Jeremy John Langley & Anor v Sophie Anne Langley & Anor [2026] EWHC 1279 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1279 (Ch)Case No PT-2025-BRS-000143IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEVenue BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BRISTOLPROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)Venue Bristol Civil Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GRDate 28 May 2026
Before
HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
Between
JEREMY JOHN LANGLEYClaimantsANDREW JOHN LANGLEYClaimantSOPHIE ANNE LANGLEYDefendantsSIAN MORETONDefendant
Kingsley Napley LLP for ClaimantsThe First Defendant in person for in personApplication dealt with on paper
This judgment was handed down remotely at 3.30 pm on 28 May 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.HHJ Paul Matthews :

Introduction

[1]This is my judgment on an application by the first defendant pursuant to CPR rule 3.3(5) made on 14 December 2025 in respect of the order which I made on 11 December 2025, dismissing an application by the first defendant in Form N244 filed on 31 October 2025. That latter application was for an order to stay the present probate claim “pending determination of the citation issued 6 October 2025”. It is therefore necessary that I give a certain amount of background information so that the present application (on which this is my judgment) can be properly understood, and so that I can explain the reasoning for my decision.

Background

[2]The claimants are two of the three children of the late Anne Shirley Langley (“the deceased”), who died on 1 May 2024. The first defendant is the third of those children. The second defendant was a longstanding friend of the deceased. The first claimant, the second defendant and a Mr Walter Thrush were appointed as executors of an apparent will of the deceased dated 27August 2020. (It appears that Mr Thrush renounced his position as executor by way of a deed dated 17 August 2024. He plays no further part in the story.) There is also an earlier apparent will dated 2 October 2018. The remaining executors instructed solicitors (Omnia Legal) to act in the administration of the estate. In October 2024 they received a letter from Myerson Solicitors, acting for the first defendant, informing them that they had been instructed to investigate the circumstances of both the 2020 and the 2018 wills. The remaining executors applied for probate of the 2020 will on 4 November 2024, but were informed on 26 November 2024 that the first defendant had entered a caveat against the issue of a grant of probate.[3]At this point the executors instructed Kingsley Napley, who corresponded with Myerson Solicitors between December 2024 and February 2025. In June 2025 the first defendant replaced Myerson Solicitors with Payne Hicks Beach, who sent a letter of claim dated 27 July 2025. A detailed letter of response was sent on 11 September 2025, but there was no substantive correspondence thereafter. On 6 October 2025, the first defendant applied to HMCTS for the issue of a citation to require the first claimant and the second defendant as executors of the will of 27August 2020 to propound that will. (Elsewhere in the papers the first defendant refers to this citation as one to accept or refuse probate, but these are different things: see the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, rules 47 and 48. The form of the citation submitted in the present case is clearly to propound the will.)[4]On 7 October 2025, HMCTS informed the first defendant that the application for the issue of a citation should be sent to Leeds District Probate Registry. The first defendant sent it to Leeds. On 8 October 2025, Leeds District Probate Registry informed the first defendant that the application had been referred to the registrar. In the early hours of 9 October 2025, the first defendant emailed the Issue section of the Chancery Division in London, informing staff that she had already “submitted a citation to accept or refuse probate, directed to the named executors… to the Leeds District Probate Registry, which is currently pending. I made this application on an urgent basis in light of indications that an application to propound the will by beneficiaries was about to be made. I respectfully request that no further steps be taken on any propound claim until the status of that citation is confirmed by the probate Registry.”[5]However, this claim was nevertheless issued on 9 October 2025 by the High Court, Chancery Division. On 12 October 2025 and on 15 October 2025, the first defendant sent two notes to the Registrar of the District Probate Registry, highlighting a procedural conflict and a failure to give priority to her application for the issue of a citation.. In between those two dates, on 13 October 2025, the first defendant once again emailed the Issue section of the Chancery Division in London, copying in the Leeds District Probate Registry, complaining about the issue of the claim in the Chancery Division and seeking an urgent review of the matter. However, the email was addressed “Dear Registrar”. I am not aware of any response from the Issue section of the Chancery Division. The response from the Leeds District Probate Registry was as follows:
“You cannot proceed with the citation to propound as a probate claim has commenced and a claim in the High Court supersedes any action that can be taken in the Probate Registry as they are a Higher Court than us. We will now await the outcome of that probate claim.”
We will now await the outcome of that probate claim.”[6]On 16 October 2025, the second defendant acknowledged service, intimating no intention to defend the claim. On 17 October 2025, the first defendant acknowledged service in person. It appears that Payne Hicks Beach were no longer instructed. On 21 October 2025, Master Clark made an order transferring this claim to the Business and Property Courts in Bristol, and giving the claimants permission to amend the claim form to insert their residential addresses. The transfer to Bristol caused a hiatus in the proceedings, as the file was received from London only at the end of October. However, before that happened, the first defendant issued an application in London in Form N244, dated 31 October 2025.

The application of 31 October 2025

[7]The application notice sought an order that the probate claim “be stayed pending determination of the citation issued on 6 October 2025, or alternatively struck out as procedurally defective under CPR 57.5 and NCPR 47–48 … ” The application notice and supporting documents do not appear to have been transferred with the rest of the file, and it took some time for this application to come to the attention of court staff in Bristol. This was exacerbated by the illness of the first defendant, due to an infection, which required her admission to hospital on 4 November 2025.[8]It was only on 25 November 2025 that the court in Bristol had the relevant documents. They were referred to me the same day. On the following day I asked staff to ask the first defendant to supply a copy of the “citation issued on 6 October 2025”, as referred to in the application notice, because I could not find it amongst the documents that I had. This request was sent out to the first defendant on 2 December 2025. The first defendant replied later the same day, attaching a number of documents and explaining what they were. I was then sitting in London rather than Bristol, and so I saw the email and attachments only on 5 December 2025, when I told court staff that they did not include a copy of the citation as issued by the Probate Registry, and asked that they ask her for that.[9]In her email of 9 December 2025, the first defendant explained that the Probate Registry did not issue or seal the citation submitted before the issue of the High Court claim. All she had therefore was the draft that she had submitted to the Registry. I had not previously understood this, though in fact she had said much the same thing in her email of 2 December, which in my haste I had overlooked. Having considered the documents, on 10 December 2025 I provided court staff with a reply to go to the first defendant, which I understand was sent to her on 11 December 2025.[10]The reply read:
“Please tell Ms Langley (copy to Kingsley Napley) that her application by notice dated 31 October 2025 to stay this claim ‘pending determination of the citation issued 6 October 2025’ must fail, because (as Ms Langley now appears to accept) the citation she asked to be issued was in fact refused by the probate registry, on the grounds that the citation asked for the claimants to be cited to propound the will of 2020, and that is what they have done. So there was no point in the citation and it was never issued. The practical result is that there is nothing to determine, and therefore no need to stay the probate claim in the meantime. Nor is the claim procedurally defective under CPR rule 57.5 (which merely concerns the filing of evidence about testamentary scripts and lodging of such scripts) or NCPR rules 47-48 (which in any event have no application to contentious probate claims: see rules 45(4) and 46(3)). Her application is therefore dismissed on the papers, without the need to invite the claimants to comment.”
[11]There are two points that I must make here about the terms of my decision. The first is that the reference at the end of the first sentence to “that is what they have done” is one referring back to the draft citation asking for the executors to be cited to propound the will, ie to issue proceedings for probate of the 2020 will in solemn form. But the High Court claim issued on 9 October constitutes these proceedings, so that citing them to do so is now pointless. It may be that the first defendant thinks that “that is what they have done” means that the executors have already obtained probate in solemn form. But that would be nonsense. Of course that has not yet happened. A more nuanced understanding might be that “that is what they have done” means that the executors have constituted the probate proceedings in the correct way, whereas the first defendant thinks that they have been constituted incorrectly.[12]The second point is that the reference to “nothing to determine” in the third sentence is a reference to the fact that the first defendant had asked for a stay “pending the determination of the citation issued 6 October 2025”. As no citation was ever issued by the Registry, there was indeed nothing to determine, and so no determination to wait for. I now understand that the first defendant may have been using the expression “citation issued 6 October 2025” to mean the draft citation that she sent to the HMCTS on 6 October and then to the Leeds District Probate Registry on 7 October. But, according to the rules, a citation issues from the probate registry after being settled by a district judge or registrar: Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, rule 46(1). So, the first defendant and I may have been at terminological cross-purposes as well.

The Request under CPR rule 3.3(5)

[13]On 15 December 2025, the first defendant made an informal application to the court by a document sent by email headed “Request under CPR 3.3(5) for clarification and/are reconsideration of the Order dated 11 December 2025 …” Strictly speaking, this request should have been made by application notice, as provided by CPR rule 23.3: see Riniker v Al-Turk [2023] EWHC 2910 (KB), [14]-[15]. In addition, an issue fee should have been paid. But in all the circumstances I shall ignore that.[14]For some reason, probably pressure of business in the court office, this email request was not referred to me until late March 2026. I dealt with it on 23 March 2026, asking for the following reply to be sent to the first defendant:
“This is not a case within CPR rule 3.3(4), because the order was made on the application of Ms Langley herself (dated 31 October 2025) and not on the initiative of the court. The court took into account the representations made by Ms Langley in the email correspondence in November and December 2025. The reasons for the decision were set out in the decision of 10 December 2025. There is therefore no basis for reconsideration under CPR rule 3.3(5).”
[15]However, recently, I became aware that the first defendant considers that this Request under CPR rule 3.3(5) is still outstanding, whereas I thought I had dealt with it, as set out above. Having asked for an update from court staff, I understand that, in fact, this reply has still not yet been sent out. This is because of the backlog of other paperwork which the Specialist Team are having to deal with. I am afraid that resource issues make this a common feature of our work. (I have now directed that it need not be sent out, as this judgment replaces it.) In order to be fair to the first defendant, therefore, I have gone back and looked at the matter again.

Procedural rules

[16]The relevant procedural rules are contained in CPR rules 3.3 and 28.3. Rule 3.3 relevantly provides as follows:
“3.3 Court’s power to make order of its own initiative [ … ] (4) The court may make an order of its own initiative, without hearing the parties or giving them an opportunity to make representations. (5) Where the court has made an order under paragraph (4) – (a) a party affected by the order may apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed; and (b) the order must contain a statement of the right to make such an application. (6) An application under paragraph (5)(a) must be made – (a) within such period as may be specified by the court; or (b) if the court does not specify a period, not more than 7 days after the date on which the order was served on the party making the application. [(7) An application under paragraph (5)(a) shall be considered at an oral hearing unless the court decides and states in an order that the application is totally without merit. (8) If the court decides under paragraph (7) that the application is totally without merit, an application under paragraph (5)(a) may be made for reconsideration without an oral hearing.] [ … ]” (Paragraphs (7) and (8) were added to rule 3.3 in October 2023.) [ … ] (4) The court may make an order of its own initiative, without hearing the parties or giving them an opportunity to make representations. (5) Where the court has made an order under paragraph (4) – (a) a party affected by the order may apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed; and (b) the order must contain a statement of the right to make such an application. (6) An application under paragraph (5)(a) must be made – (a) within such period as may be specified by the court; or (b) if the court does not specify a period, not more than 7 days after the date on which the order was served on the party making the application. [(7) An application under paragraph (5)(a) shall be considered at an oral hearing unless the court decides and states in an order that the application is totally without merit. (8) If the court decides under paragraph (7) that the application is totally without merit, an application under paragraph (5)(a) may be made for reconsideration without an oral hearing.] [ … ]”
[17]Rule 23.8 relevantly provides as follows:
“23.8 Applications which may be dealt with without a hearing (1) The court may deal with an application without a hearing if— (a) the parties agree the terms of the order sought; (b) the parties agree to dispense with a hearing; or (c) the court does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate. (2) If the parties agree to dispense with a hearing, a party may not without the court’s permission apply to have the order set aside, varied or stayed. (3) [If the court decides the application without a hearing under paragraph (1)(c) and does so in circumstances where the parties affected by the application have not had an opportunity to make representations about the substance of the application]— (a) a party affected by the court’s order may within such period as the court may specify apply to have the order set aside, varied or stayed; (b) if no period is specified, the application must be made within 7 days after the date the order was served on the party applying; and (c) the order must contain a statement of the right to make such an application. (4) An application under paragraph (3) shall be considered at an oral hearing unless the court decides and states in an order that the application is totally without merit. (5) If the court decides under paragraph (4) that the application is totally without merit, an application under paragraph (3) may be made for reconsideration without an oral hearing.]” (The original rule 23.8, then consisting only of the text now found in sub-rule (1), was substituted by the present one in October 2023, thereby in effect adding new sub-rules (2)-(5). The words in square brackets in sub-rule (3) were substituted for the words originally found there in April 2025.) (1) The court may deal with an application without a hearing if— (a) the parties agree the terms of the order sought; (b) the parties agree to dispense with a hearing; or (c) the court does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate. (2) If the parties agree to dispense with a hearing, a party may not without the court’s permission apply to have the order set aside, varied or stayed. (3) [If the court decides the application without a hearing under paragraph (1)(c) and does so in circumstances where the parties affected by the application have not had an opportunity to make representations about the substance of the application]— (a) a party affected by the court’s order may within such period as the court may specify apply to have the order set aside, varied or stayed; (b) if no period is specified, the application must be made within 7 days after the date the order was served on the party applying; and (c) the order must contain a statement of the right to make such an application. (4) An application under paragraph (3) shall be considered at an oral hearing unless the court decides and states in an order that the application is totally without merit. (5) If the court decides under paragraph (4) that the application is totally without merit, an application under paragraph (3) may be made for reconsideration without an oral hearing.]”
[18]I need also to refer to certain paragraphs in Practice Direction 23A:
“2.2 Where a hearing is requested by the applicant or the court decides to hold a hearing, the court will notify the applicant of the time and date for the hearing of the application and may at the same time give directions for the filing of evidence. 2.3 On receipt of an application notice containing a request that the application be dealt with without a hearing, a Master, District Judge or other judge will decide whether the application is suitable for consideration without a hearing. 2.4 Where the Master, District Judge or other judge so decides, the court will inform the applicant and the respondent and may give directions for the filing of evidence.”

Caselaw

[19]In Collier v Williams [2006] 1 WLR 1945, the Court of Appeal dealt with a number of procedural matters in four conjoined appeals. One issue that arose related to the power of a litigant to seek a reconsideration of an order made on the court’s own initiative (under rule 3.3(5)). In the appeals under consideration, claimants’ solicitors had applied to the court on paper, without notice, at the last moment before the life of an issued claim form expired, for extensions of time for service. If the court refused any part of the application, solicitors were applying for reconsideration of the decision under rule 3.3(5), rather than seeking to appeal the court’s refusal. The question was whether this course was justified.[20]One side submitted that, if an applicant made a without notice application which was dismissed without a hearing, the only route of challenge open to the applicant was an appeal. The other side submitted that the court had jurisdiction to reconsider the matter in such circumstances, and advanced three alternative arguments. One of those was based on CPR rule 3.1(7), which is not relied on by the first defendant. I can therefore put that on one side, and concentrate on the other two arguments, which do rely on rule 3.3(5). One of these, which the Court of Appeal called the “direct” argument, was that:
“26. … the court has to consider whether a hearing is appropriate, and when the court concludes that it is not, it is deciding that point on its own initiative and that provides a direct route to CPR3.3(5).”
[21]The court in its judgment rejected this argument shortly, saying that it seemed to the judges to be unarguable:
“28. CPR 3.3 recognises that the court can exercise its powers on an ‘application’ or ‘of its own initiative’. CPR3.3(5) only applies where the court has made an order of its own initiative. Where a court is considering an application without notice requesting that it be dealt with on paper and decides that the application is suitable for consideration without a hearing, two things seem to us to be obvious. First the court is acting on an application and not of its own initiative, and secondly the only decision which could conceivably be said to be of its own initiative is the decision not to have a hearing. But it is not that decision which the applicant is seeking to set aside or vary.”
It was this reasoning that I sought to express in my decision of 11 December 2026. However, in that decision, I did not deal with the other argument which the Court of Appeal considered in Collier v Williams. I therefore now turn to do so.[22]That other argument, which the court called the “indirect” argument, coupled rule 3.3(5) with the power of the court to deal with matters without a hearing (under CPR rule 23.8). It depended on the fact that there was another way in the rules to treat the court’s decision as one “made on its own initiative”, and thus engaging rule 3.3(4). This was via paragraph 11(2) of Practice Direction 23. It was explained by the court in this way:
“25. … The steps in the argument in support of the proposition that CPR 23.8(c) applies are as follows: i) Where a request is made to have an application disposed of without a hearing, it must be considered by the master or district judge to decide whether it is suitable for consideration without a hearing (CPR PD 23 para 2.3); ii) Where the master or district judge agrees, the court will so inform the applicant and the respondent and may give directions for the filing of evidence (CPR PD 23 para 2.4); and (iii) Where the court so informs the parties, it follows that the court "does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate" (CPR 23.8(c)); iv) under CPR PD23 para 11.2, where CPR 23.8(c) applies the court treats the application as if it is proposing to make an order on its own initiative; and v) thus the order made by the court must be treated as made on the court's own initiative and under CPR 3.3 (5) the applicant as a party affected by the order, can apply to have it set aside or varied.” i) Where a request is made to have an application disposed of without a hearing, it must be considered by the master or district judge to decide whether it is suitable for consideration without a hearing (CPR PD 23 para 2.3); ii) Where the master or district judge agrees, the court will so inform the applicant and the respondent and may give directions for the filing of evidence (CPR PD 23 para 2.4); and (iii) Where the court so informs the parties, it follows that the court "does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate" (CPR 23.8(c)); iv) under CPR PD23 para 11.2, where CPR 23.8(c) applies the court treats the application as if it is proposing to make an order on its own initiative; and v) thus the order made by the court must be treated as made on the court's own initiative and under CPR 3.3 (5) the applicant as a party affected by the order, can apply to have it set aside or varied.”
[23]In essence, the Court of Appeal accepted this “indirect” argument. It said this: “30. What then is the position where an applicant requests the court to dispose of a without notice application on paper? If the court accedes to such a request, does it do so under CPR 23.8(b) (as Mr. de Navarro QC and Mr. Walker QC submit) or under CPR 23.8(c) (as Mr. Sharp QC submits)? The answer to this question will determine whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain an application by the original applicant to have the order set aside, varied or stayed under CPR 3.3(5). There is no doubt that the respondent to the original application can apply to set aside the[24]In considering the judgment of the Court of Appeal on this issue, it is however necessary to bear in mind that the relevant procedural rules have significantly changed since 2006. In particular, although paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the original Practice Direction 23 still find a place in the current Practice Direction 23A, so far as I can see there is no equivalent to paragraph 11(2) of the original Practice Direction 23 in the current Practice Direction 23A. Paragraph 11(2) formerly provided that: “where rule 23.8(c) applies the court will treat the application as if it were proposing to make an order of its own initiative”.[25]This formulation accordingly engaged rule 3.3(4), and led to the possibility of reconsideration under rule 3.3(5). It is step (iv) of the five steps in the “indirect” argument previously set out. However, the position is now different. There is no linking of rule 23.8(c) to rule 3.3(4) by virtue of the Practice Direction. Instead, fresh provision has been made, in rule 23.8 itself, by adding sub-rules (2)-(5) (as set out above). Consequently, although the decision of the Court of Appeal on the direct argument remains unimpaired, the indirect argument which the court accepted no longer succeeds, because the rules are now different. Instead, we have to work through the current rules.

Application of the Rules

[26]The application notice dated 31 October 2025 answered the question asked at point 4, “How do you want to have this application dealt with?” by ticking the box marked “at a hearing”. However, at point 10 (on the next page) the first defendant wrote the following:
“The Defendant respectfully invites the Court to consider this application on the papers, having sight of the confidential note attached to the front of the witness statement and given the detailed witness statement and draft order filed, and to list a hearing only if the Court considers oral submissions necessary.”
So, notwithstanding the tick on the first page, the first defendant was indeed asking for the matter to be decided without a hearing.[27]Consistently with this request, my decision of 10 December 2025 was not made at or after a hearing, but on the papers. But it was made in response to the first defendant’s application and the evidence and other material supplied with it. Accordingly, my order was not one made on the court’s own initiative, and rule 3.3(4) was not engaged as such. On that basis, it was not possible for the first defendant to make an application under rule 3.3(5), because that applies only to orders made on the court’s own initiative. And, as I have already said, there is no longer any deeming provision such as formerly was to be found in paragraph 11(2) of Practice Direction 23. So, this is not a case of a decision deemed to be made on the court’s own initiative either. As a result, the first defendant’s Request made on 15 December 2025 for reconsideration is without legal basis, and must fail.[28]Nevertheless, I go on to consider the possible applicability of rule 23.8 in its current form. Self-evidently, I did not consider that a hearing was necessary for this application, and accordingly rule 23.8(1)(c) was engaged. In such a case, rule 23.8(3) confers upon a party affected by the court’s order in certain circumstances the power to apply to have the order set aside varied or stayed. But the circumstances in which this can be done are limited to the case “where the parties affected by the application have not had an opportunity to make representations about the substance of the application”. That is not this case. The first defendant had the opportunity (of which she took full advantage) to make representations about the substance of the application. This included not only the application notice itself, but also her witness statement (running to 52 pages), a bundle of exhibits (running to a further 72 pages) and a draft order (8 pages). So the right to apply to set aside vary or stay the order is not conferred upon her under rule 23.8(3).[29]The same reasoning applies to the disposal of her Request on the papers, and without a hearing. My order is not one made on the court’s own initiative, because it is a response to the first defendant’s Request. Although rule 23.8(1)(c) is engaged, the first defendant has had the opportunity to make representations about the substance of the application (a 9-page submission with a 9-page exhibit).

Conclusion

[30]The first defendant is not entitled to apply under rule 3.3(5) for reconsideration of the order of 10 December 2025, nor to apply to set it aside under rule 23.8. Her route of challenge, if she is dissatisfied with my decision, is to seek to appeal it under CPR Part 52. The same applies to my decision today. Her application is therefore dismissed, as totally without merit.

order

see CPR 23.10. [ … ] 33. CPR 23.8(c) on its face appears to cover any situation where, regardless of what one or more of the parties may say, the court does not consider that a hearing would be appropriate. In other words, this gives the court the jurisdiction to dispose of any application without a hearing. 34. … In our view, there is nothing objectionable in giving any party affected by an order made without a hearing the right to apply to have it set aside, varied or stayed, whether the applicant requested a hearing in the first place or not. This accords with standard practice referred to at para 24 above and reflects the fact that efficient and proportionate case management often requires that orders be made on paper, but recognizes that a party may be able to put his case more persuasively at a hearing. We can find nothing in this practice which casts doubt on what we consider to be the natural construction of CPR 23.8.”