mr Matyas lived together in the same household as a married couple.

[194]I start with their financial arrangements. Although they had a substantial degree of financial independence in terms of their separate banking facilities, the way in which the joint Lloyds account was operated and the way in which purchases were made on Chris’s credit card by Mr Matyas do show an element of community of resources. There is little doubt that there were times when Chris and Mr Matyas shared a number of aspects of living together such as the purchase of groceries. The length of the period over which these arrangements lasted also shows a certain element of permanence as well.

[195]The same evidence suggests that it was Chris who was the dominant financial partner and that Mr Matyas was dependent on him. It was Chris’s credit card for which Mr Matyas was a signatory. The UBS account was in Chris’s name. The access to the funds in that account was limited by Chris to cases of urgency only. That tends to suggest that, financially, there was not a unity between the two. Similarly, their business affairs were not, despite Mr Matyas’s assertions, joint in any meaningful sense. Chris was the creative inspiration behind the businesses and it was Chris alone who owned CL Design UK Ltd and who was the sole director of the company. The fact that Mr Matyas had a more limited role in the company (as explained above at [48] to [54]) is reinforced by the fact that, in his will, Chris left the shares in the company to his family rather than to Mr Matyas.

[196]Moreover, as I have found above, Chris deliberately took the decision to hold Kinetica solely in his name. He had contemplated sharing the property with Mr Matyas but then decided not to do so; and he did the same thing in the case of Atkins Square. Although Thornbury was held in their joint names, the way in which Chris held his properties shows, in my view, the opposite of a life to be shared together equally in all respects. At least so far as Chris was concerned, this was not the case.

[197]The documentary evidence so far as their living arrangements is concerned points against their living together in the same household: Dunn Street was referenced in formal documents as the address at which Mr Matyas lived at the relevant time (see the address used for Mr Matyas in respect of Chris’s will). I also note that, on Mr Matyas’s own evidence, a single-occupancy council tax reduction was claimed in respect of Kinetica. Mr Matyas also recorded Dunn Street as his residential address for his driving licence. Of course, Mr Matyas gave evidence that he and Chris were living together but, when balanced against the documentary evidence and his unreliability as a witness, I consider that the evidence as a whole is more nuanced than that: it speaks to a significant degree of ambiguity.

[198]So far as the nature of his relationship with Chris is concerned, Mr Matyas must show that:(1) the relationship was openly and unequivocally displayed to the outside world; and

(2) the relationship was one of mutual lifetime commitment.

[199]In the case of the evidence on which Mr Matyas seeks to rely in respect of both of those matters, I note at the outset the relatively limited nature of that evidence, both in the terms in which it was given and the number of witnesses (whether business colleagues or friends or shared contacts) who could speak to the issues. Of the witnesses on whom Mr Matyas relies, one was Chris’s doctor (Dr Migeod) at the end of Chris’s life whose knowledge of the relationship between Chris and Mr Matyas was both limited in time and by context, another (Ms Ya-Fen Huang) had little to say in relation to the relationship as it existed in the relevant two-year period and the third witness (Mr Oliveira-Salac) seemed to have had a relationship more focused on business matters.

[200]In the case of Chris’s doctor, Dr Migeod, I do accept that there is evidence supportive of Mr Matyas’s case, especially the way in which Mr Matyas had been introduced by Chris as his “life and business partner”.

[201]In the case of the evidence given by Ms Ya-Fen Huang, there is, however, only limited evidence that can be said to relate to the relevant two-year period. She clearly states that, after 2003, her relationship with Chris was no longer one of regular contact and there were no personal visits between them after 2013.

[202]So far as Mr Oliveira-Salac’s evidence is concerned, it seems to me to show that Chris and Mr Matyas were in a relationship with each other but, as I note above, the relationship between the parties (Chris, Mr Matyas and Mr Oliveira-Salac) was more in the nature of a ‘networking’ business relationship. Mr Oliveira-Salac did not appear to be a close friend. His evidence also lacked detail in terms of the frequency of the contact between Chris and Mr Matyas.

[203]I must also consider the way in which Chris presented his relationship in documents and emails that relate to the relevant two-year period. It is of note that, shortly before the two-year period began, Chris referred (on 5 February 2015) to Mr Matyas as his business partner, described himself as single and gave Mr Matyas’s address as Dunn Street (which was then reflected in the will executed three months later during the relevant two-year period). This was correspondence in relation to which it might reasonably be expected that, as he would not have anticipated its being made public, Chris would be truthful. In any event, it is not consistent with a presentation to others of a relationship akin to marriage. Moreover, he had said much the same thing in the case of the discussions about his will in April 2011. And about 18 months later (in connection with the purchase of Thornbury) Chris again presented the relationship he had with Mr Matyas in a way that suggested the two were not living together as a married couple: Mr Matyas’s address was given as Dunn Street.

[204]As mentioned above, the residential address given for Mr Matyas’s driving licence was Dunn Street and his evidence was that a single-tenant council tax discount was claimed in respect of Kinetica. Acting in that way in relation to two different public authorities (the local council and the DVLA) is, in my view, not consistent with a public presentation of the relationship as one of a married couple.

[205]I also consider that Mr Pu Liu’s evidence is important. It is clear from that evidence that Chris kept his relationship with Mr Matyas secret from his family. I accept that there might be a number of different reasons why Chris might have acted in that way but, at the very minimum, this is unhelpful to his case that they had the necessary unequivocal presentation of their relationship as one akin to a married couple.

[206]Finally, it is of note that, during a significant part of the relevant two-year period (the last five months), Chris’s parents spent time looking after and caring for Chris. A reasonable inference that can be drawn from this is that, for the time during which Chris’s parents acted in this way, the relationship Chris was said to have had with Mr Matyas is likely to have been presented in terms that were inconsistent with a public presentation of them as a married couple. It is also not without significance that Chris had kept the nature of his relationship with Mr Matyas secret from his family. I do not accept the reasons given by Mr Matyas for this. Rather, it seems to me more likely than not that the relationship, from Chris’s perspective, was one which he viewed in a more equivocal way than Mr Matyas did.

[207]My assessment of the evidence overall is that Chris’s family mattered to him more than Mr Matyas did. That was reflected in the terms of Chris’s will executed in 2015. That was no last-minute decision either. It was broadly consistent with the terms in which he considered making his will in 2011. Mr Matyas was not involved in Chris’s arrangements for making a will on either occasion.

[208]Although there is some evidence that suggests that Chris and Mr Matyas were living together as a married couple, my view is that the balance of the evidence before me is not consistent with that conclusion. I am confident that Mr Matyas was in a relationship with Chris and I am also sure that, from Mr Matyas’s perspective, he most likely regarded it as akin to marriage.

[209]However, a marriage is necessarily between two persons and it seems to me that Chris was more equivocal about the relationship. Chris presented the relationship to his family as one of business colleagues and consistently did the same in correspondence with his solicitors, including expressly in his discussions for his will executed in the two-year period. The presentation of their relationship to public authorities was of persons living separately not together. Chris involved Mr Matyas in his company (CL Design UK Ltd) but only in a sales-focused, managerial capacity: Chris was the sole shareholder and director of the company and provided for the shares to go to his family (rather than Mr Matyas) on his death. Chris consciously kept much of his residential property in his sole name. There is some evidence that the relationship was presented to a relatively limited number of people as equivalent to one of marriage but, weighed against the other evidence that I have set out above, it is not enough to satisfy me that, throughout the relevant two-year period, Chris and Mr Matyas lived together in the same household as a married couple. Was reasonable financial provision for maintenance made for Mr Matyas? The law

Was reasonable financial provision for maintenance made for Mr Matyas?

[210]In determining whether and what award to make under the 1975 Act, the court must consider the factors set out at s.3(1) of that Act, namely: a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any applicant or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased; e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased; f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant or any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased; and g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant.

[211]Section 3(2A) of the 1975 Act makes further provision, in the case of an applicant such as Mr Matyas who is relying on satisfying the condition in s.1(1)(ba), requiring the court to have regard (in addition to the matters specifically mentioned in s.3(1)(a) to (f)) to: i) the age of the applicant; ii) the length of the period during which the applicant lived in same household as the deceased as a married couple or civil partners; and iii) the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the deceased, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family.

[212]In considering the factors set out in s.3(1) of the 1975 Act to which the court must have regard, the court “shall take into account the facts as known to the court at the date of the hearing” (see s.3(5) of the 1975 Act).

[213]Section 3(6) of the 1975 Act provides as follows:

“(6) In considering the financial resources of any person for the purposes of this section the court shall take into account his earning capacity and in considering the financial needs of any person for the purposes of this section the court shall take into account his financial obligations and responsibilities.”

[214]The leading authority on the meaning of s.3 of the 1975 Act is the Supreme Court decision in Ilott v Mitson

[2017] UKSC 17

(concerning an adult child applicant), which set out the following key principles that are relevant to this case: i) the starting point is that a testator is free to give his estate to whom he chooses; ii) the court must go through a two-stage test: the first stage is to determine whether the effect of the will is such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant, and, if it is not, the second stage is to determine what order should be made under the Act; iii) the first-stage test is a qualitative or ‘value’ judgment: there is no strict financial threshold; iv) there will be applicants who do not require maintenance because they are “capable of living independently” (see [20]) and can manage perfectly well without any distribution from the estate: in the absence of some special circumstance, such applications should fail; v) a child’s necessitous circumstances will not, alone, be sufficient to justify a claim under the Act: there must also in most cases be some “moral claim” that makes it unreasonable for the deceased not to have made better provision for the applicant; and vi) if a judge gave an award of little or no value to the claimant, it might “be a legitimate error of principle justifying an appellate court in setting aside his order” (see [35]).

[215]It is also of relevance to this case to set out what Browne-Wilkinson J said in Re Dennis

[1981] 2 All ER 140

about the hopelessness of the claim for maintenance in that case:

“A person who is physically capable of earning his own living faces a difficult task in getting provision made for him, because the court is inclined to ask: 'Why should anybody else make provision for you if you are capable of maintaining yourself?' The applicant is 38 years old. There is no evidence that he is in any way unfit. Although at present out of work he appears to have as much chance as anybody else of obtaining employment and maintaining himself. In addition, the court is reluctant to make further provision for someone for whom large sums of money have been provided and which have been dissipated by him.”

Discussion

[216]If (as I have determined it must) the beneficial interest claims fail, Mr Briggs submitted that the merits of Mr Matyas’s claim under the 1975 Act are dramatically improved. The effect of the will is, Mr Briggs submits, that Mr Matyas receives 30% of Thornbury (after deduction of IHT), and (because specific legacies abate rateably in relation to their probate values) roughly 7.5% of what remains in the estate.

[217]That is one way of looking at matters. But it seems to me to be also relevant to look at things as follows. As explained above, Mr Matyas made no financial contribution to the purchase of either Kinetica or Atkins Square. I am prepared to assume in favour of Mr Matyas that he put his own money into the purchase of Thornbury. The net value of Thornbury at the date of death was £240,000 and, accordingly, Mr Matyas acquired on death property worth £120,000. He also acquired a quarter share of Atkins Square, which as at the date of death had a net value of £319,000. In other words, Mr Matyas acquired further property worth about £79,750 (in addition to a half share in Thornbury).

[218]As at the time of his death, Chris had assets of just over £1million (Kinetica had a value of £575,000), and Mr Matyas inherited therefore about 20% of the value of those assets.

[219]At the time of Chris’s death, Mr Matyas was only 39 years old. He had many strings to his bow from the point of view of his employment in the labour market. He had experience in information technology. He had significant experience in the fashion world. He had shown that he could act in sales or in marketing. He could act in a managerial or administrative capacity.

[220]In my view, he was, at the time of Chris’s death, capable of living independently and could manage perfectly well without any distribution from the estate. He had (net) capital assets of about £265,000 (£120,000 of his existing share of Thornbury plus about £200,000 assets inherited from Chris less about £55,000 in respect of IHT). He could earn a good living from his own efforts irrespective of this significant property holding. There is nothing to suggest that, at the time of Chris’s death, he was not in good health. In short, he was financially and professionally in an enviable position. It was Chris who, in my view, had created the value of the businesses he carried on in part with Mr Matyas. The funding for the purchases of Kinetica and Atkins Square is obscure but what is clear, in my view, is that Mr Matyas made no financial contribution to either. Nonetheless, Chris generously provided in his will for a quarter of Atkins Square to be passed to Mr Matyas on his death.

[221]Since Chris’s death, Mr Matyas has, as explained above, incurred significant expenses in conducting litigation involving the administration of the estate. His success (or rather his lack of success) in the litigation so far is revealed by the fact that eight separate costs orders have been made against him one of which was on the indemnity basis. The cause for his perilous financial position is the conduct of Mr Matyas and the conduct of Mr Matyas alone.

[222]Although I discuss this more fully below in considering his late application to bring the 1975 Act claim, I accept that Chris’s death has affected Mr Matyas emotionally and physically to some extent in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder. However, in putting forward his own claim, Mr Matyas does not say that, as at the date of this trial, this condition alone would prevent him from becoming an entrepreneur or from performing low-paid jobs. And he also said that he has been able to work as a chef in a three-star Michelin restaurant, another string to his employment ‘bow’ and another sign that he can hold down employment.

[223]Judged as at the date of the hearing, my view is that Mr Matyas is capable of finding a number of different types of job many of which are likely to pay well enough to support him in a reasonable way. His earning capacity is good. His difficulty – wholly as a result of his own actions in relation to the estate – is that he has incurred significant liabilities, which will, I acknowledge, inevitably have an impact on the manner in which he will be able to live.

[224]His actions have also had an impact on the beneficiaries of the estate. As explained above, the beneficiaries have decided to take no part in these proceedings because their financial resources have been so depleted by the conduct of Mr Matyas.

[225]I do not consider that Chris had any obligation or responsibility towards Mr Matyas. They did not live together as a married couple. As noted above, Chris gave to Mr Matyas a significant proportion of the assets he owned at the date of his death. In so doing, he acted, in my view, generously towards Mr Matyas. However, Chris clearly did take his obligations towards his Chinese family very seriously. He was close to them. He spent time in China. He helped his father buy a property in China. In somewhat obscure circumstances, his family was also involved in Chris’s purchases of Kinetica and Atkins Square.

[226]I have set out above my views in relation to the matters specifically referred to at s.3(1)(a) to (g) of the 1975 Act as well as those that are contained in s.3(2A) of the 1975 Act. Taking account of those matters, I consider that Chris’s will made such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances for Mr Matyas to receive for his maintenance. Extension of time under s.4 of the 1975 Act The law

Extension of time under s.4 of the 1975 Act

[227]As set out above, s.4 of the 1975 Act provides that an application for an order under s.2 of that Act may only be made after the end of the period of six months from the date on which representation with respect to the estate of the deceased is first taken out with the permission of the court.

[228]The Court of Appeal in Berger v Berger

[2013] EWCA Civ 1305

noted at [44] that s.4 of the 1975 Act does not give any guidance as to how the court should approach an application for permission but accepted the judge’s statement of the applicable factors, derived from Re Salmon

[1981] Ch 167

and Re Dennis

[1981] 2 All ER 140

“(1) The court’s discretion is unfettered but must be exercised judicially in accordance with what is right and proper. (2) The onus is on the Applicant to show sufficient grounds for the granting of permission to apply out of time. (3) The court must consider whether the Applicant has acted promptly and the circumstances in which she applied for an extension of time after the expiry of the time limit. (4) Were negotiations begun within the time limit? (5) Has the estate been distributed before the claim was notified to the Defendants? (6) Would dismissal of the claim leave the Applicant without recourse to other remedies? (7) Looking at the position as it is now, has the Applicant an arguable case under the Inheritance Act if I allowed the application to proceed?”

[229]The relevant test was reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Cowan v Foreman

[2019] EWCA Civ 1336

at [43] to [52] and, in my view, the following dicta are relevant to this case: i) section 4 of the 1975 Act, as pointed out by Briggs J in Nesheim v Kosa

[2006] EWHC 2710 (Ch)

, exists for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary delay in the administration of estates which would be caused by the tardy bringing of proceedings and to avoid the complications which might arise if distributions from the estate are made before the proceedings are brought (see [44]); ii) if the circumstances warrant it, the power to permit a late application can be used to further the overriding objective of bringing claims before the court where it is just to do so (see [44]); iii) there is no analogy with relief from sanctions: there is no disciplinary element to s.4 of the 1975 Act and the time limit is not enforced for its own sake but is designed to bring a measure of certainty for personal representatives and beneficiaries (see [45]); iv) the court must consider all of the relevant circumstances of the case and the factors highlighted in Berger v Berger (see [45]); v) an applicant must make out a “substantial case” for the exercise of the court’s discretion, which is “no triviality” (see [48]); vi) it is not necessary that there is a good reason for every period of delay but that will be a relevant factor (see [51]); and vii) if the claim would pass the summary judgment test, it does not mean that the court will exercise the power to extend time: it is dependent on an evaluation of all of the relevant factors in the circumstances (see [52]).

[230]It is also relevant to note the following two cases relied on by Mr Briggs in support of Mr Matyas.

[231]The first is Re Adams (22 July 1981, CA) in which the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision to refuse an extension of time because, although proceedings had been issued in time, they were in the wrong form due to negligence by the claimant’s solicitors: the only prejudice to the defendants was the “purely formal” loss of the protection under s.4 of the 1975 Act.

[232]The second is Nesheim v Kosa

[2006] EWHC 2710 (Ch)

where a claim was issued in time but permission to serve out of the jurisdiction was not obtained within the prescribed time limit. Retrospective permission was granted and the defendant appealed. Dismissing the appeal, Briggs J (as he then was) considered that the prejudice to the defendant in having lost its right to defend the claim as statute-barred “should be assessed at a very low level” and also opined obiter that if a fresh claim had been issued it would have “a very considerable prospect of success” in obtaining permission (see [46]). The following were factors that were relevant to his being of that opinion (set out at [46] to [53]): i) the fact that an early intimation of the claim was made “very shortly” after the grant of probate; ii) this was followed by “sensible requests” for information and discussions about the claim and about the estate between the parties; iii) there was a clear intimation that the claim had been issued on the day when it was issued; iv) there was then no attempt by the defendant to administer or distribute the estate for six months after that claim was issued or before the matter was the subject of the litigation; v) there was “de facto service”: this achieved the intended effect of bringing the claim to the attention of the defendant herself and was done in time; and prompt steps were taken to remedy the defect once it was pointed out to his solicitors; vi) the failure to obtain permission in good time was the fault of the solicitors against whom a monetary remedy would not be a satisfactory substitute for a successful claim; and vii) a refusal of permission would be to put the need to “discipline lawyers for a genuine mistake ahead of the clear interests of doing justice between the parties”.

Factual findings: the proceedings relating to the administration of the estate

[233]It is relevant to set out how it is that, even though Chris died in April 2017, the claim in these proceedings was made some nine years later.

[234]Mr Matyas and Mr Pu Liu were unable to agree on the administration of the estate. This led to the issue on 29 October 2019 by Mr Pu Liu of a Part 8 claim (PT-2019-000886), seeking either the removal of Mr Matyas as personal representative or the appointment of Mr Daniel as the personal representative in place of both executors.

[235]The claim was supported by a witness statement made by Mr Pu Liu on 4 October 2019. In the hearing before me Mr Briggs referred to [6] to [8] of that statement but, in my view, the statement as a whole deserves consideration and is of relevance to Mr Matyas’s conduct in relation to Chris’s estate. The statement was not the subject of cross-examination in the Part 8 claim issued by Mr Pu Liu.

[236]As Mr Pu Liu explained in his witness statement for the administration claim, Mr Matyas failed to engage with his role as executor. Of most relevance to the proceedings before me is the delay in acting and the conduct of Mr Matyas. The following is a summary of the main events: i) having instructed Mr Chiwai Lu of Lu Oliphant Solicitors (LLP) to advise Mr Pu Liu, the solicitors wrote to Mr Matyas on 19 April 2017 informing him of this and Mr Matyas replied the next day, asking for time to grieve but saying that he would be in touch to schedule a meeting “in the near future”; ii) the solicitors responded to this on 11 May 2017 to which Mr Matyas replied saying that, once “memorials” had been completed (the end of May/beginning of June), he would be able to turn to other matters; iii) the solicitors enquired on 12 July 2017 as to when Mr Matyas might turn to the will to which Mr Matyas replied 19 days later on 31 July 2017, saying the time for grieving was not enough and requiring the solicitors to take no action without his “knowledge or written agreement”; iv) the solicitors responded on 2 August 2017, emphasising (again) their duties as executors to which Mr Matyas replied on 14 August 2017, denying “your misguiding, baseless and incorrect assertion”; v) there was an inconclusive meeting in March 2018 between the solicitors and Mr Matyas; vi) several months then passed without progress before the solicitors wrote a letter before action to Mr Matyas on 4 September 2018, threatening his removal as executor if he did not engage by 1 October 2018 with obtaining the grant of probate; vii) Mr Matyas replied on 8 October 2018, claiming he had been suffering from “several illnesses” in July and that he had, since August, fractured two fingers on his right hand (his dominant hand) and injured his left knee; viii) Mr Pu Liu’s solicitors responded on 26 November 2018 to which Mr Matyas replied on 13 December 2018, saying that they could expect to hear from him on or before Monday 14 January 2019; ix) on that day (14 January 2019) Mr Matyas emailed the solicitors, claiming that, since 4 January 2019, he had been suffering with an eye injury as well as flu and a sore throat but that the solicitors would receive his letter as soon as possible (expected to be no later than the end of the week – namely, Friday 18 January 2019); x) as nothing had been received by 24 January 2019 (on the Thursday following the end of the week by which Mr Matyas expected to respond), the solicitors chased for a reply to which Mr Matyas responded on 28 January 2019, saying that he had on 20 January 2019 been mugged, was in agonising pain and could only walk with the aid of crutches but, nonetheless, noted that he was recovering quickly and “strongly” hoped to finalise “our matters as soon as I am able to do within the next two weeks”; xi) that was followed by an email from Mr Matyas to the solicitors on 25 February 2019, saying that he had been able to walk and attend legal meetings and, consequently, “you can expect my response letter within the next 2 weeks”; and xii) as at October 2019, that was the last communication from Mr Matyas to the solicitors or Mr Pu Liu.

[237]Mr Matyas finally agreed to be removed as executor in July 2020. The identity of the administrator was, however, still in dispute. This was resolved in a judgment given on 7 October 2020 by Deputy Master Linwood in which Mr Matyas’ candidate, Ms Sukhi Bagha (solicitor at Curzon Green), was appointed. Mr Matyas was ordered to pay Mr Pu Liu’s costs on the indemnity basis.

[238]However, for reasons that are unexplained, it seems that Ms Bagha made no progress in administering the estate. This led to a further order by Master Pester on 22 February 2022 in which Ms Bagha was replaced with Mr Pu Liu’s candidate, Mr Peter Daniel of Collyer Bristow. Again, costs were awarded against Mr Matyas.

[239]Once appointed as administrator, Mr Daniel found it difficult to progress matters. There were a number of difficulties, including:(1) how Mr Matyas would pay the IHT due on Thornbury and the securing of information needed to enable the submission to HMRC of the IHT account;

(2) whether compensation should be payable to the estate for the occupancy of Kinetica by Mr Matyas; and

(3) the treatment of the rents received by Mr Matyas in respect of Atkins Square.

[240]Five different letters/emails were sent to Mr Matyas in March to May 2022 but none of them took matters further forward. A representative response by Mr Matyas to correspondence with him is seen in his response of 19 April 2022 to a letter sent to him on 8 April 2022: “I will respond before the end of the week”.

[241]On 6 June 2022 there was a discussion between Mr Merritt (Collyer Bristow) and Mr Matyas in which the latter was recorded as saying that he has an ‘Inheritance claim’ which he was contemplating bringing in respect of Kinetica. In the proceedings leading up to the October 2020 order there had also been mention of Mr Matyas’s claims against the estate.

[242]Following the 6 June 2022 meeting there were attempts by Collyer Bristow to elicit from Mr Matyas further details about his potential claims against the estate. On 22 August 2022 Mr Matyas wrote a “letter before action”, demanding the termination of Mr Daniel’s appointment as personal representative. That was followed up with a letter on 6 September 2022 in which Mr Matyas insisted that Mr Daniel stopped all work on “my properties”. Collyer Bristow wrote to Mr Matyas on 25 November 2022 but Mr Matyas did not respond to that letter until 26 April 2023.

[243]In the meantime (on 26 March 2024 and nearly seven years after Chris’s death), Mr Daniel finally obtained letters of administration for the estate.

[244]There were exchanges between Collyer Bristow and Mr Matyas in July 2023 relating to the rent from Atkins Square with a threat of possession proceedings made in August 2023. In the event, the mortgagee of Atkins Square appointed a receiver in October 2023 and took possession of the property in February 2024.

[245]Attempts were also made to find out more about Mr Matyas’s claims against the estate, including an email from Mr Pu Liu to Mr Matyas on 7 August 2023 requesting him to provide more details of the claims and an email from Mr Daniel to Mr Matyas on 5 February 2024 to much the same effect.

[246]On 13 October 2023 Collyer Bristow wrote to Mr Matyas, informing him that Mr Daniel was preparing an application to the court for directions in the light of Mr Matyas’ behaviour. On 7 February 2024 Mr Daniel sent an email to Mr Matyas in which he explained that proceedings would be issued unless Mr Matyas provided evidence in support of his claims or he reached agreement with Mr Pu Liu and his parents.

[247]As neither of those things came to pass, the proceedings were issued on 17 May 2024 (claim 430), seeking, among other things:(1) directions to sell Kinetica and obtain possession from Mr Matyas;

(2) an account of rental income from Mr Matyas for Atkins Square; and

(3) orders to recover IHT from Mr Matyas in respect of Thornbury.

[248]In a witness statement given by Mr Matyas on 1 July 2024 (defending the claim) he said at [5] that “I intend to submit my beneficiary and inheritance claims in the July of 2024”. He failed to do that.

[249]However, nearly four years after he first referred to unparticularised claims against the estate, Mr Matyas did finally issue his own Part 8 proceedings (PT-2024-00083). The claim was CE-filed at 7.46pm on 26 September 2024 but the claim was not sealed until the next day (27 September 2024). The claim asserted that Mr Matyas had a beneficial interest in Kinetica and Atkins Square and also sought relief under the 1975 Act (including permission, if necessary, to bring the 1975 Act claim out of time). The defendants to the claim were Mr Pu Liu and Chris’s parents. Despite his role as administrator, Mr Daniel was not named as a defendant and was not served. He was made aware of the claim only when, on 30 September 2024, Pu Oliphant solicitors emailed the claim to Collyer Bristow.

[250]Mr Matyas unsuccessfully attempted to serve the claim form by emailing a copy to Pu Oliphant, who responded by saying that they had no instructions to accept service. Mr Matyas also attempted to serve a copy of the claim form on Mr Pu Liu by email but he did not respond. In the light of these failed attempts, Mr Matyas sent a letter on 29 October 2024 to the court asking for guidance about service. On 11 November 2024 Master Brightwell sent an email to Mr Matyas pointing out the need to obtain permission to serve out of the jurisdiction and referring him to Rule 6.36 of the Civil Procedure Rules. But Mr Matyas failed to take any action to serve the claim before, over four months after being made aware of that requirement, the time for serving the claim expired on 26 March 2025.

[251]As a result, Mr Daniel took steps of his own on 13 January 2025 to move things forward by applying for a final disposal of the administration action he had brought (under claim 430). On 10 April 2025 Master McQuail, in proceedings on that application:(1) ordered an account of the rental income in respect of Atkins Square;

(2) gave directions for the sale of Kinetica;

(3) ordered an account of occupation rent from Mr Matyas in respect of Kinetica; and

(4) authorised Mr Daniel to distribute the estate on the basis that Mr Matyas had no beneficial interest in Kinetica or Atkins Square.

[252]It was only then (six days later, on 16 April 2025) that Mr Matyas issued the claim (claim 384) which is the subject of this judgment. The claim was in the same terms as the unserved claim of 26/27 September 2024, but, on this occasion, was issued against Mr Daniel only. Orders were later made for notices to be served on Mr Pu Liu and Chris’s parents all of whom acknowledged service.

[253]That was by no means the end of the proceedings but I do not consider it necessary to say any more about them.

[254]The estimate of the amount of the costs orders varies as between the parties but Mr Briggs (on behalf of Mr Matyas) says that the costs orders in favour of Mr Daniel amount to £156,382 and those in favour of Mr Pu Liu amount to £162,000 (a total of £318,382). Mr Briggs also says that some £113,246.97 of these costs are owed to the estate and charged to Thornbury and a further £11,792.30 are unsecured orders owed to the estate. Further

Factual findings

[255]Mr Matyas says at [103] in his February 2026 witness statement that before 11 November 2024 he experienced a significant deterioration in his health. In addition to his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), he developed acute sciatica, which lasted for approximately three months. He claims that his PTSD affected his ability to deal with legal issues “promptly and consistently” while also accepting that there have been periods when he was able to function relatively normally. However, there were “other sometimes extended periods where I was not”.

[256]Mr Matyas also relies on a witness statement given by Emerson Bastos (dated 12 June 2025) about his health. Mr Bastos described himself as a “psychotherapy counsellor” and initially provided Mr Matyas with Shiatsu treatments from June 2012. He observed at the beginning of his statement that, throughout their time together, Mr Matyas “has consistently appeared to function well despite his demanding schedule”. He then went on to explain how he began seeing Mr Matyas for psychotherapy from November 2017, noting that he thought that Mr Matyas had changed significantly. Mr Bastos says that the sessions took place “every month or two” to address issues primarily related to PTSD. He said that Mr Matyas exhibited persistent and severe PTSD symptoms, which, among other things, delayed his engagement with tasks such as opening letters and emails (an example of “avoidance behaviour”). No particulars were given, however, of the extent to which this was said to affect Mr Matyas or of the particular periods in which he was said to be most affected.

Discussion

[257]Mr Briggs submitted that the case for extending time was a very strong one: i) Mr Matyas discussed a 1975 Act claim as early as July 2022 so that all parties were very much on notice; ii) Mr Matyas issued a claim in time on 27 September 2024 and it was only because Mr Matyas was unable to make the “notoriously difficult” arrangements for service in China that the claim failed; iii) once Mr Matyas discovered the effect of his failure to serve, he issued this claim promptly (albeit 6.5 months out of time); iv) his failure to engage fully with proceedings is understandable in the light of his PTSD; v) the only prejudice to the defendants is the “purely formal” prejudice identified by Briggs J in Nesheim, which should be assessed at “a very low level”; and vi) by contrast, the prejudice to Mr Matyas of refusing an extension is that an otherwise meritorious claim will be unable to proceed.

[258]I do not accept those submissions. I consider that, in the circumstances of this case, it is not appropriate to give Mr Matyas permission to bring his claim after the time-limit set out in s.4 of the 1975 Act had ended.

[259]In my view, the evidence set out above tells a consistent story of Mr Matyas ‘playing for time’, taking every step he could to delay proceedings relating to Chris’s estate. It is true that Mr Matyas intimated in very broad terms that he had a 1975 Act claim some years before he actually brought one. But it is, in my view, of more relevance to note that he failed to particularise his claim when repeatedly asked to do so. Even when he did finally say that he would issue proceedings by the end of July 2024, he did no such thing. Instead, he waited a further eight weeks to the very end of the six-month period to file his claim. He then took the conscious decision to serve the claim not on Mr Daniel but on persons he knew to be resident in China. He was then clearly advised what steps he needed to take to effect service there but he failed to take those steps. He was very much the author of his own misfortune.

[260]I do not accept that, to the extent he was suffering PTSD in the time after he was aware of what steps he needed to take to effect service out of the jurisdiction, this was of such severity as to lead to his complete stasis for well over four months. The evidence of Mr Bastos does not, in my view, bear that out: Mr Matyas consulted him only every month or two and Mr Bastos noted in his witness statement that, throughout their time together, Mr Matyas “has consistently appeared to function well despite his demanding schedule”. It may be that this was intended to be a reference to the time before Chris’s death but that is not what he actually said. I also note that Mr Bastos does not appear to be medically qualified, describing himself simply as a psychotherapy counsellor. If matters were as debilitating as Mr Matyas claims them to have been, I would expect other evidence (whether that of a doctor or other witnesses who could speak to his complete inability to progress his case) to have been presented. There was none. However, what is clear is that, both before this four-month period of inactivity and at all times since, Mr Matyas has been able to play a full part in the proceedings. That tends to suggest to me he could, if he had so desired, taken the necessary steps to effect service of his claim out of the jurisdiction.

[261]Nor do I consider this case to be comparable to Nesheim. That was a case of fault by solicitors where, unlike this case, early intimation of the claim was made shortly after the grant of probate in circumstances where the grant had not been seriously delayed by the actions of the person making the claim. As Briggs J said in that case, not to have given retrospective permission to serve outside the jurisdiction would have been to put the need to discipline lawyers for a genuine mistake ahead of the clear interests of doing justice between the parties.

[262]In my view, the contrast to the facts of this case could hardly be starker. To allow a late claim in this case would, in substance, reward conduct sustained over a nine-year period designed – in a deliberate and considered way – to delay the administration of the estate.

[263]Accordingly, I do not consider that this is a case where it would be appropriate to allow Mr Matyas to bring a late claim.

DISPOSITION

[264]I dismiss Mr Matyas’s claim to have a beneficial interest in either Kinetica or Atkins Square for the reasons given above. In my view, Mr Matyas’s 1975 Act claim fails substantively for each of the three separate reasons I have set out above (Chris was not domiciled in England and Wales at the time of his death; Chris and Mr Matyas did not live together in the same household as a married couple throughout the two-year period ending with Chris’s death; and Chris’s will did make reasonable financial provision for the maintenance of Mr Matyas), and I would, in any event, not have granted permission to Mr Matyas to bring the claim late.