Jagathesan Nadson v Whiting Group Limited / Graham Shepherd & Ors [2026] EWHC 1288 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1288 (Ch)Case No PE-2025-000012IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESPENSION LIST (ChD)Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 29 May 2026
Before
DEPUTY MASTER HOLDEN
Between
JAGATHESAN NADASONClaimant(1) WHITING GROUP LIMITED / GRAHAM SHEPHERDDefendants(2) THE ROYAL LONDON MUTUAL INSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITEDDefendant(3) THE PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
The Claimant appeared in person for in personLydia Seymour (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP) for First DefendantMichael Bowmer (instructed by Wedlake Bell LLP) for Second DefendantCleon Catsambis (instructed by M&G plc) for Third DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 19 March 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 29 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Deputy Master Holden:

[1]This is my judgment in respect of applications by the Defendants dated 7 November, 11 November, and 2 December 2025 to strike out the Claimant’s claim, or for summary judgment in the Defendants’ favour in respect of the claim.

Factual background

[2]The Claimant is Mr Jagathesan Nadason. Between around 1978 and 1993, Mr Nadason accrued pension benefits, including a Guaranteed Minimum Pension entitlement (GMP) under a contracted-out salary-related occupational pension scheme called the Bank of China Pension & Assurance Scheme, which was administered by AXA Sun Life (the ‘Bank of China Scheme’).[3]In 2002, Mr Nadason instructed an IFA. As to the identity of that adviser: i) The entity with which Mr Nadason interacted to receive advice concerning his pension was Direct Pension Services Limited (‘DPSL’). DPSL was in turn an Appointed Representative of the First Defendant, Whiting Group Limited (‘Whiting’). ii) Mr Nadason’s case is that he received financial advice both from Whiting and from Mr Graham Shepherd, who (confusingly) is also named by Mr Nadason as the First Defendant to this claim. The confusion as to the identity of the First Defendant is addressed below at paragraphs 40 – 41 of this judgment. iii) In fact, by a letter dated 8 March 2002, Mr Nadason authorised DPSL, and not Whiting, to advise him in respect of his pension. Nevertheless, for the purposes of determining the applications I will assume (in Mr Nadason’s favour) that he has an arguable case that DPSL was acting as an agent of Whiting.[4]The reason Mr Nadason sought advice in 2002 is because he wanted to obtain immediate access to his pension fund, in advance of his usual retirement date.[5]On 21 June 2002, DPSL produced a document entitled “Detailed Report and Recommendations”, setting out its advice and recommendation as to how Mr Nadason might achieve his aim. DPSL recommended that Mr Nadason undertake a “Split Transfer Between Personal Pension and an Immediate Vesting Section 32 plan”. It explained that:
“By splitting your benefits into two plans, we can provide a separate contract to accept the element of Guaranteed Minimum Pension. This will remain invested with the company set out in Section 8 of this report, and become available from age 60 onwards, whilst providing another plan with the company set out in Section 8 of this report. To accept the element of Excess Pension benefits allowing the maximum cash sum to be paid to you. In arranging the transfer to a Personal Pension with the company set out in Section 8 of this report, the element of Guaranteed Minimum Pension will be converted to Protected Rights benefits. Once transferred in this way, you would lose the guarantees applicable to this part of your pension. It will, however, be invested for you and it is the performance of the fund that will determine the eventual pension you will receive”
(emphasis in original).[6]At section 8 of the Report, DPSL recommended the split transfer option, on the footing that “your objectives are clearly to maximise a Tax Free Lump Sum Cash Payment and for any surplus to generate additional pension income.”[7]On the same date, Mr Nadason provided a letter to DPSL in the following terms: “I confirm that Direct Pension services Ltd (DPS) have provided me with advice restricted to the pensions area of my personal and financial situation and not with detailed financial advice covering any other areas. I confirm having instructed you to effect a transfer from my existing pension arrangements so that I can take immediate retirement benefits obtaining my maximum Tax-Free Cash entitlement. I am aware that this could detract from my potential deferred pension benefits and I understand that this course of action may not necessarily be in my long-term interest. However, I require cash with immediate effect for my present needs…”.[8]On 1 July 2002, Mr Nadason duly signed application forms to effect the split transfer option via a transfer to two plans – the Talisman Section 32 Buy Out Plan (the ‘Buy Out Plan’), and the Talisman Personal Pension Plan (the ‘Personal Pension Plan’). Both of these plans were administered by Scottish Life, a marketing division of the Second Defendant, Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Limited (‘Royal London’).[9]In respect of the Buy Out Plan, in December 2002 Mr Nadason received a tax-free lump sum payment of £19,284.25 (net of commission), with the remaining funds used to purchase a level-term annuity of £2,259.16 per annum.[10]In 2006, that annuity was transferred to the Third Defendant, Prudential Assurance Company Limited (‘Prudential’) via a bulk transfer pursuant to Part VII of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as approved by the Court of Session. The annuity has since been paid to Mr Nadason by Prudential.[11]In respect of the Personal Pension Plan, the sum of £27,616.96 was invested in units in an open-ended equity fund managed by Invesco Perpetual.[12]In December 2014, Mr Nadason was contacted by HMRC to let him know that he had contracted out of the Additional State Pension, with the effect that his State Pension would be subject to a Contracted-Out Deduction. This led Mr Nadason to contact Mr Shepherd of Whiting to complain about the loss of his GMP rights under the Bank of China Scheme.[13]On 27 January 2015, Mr Shepherd wrote a detailed email to Mr Nadason, in which he explained (correctly) that in 2002, two plans had been set up with Scottish Life – one to receive excess benefits under the Bank of China Scheme, which was used to pay Mr Nadason a tax-free lump sum, with the balance used to purchase an annuity (the Buy Out Plan); and the other to receive the cash equivalent of Mr Nadason’s GMP rights under the Bank of China Scheme, which was invested for Mr Nadason’s benefit (the Personal Pension Plan). Mr Shepherd explained that:
“Policy G2315839 received the cash equivalent of the Guaranteed Minimum Pension from the Bank of China scheme, which means that when the benefits were transferred to Royal London the GMP was forsaken and the money transferred was treated as Protected Rights funds.”
[14]Mr Shepherd went on in the same email to say that “Royal London are correct that when the transfer of benefits into the Appropriate Personal Pension plan was made, the GMP was lost...”.[15]Mr Nadason then made a complaint to Royal London concerning the loss of his GMP rights. I have seen a letter to Mr Nadason dated 9 February 2015 responding to the complaint. The complaint was rejected on the basis that Royal London had no obligation to “retain” Mr Nadason’s GMP entitlement. Royal London pointed out that the initial sum of £27,616.96 received into the Personal Pension Plan had grown by that date (according to an illustration) to the sum of £71,484.49. The response letter referred to Mr Nadason’s right to refer his complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service.[16]Mr Nadason then wrote to Mr Shepherd by email dated 12 February 2015 saying, “Further to my recent email regarding my dispute with Scottish Life/Royal London, which their IDRP has upheld and giving me recourse through the Pensions Ombudsman, I write to inform you that I do not have the time to pursue this matter any longer.” Mr Nadason asked for his benefits in the Personal Pension Plan to be transferred into a capped income drawdown policy, so as to access a further tax-free lump sum. It seems that this was then done in February 2015, with the sum of £74,389.27 transferred into a Royal London Income Release plan, yielding a further tax free lump sum payment to Mr Nadason of £18,597.32.[17]In May 2015, Mr Nadason wrote to Mr Shepherd to complain about some issues he was having with HMRC in relation to his tax code. In that email, Mr Nadason referred to the “GMP he should have received” from Scottish Life, and said that Mr Shepherd “[knew] very well my dispute with Scottish Life/Royal London on this and the outcome.” Mr Nadason asked Mr Shepherd to contact Royal London and urge them to sort out the issue with his tax code. He said “[d]o not make me take this matter up further with HMRC and revive my original dispute relating to my lost GMP.” I have not seen any further correspondence relating to that further issue.[18]Some 9 years later, in October 2024, Mr Nadason wrote to Mr Shepherd and Royal London to “follow up on my complaint to Royal London in 2014.” There followed a long list of complaints, which are very difficult to follow, but which broadly allege the mis-selling of pensions to Mr Nadason, as well as a breach of trust. The email is couched in trenchant terms, with Mr Nadason alleging on multiple occasions that he had been “ROBBED.” Mr Nadason also made a complaint to Prudential.[19]Those complaints were rejected. In September 2025, Mr Nadason then sent a letter of claim, which was said to be written pursuant to the “Pre-Action Protocol for Professional Negligence.” The letter of claim: i) alleged “multiple breaches of statutory, fiduciary, professional duties, deliberate concealment, deliberate misclassification, and deliberate misrepresentation relating to the transfer and mismanagement of the Claimant’s accrued statutory entitlement of Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) under a Contracted-Out Salary-Related (COSR) occupational pension scheme to a S32 Buyout Personal Pension Plan”; ii) provided a chronology setting out the original 2002 transfers to the Scottish Life plans; iii) alleged that on 30 August 2014 Royal London “failed to fullfil their statutory obligation to commence the Claimant’s monthly Guaranteed Minimum Pension at State Pension Age”; and iv) referred to Mr Nadason’s complaints that had been made in 2014/15, including a description of the letter from Royal London I refer to at paragraph 15 above as a “full and final response on claim for non-commencement of Guaranteed Minimum Pension with self incriminating admission of conversion, misclassification and misrepresentation and referral to Financial Ombudsman Service.”[20]The letter of claim referred to alleged causes of action in breach of statutory duties; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; professional negligence “in relation to the IFA’s advice and the Section 32 Buyout transfer, including failure to provide a Suitability Report”; “misrepresentation and misclassification of GMP as ordinary protected rights”; deliberate concealment and misrepresentation; and “[d]eliberate and unlawful act of conversion of GMP to pension portfolio with income release preempting Pension Schemes Act 2015.” The letter of claim sought damages together with alleged lost investment growth of £549,519.18.

Procedural history

[21]Royal London provided a letter of response dated 30 September 2025, but before the First and Third Defendants were able to provide a substantive response to the letter of claim, on 6 October 2025 Mr Nadason issued the present claim. The claim form (incorporating particulars of claim) alleges “breaches of statutory, fiduciary, professional duties, deliberate concealment and deliberate misrepresentation relating to the transfer and mismanagement of the Claimant’s accrued statutory Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) entitlement under a Contracted-Out Salary-Related (COSR) occupational pension scheme. As a result, the GMP remains unpaid from the Claimant's State Pension Age (SPA) of 65 on 30-8-2014 until today in 2025. The discovery of material negligence was made by re-examination of transfer and contract documents from a legal standpoint in 2024/2025 following refusal by 2nd Defendant to honor their statutory obligations to commence monthly GMP payments on the unlawfully deferred vesting date of 30-8-2024. The claim further concerns systemic failures in pension servicing, regulatory non-compliance, professional negligence.” Mr Nadason also alleged that the Defendants had failed to comply with the pre-action protocol.[22]The particulars of claim incorporated in the claim form did not in fact particularise Mr Nadason’s claim. Instead, they referred to Mr Nadason as “a recently reinstated (2024) UK resident under the UK Home Office Windrush Scheme”, that status being said to be a “relevant disability for limitation purposes under s.32 Limitation Act 1980.” The particulars of claim again contain a list of alleged causes of action, including “professional negligence, regulatory failure, breach of statutory duty and deliberate concealment arising from the Defendants’ conduct in the administration, servicing and non payment of his statutory Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) at his State Pension Age of 65 on 30th August 2014.”[23]The Defendants have applied to strike out or obtain reverse summary judgment in respect of Mr Nadason’s claim, on the footing that, in its present state, it is incoherently pleaded and any alleged losses caused to Mr Nadason arising out of the loss of his GMP entitlement under the Bank of China Scheme as a result of the 2002 transfers were time-barred.[24]In the context of those strike out/summary judgment applications, Mr Nadason has: i) filed documents said to constitute skeleton arguments in response to the strike out/summary judgment applications, which between them and their appendices comprise over 200 pages of materials; ii) filed documents said to constitute a skeleton argument and “judicial orientation note” in response to the applications, which together with its appendices comprises a further 100+ pages of materials; and iii) filed a “Report of Fraud Relating to Tampering and Fraudulent Execution of Pension Documentation”, in which Mr Nadason purported to make a report of fraud to the UK Report Fraud Office in respect of the alleged “tampering of the S32 Buyout Bond Application pre completed Forms” and the “fraudulent execution of pension Policies under Claimant’s name utilising the tampered Forms”.[25]Mr Nadason has also filed multiple applications, including for an “urgent Pre-CMC-Order” and for an unless order requiring the Second and Third Defendants to file and serve their Defences on a date to be determined; and has filed what purported to be a Notice to Admit Facts pursuant to CPR r.32.18. None of these applications made by Mr Nadason was listed for hearing before me, and (as I indicated to Mr Nadason at the hearing) it seemed to me that the efficient means of proceeding would be to determine the Defendants’ applications, which (if successful) would logically dispose of the procedural applications made by Mr Nadason.

Legal principles

[26]The Defendants’ applications are for strike out pursuant to CPR r.3.4(2) and, in the alternative, for reverse summary judgment pursuant to CPR r.24.2. The legal principles to be applied are well-known and uncontroversial.[27]The principles governing an application to strike out a statement of case were summarised by Mr Jonathan Hilliard KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, in Jon Flowith & Partners v Greaves [2025] EWHC 2343 (Ch), at [66], as follows:
“(1) The Court has power under CPR r.3.4(2) to strike out a statement of case if it appears to the Court that, “(a) The statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim; (b) The statement of case is an abuse of the Court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or (c) There has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or Court Order”. (2) For the purpose of r.3.4(2)(a), paragraph 1.2 of Practice Direction 3A gives examples of cases where the Court may conclude that the PoC fail to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim, including: “(1) those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about, for example ‘Money owed £5000’, (2) those which are incoherent and make no sense, (3) those which contain a coherent set of facts but those facts, even if true, do not disclose any legally recognisable claim against the defendant”
. Similarly, the White Book explains at [3.4.1] that grounds (a) and (b) in r.3.4(2) cover statements of case which are unreasonably vague, incoherent, vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded and other cases which do not amount to a legally recognisable claim or defence. (3) Where a statement of case is found to be defective, the Court may consider whether the defect may be cured by the respondent making an amendment. “[W]here the court holds that there is a defect in a pleading, it is normal for the court to refrain from striking out that pleading unless the court has given the party concerned an opportunity of putting right the defect” (Kim v Park [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB) at [40]). However, such an option only arises, “provided that there is reason to believe that he will be in a position to put the defect right”. (4) The approach in (3) is not a freestanding principle, but rather a reflection of what will in many cases fulfil the overriding objective: Alton v Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen [2024] EWCA Civ 1435 at [34]. (5) One possible order that the Court can make in the circumstances in (3), if it considers it appropriate on the facts, is that the claim is struck out unless the claimant applies for permission to amend within a certain period and such permission is granted to remedy the defect: Ashraf v Lester Dominic Solicitors Ltd [2022] EWHC 621 (Ch) at [272]. (6) When striking out a statement of case, CPR r. 3.4(3) empowers the Court to make any consequential order it considers appropriate, including dismissal.”[28]The learned Deputy Judge also provided, at [67], a helpful summary of the principles governing reverse summary judgment, derived largely from the often-cited judgment of Lewison J (as he then was) in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), at [15]. I bear those principles in mind, though for concision I do not set them out in full in this judgment.[29]I was also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wilson v HB (SWA) Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 1360; [2025] 4 WLR 114, at [22] – [23], in which Coulson LJ referred to the dicta of Tugendhat J in Kim v Park set out above (that “where the court holds that there is a defect in a pleading, it is normal for the court to refrain from striking out that pleading unless the court has given the party concerned an opportunity of putting right the defect”), and commented that “it is very difficult for the court to conclude (in Tugendhat J’s words) that ‘there is a reason to believe that the claimant would be in a position to put the defect right’ if there is no proposed amendment which seeks to do just that.”

Submissions

[30]At the hearing on 19 March 2026, the Claimant appeared by video link from Malaysia, having been prevented from travelling to London as a result of recent disruptions to air travel via the Middle East. The Defendants were each represented by counsel (Ms Seymour for the First Defendant; Mr Bowmer for the Second Defendant; and Mr Catsambis for the Third Defendant) who appeared in person. I am grateful to them for the efficient manner in which they made their submissions in respect of their clients’ substantially overlapping applications.[31]On behalf of Whiting (and, to the extent applicable, Mr Shepherd), Ms Seymour submitted that the claim should be struck out and/or dismissed by summary judgment on two independent grounds:(i) that it is out of time; and(ii) that the particulars of claim are incoherent and disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing any recognisable claim.[32]As to limitation, Ms Seymour submitted that, on any sensible view, the claim concerns advice and steps taken in 2002 in relation to Mr Nadason’s decision to transfer out of the Bank of China Scheme into the Scottish Life plans. She submitted that the relevant events occurred in 2002 (with the transfer implemented in October 2002), and that proceedings issued in 2025 are therefore far outside any primary limitation period, and also outside the 15-year latent damage long-stop under section 14B of the Limitation Act.[33]Ms Seymour submitted that Mr Nadason’s own case and correspondence show that he was well aware of the essence of the alleged loss of his GMP by 2014-2015, when he corresponded with Mr Shepherd and raised a complaint with Royal London following the commencement of his State Pension subject to a Contracted-Out Deduction. She submitted that section 32 of the Limitation Act has no application because there was no deliberate concealment: on the contrary, the documentary position was said to be transparent, and Mr Nadason’s later letters demonstrate his awareness of the essential issue (the loss of his GMP entitlement).[34]As a separate and independent basis for disposing of the case, Ms Seymour submitted that Mr Nadason’s particulars of claim are fundamentally defective: they do not plead any coherent duty, breach, or causation, and are unreasonably vague.[35]Ms Seymour also submitted that the claim against Mr Shepherd personally is misconceived: there is no pleaded basis for the attribution of any personal duty of care, no pleaded contractual relationship with him personally, and no proper pleaded case that he personally gave advice in an individual capacity.[36]On behalf of Royal London, and in addition to the points advanced by Ms Seymour, Mr Bowmer submitted that: i) the particulars of claim consist of no more than broad categories of causes of action without pleading the material facts needed to establish any of those causes of action. He submitted that it is not a proper approach to require defendants to trawl through extensive later filings to attempt to reconstruct a case that is not pleaded. ii) on the underlying facts, Royal London did not provide any advice of any nature to Mr Nadason. Its role was limited to establishing the plans which Mr Nadason applied for; receiving the transfer value of the Bank of China Scheme; and implementing Mr Nadason’s instructions given (including his taking of the tax-free lump sum and the purchase/transfer of an annuity in relation to the excess element); iii) any claim arising from the 2002 events is plainly statute-barred. He submitted that Mr Nadason’s assertion that his status under the Windrush scheme is a relevant disability postponing the running of the limitation period was misconceived. In any event, it is clear that Mr Nadason was aware of the relevant issue by 2014–2015. As to the application of section 32 of the Limitation Act, Mr Bowmer submitted that deliberate concealment was fanciful on the evidence, and that any such case could not in any event avoid the conclusion that time began running (at the latest) in 2014–2015.[37]On behalf of Prudential, Mr Catsambis submitted that the claim against his client should likewise be struck out and/or summarily dismissed. He observed that Prudential had had no involvement whatsoever in the original scheme, no role in any advice said to have been given in 2002, and no role in establishing the arrangements said to have resulted in the loss of GMP. He submitted that Prudential’s involvement was confined to becoming responsible (following a Part VII bulk transfer, as approved by the Court of Session) for administering and paying an annuity to Mr Nadason from November 2006. He submitted that there is no pleaded duty, breach or causation as against Prudential, and that the bare assertion of joint and several liability is unsupported by any pleaded basis in agency, vicarious liability or otherwise. He also adopted the other Defendants’ submissions that, in any event, the claim is time-barred and not apt for amendment.[38]Because the Claimant acted as a litigant in person and appeared by video link, I wished to ensure that the Claimant was able fully to follow the proceedings and to make such representations to the court as he wished. The Claimant confirmed to the court that he was able to hear both me and the Defendants’ counsel, and that he had access to all documents relevant to the application. I was also able clearly to see and hear Mr Nadason. I gave the Claimant a full opportunity to make submissions as to the nature of his claim against each of the Defendants, and the basis on which he asserted that the claim could be brought notwithstanding the limitation defences that had been raised.[39]Mr Nadason’s submissions were at times difficult to follow. In order to ensure that I understood his position, I spent something in the order of an hour in direct dialogue with Mr Nadason. I consider that the following is a fair summary of the submissions he articulated at length in the course of the hearing: i) Mr Nadason submitted that his GMP was an inalienable statutory entitlement, and that a statutory entitlement of that kind cannot lawfully be forfeited or extinguished by any form of contractual or administrative conversion. He submitted that, insofar as it involved the loss of his GMP entitlement, the 2002 transfer was therefore unlawful and void. His position was that his GMP entitlement simply could not be lost via transfer or buy out under any circumstances. ii) When I asked Mr Nadason to explain the legal basis of that submission, he referred me to various statutory provisions. Mr Nadason’s position as to the applicable statutory regime fluctuated across the course of his submissions. At one juncture, I therefore asked Mr Nadason directly to identify the statutory regime he was relying upon. He referred me to sections 67 - 70 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993. However, looking at those sections, they did not support, and were irrelevant to, Mr Nadason’s submission. iii) In respect of the advice he received in 2002 and the setting up of the Royal London plans, Mr Nadason submitted that the 2002 application forms had been “tampered with”, including by material being struck through, and he submitted that this amounted to fraud and deliberate concealment. He placed responsibility in particular on Mr Shepherd, asserting that Mr Shepherd had pre-completed and altered forms. This appeared to found Mr Nadason’s case against Mr Shepherd personally, whom Mr Nadason did not accept was acting as an employee of, or within the scope of his ordinary authority from, Whiting. Rather, Mr Nadason submitted that Mr Shepherd was acting as an IFA in his own right, and that he could not “hide behind the corporate veil of the Whiting Group.” iv) In respect of the limitation period, Mr Nadason candidly accepted that he had become aware of a problem in 2014-2015 when his State Pension came into payment and he learned of the Contracted-Out Deduction, which led him to contact those involved and to raise complaints about the loss of his GMP entitlement. However, he submitted that he did not discover the alleged “tampering” (and therefore the alleged fraud/concealment) until later, in 2023–2024, and that it was only then that he could “put the pieces together”. On that basis he relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 and submitted that the date of discovery of these matters raised a triable issue of fact. v) In the course of his oral submissions, Mr Nadason also advanced a varied array of alternative arguments on limitation, including a contention of a continuing breach (that each month of non-payment of his GMP would give rise to a fresh cause of action) and reliance on the technical complexity of GMP as supporting a latent-damage analysis. He further submitted that liability was joint and several across the Defendants, on the basis that the transfer and administration of pension plans said to have involved an unlawful loss of his GMP entitlement meant that Royal London and Prudential had “inherited” responsibility for the underlying alleged defect. vi) Mr Nadason also contended that he had served a notice to admit facts which had not been answered, and that this should be treated as an admission of all material facts underpinning his case.

Disposal

(a) Identity of the First Defendant

[40]The documentary record makes it clear beyond any sensible doubt that at all material times Mr Shepherd acted as an employee or agent of Whiting. In turn, DPSL acted as an Appointed Representative of Whiting. At all material times, Mr Shepherd interacted with Mr Nadason in that capacity, and not in his personal capacity.[41]Even if there were any viable cause of action against Whiting (which issue I consider below), it is therefore clear that Mr Nadason has no cause of action against Mr Shepherd personally. Mr Shepherd should not have been joined as a Defendant to this action, and to the extent that he was, I strike out the claim against him. The only proper Defendant (based on the assumption favourable to Mr Nadason which I made at paragraph 3(iii) of this judgment) is Whiting.

(b) Strike out/reverse summary judgment applications

[42]In my judgment, Mr Nadason’s claim as pleaded is incoherent.[43]Mr Nadason’s claim form and particulars of claim do not articulate any legally cognisable claim, and do not plead any of the essential facts necessary to sustain any such claim. Rather, the claim form and particulars of claim refer in bald and undeveloped terms to a series of categories of causes of action (“breaches of statutory, fiduciary, professional duties, deliberate concealment and deliberate misrepresentation relating to the transfer and mismanagement of the Claimant’s accrued statutory Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) entitlement under a Contracted-Out Salary-Related (COSR) occupational pension scheme”), without explaining the factual or legal basis of any such claim.[44]Having entered into a lengthy dialogue with Mr Nadason at the hearing, through which I endeavoured to understand his case, I am no clearer as to the legal basis on which Mr Nadason submits that his GMP entitlement was, or is, inalienable, or how that is said to give rise to civil liability on the Defendants’ part as a matter of law. As I have said, the statutory provisions which Mr Nadason referred me to in that regard at the hearing did not provide any legal foundation for that submission.[45]Even taking his case at its highest, I am not satisfied that Mr Nadason has identified any tenable legal basis on which the 2002 transactions are to be treated as void, or on which the alleged statutory character of his GMP entitlement gives rise to a direct cause of action against the Defendants in the manner contended for by him. The difficulty is not merely that the pleaded case lacks detail; it is that Mr Nadason has not identified any statutory provision which, on its proper construction, invalidates the transfer/buy-out that occurred in 2002, or renders the Defendants liable in the manner alleged. Nor has Mr Nadason articulated any coherent basis on which Royal London and Prudential, as later providers or administrators of the arrangements into which the transferred funds were paid, are said thereby to have assumed an obligation to pay a GMP said to subsist independently of the contractual arrangements actually put in place.[46]Mr Nadason’s claim against Royal London and Prudential is premised on the submission that his GMP entitlement is an inalienable right, which – as transferees – Royal London and Prudential have become jointly and severally liable to pay. But in the absence of any coherent legal basis for that contention, in my judgment the claims against Royal London and Prudential are incoherent.[47]In those circumstances, I conclude that I ought to strike out or grant reverse summary judgment in respect of Mr Nadason’s claim against Royal London and Prudential.[48]As to Mr Nadason’s claim against Whiting, he alleges that the application forms to transfer his Bank of China pension to Scottish Life had been “tampered with”. However, the contemporaneous documents provide no basis for any allegation of fraudulent tampering. On the contrary, they demonstrate that Mr Nadason received clear advice as to the consequences of the transfer of his pension, including as to the loss of his GMP entitlement. Mr Nadason provided DPSL with a letter confirming safe receipt of its Detailed Report and Recommendations containing that advice. The transfer to Scottish Life then implemented the recommendation that had been communicated to Mr Nadason. The application forms were not “tampered with”: they were filled in correctly, in accordance with the advice Mr Nadason had received and acknowledged.[49]It seems to me that Mr Nadason’s only other complaint against Whiting, to the extent that any can be discerned in his claim form, is that the advice he received from DPSL/Whiting in 2002 was negligent, in that (he alleges) DPSL/Whiting failed to provide him with sufficiently clear advice that the transfers to Scottish Life would involve the loss of his GMP entitlement. However, as in the case of the alleged “tampering”, a professional negligence claim appears to me to be manifestly inconsistent with the contemporaneous documents. In circumstances in which Mr Nadason acknowledged receipt of a detailed report explaining that the transfer to Scottish Life would involve the conversion of his GMP entitlement into Protected Rights benefits, and he authorised the transfer on that footing, a claim that DPSL/Whiting negligently failed to advise him of the potential loss of his GMP entitlement is obviously doomed to fail.[50]In those circumstances, I conclude that I ought to strike out or grant reverse summary judgment in respect of Mr Nadason’s claim against Whiting as well.[51]In any event, in my judgment any cause of action that Mr Nadason may have had against any of the Defendants has clearly become time-barred. The events giving rise to Mr Nadason’s claim occurred in 2002, over 23 years before the claim form was issued. As such, all primary limitation periods for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and restitution have already expired. In respect of Mr Nadason’s submissions as to limitation: i) Mr Nadason cannot rely on the latent damage provisions of s.14A of the Limitation Act, because any such claim would be subject to the long-stop date of 15 years from accrual of the cause of action under s.14B of the Limitation Act. As the events giving rise to Mr Nadason’s alleged loss occurred over 15 years prior to the issuing of his claim form, they are all time-barred regardless of whether the damage was originally latent. ii) Mr Nadason’s reliance on s.21(1)(b) of the Limitation Act is also conceptually flawed: his complaint does not involve any allegation that trust property has been retained by a trustee or converted to the trustee’s own use. iii) Mr Nadason has not established deliberate concealment so as to extend time pursuant to section 32 of the Limitation Act. On the contrary, I accept the Defendants’ submission that Mr Nadason’s communications with the Defendants in 2014-15 show that he was well aware by that date of the loss of his GMP entitlement. Had he not been aware by that date of the consequences of the 2002 transfers, Mr Shepherd’s email of 27 January 2015 clearly explained the position to him. By 2014–2015 he plainly knew the essential facts that he now relies upon as constituting the substance of his alleged loss, namely that he considered his GMP rights to have been lost in consequence of the 2002 arrangements, and he knew the identity of those whom he considered responsible. Mr Nadason did not then issue his claim form for another 10 years. In my judgment, there is no real prospect of Mr Nadason establishing deliberate concealment so as to avoid a successful limitation defence. iv) I also reject Mr Nadason’s submission that his status under the Windrush scheme, or his having left the UK, constitute a relevant disability preventing the running of time for limitation purposes. They do not. v) I do not agree that Mr Nadason’s claim can be maintained on the basis of the doctrine of continuing breach. Mr Nadason’s essential case is that the loss of his GMP entitlement was caused by a single act (the transfer of his pension to the Scottish Life schemes in 2002) which has caused his alleged loss. The fact that Mr Nadason’s losses are alleged to accrue over time (by reason of the alleged underpayment of his pension) does not mean that any continuing breach of any duty owed to Mr Nadason has occurred.[52]Accordingly, Mr Nadason’s claim against all three Defendants is time-barred. I would therefore grant reverse summary judgment in respect of Mr Nadason’s claim against all three Defendants on that basis as well.[53]I should also deal expressly with the Claimant’s reliance on the notice to admit facts which he contends was not answered. That point does not assist him. The procedural step on which he relies cannot cure the absence of a properly pleaded claim. For the reasons set out above, the defects in Mr Nadason’s case are not confined to disputed issues of fact. They concern the absence of any coherent legal basis for liability against the Defendants, and the operation of the Limitation Act. The Claimant’s reliance on the purported notice to admit therefore provides no answer to the Defendants’ applications.[54]For completeness, I am satisfied that this is not a case in which the just disposal of the proceedings requires that the Claimant be afforded any further opportunity to re-plead. Mr Nadason has had ample opportunity, both in his written submissions and at the hearing, to articulate the legal and factual basis of his claim. The defects in Mr Nadason’s case are not merely defects of form or drafting; they go to the absence of any properly articulated legal basis for liability against any of the Defendants. In those circumstances, I do not consider that an order giving the Claimant a further opportunity to amend would serve any useful purpose.

Conclusion

[55]For the reasons set out in this judgment, I strike out the claim, and to the extent necessary I grant reverse summary judgment in the Defendants’ favour.

Postscript

[56]Following the circulation to the parties of a draft of this judgment, Mr Nadason asks the court to reconsider its judgment. I do not consider that there is any basis to do so, but for completeness I address Mr Nadason’s further points below.[57]Mr Nadason submits that there were pre-hearing judicial irregularities caused by the court, which led to Mr Nadason being deprived of a “fair and meaningful opportunity to present the case.” Having looked at the chronology, I do not consider that there were any pre-hearing judicial irregularities of the manner suggested by Mr Nadason. In any event, it is clear that Mr Nadason was not deprived of his opportunity to present his case: he did so fully and vigorously, and the court accommodated him in doing so.[58]Mr Nadason repeats his complaint that the Defendants failed to respond to his Notice to Admit Facts served pursuant to CPR r.32.18. I dealt with this at paragraph 53 above, but as the complaint has been repeated I will say a little more about it: i) Mr Nadason is under the misapprehension that a failure to respond to a Notice to Admit Facts served pursuant to CPR r.32.18 constitutes a deemed admission of those facts. Thus, he has referred in subsequent documents to “deemed admissions” said to have been made by the Defendants. That is not correct. Non-response to a Notice to Admit Facts served pursuant to CPR r.32.18 does not constitute a deemed admission of those facts, although the failure to admit facts which ought to have been admitted may later give rise to adverse costs consequences. ii) In this regard, in his correspondence with the Defendants’ solicitors dated 9 March 2026 Mr Nadason purported to quote CPR r.32.18(2) in the following terms:
“If a party does not respond to the notice within the period specified in the notice (or, if no period is specified, within 21 days), the court may treat the facts as admitted and may impose cost sanctions on the non-responding party.”
But this is not what CPR r.32.18(2) says. In fact, CPR r.32.18(2) says:
“[a] notice to admit facts must be served no later than 21 days before the trial.”
The provision quoted by Mr Nadason does not appear anywhere in the Rules, and appears to be a fictitious reference. iii) In any event, the Defendants responded to Mr Nadason indicating that they did not make any admission in response to the Notice to Admit Facts. Mr Nadason suggests that an “express admission” was made by a statement by one of the Defendants’ solicitors that “none of the items raised in the notice to admit is not admitted”, which double negative was subsequently clarified to have been a typographical error. Mr Nadason seeks to treat that obvious slip as a formal notice of admission pursuant to CPR Part 14, but self-evidently it was not.[59]Mr Nadason complains that a Deputy Master was assigned to determine this case. He also says that “[t]he Deputy Master ’s lack of preparation was visibly evident and the transcript and or video recording would testify to this conduct.” The assignment of a Deputy Master to a case is not a valid ground for complaint, and I do not consider that I was underprepared for the hearing.[60]Mr Nadason suggests that the court “engaged in mini-trial conduct and cross examination style questioning of the Claimant.” That is incorrect: the application was not determined via a “mini-trial”, and there was no cross-examination style questioning: rather, as I adverted to at paragraph 39 above, I endeavoured through extensive dialogue with Mr Nadason to understand the legal basis of his claim.[61]Mr Nadason also asserts that the court “did not consider” his submissions pursuant to section 32 of the Limitation Act or on the basis of an alleged continuing breach. That is evidently incorrect: see paragraph 51(iii) and (v) above.[62]Mr Nadason suggests that the court has “applied the wrong test for strike-out/summary judgment.” I disagree.[63]In the premises, I do not recall or alter my judgment.