Gabriela Mozerle Teixeira v Amir Ahmad Moaven & Ors [2026] EWHC 1215 (Ch)
[2026] EWHC 1215 (Ch)Case No HC-2016-003119IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESPROPERTY TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 22/05/2026
Before
MASTER BOWLES (SITTING IN RETIREMENT)
Between
Gabriela Mozerle TeixeiraClaimant(1) AmirAhmad MoavenClaimant(2) Behzad FaizClaimant(3) Marios Robert PittalisClaimant(4) The Estate of Shokouh Nazemi TehranClaimant(5) Elis Texeira MoavenClaimant(6) Amir Aryan MoavenClaimant(1) Simon TreherneClaimant(2) Helen BunkerClaimantGabriela Mozerle Teixeira-and-(1) AmirAhmad Moaven (2) Behzad Faiz (3) Marios Robert Pittalis (4) The Estate of Shokouh Nazemi Tehran (5) Elis Texeira Moaven (6) Amir Aryan Moaven-and-(1) Simon Treherne (2) Helen Bunker Claimant Defendants Third Parties-Alexander Learmonth KC (instructed by Seddons GSC LLP) for Claimant and Fifth and Sixth DefendantsLydia Pemberton and Eleanor Vickery (instructed by Northover Law) for First DefendantFrancesca O’Neill (instructed by Pittalis LLP) for Third DefendantToby Bishop (instructed by Ashfords LLP) for Third PartiesThe Second Defendant appeared in person. for in person for The Fourth Defendant, represented by the First Defendant, did not appear separately.Hearing Hearing dates: 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 March 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives(see eg https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2022/1169.html)..............................MASTER BOWLES (SITTING IN RETIREMENT)
Master Bowles (sitting in retirement) :
[1]Amir Abbas Moaven (Abbas) died at the early age of 44 on 16 May 2012. At the date of his death he had been married to the First Claimant, Gabriela Mozerle Teixeira (Gabriela), since 23 November 2002. They had had two children, the Fifth and Sixth Claimants, Elis Teixeira Moaven (Elis) and Amir Aryan Moaven (Aryan). Abbas was Iranian, by birth. Gabriela is Brazilian. At the date of Abbas’ death, Gabriela was 37, Elis was 8 and Aryan was 5. Abbas had been diagnosed, in October 2009 as suffering from the virulent and aggressive form of liver cancer from which he eventually died.[2]By his will dated 20 April 2012, made while he was in hospital and close to the end of his life, Abbas chose, notwithstanding the then age of his children, to demise his estate to Gabriela, Elis and Aryan in one third equal shares. In regard to his children, however, the will provided that their shares in residue would not vest until they reached what was termed ‘the designated age’. The ‘designated age’ was defined in the will as being any time between the ages of 26 and 35, as determined by Abbas’ trustees, acting unanimously.[3]Unusually, in context, Gabriela was not appointed as either an executor or trustee of Abbas’ estate, or the will trusts created by the will. Instead, he appointed, as executors and trustees, the First Defendant, his younger brother, Amir Ahmad Moaven (Amir), his and Amir’s long-standing accountant, Behzad Faiz, the Second Defendant (Mr Faiz), and their long-standing conveyancing solicitor, the Third Defendant, Marios Robert Pittalis (Mr Pittalis).[4]At the date of this trial, in early March 2026, some fourteen years after Abbas’ death, there has been no grant of probate, other than a limited grant, ad colligenda bona, in December 2021 and Abbas’ estate remains very largely unadministered.[5]A primary reason for this state of affairs and the primary reason underlying this trial is that, there are fundamental questions as to the size of Abbas’ estate, which, until resolved, prevent probate being granted and, correspondingly, prevent the administration of the estate, the proper resolution of the tax affairs of the estate and the determination, in particular, of the claims now advanced by Gabriela and her two children, under and pursuant to section 2 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act), in respect of the provision made for them by Abbas out of his estate.[6]Although, as outlined later in this judgment, Abbas, Amir and their mother, Shokouh Nazemi Tehran (Mrs Nazemi) were concerned, or purportedly concerned, collectively, in a considerable number of limited companies, the focus of the debate at this trial has been as to the ownership of four properties (the properties) purchased by Abbas in his own sole name between 1996 and 2004 and whether those properties, or, as set out in the next paragraph, the proceeds of sale of one of them, fell into Abbas’ estate on his death in May 2012.[7]Those properties are Flat 1, 192 Queens Gate, London SW7 (Queensgate), registered in Abbas’ sole name on 25 March 1996. This property is currently occupied by Gabriela, Elis and Aryan and mortgaged to Lloyds Bank; Flat 2 Brasenose House, 35 Kensington High Street, London W8 (Brasenose), registered in Abbas’ sole name in January 2002. This property was sold by Abbas, prior to his death, on 2 April 2012; 353, 353A and 355 Harrow Road, London W9 (Harrow Road), purchased in Abbas’ sole name on 27 January 2003; and Flat 2, 33 Holland Park, Kensington, London W11 (Holland Park), purchased by Abbas on 23 December 2003 and registered in Abbas’ sole name on 5 May 2004. This property was occupied by Amir from 2007 and is stated by Amir to remain his home. This property is mortgaged to Barclays Bank.[8]The issue as to the ownership of these four properties and, in respect of Brasenose House, the proceeds of sale arising from the sale of that property, turns upon the effect, if any, to be given to four declarations of trust (the Declarations of Trust), executed by Abbas, on 19 April 2012, a month, or so, before his death and while he was already in hospital, and whether those deeds truly reflected and evidenced the beneficial ownership of the four properties as reflected in the deeds.[9]The four declarations are in identical form and contain the following recital: ‘The Trustee (Abbas) wishes to record long-standing arrangements in respect of the Property, in that the Property was purchased through the efforts of the Trustee and the Trustee’s brother, AMIR AHMAD MOAVEN (“the first beneficiary”) and the support and funds supplied by the Trustee’s mother, SHOKOUH NAZEMI (“the second beneficiary”) with the balance of monies required towards the purchase of the Property to include legal charges and by the Trustee, the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary, being jointly responsible for liabilities emanating from the Property as well as sharing any profits, and this declaration is entered into to reflect the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary’s shares in the Property with the Trustee acknowledging that he has held and he holds and will continue to hold the Property as trustee for himself and the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary since the Purchase date, having regard to the second beneficiary’s wish to have interest in investment property in the United Kingdom, as well as to support her sons, and difficulties encountered by the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary raising finance’.[10]The operative provisions of each deed then provides ‘in pursuance of the said agreement’ that ‘(t)he Trustee declares that he has held and holds and will continue to hold the Property and the net proceeds of sale and net income until sale for himself, the first beneficiary and the second beneficiary as tenants in common as to one third for the Trustee and as to one third for the first beneficiary and as to one third for the second beneficiary’.[11]As is clear for the recital and from the operative provisions of each deed, the deeds do not purport to create new trusts but to confirm a long-standing, pre- arrangement, or agreement, whereby, by reason of the efforts of Abbas and Amir and the support of their mother and by reason of the provision of purchase funds in respect of the relevant property from each of Amir, Abbas and their mother, each property was to be held on trust for Amir, Abbas and their mother in one third equal shares,[12]If that were the case and if the deeds and each of them truly represented the conduct of Abbas, Amir and their mother in respect of the properties and truly represented the agreement or arrangement they had reached in respect of the properties and if those agreements had been acted upon by the several parties in such a way as to give rise to the trusts alleged, then, by reason not of the deeds, which purportedly merely confirmed a status quo ante, but by reason of the prior dealings and prior agreements of Amir and Abbas and their mother, the properties would be held in the one third shares alleged, such that the beneficial shares vested in each of Amir and in Mrs Nazemi would not fall into Abbas’s estate, or be available to the beneficiaries under his will.[13]Correspondingly and conversely, if the facts were not as described in the recitals to the deeds, if there had not been the alleged long standing agreement, or arrangement, or if any such agreement, or arrangement, had not been acted on in such a way as to give rise to the trusts alleged in the deeds, then, notwithstanding the terms of the deeds, the properties would not have been held in the alleged one third shares and would not, therefore, have had the effect of diminishing Abbas’ estate. The trust deeds could not and did not have retrospective effect.[14]The only possible exception to the last foregoing would be that which might arise if, notwithstanding the prior non-existence of the alleged trusts over Abbas’ properties, as at the date of the deeds, the deeds were to be construed as being intended to operate, or have effect, prospectively, such that, as from the date of the deeds and by reason of the deeds, the properties and each of them were held in the one third shares declared by the deeds.[15]In that event, the deeds would operate, in their own right, as dispositions by Abbas of one third interests in each of the properties in favour of Amir and Mrs Nazemi and, as explained later in this judgment, questions then arise as to whether either those dispositions fell to be set aside as dispositions at an undervalue for the purpose of defeating claims advanced against what might be termed Abbas’ pre-disposition estate, pursuant to section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the 1986 Act), or whether those dispositions fell, in respect of Gabriela and her children’s 1975 Act claims, to be subject to an order under section 10 of the 1975 Act, requiring Amir, or Mrs Nazemi’s estate, to restore, in whole, or in part, Abbas’ estate, on the grounds that the dispositions had been effected in order to defeat those claims.[16]Overarching all of the foregoing, as it relates to the deeds, is the question as to whether the deeds were ever intended to be anything more than devices designed to disguise, or hide, the true nature and extent of Abbas’ estate from those who might have claims upon it, such that the deeds were, in a legal and equitable sense, ‘shams’ and such that they are to be regarded as having no legal, or equitable, effect at all.[17]The presence, or absence, of two thirds of the value of each of the four properties within Abbas’ estate necessarily has a considerable, even fundamental, impact upon the value of Abbas’ estate and, correspondingly, upon the inherited rights of the beneficiaries of his estate, and upon the claims being made on that estate by Gabriela and her children. The value of the estate, coupled with the question as to whether the Declarations of Trust are construed as having prospective effect, as dispositions by Abbas of interests in his estate, in the weeks prior to his death, has, or will have, a corresponding impact upon the taxation of his estate and the proper performance by his personal representatives of their obligations in respect of his estate. While, at this trial, there was no detailed consideration of the differential values of the estate, dependent upon the validity and effectiveness of the Declarations of Trust and the existence, or otherwise, of the facts recited and declared in the Declarations of Trust, I was told that if the trusts on which the properties were held, or are held, reflect the terms of the Declarations of Trust, then, far from the estate having a substantial value to its beneficiaries and to those claiming against it, it might well be in deficit and insolvent.[18]The procedural history giving rise to this trial is not wholly straightforward. These proceedings commenced as long ago as 1 November 2016. They were issued by Gabriela under section 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985 to procure the removal and replacement of t Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis as personal representatives of Abbas’ estate and as trustees of the will trusts arising from his will.[19]The primary target of the claim was Amir and the primary ground advanced for his removal was the manifest conflict between his duty as executor to bring in and preserve the assets of Abbas’ estate for the beneficiaries of the estate and his claim, arising out of the Declarations of Trust, to be a one third owner of the four properties, or their proceeds, held by Abbas in his own name at the date of his death and, potentially, the main assets of his estate. That conflict was compounded by the fact that Amir had continued in occupation of Flat 2 33, Holland Park, following Abbas’ death without making, or offering to make any occupation payment to the estate and by the further fact that Amir appeared, as has since transpired to be the case, to be asserting a claim against the estate as creditor.[20]In regard to Mr Faiz, concerns were expressed, in the light, apparently, of a prospective tax investigation into a number of companies with which Abbas had been concerned, as to his dealings with Abbas’ tax affairs and as to the need for an independent person to take control of the accounts and tax affairs relating to the estate.[21]Mr Pittalis was seen, at that stage. as a reluctant executor, trying to do his honest best. The concern, in his case, however, was, rightly, that he had been too much involved, as set out in extenso later in this judgment, with advising and acting in the preparation of Abbas’ will and the Declarations of Trust and was far too closely associated with Amir, a long-standing client. It was felt that, given that personal involvement and given that association, he was not in a position to act independently in the best interests of the estate and that his approach to the administration of the estate would always be coloured by his prior involvement and association and by his need for self-justification.[22]By my order of 23 July 2020, in these proceedings, all three of the named executors were removed and replaced as personal representatives of Abbas’ estate by the Third Parties, Simon Treherne and Helen Bunker (Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker), solicitors and partners in Blake Morgan LLP.[23]As appears from the recitals to my order, both prior to and post the issue of these proceedings, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis consented to their removal as executors. Amir did not formally consent to his removal, but, save on the question of costs, he did not oppose the application.[24]By my order, the three removed executors were required to provide a complete account of the assets of the estate in their hands or under their control within 14 days of my order. They were further required to transfer to Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker any estate monies in their hands and to hand over to Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker all administration files and estate papers within the same period. All assets of the state were formally vested in Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker.[25]Given the perceived lack of liquidity in the estate, Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker were absolved from taking any steps in respect of the administration of the estate, unless and until funds were available either from the estate or from the parties to this litigation to take such steps.[26]My order as to the provision of accounts, transfer of funds and handing over of documents was not complied with. Information and documents were provided incoherently, piecemeal, or not at all and the removed executors failed to understand, as it seemed to me, that their obligations, in particular, to account were collective. It was not open to any one of the removed executors to say that the accounting obligation, in any particular respect, fell on other of the removed executors and not on himself.[27]In the result and notwithstanding the protective provisions of my order, Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker came to the view that the proper preservation and administration of the estate and the proper protection of those entitled to the estate required them to take action. An important factor, in reaching that conclusion, was the failure of Amir to account to the estate for any of the commercial rents received in respect of Harrow Road, which, as it transpires, continued to be paid to a company, Mellcraft Ltd, under the effective control of Amir, and the use of some, or all, of those rental receipts to pay the mortgage and mortgage arrears in respect of Holland Park, then occupied by Amir, with a resultant accretion of substantial arrears of mortgage repayments and service charge in respect of Queensgate, occupied by Gabriela and her children and with the consequential and very real prospect that that property would be re-possessed and subject to a forced sale.[28]In consequence, by application in these proceedings, dated 22 July 2024, Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker launched a wide ranging application seeking compliance with my order of 23 July 2020, permission to pursue additional claims for declaratory relief as to the validity and effect of the Declarations of Trust, for the sale of the unsold properties, for possession of the Holland Park property, coupled with accompanying orders for mesne profits, or occupation rent, and for the removed executors to be required to account to the estate upon the basis of wilful default, together with the joinder of all necessary and consequential parties.[29]That application came on for hearing on 2 May 2025. By my order of that date, further and more specific directions were given to the removed executors as to their obligations to account in respect of their conduct and dealings in regard to the estate and as to the delivery up of estate documents and estate monies. Relevantly to the current trial, specific direction were given as to the delivery up of attendance notes pertaining to meetings of the removed executors. Amir was required to pay over to Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker all rents that he, or Mellcraft Ltd, had received from the tenants of the property at Harrow Road and authority was given to Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker to sell that property, with a view to increasing the liquidity of the estate and dealing with the arrears in respect of Queensgate.[30]Permission was, also, given to Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker to bring their proposed additional claim as to the validity and effectiveness of the Declarations of Trust and as to the beneficial interests of Abbas’ estate, Amir and Mrs Nazemi (or her estate) in the properties (the Declarations of Trust Claim).[31]That claim, which is the central claim to which this trial and this judgment is directed, reflected the dispute which had existed, since 2013, between Gabriela and Amir, as to the validity and effect of the Declarations of Trust and as to the truth of the facts and arrangements embodied in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust, and the necessity, from the perspective of the personal representatives, to have clarity as to the contents of Abbas’ estate in order to enable its proper administration.[32]As a purported beneficiary of the trusts declared by the Declarations of Trust, Mrs Nazemi’s estate (Mrs Nazemi having died in July 2023) was, necessarily, joined as a party and, in the absence of a grant of probate, or letters of administration, in respect of her estate, Amir was appointed to represent her estate. Correspondingly, Elis and Aryan, as persons affected by the validity, or otherwise of the Declarations of Trust, having regard to their shares in Abbas’ estate, under his will, were, likewise, necessary parties to the Declaration of Trust Claim and were joined as such. Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker’s application in respect of the other proposed additional claims was stood over.[33]In conjunction with the foregoing, the 2 May 2025 order, also, made provision for Gabriela’s 1975 Act proceedings to be advanced either by way of an amendment to the original proceedings, or as an additional claim, pursuant to CPR.8.7, within these proceedings.[34]Gabriela had, from an early stage and as already stated, challenged the validity and effectiveness of the Declarations of Trust and the facts said to underlie the Declarations of Trust and asserted that the entirety of the legal and beneficial interests in the properties fell into Abbas’s estate and were, correspondingly, available to meet her claim. Accordingly, it was appropriate, if not strictly necessary, that the resolution of that question should be determined within the context of her proposed claim and in alignment with the Declarations of Trust Claim.[35]Reflecting that alignment, the order gave directions for Gabriela to serve and file her evidence both in support of her claim and in regard to the Declarations of Trust Claim and for Amir, in his own behalf and on behalf of his mother’s estate, to reply to that evidence,[36]Gabriela’s 1975 Act claim was launched by way of an application notice dated 24 October 2025.[37]In the same application and on the footing, were it to be the case, that the Declarations of Trust constituted valid dispositions of Abbas’ estate, she sought, as outlined in paragraph 15 of this judgment, orders under section 10(2) of the 1975 Act requiring that Amir and/or Mrs Nazemi’s estate to restore, in whole, or in part, the reduction in Abbas’ estate, arising from the Declarations of Trust, on the basis that the Declarations of Trust had been effected to defeat her 1975 Act claim.[38]Gabriela’s application also sought, as outlined in paragraph 15 of this judgment and on the footing that the Declarations of Trust constituted valid dispositions of Abbas’ estate, an order under section 423 of the 1986 Act setting aside the Declarations of Trust as being dispositions of Abbas’ estate entered into for the purpose of defeating claims against his estate.[39]Although, at this trial, the court has not been called upon to determine the overall merits of Gabriela’s claim, or to make any final determination in respect of that claim, it is helpful to understand the basic thrust of the claim that she seeks to advance.[40]In broad terms, she seeks a determination that she should receive, out of Abbas’ estate, sufficient provision to enable her to live at the same approximate level of comfort and with the same level of stability as obtained during her marriage to Abbas and that, for purposes of her claim, the full value of the properties should be treated as falling within his estate. Her contention, as already foreshadowed, is that the Declarations of Trust and each of them are ‘sham’ and that the trust arrangements set out in the recitals to each of the Declarations of Trust are invented and untrue. Alternatively and to the extent, if at all, that the Declarations of trust have any prospective effect, as dispositions of interests in the properties in favour of Amir or Mrs Nazemi, she contends that those dispositions should be set aside under section 423 of the 1986 Act, or that Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate should be directed to restore those interests to the estate, pursuant to section 10(2) of the 1975 Act.[41]As explained in her witness evidence, in making that claim, given the terms of Abbas’ will, Gabriela is seeking provision which, on its face, conflicts with her children’s rights under and in respect of Abbas’ will. That has been recognised by Gabriela and her children and while, in form and as set out below, Elis and Aryan have advanced separate claims for financial provision, they have agreed, in effect, to stand aside in respect of their mother’s claim and, to the extent necessary to meet her claim, for their shares in Abbas’ estate to pass to her; she, in her turn, acknowledging their entitlement, through her, to share in Abbas’ estate. Not least of the relevant considerations, in that regard, is the tax inefficiency of the current arrangements under Abbas’ will and the obvious benefits to be obtained if Gabriela can take advantage of the spousal exemption in respect of Inheritance Tax[42]Reverting to the Declarations of Trust and the facts and matter said in the recitals to underlie those Declarations, Gabriela’s contention, in barest outline and as set out in her witness statement of 24 October 2025, is that, in his lifetime, Abbas never suggested, at all, that he was anything other than the legal and beneficial owners of the four properties. In respect of Queensgate, into which Gabriela moved when she and Abbas began to live together and in which, at that date, Amir was also living, Abbas expressly informed her that that property was his. In respect of Holland Park, Gabriela’s evidence is that it was she who found that property and that it was purchased as their matrimonial home. In regard to Brasenose that, too, had been purchased by Abbas shortly after he and Gabriela had moved in together and, eventually, from 2007, became their matrimonial home. At no stage was any mention made that either Amir or Mrs Nazemi had any interest in either of those properties.[43]In regard to the suggestion in the recitals that the properties had been purchased by the joint efforts of Abbas and Amir and with the financial support of their mother, under the long-standing trust arrangements alleged in the Declarations of Trust, Gabriela pointed to the paucity of any evidence provided by Amir, whether in his own behalf, or on behalf of his mother, in support of the existence of those arrangements and of their alleged beneficial rights in the properties and, also, to the inconsistency of those instructed by Amir, when responding to requests for such evidence, as to the existence and availability of such evidence.[44]Most significantly, Gabriela placed reliance upon a body of attendance notes disclosed by Mr Pittalis in August 2025 and discussed at some length later in this judgment, which, as she contended, demonstrated that the Declarations of Trust, were not understood, or intended, by Abbas and Amir to have any legal effect, but existed solely to be deployed, as necessary, in order to obscure the true beneficial ownership of the properties and, specifically and consequentially, to limit and reduce her rights in respect of Abbas’ estate.[45]Amir’s position (and, through him, that of his mother’s estate) as to the Declarations of Trust emerges from his witness statements of 15 August 2025 and 19 December 2025. In essence and in outline, he contends that the recitals to the Declarations of Trust are true and that they accurately reflect the long standing arrangements between Abbas, himself and his mother and the trusts which had arisen in consequence of those arrangements.[46]His contention is that from the late nineteen eighties, he and Abbas had, together with their mother, collaborated in all their business enterprises and activities, including the acquisition of the properties and that they had done so pursuant to an informal arrangement, or understanding, whereby their resources and efforts were pooled and their assets jointly owned, irrespective of the name in which the properties were nominally held and, pursuant to which, each of them was entitled to a one third share of their collective businesses and their various properties. Abbas was, he said the visionary. He, Amir, was the implementer. His mother, working in Iran, contributed, financially, to their business and property ventures, as an investor therein. In regard to his mother, Amir’s written and oral evidence, at trial, emphasised her role in the early years of their businesses as providing the ‘seed capital’ from which their other businesses and property purchases had developed and that it had been long agreed between himself and Abbas that, even if her contribution to their collective business and property affairs was not an equal one, she should, nonetheless have one third of everything.[47]As part of the materials that he advanced as supporting the existence of the arrangements and trusts that he asserted, he pointed to his and Abbas’ tax returns and tax summaries, in the period 2005 to 2012 as evidencing those arrangements.[48]His explanation of the Declaration of Trusts was that Abbas, perhaps at the suggestion of Mr Faiz, wanted to formalise the ownership structure in respect of the properties and, in consequence, instructed Mr Pittalis to draw up the Declarations of Trust in order to record Amir’s and his mother’s one third interest in each of the properties.[49]The outstanding aspects of the 22 July 2024 application, together with the Declarations of Trust Claim and Gabriela’s 1975 Act claim, came before the court on 11 November 2025.[50]At that hearing and by my order of that date, I gave directions for this trial and for the determination, at this trial, of all issues pertaining to the Declaration of Trust and to the beneficial interests in the properties, including the issues, raised by Gabriela, under section 423 of the 1986 Act and section 10 of the 1975 Act and including any questions of limitation arising. Given the continuing mortgage arrears in respect of Queensgate and the continuing lack of liquidity within the estate, I also gave permission for Mr Treharne and Ms Bunker to pursue, at this trial, their additional claim against Amir for possession and sale of Holland Park and, at least in principle, his liability for mesne profits or occupation rent in respect of that property. Reflecting a concern expressed by Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker that the arrangements alleged to exist between Abbas, Amir and Mrs Nazemii constituted a partnership, I agreed that that question, if pursued, would also be determined at this trial.[51]To ensure that all appropriate claims and parties were before the court, I gave permission to Elis and Aryan to bring their own, already intimated, 1975 Act claims and to be joined as co-claimants with Gabriela in the 1975 Act claims and in claims under section 10 of the 1975 Act and section 423 of the 1986 Act, corresponding to those already advanced by Gabriela; their applications, in that regard, to stand as additional claims, pursuant to CPR 8.7 and their evidence in support of those applications to stand as their evidence in support of those claims. Although my order is silent on the point, Gabriela’s claims, although launched by application notice, were treated as additional claims in the same way. Permission was also given to Mr Treherne to pursue their proposed additional claim against the removed executors for an account on the basis of wilful default, leaving the scope and form of that account to be considered following the determination of this trial.[52]I have set out the broad position adopted by Elis and Aryan in paragraph 41 of this judgment. Subject to that position, my understanding is that, at any substantive hearing of their 1975 Act claims, they would, at the least, seek relief by way of an order removing the age condition attaching to the vesting their shares in Abbas’ estate and the effective ability of Abbas’ will trustees, or any one of them, to postpone the vesting of their shares until they reached 35 years of age. In regard to the size of Abbas’ estate, the potential impact upon that estate of the Declarations of Trust and the relief potentially available to them under section 10 of the 1975 Act and section 423 of the 1986 Act, they share a common position with their mother.[53]In regard to the issues determined for trial, I directed that Gabriela, Elis and Aryan should stand as claimants, in respect of all issues bearing on the Declarations of Trust and that Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker should stand as claimants in respect of the claims for possession, sale and monetary relief, relating to Holland Park and, also, in respect of the investigation as to whether the arrangements said to exist between Amir, Abbas and Mrs Nazemi gave rise to a partnership and, if so, how that partnership bore upon, or affected, Abbas’ estate. To ensure that all parties had had full opportunity to advance their respective cases, I gave all parties the opportunity to adduce further evidence.[54]By the date of the trial, certain of the issues for determination had fallen away. It was, rightly, no longer contended by Amir that Gabriela, Elis and Aryan’s 1975 Act claims were time barred and that the limited grant, ad colligenda bona, had had the effect of setting time running in relation to those claims. It had, also, become clear that Amir was not asserting that the arrangements that he alleged to have existed between himself, Abbas and Mrs Nazemi had constituted, or given rise to, a partnership.[55]Likewise, although a live issue at the commencement of the trial, including, as set out later in this judgment, whether Amir actually occupied Holland Park, as his home, by the final day of the trial, it was conceded by Amir’s counsel, Ms Pemberton, that the possession and sale of Holland Park was no longer in contest. Reflecting that fact, by an order of Master Clark, dated 24 March 2026, following my reservation of judgment in this case, Amir agreed to give vacant possession of Holland Park, by 19 May 2026 and Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker were authorised to sell that property. Although the order of 24 March 2026 is silent on the issue, it is my understanding that Amir has also agreed to account for the occupational rent payable in respect of his occupation of Holland Park, subject to such credits as he may be entitled. The form of that account, as with other outstanding accounting issues, will be determined following the handing down of this judgment.[56]In the result and, as already stated, Gabriela, Elis and Aryan’s position at trial was that they were asserting that the entirety of the beneficial interests in the properties fell into the estate, that the Declarations of Trust were ‘sham’, the long standing arrangements set out in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust were invented and untrue and that, if, to any extent the Declarations of Trust were prospectively effective they fell to be set aside, under section 423 of the 1986 Act, or Abbas’ estate restored, under section 10 (2) of the 1975 Act.[57]Amir’s position and, through him, that of Mrs Nazemi’s estate was that the Declarations of Trust were not ‘sham’, that the arrangements set out in the recitals were true and that those arrangements, as implemented, had given rise to common intention constructive trusts over and in respect of each of the properties, such that the beneficial interests in those properties were shared equally between Amir, Abbas’ estate and Mrs Nazemi’s estate. On that basis, the Declarations of Trust were not transactions, or transfers, at an undervalue and were not intended to defeat, or impede, those who might be claiming Abbas’ estate, or shares in that estate. In regard to the section 423 claims, his contention, although only faintly pursued at trial, was that those claims were statute barred.[58]In regard to the other participants at the trial, Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker had, from an early stage, asserted neutrality in respect of the court’s determination as to the beneficial interest in the properties, seeking only the clarification required for them to exercise their duties as personal representatives. By the close of the trial, however, their position, as was their right and, very arguably, their duty was one of active support for the position advanced by Gabriela, Elis and Aryan.[59]Ms Pemberton drew my attention to authorities bearing on the usual neutrality of personal representatives, where there were rival claimants to a fund, or asset, (here, the beneficial ownership of the properties) and advanced the proposition, also, that, as personal representatives of Abbas, they were estopped by deed from challenging the contents of the recitals to the Declarations of Trust.[60]It did not seem to me, however, that the court was empowered to preclude the personal representatives from taking an active position in respect of the beneficial ownership of the properties. Nor, where the issue before the court was the very validity of the deed said to give rise to the estoppel in question, could I see that the personal representatives were estopped from challenging that validity.[61]The personal representatives’ fundamental duty was to get in and protect the estate. No doubt, in many cases, where the beneficiaries of the estate were, themselves, asserting the estate’s right to a particular asset, it would be appropriate for the personal representatives to, simply, stand by and await the outcome. In that context, an unnecessary intervention could sound in costs.[62]The question, however, of the personal representatives’ degree of involvement is, ultimately, a question for their own resolution and not a question for the court. Accordingly, if, as here, the personal representatives took the view that the proper protection of the estate required them to take an active stance, then, subject to the costs risk to which I have just referred, they were perfectly entitled to take that position.[63]Given the matters set out later in this judgment, I do not think that the personal representatives can be criticised for taking the view that their involvement was appropriate, or that they would not be properly fulfilling their duties to the estate simply by abiding by the outcome of the debate between Gabriela and her children and Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate. The beneficial ownership of the properties is, as already set out, the fundamental question, in determining the value, even the solvency, of Abbas’ estate. It would, very arguably, be wrong for the personal representatives not to take and advance a view.[64]Conversely to the foregoing, at the outset of the trial, Mr Pittalis’ position, as made clear both in his written evidence and in his counsel’s skeleton argument, was that the Declarations of Trust were not ‘sham’ and that Gabriela’s claims as to the validity of the Declarations of trust should be dismissed. By the end of the trial, however, and in light of the evidence given during the trial, his position, by his counsel, Ms O’Neill, was that, whatever, the court’s conclusion as to the Declarations of Trust, he had, throughout his dealings in respect of those declarations, acted honestly and in good faith. Mr Faiz, who appeared at the trial and gave his evidence unrepresented, also adopted a neutral position as to the merits. Both were at pains to emphasise their lack of expertise in respect of the administration of estates and that they and each of them had accepted the role of executor out of a sense of duty to Abbas.[65]I have already set out, in paragraphs 12 to 16 of this judgment, the effect, in terms of Abbas’ estate, of the possible conclusions that might be reached in respect of the matters set out in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust and, consequential upon those conclusions the further questions which potentially arise for determination.[66]As set out in paragraph 12, if the arrangements between Amir, Abbas and Mrs Nazemi were as recorded in the recitals and if those arrangements had been acted upon in such a way as, quite independently of the Declarations of Trust, to create informal trust interests over the properties, then the consequence would be that the properties and each of them would have been held in the agreed shares, such that only one third of their values would have fallen into Abbas’ estate. In that context, the Declarations of Trust would simply have an evidentiary value, as evidencing, as admissions against Abbas’ interest, the arrangements and agreements that had operated in resect of the properties.[67]Conversely, if, as set out in paragraph 13 of this judgment, the court were to conclude that there had been no such arrangements as set out in the recitals, such that no informal trust interests could have been derived therefrom, then, in that context, the false, or incorrect, statements made in the recitals, unless mistakenly made, would go a long way towards establishing that the Declarations of Trust were ‘sham’ and had been created to deceive those to whom the declarations were tendered as to true beneficial ownership of the properties.[68]In so saying, I do not in any way disregard the words of Briggs LJ, as he then was, in Slocum Trading Ltd v TatikInc. [2014] EWCA Civ. 831, at paragraph 61, to the effect that an ‘agreement is not a sham … merely because it deliberately misdescribes history’. Those words, however, must be set in their context and the context, in that case, was as to whether the document then in question was a sham in respect of the rights that it created, going forward.[69]In this case, the Declarations of Trust, as set out in paragraph 11 of this judgment are, essentially, confirmatory of an allegedly pre-existing state of affairs and of allegedly pre-existing equitable rights. In that context, deliberately false statements, contained in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust, as to that allegedly pre-existing state of affairs and as to those pre-existing equitable rights, must, as I see it, constitute very strong evidence that the intention underlying the Declarations of Trust was to give to third parties, or to the court, the appearance that, the equitable rights of the parties in the properties were different from what they actually were and to give third parties a false impression of those rights and that, in consequence, the Declarations of Trust were ‘sham’.[70]The necessary corollary of the foregoing, as it seems to me, is that if it is demonstrated, independently of any factual analysis of the historic arrangements and dealings between Amir, Abbas and Mrs Nazemi, that the Declarations of Trust had been prepared and executed, not with the intention of reflecting the truth of the recited facts, but to suit Abbas’ then purpose, then that, too, would provide powerful and convincing evidence both that the Declarations of Trust were ‘sham’ and that the recited facts and any evidence given in support of the recited facts were untrue.[71]Reflecting the foregoing, it was common ground between the participating parties that the ‘battleground’, as between the parties, was as to the truth, or falsehood, of the recitals to the Declarations of Trust and as to the facts and circumstances which had given rise to the Declarations of Trust.[72]In this regard there was, at the outset, some debate as to where the relevant burdens of proof lay, albeit that, by the end of the trial and given the weight of evidence before the court, it was accepted that there was no serious likelihood that the burden of proof, or otherwise, upon a particular participant would affect the outcome of the trial.[73]That said, I think it helpful to give some consideration to the legal shape of the court’s enquiry.[74]It seems to me that Gabriela and her children, as claimants in respect of the issues relating to, or bearing on, the Declarations of Trust, carry the ultimate legal burden in establishing that those declarations did not inhibit, or affect, Abbas’ legal and beneficial ownership of the properties, such that all four properties, or their value, formed part of his estate.[75]Their starting point, in that regard is the fact that Abbas had been the registered proprietor of the properties and that, in consequence, equity following the law, he was the presumptive beneficial owner of the properties.[76]To meet that presumption there was, as I see it, an evidential burden, upon Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate, to establish the facts and interests alleged in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust. In so doing they were entitled, as already stated, to rely on the Declarations of Trust, themselves, as admissible evidence of the recited facts, on the footing that the Declarations constituted admissions by Abbas against his interest, in respect of his beneficial share in the properties and to meet that contention, the burden was, then, shifted on to Gabriela and her children to provide evidence that the Declarations of Trust were ‘sham’, of no evidential value and of no effect.[77]In meeting that burden, albeit to the civil standard and having regard to the context and circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust were entered into, the court, reflecting the perceived unlikelihood of dishonest, or deceitful, behaviour, requires evidence to a high standard and of convincing quality.[78]As set out in paragraphs 45 to 48 of this judgment, the case advanced by Amir and by Mrs Nazemi’s estate was that there had been a long-standing arrangement between Abbas, Amir and Mrs Nazemi whereby Amir and Abbas had collaborated in all their business enterprises and activities, including the purchase of the properties, and had done so pursuant to an arrangement whereby all efforts and resources were pooled and all assets jointly owned, irrespective of the name in which any particular asset, or property was shown to be held, and whereby all assets and properties were held between Amir, Abbas and their mother, reflecting her financial assistance and support for their various activities, in one-third equal shares. In that context, it is Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate’s case, as set out in paragraph 48 of this judgment, that the Declarations of Trust were executed, simply, to confirm and evidence what had taken place.[79]Conceptually, it seems to me that such an arrangement, if made and implemented, could give rise to informal trust interests in respect of the agreed shares in the assets and properties falling within the arrangement. If the three parties had made the arrangements in question and if, whether by effort, or by financial contribution, or both, they had acted in reliance upon those arrangements, then, if, or when, those arrangements were resiled from, such that one party or another were, thereby, deprived of assets for which they had worked for a share, then there would have been the requisite detrimental reliance such as to make it unconscionable for the arrangements to be resiled from and such, consequentially, as to create constructive trusts.[80]The question, however, in this case, is whether, as a matter of fact, that is what has occurred and, therefore, whether, as contended by Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate, the Declarations of Trust accurately and honestly reflect and evidence what has occurred.[81]I am satisfied that the Declarations of Trust do not honestly and accurately reflect what has occurred and that no constructive trust, or other informal property interests have been created over the properties, or any other assets falling potentially within Abbas’ estate.[82]I am in no doubt that Abbas and Amir did collaborate in many of their business activities. The focus of the trial was not on the detail of those activities, which appear to have been transacted via a range of now dormant or semi-dormant companies. What is clear, however, is that from the time that they were young men, in the late nineteen eighties, until Abbas’ death in 2012, they worked together, to a greater or lesser extent and with a greater or lesser degree of success, in a number of businesses.[83]Abbas and Amir were born in Iran, of Iranian parents. In 1982 they left Iran to live with their father, first in the UK and then in Spain. They returned to the UK in about 1985 and first started trading together, in the late nineteen eighties, when they started selling clothing from a stall in Portobello market. That business, known as HomeBoy, was a success and expanded into two or three shops in the Queensway area of London.[84]In about 1993, however, seeing a gap in the market, Abbas and Amir, moved out of the clothing business and set up a mobile phone sales business from their previous shop premises at 2/4 Westbourne Grove. That business, One Stop Fone Shop, was initially operated by Abbas and Amir, in conjunction with a Mr Nazarbaghi, and incorporated, as Euro Fone House Ltd (Euro Fone), in, or about, 1997, with Amir, Mr Nazarbaghi and, eventually, Abbas as directors and shareholders.[85]That business, too, had some success. However, in about 1999, there was a falling out between Abbas, Amir and Mr Nazabaghi, as to the strategy of the business, resulting in Mr Nazabaghi being bought out of the business and the business continuing, until, forced out of the market by larger operators, it went into administration in 2003 and into liquidation in 2004.[86]Alongside Euro Fone and following the eventual failure of Euro Fone, there were other businesses; Eurofone Ltd, which, as I understand it, carried on a similar business to Euro Fone, following the failure of that company; the Gate, a restaurant/night club in Notting Hill Gate; UKAI UK Ltd, incorporated in 2006 to run a sushi bar business from 223 Portobello Road and, then, 58 Poland Street and, in due course, an organic food shop at 207-209 Portobello Road; Unifield Ltd, incorporated in 2011 to run a café; Foneshield UK Ltd, first incorporated as Eurofone Properties Ltd. The business of Foneshield was the provision of insurance for mobile telephones and also and separately the opening and running of restaurants. Amir’s evidence was that he ran the insurance side while Abbas focused on the restaurants. In tandem with these businesses, there were a number of companies holding leases and subletting properties. Mr Faiz, in his oral evidence, described the brothers’ residual collective businesses, at the time of Abbas’ death, as being very little more than the collecting of the difference between rents paid out and the sub-rents received.[87]Amir’s degree of involvement within these businesses is a matter of some dispute. Two of his long-standing friends, John Keaveney and Zoubin Zaeri, together with his ex-wife, Fatema Reshad gave evidence in support of his case. Without seeking to besmirch their good faith, it was fairly obvious, both that they were seeking to put the best gloss on his role in the businesses and, as acknowledged by all of them, that they were all, in essence, outsiders looking in and in no position to give any remotely definitive evidence as to the inner workings of the arrangements existing between Amir and his brother, or, indeed, that either Abbas or Amir had ever informed them of those arrangements.[88]Mr Zaeri, while clear that, when working together, he saw Amir and Abbas as equal partners, was also clear that their business dealings were not solely with one another. He had, himself worked with Abbas in a letting business and, when he moved to Florida had passed his share of that business to a Mr Zahari. Amir was not involved. He it was, also, who introduced his friend, Mr Nazabaghi, to work with Amir and Abbas in Euro Fone. It was also his recollection that Amir had been at college in Portsmouth for at least part of the time when working with Abbas in the clothing business. In regard to his evidence as to Amir’s role in the Gate business, he explained, in cross examination, that his primary view of Amir’s role in that business had been founded upon drinking evenings with Amir and Abbas at the club.[89]The Gate, itself, as was common ground, had never been solely the business of Amir and Abbas. Gabriela’s evidence, not, in itself, disputed by Amir was that it was run in partnership by Abbas, a Mr Kushan Zafari and a Mr Ali Behar. Amir says that he was also a partner, although nothing was written down, but that, in the main the management of the Gate was left to Mr Zafari.[90]Gabriela’s further evidence was that, following the disagreement with Mr Nazabaghi, Abbas had told her that he had little inclination to enter into further businesses with Amir. Her evidence, also, was that during at least some part of the Euro Fone years Amir had been studying and that, while he kept a desk at one of the retail units, the burden of Euro Fone fell very largely on Abbas. Whatever Abbas may have said to Gabriela, the evidence is clear that the business relationship subsisted beyond the failure of Euro Fone, although Amir, himself, accepts that in a period that he places between 2005 and 2009, he was studying at SOAS for a master’s degree, which, necessarily, must have impacted to some extent upon his involvement in the businesses.[91]There is nothing in any of the foregoing to establish, or evidence, anything other than a perfectly conventional, or every day, working relationship between Amir and Abbas, whereby both men worked together in their various businesses and whereby each of them, as Amir, himself, put it, in paragraph 47 of his witness statement, dated 15 August 2025 generated their own incomes from their several businesses. Specifically, there is nothing at all in their ostensible business arrangements to demonstrate, or suggest, that they had reached and were acting upon an arrangement whereby all their assets, business, or otherwise, were to be pooled and jointly owned, as between them, let alone that those assets were to be shared with their mother, or that, by reason of their arrangements they were unable to work separately from one another, or to buy and own assets separately from one another.[92]The evidence is rather to the contrary. By way of example, Queensgate was purchased by Abbas in 1996 and, in the same year, Amir purchased, in his own name, a property in Exhibition Road, subsequently transferred to Mr Nazabaghi, as part of settlement arrangements relating to Euro Fone. Those purchases were made at a time when Euro Fone was doing well and when both brothers were, therefore, having some financial success. The plain inference is that each brother, separately, had the means and inclination to buy his own property and that is what each of them did.[93]Correspondingly, there is nothing in the purchase arrangements relating to any one of the four properties to support the suggestion that, although held in Abbas’ name it was actually held pursuant to an arrangement that it was to be owned jointly with Amir or Mrs Nazemi. The evidence of Mr Pittalis, in respect of each of the three properties in which he acted for Abbas, as purchaser, Harrow Road, Holland Park and Brasenose, is that his instructions emanated from Abbas and his dealings in respect of those transactions were with Abbas. Correspondingly, although he had not acted in the purchase of Queensgate, he did act on the re-mortgage and again dealt entirely with Abbas. It was only in respect of the sale of Brasenose, in 2012, when Amir acted as Abbas’ attorney, because of Abbas’ ill health that Amir had any dealings with the properties at all.[94]The same can also be said in respect of the purchase of properties registered in Amir’s name, the Exhibition Road property and a property at Flat 4, 192 Queensgate (Flat 4). In both cases the conveyancing, in respect of their purchase and, in the case of Flat 4, a lease extension, were transacted by Mr Pittalis, on behalf of Amir, without any suggestion of there being any other involvement in the transactions. In this regard, it is, I think, noteworthy that, when, in 2014, after Abbas’ death, Flat 4 was sold, Amir was recorded by Mr Pittalis, in an attendance note dated 14 January 2014, as being disappointed to be told that the entire proceeds of that property were not available to him as working capital, by reason of the arrangement that Amir now seeks to uphold. The very strong inference is that Amir saw Flat 4 as his and did so because Flat 4 was his and was not, in truth, the subject of any other arrangement.[95]Similar observations to the foregoing can be made in respect of the funding of the various properties.[96]There is nothing to suggest that the purchase funds in respect of any of the four properties emanated from anyone other than Abbas and, in fairness, Amir has not, with any force, advanced that suggestion. There are ledger references to monies being credited as deriving from AA Moaven, which could refer to either brother, but Amir does not and cannot lay claim to the provision of those funds. There are also ledger references to monies from Euro Fone being made available towards the purchase of Harrow Road, by Abbas, and towards the purchase of Flat 4, by Amir.[97]As regards Harrow Road, however, it is clear that those monies were not used in the purchase and were, at Abbas’ direction, returned to Euro Fone. Even if they had been used, there is no reason to think, Abbas, being a director and shareholder in Euro Fone, that they were not monies advanced to him by Euro Fone, or that they reflect any wider arrangement. The precise same comment, in respect of Amir, can be made in relation to Euro Fone funds used, apparently, in his purchase of Flat 4.[98]The only evidence, so far as I am aware, of any, what I will call, cross contributions, as between Abbas and Amir in respect of their property purchases is to be found in a payment, seemingly emanating from Abbas’ Bank of Scotland bank account and utilised in the purchase of Flat 4. That payment, of £20,000, in the context of what is said, on all sides, to be the very close brotherly relationship that existed between Amir and Abbas and the very real prospect that monies were loaned, or gifted, by one brother to the other, is no sensible basis for any inference, either that Abbas was to have an interest in Flat 4, or that there was the wider tri-partite arrangement for which Amir contends. For similar reasons and although I note that, in 2011, there was email correspondence between Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, regarding a possible sale of Flat 4 and that such a sale had been agreed by Abbas and Amir, I am not persuaded that, without much more, that correspondence points to Abbas having an interest in that property, or to the existence of the tri-partite arrangement . There are any number of reasons, connected with the brothers’ various businesses, why Abbas and Amir might have agreed that Amir, as owner of Flat 4, should sell Flat 4 and put its proceeds, or some of them, into their collective businesses and the fact that the email emanated from Mr Faiz, their accountant, tends to suggest that that, or something like it, was the case.[99]My observations as to funding extend, not merely, to any contribution to the properties by Amir but to any contribution to those properties by Mrs Nazemi; it being central to the facts alleged in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust that her supposed one third share in the collective assets of herself, Abbas and Amir, was agreed and intended to reflect her financial assistance in the acquisition of those assets, including the properties.[100]The evidence as to the financial assistance provided by Mrs Nazemi is scanty, at best, and the basis upon which any such assistance was provided is equally and equivalently unclear.[101]The only documentary evidence of monies emanating from Mrs Nazemi consists of seven transfer slips, showing payments to Abbas between October 1993 and March 2012, totalling something over £70,000. None of those payments, however, relate to, or appear to have been used in, the purchase of the properties and the only narrative in respect of any of those payments seems to have been that one such payment was intended to fund a pilgrimage and that, late on and, as appears from Mr Pittali’s attendance note of 4 October 2013, the last payment advanced was intended to enable Abbas to go to Japan for medical treatment.[102]Amir contends that there were other payments and Mr Faiz, in cross examination, proffered the suggestion that, because Mrs Nazemi ran a successful taxi business in Tehran and lived a modest life, then the likelihood is that her surplus monies would have gone to her children.[103]I do not find that suggestion (no more, in truth, than a speculation) at all convincing. Nor am I persuaded, or impressed, by the various explanations advanced by, or on behalf of, Amir for the absence of any materials supporting the existence of any additional payments, or quantifying, the further payments alleged, or identifying the use to which any such additional payments were put.[104]The primary explanation, eventually advanced, by Amir’s then solicitors, Kaur Maxwell, in 2017 and now asserted by Amir, was that Mrs Nazemi had been burgled in 2013 and documents evidencing transfers lost in that burglary. Previously, in 2013, Mr Pittalis, then acting for Amir, had said that he had proofs, presumably including proofs of payments, on his file, while, later that year, he acknowledged that he did not have, but was seeking, those proofs.[105]Given these changes of position, I cannot be satisfied of the probability that any additional payments were ever made. Nor do I find it at all likely that financial records, evidencing money transfers, would have been the subject of, or lost in, a domestic burglary.[106]In regard to those payments that were made, there is no evidence either within, or contemporaneous with, the transfers, other than the limited narrative outlined in paragraph 96 of this judgment, as to the purpose, or basis, of those payments, or, specifically, that they were made in pursuance of the long-standing arrangements alleged in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust.[107]These were payments by a mother to her son, or, as Amir would have it, her sons. In those circumstances the presumption of advancement, applicable as between a parent, mother or father, and a child, is engaged and an evidential presumption exists that the monies advanced to Abbas, or to Abbas and Amir, were gifts and were not, therefore, made pursuant to the arrangement contended for by Amir, or set out in the recitals to the Declaration of Trust.[108]The presumption of advancement, as with other equitable presumptions, such as the presumption of resulting trust, reflects equity’s understanding of the everyday operation of human affairs and the core probability that a parent who provides money, or other property, to a child intends that money, or property, to be a gift to the child and not to create either a loan, or a trust.[109]In an attendance note of 9 July 2013, Mr Pittalis records Amir as describing the payments received from Mrs Nazemi as payments ‘helping out her sons’, That description accords, precisely, with the understanding of human affairs which underwrites the presumption of advancement and tends, therefore, to suggest, strongly, in the absence of other evidence, that, in this case, the monies advanced, or provided by Mrs Nazemi were gifted to her children.[110]Such other evidence as there is, other than Amir’s own evidence, to which I will turn later in this judgment, and the Declarations of Trust themselves, is indicative not that monies were provided pursuant to the arrangements described in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust, but that they were contemplated as being advanced by way of loan.[111]Specifically, it appears that, in 1999, Amir, having purchased the Exhibition Road property in 1996, agreed to enter into an ‘all monies’ charge over Exhibition Road, in respect of all monies advanced, or to be advanced, by Mrs Nazemi to Amir and that, in 2000, a similar ‘all monies’ charge, in favour of his mother, was contemplated, by Abbas, in respect of Queensgate. There is no suggestion that the Exhibition Road charge was ever registered and it does not appear that the charge over Queensgate was ever executed.[112]What can, however, be said to be clear is that such monies as were provided by Mrs Nazemi as were not intended to be gifts to her children were intended to be loans and that, reflecting that status, serious contemplation was given to securing such monies as were so advanced against Amir and Abbas’ respective properties. None of that is remotely consistent with the recitals, or with the case advanced to me by Amir.[113]Nor does it seem to me that Amir’s case is at all consistent either with the documents made available to the court in these proceedings, or with the apparent understanding of Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis as to the arrangements underlying the brothers’ businesses.[114]Although, in this case and notwithstanding my various orders, set out earlier in this judgment, there has been legitimate criticism of the failures of disclosure by Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz and although both in the preparation for the trial and at trial itself there persisted an unfortunate pattern of late and piecemeal disclosure, the fact remains that, at trial, there were before the court some 7000, or so, pages of documentary material. Within that material, however, there was at no stage any explicit, or even, implicit, reference to the arrangements set out in the recitals and advanced, in evidence, by Amir, or of conduct, on the part of Abbas, such as the division of rents recovered from Harrow Road being apportioned between Amir, Abbas and Mrs Nazemi, or any mortgage payments on the properties being paid by anyone other than Abbas, such as might point to the sharing arrangements set out in the recitals.[115]Prior to trial and in his written evidence, as set out in paragraph 47 of this judgment, Amir had placed substantial reliance upon tax returns and tax summaries prepared by Mr Faiz, for himself and Abbas, for the years 2005 to 2012, which, on their face, appeared to confirm a one third division of, in particular, rental incomes arising from the brothers’ various properties, including the properties. At trial, however, it became clear that, far from these returns providing historic support for the alleged one third shares arrangements, they had been prepared by Mr Faiz, or his office, after the death of Abbas, after the execution of the Declarations of Trust and in reflection of the terms of the Declarations of Trust.[116]As Mr Faiz told me in evidence, these retrospective tax returns did not, in any way, reflect what had happened to rental receipts (as he put it the ‘cash flow’ position), but simply provided an arithmetical apportionment of those receipts, in line with the situation represented in the Declarations of Trust. That income, itself, as it emerged at trial and given, it would seem, a lack of complete records, was, itself, speculative. Abbas’ own income, as advanced to the revenue in his retrospective tax returns, had been so advanced not on the basis of monies shown to have been earned, or received, but on the basis of the income which must have been required to finance the expenditures he had incurred.[117]All of this, as acknowledged by Amir’s counsel, Ms Pemberton, had the inevitable effect that the returns carried no evidential weight at all, in respect of the arrangements alleged by Amir to have existed between himself Abbas and his mother. I will return to these returns and, specifically, to Amir’s evidence about these returns when considering Amir’s evidence at trial.[118]Ms Pemberton did, however, ask me, in considering evidence which might give some support to the alleged tri-partite agreement, to have regard to the fact that Mrs Nazemi was shown, in Companies House records, as the sole shareholder in some, if not all, of the companies incorporated by the brothers post-Euro Fone. Amir’s written evidence was that this had been done to mark Mrs Nazemi’s role in the brothers’ affairs. Ms Pemberton, also, asked me, although not bearing, directly, on the alleged tri-partite arrangement, to have regard to the fact that, in an attendance note, dated 29 May 2012, a date very shortly after Abbas’ death, Gabriela is reported as saying that Abbas had often told her that his assets were to be divided between herself and Amir, because he and Amir had put together their assets jointly.[119]I do not attach any weight to these shareholdings. Mr Faiz, who incorporated the companies, described the choice as to who might be the shareholder in a given company as being entirely random. Amir, himself, acknowledged, in his written evidence, that they did not, in themselves, support, or evidence, the alleged arrangements, describing the shares as being themselves subject to, or held under, the trusts arising from the alleged arrangements. There was no evidence that any dividends, or other income, had been earned from the shareholdings by Mrs Nazemi, who, as it emerged at trial, had not been known to the tax authorities in this country until the retrospective tax filings, seemingly made on her behalf, after Abbas’ death.[120]Mr Learmonth KC, for Gabriela and her children, attributed the presence of Mrs Nazemi as shareholder as being for the purposes of tax evasion. My own, not dissimilar view, is that her apparent shareholdings formed part of what seems to have been a not unfamiliar pattern of conduct, by Abbas (and Amir), demonstrated and discussed later in this judgment, whereby assets were purportedly placed in their mother’s name to safeguard those assets from those who might otherwise have claims against them.[121]As regards what Abbas may have told Gabriela, as recorded in the attendance note, plainly it does not support the tri-partite arrangement. Nor does it seem to state, in terms, that Abbas regarded his assets as being jointly owned with Amir, which would, in itself, conflict with the tri-partite arrangement. Rather, the suggestion seems to be that Abbas told Gabriela that he would divide his (Abbas’) assets with Amir, not because they were jointly owned, which, of course, would not require him to make any division, but in recognition that he and Amir had worked together in their collective businesses in order to enable each of them to put together their assets.[122]Ms Pemberton, also, faced with the paucity of evidence of the tri-partite arrangement, sought to make a virtue of necessity. She submitted that it was precisely because of the level of trust subsisting between Abbas and Amir and their mother that there was not and there had been no need of any outward signs of their understanding, or arrangement. Attractively though Ms Pemberton advanced this submission, I am not persuaded. In an arrangement which, ostensibly, went back many years and extended over multiple property and corporate dealings it is, I think, inconceivable that no documentary, or other record, of the arrangements operated by the three participants would have emerged. The absence of any such material points, very strongly, to the absence of any such arrangement as is alleged.[123]For similar reasons, the fact that, as it appears, neither Mr Pittalis, nor Mr Faiz were aware of the alleged arrangements, also, points strongly to the non-existence of those arrangements.[124]Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz had been, as already stated, respectively, the long-standing conveyancing solicitor and the long-standing accountant to both brothers. While Mr Faiz, in particular, denied anything other than a professional relationship with the brothers, both Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis had acted for the brothers over many years and it was, as they both told me, because of their loyalties, if not friendships, arising from these long-standing relationships that they both felt constrained to accept the appointment, with Amir, as executors of Abbas’ estate when asked to do so, even while recognising that their appointment as executors did not fall within their usual areas of expertise.[125]In the context of these long-standing professional relationships with the brothers, relating, specifically, to their business and property affairs, the plain expectation, if arrangements of the kind contained in the recitals and advanced, in this case, by Amir had existed in respect of those affairs, is that it would have been Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis who would have known about them. Yet they, apparently, did not.[126]Both Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz gave written evidence. Neither of them gave any support, within that evidence, for the alleged tri-partite arrangement. In his oral evidence, Mr Faiz, far from confirming the tri-partite arrangement, described the dealings of the brothers as having no coherent structure. Mr Pittalis, while explaining that, in his dealings with Amir, Amir tended to compartmentalise his financial and property affairs, was, likewise, unable to tell me, in oral evidence, that he had been aware, prior to the date when the Declarations of Trust were, finally, prepared and executed, that there had been any tri-partite agreement as now alleged.[127]As explained later in this judgment, Mr Pittalis had, on 17, or 18, April 2012, prepared a batch of Declarations of Trust, setting out alternative beneficial ownerships of the properties, all of which were different to the Declarations of Trust executed on 19 April 2012. While, in some of the discussions, on 18 April 2012, referred to in the next paragraph of this judgment, Mr Pittalis, seemingly on the false footing that Amir had been unable to obtain mortgages, contemplated the sustainability of declaring a trust, whereby assets had been held for Amir and Abbas, his evidence was that he had had no personal knowledge of any prior arrangements as to the ownership of the properties and had, simply, drafted the declarations as instructed.[128]When those declarations (all, according to Mr Pittalis, executed by Abbas, notwithstanding their necessary inconsistency, both with each other and with the Declarations of Trust executed on 19 April 2012 and now relied on) were discussed by Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, on 18 April 2012, and when, in particular, discussion took place as to the sustainability of a declaration that Abbas had held all his assets for his mother, both Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis were clear that a declaration to that effect could not be sustained because there was no trace of their mother being involved in their affairs.[129]Putting aside, for the moment, the larger implications arising from the last foregoing and explored, in more detail, later in this judgment, what is wholly clear is that, despite their years of dealing with Amir and Abbas, neither of Abbas and Amir’s professional advisers had had any idea that there had been any agreement, or understanding, as now alleged, and that the plain probability is that the reason for this, as with the lack of documentary support for the arrangement, is that the arrangement did not exist.[130]In the light of all the foregoing, I am left with the fact that the only support for the arrangements set out in the recitals to the Declarations of Trust is to be found in Amir’s evidence and, in so far as it has any, the probative value to be found in the Declarations of trust themselves.[131]I deal first with Amir’s evidence.[132]Looking first as to its substance, there is a complete lack of particularity as to the circumstances in which the familial arrangement, as he describes it, came into being. There is nothing in Amir’s written or oral evidence to identify, or date, any discussion, as between himself, Abbas and his mother, as to the alleged arrangements, or any evidence at all as to the content, or circumstances, of any such discussions. In particular there is nothing in the written, or oral, evidence to explain how, or when, the one third shares came to be agreed. Given the contents of paragraph 22 of Amir’s 19 December 2025 witness statement, which refers to an agreement between Abbas and Amir that their mother would have one third, notwithstanding her actual level of contribution, it remains unclear as to whether it is alleged that Mrs Nazemi was even ever a party to the alleged arrangements. Matters have been left at a high degree of generality, without, therefore, the plausibility which might derive from particularity.[133]Turning to Amir’s extensive evidence at trial, Amir was not a good witness Mr Bishop, for Mr Treherne and Ms Bunker, described him as having a complex relationship with the truth. Mr Learmonth KC, for Gabriela and her children, described him, rather more robustly, as an inveterate liar.[134]I had no sense at all, when listening to Amir’s evidence that he was trying to tell me the truth. He was a witness who diverted and deflected questioning, rather than giving, or even attempting to give a straight answer. In the result, most questions were left unanswered, or unsatisfactorily answered. There were moments when, under pressure, he appeared to be making up his evidence as he went along.[135]In two sets of other proceedings, Amir had given sworn evidence inconsistent with the evidence given to this court.[136]Before the Immigration Tribunal, in January 2014, Amir gave evidence in support of Mrs Nazemi’s application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. Somewhat counter-intuitively, that application required her to establish that she had exceptional compassionate circumstances and was wholly, or mainly, dependent upon Amir.[137]His evidence, which he now says was untrue, was that his mother was of very limited means and financially reliant upon him. What he did not say, because, so he told me, he believed that it would prejudice his mother’s application, was that she had the property interests, for which he now contends, in this country and that, far from being in receipt of aid, she had, in fact, financed and assisted her children. He had, he said, excluded those matters out of his desperate concern that if his mother had to leave the United Kingdom she would not get necessary medical help in Iran.[138]In county court proceedings, at the Central London County Court, before His Honour Judge Monty QC, in November 2020, in respect of premises at 269 Portobello Road, Amir gave evidence that following his refurbishment of the property in about 2014, he had occupied the property, with Ms Reshad and their young daughter as his ‘main residence’ and that he had conducted the business of Mellcraft, the lessee of the premises, from that property and was, in consequence, entitled to the protection of Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, in respect of that property. The premises had been let to Mellcraft as a dwelling. On appeal to the High Court, before Edwin Johnson J, in March 2024, that position was maintained. In contrast, in these proceedings, it has, as already been stated, been Amir’s position that he lives at the Holland Park property and has done so since 2007.[139]When asked about this inconsistency, Amir had, with respect, no coherent answer. It was plain that he had either been lying to the county court and, by extension, the High Court, on the appeal, or that his written evidence to me has been untrue.[140]Whatever the truth of this last, I am left with the position that Amir has, in the one instance, admitted, or purported to admit, that, in extremis, he was prepared to deliberately deceive the Immigration Tribunal, and, in the other, that he has either lied to me or to the county and High Court. Neither of those positions can give me any faith, or confidence, in his evidence. If, in extremis, Amir was prepared to lie to the Immigration Tribunal, it is equally likely that, in his current circumstances, seeking to defend the Declarations of Trust, he could lie to me, both as to his evidence before the Tribunal and generally.[141]In the event, it is, as I find, completely clear that Amir’s written evidence deliberately misled the court in, at least, three fundamental, respects.[142]I have already mentioned the reliance that Amir’s written evidence sought to place upon what turned out to be the retrospective tax returns prepared only after the Declarations of Trust had been put in place. What should also be noted and what was deliberately misleading is that, in that evidence and although Amir was well aware that the tax returns were retrospective and created to reflect, even if not specifically to support, the Declarations of Trust, Amir, transparently, sought to advance those tax returns as historic documents, prepared prior to the execution of the Declarations of Trust and, purportedly, therefore, giving evidential support to the contents of the declarations.[143]At a meeting of the then executors on 14 January 2014, as appears from Mr Pittalis’ attendance note of that date, Mr Faiz had explained to Amir that, because the tax returns had been retrospectively prepared, in conformity with the Declarations of Trust, they carried no evidential weight and were ‘irrelevant’ Nonetheless, in paragraph 27 of his 19 December 2025 witness statement, Amir chose to draw attention to the fact that the returns, referred to Abbas as being single and posed the question as to why Gabriela had not raised that incorrect status with her husband. In so doing, he necessarily and, as I find, deliberately and dishonestly sought to convey to the court that these retrospective documents constituted a form of contemporaneous support for the contents of the recitals. All that, as it was put to him by Mr Learmonth KC, was a lie.[144]The second fundamental lie arises from Amir’s written evidence, as set out at paragraph 48 of this judgment; namely that the Declarations of Trust had been prepared, simply, in order to formalise, or evidence, the supposed long-standing arrangements which had existed between Abbas, Amir and their mother.[145]That was completely untrue. The true position, as already touched upon, in paragraph 127 of this judgment, was that the Declarations of Trust, now relied upon, were only executed after a range of other possible declarations of trust had been executed by Abbas and considered by Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz.[146]The provenance of the Declarations of Trust can be traced, with a high degree of accuracy, from attendance notes and accompanying documents prepared by Mr Pittalis, between 17 and 20 April 2012, and from earlier attendance notes in August 2011 and March 2012.[147]In August 2011, at a time when Abbas was just about to commence chemotherapy, Amir consulted Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz. His concern was that, if Abbas passed away, Gabriela and her children might ‘disappear’ to Brazil. He wanted to know how this could be prevented and how Gabriela could be prevented from having access to funds from the properties. He wondered whether, if Brasenose was sold, the proceeds could be transferred abroad.[148]That possibility appears to have been pursued further, because, in March 2012, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz were, again, consulted by Amir, to discuss ‘strategy’ and to provide advice. The question raised was as to the possibility of opening an offshore account in the name of Mrs Nazemi and the evident purpose of the arrangement was to enable the transfer of assets out of Abbas’ name and into the name of Mrs Nazemi. Mr Pittalis cautioned that, if this strategy was adopted, it would be a matter for the Moaven family to establish that Abbas’ assets had been held on trust for his mother. In the event, this so-called ‘strategy’ was not pursued.[149]What actually happened, although entirely supppressed in Amir’s written evidence, was that, on 17 April 2012 Amir contacted Mr Pittalis. Abbas was unwell and in hospital and Amir wanted advice in regard, as it was put, to ‘various questions relating to trust arrangements and asset transfers’. That was a reference, as I find, to the earlier discussions, set out in paragraphs147 and 148 of this judgment.[150]In the course of a telephone conversation, it was agreed that Mr Pittalis was ‘to prepare documents’ which would be couriered to Amir. Mr Pittalis’ 17 April 2012 attendance note then records that one and a half hours was spent by Mr Pittalis and his assistant in preparing documents.[151]Those documents, as it transpired, consisted of a range of draft declarations of trust, which, by the early evening of 18 April 2012, had been couriered to Amir, taken, presumably, by Amir to Abbas, in hospital, executed by Abbas and brought, executed, to a meeting of Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz at Mr Pittalis’ office.[152]At trial, Mr Pittalis told me that he had drafted the declarations on Amir’s instruction. Amir denied this and denied, even, that he had been aware of the contents of the draft declarations; this although he had instigated the discussion leading to the drafting of the declarations, they had been couriered to him, he had taken them to Abbas, in hospital, for execution, and he had brought the executed declarations to the 18 April meeting. Amir’s evidence, in this regard, was wholly implausible and obviously untrue.[153]Although, for reasons which were, at trial, left entirely unexplained, the executed versions of the drafts have never been disclosed and must, I assume, being, in the event unused, have been destroyed, unexecuted versions of the drafts were, eventually and late in the day (26 January 2026), disclosed.[154]The unexecuted drafts were all, broadly, in the same form as the Declarations of Trust. Each of them purported to declare trusts, in reflection of long-standing arrangements that had existed in respect of the particular property, or properties, to which the declaration of trust were said to relate and in reflection, variously of the efforts and financial contributions of Amir and Abbas, where they were said to be beneficiaries of the trust declared, and the financial contributions of Mrs Nazemi, where she was said to be a, or the, beneficiary of the trusts declared.[155]In respect of each of the three of the properties to which the draft declaration were said to relate (drafts do not appear to have been prepared, at this stage, in respect of the already sold Brasenose), three alternative alleged beneficial ownerships were purportedly advanced. The properties could either be said to be held exclusively for Mrs Nazemi, or they could be said to be held for Abbas and Amir in undivided shares with whatever their percentage interests might be agreed, or they could be said to be held by Amir and Mrs Nazemi in equal shares. Manifestly, not all of those possibilities could be true and, as is clear and as already stated, none of those purported possibilities reflected the Declarations of Trust, as eventually executed, or the alleged tri-partite arrangement and ownership that Amir has advanced in his evidence to this court.[156]It is perfectly clear from the foregoing and requires to be plainly stated that the process which I have just described cannot have been intended to reflect the truth of the arrangements that had existed as between Amir, Abbas and their mother, or to regularise, or formalise, those arrangements. Had that been the case, there would have been no need for these various alternative declarations of trust to be drawn up and Mr Pittalis would simply have been instructed to draft declarations in the form of the eventual Declarations of Trust. Rather, the manifest purpose of the exercise was to enable Abbas, guided by Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, to select the supposed arrangement that best suited his wishes and intentions. Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz were, as I put it, in the course of argument, to ‘shuffle the pack’ of possible declarations of trust in order to find the declaration that worked best.[157]The debate, or discussion, which took place between Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, on 18 April 2012, focussed on two things; the purpose of the exercise and the sustainability of the declarations of trust, intended to give effect to the exercise. As to the former, Amir explained that the primary object of the exercise was to prevent assets coming into Gabriela’s hands because any such assets would be dissipated. As to the latter, discussion took place, as foreshadowed in paragraphs 126 and 127 of this judgment, as to which of the forms of declaration of trust would be sustainable to achieve the intended end. The view taken was that a trust whereby the properties were said to have been vested beneficially in Mrs Nazemi would not be sustainable, whereas a trust alleging that the properties had been vested beneficially as between Amir and Abbas was more sustainable.[158]Whether the arrangement to be advanced had any relationship to the truth was, as it would appear, only a relevant consideration to the extent that it bore on sustainability. What was, seemingly, neither raised, nor discussed, at all, notwithstanding the case which has been advanced by Amir and notwithstanding the terms of the recitals to the eventual Declarations of Trust, was that the actual arrangement between Amir and Abbas and their mother was that which finally found its form in the Declarations of Trust.[159]Subject to some further discussion as to whether the estate, falling into Gabriela’s hands, could be diluted further by devolving a quarter share of Abbas’ estate to Mrs Nazemi, or, alternatively, by Mrs Nazemi advancing a claim against the estate as a debtor of the estate, in respect of monies advanced to Abbas, matters were left on the basis that the documentation which had been prepared ‘would have to suffice’. Abbas, having executed the various declarations was of the view that his affairs had been regularised and he should not be disturbed further. The plain implication was that Abbas was content with any one of the executed alternatives and that the truth, or falsehood, of the recitals said to give rise to the various alternative trust arrangements was entirely immaterial provided that the selected declaration had the intended ostensible effect of diluting, or reducing, his estate.[160]Matters, however, did not end there. At some point prior to the early afternoon of 19 April 2012, Amir had been in communication with with Mr Faiz. Abbas now wanted a declaration of trust different to the three formulations he had already executed. The formulation that he now sought was one that purported to support the tri-partite arrangement eventually reflected in the current Declarations of Trust.[161]In the early afternoon, Mr Faiz telephoned Mr Pittalis and passed on this new information. Somewhat late in the day, he was expressing a concern that, to date, Abbas’ instructions had been conveyed by Amir and that he felt it necessary that they should talk to Abbas to ensure that the provisions that they were making were those that Abbas wanted.[162]Reflecting that concern, arrangements were made to visit Abbas, in hospital, and, at around 5 pm that afternoon, as appears from metadata, disclosed by Mr Pittalis, Mr Pittalis prepared drafts of the Declarations of Trust .[163]At about 6.15 pm, that evening, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis met with Abbas in his hospital room. In his attendance note of this meeting, Mr Pittalis described Abbas as looking sick and frail and in pain. Elis, in her evidence, told me how her father had lost a lot of weight. Gabriela, under cross-examination by Ms Pemberton, had referred to Abbas as having lost capacity. In her written evidence she had also described a change in Abbas’ attitude towards her and a developing hostility, as his illness took hold.[164]I do not think that those reference to capacity were advanced by Gabriela in any technical sense. What Gabriela was talking about, as it seems to me, was a man affected by the pain of disease.[165]As to what I would term Abbas’ technical capacity, Mr Pittalis’ estimation, as recorded in his attendance note, is clear and circumstantial. He noted that, in his view, Abbas had all his mental faculties and that, as Abbas had told him, Abbas was only taking a minimal amount of morphine, in order to ensure that he remained alert. That view of Abbas’ capacity is confirmed, I think, by the fact that when his will was executed, a day later, on 20 April 2012, the subscribing witnesses were a senior nursing sister and a staff nurse, who would not have subscribed to the will had they had concerns as to Abbas’ capacity.[166]Following some discussion as to Abbas’ choice of executors and the ages at which his children could take up their projected interests in his estate, matters turned to the Declarations of Trust and to the fact that, notwithstanding his execution of the forms of declaration set out in paragraph 155 of this judgment, Abbas now wished to record the fact that the properties held in his name were held for himself, Amir and Mrs Nazemi and that this had, in practice, always been the case. On that footing, as Mr Pittalis recorded, the Declarations of Trust were read through to Abbas and executed by Abbas.[167]Ms Pemberton, in her able argument, submitted that, whatever Abbas had said, or done, previously, he had, eventually, come to the truth. I am, however, not persuaded.[168]It comes back to this. If the Declarations of Trust had always reflected the true arrangement, why had there been the need to draft and execute the alternative versions? Why had not Abbas, or Amir, knowing the truth of the arrangement, simply, instructed Mr Pittalis accordingly? Why had Abbas, having executed the alternative forms of declaration, regarded his affairs as having been ‘regularised’, leaving it, apparently to his brother and their advisers to select the draft that best suited? Why had not the ‘true’ arrangement, as between Abbas, Amir and their mother not been ventilated, at all, when the alternative forms of declaration of trust were discussed on 18 April 2012?[169]The answer to all those questions, as it seems to me, is clear and consistent with all the other material, already discussed in this judgment; namely that the Declarations of Trust no more reflected the truth of the arrangements between Amir, Abbas and their mother than had the three previous versions.[170]What is very much more likely to be true and what I find to be true is that Abbas, with, or without, the complicity of Amir, had decided that the prior alternatives were either unsustainable, in respect of the purported trust in favour of his mother, or the trust in favour of Amir and his mother (each of which held him out as a bare trustee of properties he had demonstrably purchased), or that the alternative of a shared ownership between himself and Amir did not sufficiently dilute his estate. The new version of the declarations, the Declarations of Trust, as executed, both diluted his interest in the properties by two-thirds and, given that he had been in business with his brother and had received some modest funding from his mother, set up a scenario that was, at least potentially, capable of being sustained.[171]I do not think that the foregoing analysis is either over-cynical, or unrealistic, or that it bears over-harshly on the conduct of Abbas, in respect of his estate.[172]The third fundamental untruth advanced by Amir, in his written evidence, and which he sought to sustain, in his oral evidence, was his explanation as to why, in 2002, Abbas had executed a declaration of trust, in respect of Brasenose, which purported to show that that property was held in trust for Mrs Nazemi.[173]Amir’s explanation for this declaration of trust, manifestly inconsistent with the Declarations of Trust and the arrangements said to underlie the declarations of trust, was that this declaration had been prepared as part of a form of projected partitioning, as between Amir, Abbas and their mother, of their shared ownership of the properties. His contention was that, rather than each of them having an interest in each property, there had been a plan, not, in the event, implemented, whereby each of them would become the beneficial owner of a particular property and that this declaration of trust was designed to render Mrs Nazemi the beneficial owner of Brasenose. The plan had, however, not been further implemented, once it had been realised that the disparity in values between one property would not be consistent with their underlying wish to have equal shares and he, his mother and Abbas had, simply, agreed, without further formal documentation, to revert to the original tri-partite arrangement.[174]That evidence was completely untrue and an invention.[175]The truth of the matter is made clear in Mr Pittalis’ attendance note of 22 November 2002, the day preceding Gabriela’s marriage to Abbas.[176]The attendance note is pellucidly clear. Mr Pittalis was instructed by Abbas to prepare declarations of trust, in respect of his assets, declaring that those assets were held in trust for his mother. The purpose of the declarations, as set out in the attendance note, was to preclude any future claims on his assets by Gabriela.[177]The attendance note did not specifically refer to Brasenose, but, rather, referred to ‘assets’. The high likelihood, as it seems to me, is that Mr Pittalis prepared a number of declarations, but that it is only the Brasenose declaration that has seen the light of day. One thing is very clear in this case, namely that Mr Pittalis is a careful and accurate note taker. I do not believe that the word assets, in the attendance note, was an error. Had the intention, simply, been to declare a particular asset in favour of Mrs Nazemi, that asset would have been identified.[178]The conclusion I reach, therefore, is that, in 2002, on the verge of his marriage and to protect his assets from any claims from his wife-to-be, Abbas chose to purportedly transfer his assets to his mother, by way of purported declarations of trust.[179]I do not believe, or accept, that these declarations, including, of course, the Brasenose, declaration were real, in the sense of being intended to actually transfer Abbas’ assets to his mother. Rather, they were, in effect, pieces of paper, which could be used, should need arise. It is conspicuous that, at no stage, whether in 2012, or earlier, when Abbas’ assets were under discussion, was it suggested that, actually, the assets were not his but his mother’s and the fact that Amir has concocted a complex lie to explain the Brasenose declaration is powerful evidence that it was his desire to hide the fact that Abbas had, in the past chosen to create declarations which had no real substance, but were simply verbal formulations, designed, as necessary, to obscure, or hide, the true ownership of his assets. The reason for Amir acting in that way is not hard to find. He did not want the fact that Abbas had, in the past, been prepared to create ‘paper’ declarations to lead the court to the view that the Declarations of Trust, which underwrite his evidence, might have been prepared in the same way and for the same broad purpose.[180]That willingness, in Abbas, to obscure ownership and to use his mother’s name to obscure ownership is, as I see it and as foreshadowed in paragraph 120 of this judgment, the reason why so many of the corporate shareholdings were ostensibly registered in Mrs Nazemi’s name. This was nothing to do with any familial arrangement, but another device, like the declarations, designed to obscure, in this instance, share ownership from any prying eyes.[181]Finally, in that regard, it is to be noted that, when Abbas’ assets were under discussion in 2011, as set out in paragraph 147 of this judgment, mention was made of a declaration, made, it was said, many years earlier, purporting to say that the properties were held jointly by Abbas and Amir. That declaration would have been, if effective, entirely inconsistent with the Declarations of Trust and with, at least two, of the alternative declarations of trust, discussed on 18 April 2012. What is completely clear, however, is that, at no stage, did any of Abbas, Amir, Mr Pittalis, or Mr Faiz regard that declaration, or any other declarations, as affecting Abbas’ freedom of action in dealing with the properties.[182]It is perfectly plain that this declaration, like the declarations in 2002 and those discussed on 18 April 2012, were regarded as completely dispensable and interchangeable, rather than as documents intended to have (and having) any real legal, or equitable, effect, or to honestly, or accurately, confirm the recited facts said, in any given case, to underpin, or underlie the trust purportedly declared. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the Declarations of Trust executed on 19 April 2012 were any different than their predecessors, or were intended to be anything other than, as I have put it, pieces of paper designed to disguise the true facts, but having, in themselves, no legal, or equitable, reality, and I am quite satisfied that that was not the case.[183]I have, in discussing Amir’s evidence, interleaved my discussion with my findings as to what took place in April 2012 and what took place in November 2002, since, in my view, these matters bear heavily upon each other.[184]What is completely clear, given my findings, is that the Declarations of Trust and, more particularly, the recitals to the Declarations of Trust can bear no evidential weight whatsoever and do not recite and were never intended to recite any objectively true facts. They were, quite simply, a means to an end, that end being to present Abbas’ estate as being very much smaller than was, in fact, the case and to do so by the purported confirmation of informal trust arrangements that had no basis in fact.[185]In the light of the foregoing, Amir’s evidence can be seen for what it is; a fiction designed to reflect and give support to the false and untrue facts recited in the Declarations of Trust. It was to that end that, contrary to all the other material facts and evidence, he sought to put forward retrospective tax returns as evidence of the supposed tri-partite arrangement, supressed all the evidence relating to the actual circumstance in which the Declarations of Trust came into existence and concocted a story to hide the fact that Abbas had a record of creating false declarations of trust to protect the ownership of his assets.[186]The consequences of the foregoing are clear.[187]Firstly, fundamentally and contrary to the false narrative set out in the recitals to Declarations of Trust, the properties are not and never have been held on the informal trusts alleged in those recitals and in the Declarations of Trust. Not merely has the presumption that Abbas has always been the beneficial owner of the properties, arising from his registered proprietorship of those properties, never been rebutted, but the extrinsic evidence fully supports the view that he has always been the legal and beneficial owner of the properties.[188]Secondly, given my findings as to the Declarations of Trust, namely that they were documents without any legal, or equitable substance, designed, simply, to give a false impression to Gabriela and to the world, as to Abbas’ assets and as to his estate, the Declarations of Trust are ‘sham’. I have no doubt, in this regard, given my findings as to the Declarations of Trust and the evidence, discussed in this judgment, which support those findings, that the burden on Gabriela and her children to provide convincing evidence of ‘sham’, to a high standard (as set out in paragraph 77 of this judgment), has been well and truly met.[189]The Declaration of Trust are ‘sham’ because they were not intended either to create, or to confirm, the rights purportedly declared, but, rather, to convey to those to whom the Declarations of Trust were deployed that the ownership of the properties was different to what it actually was and, by extension, that Abbas’ estate, following his death, was different and very much smaller than that which it actually was. The Declarations of Trust and the conduct of Abbas, in complicity with Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, as set out in this judgment, in bringing into being the Declarations of Trust, falls precisely within Diplock LJ’s seminal explanation of a ‘sham’, in Snook v London and West RidingInvestment Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, at 802 C to F. They were documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which were intended to give to third parties and to the court the appearance of creating legal (or, in this case, equitable) rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights, or obligations (if any) which the parties to the ‘sham’ intended to create. In this case the parties to the ‘sham’ did not intend to create any new rights or obligations over the properties, but simply to disguise, or hide from Gabriela and, probably, the tax authorities, Abbas’ continued ownership of the properties at the date of his death.[190]The effect of this last conclusion, reflecting the reality that the Declarations of Trust were no more than pieces of paper to be deployed as necessary, is that they did not have, because not intended to have had, any legal, or equitable, effect. They were, simply, deceitful forms of words, which did not affect, or limit, Abbas’ legal and beneficial ownership of the properties, at the date of his death and did not, therefore, preclude the full value of the properties falling into his estate. To the extent that the Declarations of Trust would, if not ‘sham’ have given rise to, or created, prospectively, the one-third beneficial interests in the properties, in favour of Amir, or Mrs Nazemi, or her estate, purportedly declared by the Declarations of Trust, those prospective interests have not been created and do not arise.[191]I add that I am, in any event, not completely persuaded that ‘sham’, or no ‘sham’, the Declarations of Trust have, as a matter of construction, any prospective effect.[192]The Declarations of Trust and each of them, as set out earlier in this judgment, are, essentially, confirmatory. As set out in each recital, the declarations are said to be entered into to reflect Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s shares in the properties, pursuant to their long-standing arrangements, with Abbas acknowledging that, pursuant to those arrangements, he has held, holds and will continue to hold the properties on trust for himself, Amir and Mrs Nazemi. The substantive part of each declaration provides that it is in pursuance of the agreement set out in the recital, that Abbas declares that he has held, holds and will continue to hold the property the subject of the particular Declaration of Trust, on trust for himself Amir and Mrs Nazemi.[193]Objectively construed and putting aside all questions of ‘sham’, it seems very arguable to me that Abbas’ intention, as perceived by a reasonable observer, aware of all relevant facts, was to acknowledge and declare the pre-existing trusts pertaining to the properties and not to create, or declare, any new trusts.[194]The corollary, or consequence of that, if correct, is that, if, as is the case, there were no pre-existing trusts pertaining to the properties, then the Declarations of Trust were empty documents having no legal, or other, effect.[195]Be this last as it may (and it was not a subject of discussion, or argument, at trial), I remain satisfied, as set out in paragraphs 187 to 190 of this judgment, both that Abbas’ beneficial ownership of the properties was never subject to any informal trust interest in favour of Amir, or Mrs Nazemi and that, by reason of ‘sham’, the Declarations of Trust did not, even if they otherwise could have done, operate to give rise to effective dispositions of the beneficial interests in favour of Amir and Mrs Nazemi, as set out in the Declarations of Trust.[196]The consequence of that is that the issues that might otherwise have arisen for determination, pursuant to section 423 of the 1986 Act and section 10 of the 1975 Act, no longer arise. That said, those issues having been canvassed, I will, albeit in relatively short form, set out the conclusions that I would have reached had it transpired that those issues were material.[197]As set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 of this judgment, the section 10 and section 423 issues only come into play in the event that the court is satisfied that, contrary to the recitals, no informal trust interests had pre-existed the Declarations of Trust, but that, nonetheless, properly construed, the Declarations of Trust have operated as effective dispositions in favour of Amir and Mrs Nazemi of the beneficial interests purportedly declared by the Declarations of Trust.[198]In that postulated context, addressing section 423 of the 1986 Act, the disposition of beneficial interests in the properties to Amir and Mrs Nazemi, by way of the Declarations of Trust, would have been dispositions by Abbas at an undervalue, falling within section 423(1) of the 1986 Act and falling, in the discretion of the court, to be set aside, pursuant to section 423(2)(a) of the 1986 Act, if the court were to hold, pursuant to section 423 (3)(a), that the transaction, or disposition, had been entered into by Abbas for the purpose of ‘putting assets beyond the reach of a person who’ was making or who might ‘at some time make a claim’ against him.[199]Given the contents of this judgment, it is unequivocally clear that the entire purpose of the dispositions, by way of the Declarations of Trust, was, or would have been, to put assets out of the reach of Gabriela and her children and out of the reach of any claim that they might bring. Accordingly and rightly, Ms Pemberton did not seek, in her closing submissions to seriously argue the contrary. Nor, given the decision of Parker J, in B v IB [2013] EWHC 3755 (Fam) at, in particular, paragraph 63, was it suggested that the fact that Gabriela’s 1975 Act claim and her children’s claims are claims on Abbas’ estate rather than against Abbas, himself, disqualified her or her children from falling within the ambit of section 423(3)(a). Nor, rightly, did she choose to argue that any reason existed whereby, the factual requirements of section 423 being made out, the court would not exercise its power to restore the position as it had existed prior to the Declarations of trust, by setting aside the Declarations of Trust.[200]What was submitted by Ms Pemberton, reflecting the decision in Hill v SpreadTrustee Co. Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 2004 and my own decision in Riley v Aidiniantz [2025] EWHC 3222 (Ch), was that the section 423 claims were actions on a ‘specialty’, carrying, consequentially, a limitation period of twelve years, pursuant to section 8 of the Limitation Act 1980 and that, on that footing and treating time as beginning to run as at the date of the Declarations of Trust, the limitation period expired on 19 April 2024 with the result that Gabriela’s section 423 claim, only first advanced by her application notice of 24 October 2025 (Elis and Aryan’s commencing even later), was statute barred.[201]Mr Learmonth KC met that submission in a number of ways.[202]Firstly and most straightforwardly, he pointed out that time can only begin to run against Elis and Aryan from the date of their relevant majorities and that, on that basis, neither of their claims can be time barred.[203]In regard to Gabriela, his further submission was that, because, as the law then stood in 2012, she was not, at that date, able to commence a 1975 Act claim (statute then requiring that such proceedings could not issue without a grant of representation) and because, as he put it, her section 423 claim was brought in support of her 1975 Act claim, she did not become a ‘victim’ of any disposition effected by those Declarations of Trust until such time (namely the amendment of the 1975 Act by way of the Inheritance and Powers of Trustees Act 2014) as she was enabled, by that amendment, to bring a 1975 Act claim. On that footing, time did not begin to run until 2014 and her section 423 claim, launched in 2025, was launched in time.[204]Mr Learmonth KC supported that submission by reference to the decision of Parker J, in B v IB, to which reference has already been made and to the view, which, as I read it, appears to have been taken, by Parker J, in that case, that, because 1975 Act proceedings could not, in that case, yet be commenced (there having been no grant of representation and the pre-2014 law applying) the cause of action under section 423 had not arisen and, accordingly, time had not begun to run.[205]I confess myself to be less than persuaded as to the correctness of that analysis. The fact that, in that case, the 1975 Act claim could not yet be advanced does not seem to me to mean that the cause of action under section 423, a claim entirely free-standing of the 1975 Act claim, had not arisen, or that time, in respect of that claim, had not begun to run.[206]The cause of action in a section 423 claim, brought by an alleged victim of a transaction, arises where there has been a transaction at undervalue, where, the intent, or purpose, of the person making the transaction has been to put assets out of the reach of a person who either is, or at some time may be, making a claim against the person effecting the transaction (or, as here, that person’s estate) and where the person pursuing the section 423 claim can be said to be a victim of the transaction, in the sense of being a person whose interests are capable of being prejudiced by the transaction. As explained by Sir Martin Nourse, in Hill, the existence of a victim of the transaction is an essential ingredient of the cause of action.[207]There is nothing in the foregoing to preclude the cause of action, under section 423, arising, in a case such as this, simply because, as the law was in 2012, the 1975 Act claim could not be immediately advanced. Treating the Declarations of Trust as having prospective effect and, on the footing, as I have found, that they were effected with the intent of putting assets out of the reach of Gabriela and her children and out of the reach of any claim that she, or her children, might at some time make against Abbas’ estate, thereby, prejudicing her, or their, interests, in respect of such a claim, it seems to me that Gabriela became, as at the date of the Declarations of Trust, a victim of the transactions effected by the Declarations of Trust and that her cause of action under section 423 became complete, notwithstanding that, as the law then stood, she could not immediately advance her 1975 Act claim. What she could have advanced was her section 423 claim and if, therefore, a twelve-year limitation period is to be applied to that claim, then that claim, taken in isolation, has become time barred.[208]That claim is not, however, to be taken in isolation. Nor, despite what was said in Aidiniantz, is it necessarily the case that a claim under section 423 of the 1986 Act carries a twelve-year limitation period, or any limitation period.[209]In Hill, the Court of Appeal was divided on the question as to whether, given the terms of section 424(2) of the 1986 Act (which provides that an application under section 423, made by any one of the classes of applicant entitled, under section 424(1) of the 1986 Act to make such an application, is to be treated as made on behalf of every victim of the relevant transaction) the applicable limitation period should be regarded as commencing, for all victims of a particular transaction when, once time began to run against one of them, or whether a separate limitation period applied to every individual victim. The majority view, with Arden LJ dissenting, was that, despite the collective nature of the remedy under section 423, a separate individual limitation period applied to each individual victim applicant.[210]On that footing, it seems to me that the fact that Elis and Aryan’s section 423 claims were launched in time would not preclude Gabriela’s individual claim from being time barred, if that claim was otherwise barred[211]Equally, however, it seems to me, that, given the collective nature of the remedy under section 423 and the fact that, under section 424(2), any in-time claim by a victim is to be treated as made on behalf of all victims of the relevant transaction, the fact that Gabriela’s individual claim might be time barred would not preclude her from benefitting from any relief granted to Elis and Aryan pursuant to their section 423 claims. If, pursuant to section 423, the dispositions effected by the Declarations of Trust are set aside against Elis and Aryan, they will also, because of the collective nature of the section 423 remedy, be set aside against all other victims of the transaction effected by the Declarations of Trust irrespective of whether an individual claim, by another victim (here, Gabriela) would be time barred. As I put it in the course of the parties opening statements, at trial, the remedy under section 423 is, in effect, a remedy in rem, rather than in personam, and, inconsequence, benefits all parties who have been victims of the relevant transaction, whether, or not, they have brought proceedings and whether, or not, they would have been time barred had they brought proceedings.[212]All of the foregoing has proceeded upon the basis of a twelve year limitation period and on the basis that the section 423 claim is a claim on a ‘specialty’. That was the view adopted in Hill and the basis of my decision, in Aidiniantz.[213]That view, however, cannot, as it seems to me, survive the decision of the Supreme Court, in Zedra Trust Co.(Jersey) Ltd v THG plc [2026] 2 WLR 479 and the comprehensive and scholarly majority judgment of Lords Richards and Hodge, in that case.[214]In that judgment, Lords Richards and Hodge traced the meaning of the word ‘specialty’, as it has developed in English law, and demonstrated, in my view, conclusively, that, properly understood, a ‘specialty’ was an action brought to enforce an obligation under a deed, or statute, and did not embrace the situation, such as that arising under section 423 of the 1986 Act, or, as in Zedra, itself, under sections 994 to 996 of the Companies Act 2006, where statute provides relief, not in respect of a substantive statutory obligation, but in respect of a particular state of affairs; under section 423, a transaction at an undervalue intended to put assets out of the way of claimants who might claim on those assets; under sections 994 to 996, conduct that resulted in, or constituted, unfair prejudice.[215]As explained, at paragraphs 110 to 112, in Zedra, until Collin v Duke ofWestminster [1985] QB 581, there had been no case in recent centuries that had treated a ‘specialty’ as going beyond a monetary obligation, under deed or statute. In Colin, however, Oliver LJ was prepared to expand the concept of ‘specialty’ such as to embrace a statutory non-money obligation (in that case a statutory right of enfranchisement) and, apparently and more widely, to embrace, as a ‘specialty’, any claim to enforce rights arising under statute, whether, or not, the claim was a claim to enforce an obligation, monetary, or otherwise.[216]As explained, further, in Zedra, at paragraph 112, it was that wider view that was adopted in a number of later cases, including, albeit somewhat less clearly than in the other such cases, Hill. In all those cases, including Hill, ‘specialty’ had been treated as embracing claims brought under statute for the grant of relief arising out of the existence of a past or present state of affairs, even although in none of those cases, including Hill, was the claim advanced a claim to enforce an obligation.[217]That wider view, or understanding, of a ‘specialty’ was wrong. The true position is explained and set out in paragraphs 114 and 115 of Zedra. ‘(It) is of the essence of an action upon a ‘specialty’ that it is an action to enforce obligations created by a deed or statute’. The wider view of ‘specialty’, derived from Collin (and applied in Hill and, following Hill, by extension, in Aidiniantz), was founded upon a misunderstanding, or mis-reading, of Oliver LJ’s judgment. There was no proper basis upon which to suggest that the fundamental nature of an action upon a ‘specialty’ had been extended from an action to enforce a statutory obligation so as to embrace all proceedings for which a statute might make provision.[218]In the light of Zedra, it is, I think, completely clear that a claim under section 423 is not a claim on a ‘specialty’ and that the twelve-year limitation period attaching to such a claim, pursuant to section 8 of the Limitation Act 1980, is, simply, not applicable.[219]Ms Pemberton did not advance any alternative limitation period and was right not to do so.[220]The only other available possibility, in terms of limitation, was, or would have been, section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980, which provides a six-year limitation period in respect of an ‘action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any statute’.[221]The judgment in Zedra, as well as exploring the nature of a ‘specialty’ also considered whether a claim under legislation, such as section 423 of the 1986 Act, which embraced a wide range of possible remedies, including, potentially, monetary remedies (see section 425(1)(d) of the 1986 Act) could be brought within the ambit of that section. The conclusion reached by the court, at paragraph 155 of Zedra, was that it could not. Although the English courts had construed section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 widely, the ambit of the section did not extend that far.[222]In the result, I am satisfied that a claim under section 423 is not subject to any statutory limitation period and that, consequently, Gabriela’s section 423 claim is not time barred. I am further satisfied that, had her personal section 423 claim been time barred, then, because her children’s section 423 claims were made in time and because of the provisions of section 424(2) of the 1986 Act, she would, in any event, have had the benefit of any relief granted to Elis and Aryan under their claims. If, therefore, the Declarations of Trust were set aside as against Elis and Aryan, they would also be set aside as against Gabriela.[223]In those circumstances and had the circumstances of the case been as postulated in paragraph 197 of this judgment, I would have had no hesitation in setting aside the Declarations of Trust and restoring the complete beneficial ownership the properties to Abbas’ estate.[224]That leaves, only, for consideration the claims under section 10 of the 1975 Act.[225]Under that section, where a 1975 Act claim is before the court and where, under section 10(2), the court is satisfied that, in the six years prior to the death of the person whose estate is the subject of the claim, that person has made a disposition, for less than full valuable consideration, with the intention of defeating a claim for financial provision Inder the 1975 Act and that an order under section 10 would facilitate the making of financial provision in favour of the claimant for 1975 Act relief, the court may order the recipient, or recipients, of the disposition to provide, for the purpose of making financial provision, such sum of money, or other property, as may be specified in the order.[226]As to the intention of defeating a claim for financial provision, section 12(1) of the 1975 Act provides that that intention will be made out, if on the balance of probabilities the court is of the opinion that the intention of the person making the questioned disposition (although not necessarily the sole intention) was to prevent an order being made under the Act or to reduce the amount of the provision which might, other than for the disposition in question, have been made in favour of the claimant.[227]In this case and in the postulated circumstances set out in paragraph 197 of this judgment, it is plain, having regard to the contents of this judgment, that Abbas’ intention, in executing the Declarations of Trust and in effecting the dispositions of the beneficial interest in the properties set out in the Declarations of Trust, was, or would have been, to reduce the size of his estate and, thereby, to reduce the amount available to Gabriela and her children, against which the court might make provision. The Declarations of Trust and the dispositions effected by the Declarations of Trust were, accordingly, made with the intent to defeat (in this case reduce) any claims that Gabriela, or her children might make for provision out of his estate and, the Declarations of Trust being made within the requisite six-year period, the court’s jurisdiction to require Amir and Mrs Nazemi’s estate to make good monies, or property, to Abbas’ estate, should such monies or property be required to facilitate the making of financial provision, is, therefore, established.[228]I do not see, however, that, at this stage, when the court has not yet embarked upon the substantive resolution of the 1975 Act claims, the court can, or could, go any further in directing Amir, or Mrs Nazemi’s estate to make any particular payment, or transfer any particular property interest, to Abbas’ estate.[229]It seems to me that any decision, as to whether and to what extent monies, or property, should be restored to Abbas’ estate, is wholly dependent upon the view that the court, dealing with the substantive 1975 Act claims, takes of those claims and whether and to what extent, given that view, monies, or property are, or would be, required to facilitate the making of the appropriate level of provision.[230]It follows from the foregoing that even had the circumstances been as postulated in paragraph 197 of this judgment, I would not have made a substantive order under section 10(2) of the 1975 Act. I would have been prepared to declare that the requirements of section !0(2)(a) and (b) had been made out, but would have gone no further.[231]In the result, however, I do not need to make any orders, or declarations, pertaining either to section 423 of the 1986 Act or to section 10 of the 1975 Act. As set out in paragraphs 187 and 195 of this judgment, Abbas’ legal and beneficial interests in the properties have never been subject to any beneficial interests in favour either of Amir, or Mrs Nazemi and the Declarations of Trust were never anything other than ‘sham’ and, consequently, have had no legal, or equitable, effect, in respect of those legal and beneficial interests.[232]I shall make declarations accordingly.