Portland Stone Firms Limited v Albert Goodman LLP [2025] EWHC 702 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 702 (Ch)

Case No CR-2024-BRS-000117

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Venue BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BRISTOL

INSOLVECY AND COMPANIES LIST (ChD)

IN THE MATTER OF PORTLAND STONE FIRMS LIMITED

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986

Venue Bristol Civil Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GR

Date 09/01/2025

Before

HHJ MICHAEL BERKLEY

(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

Between

PORTLAND STONE FIRMS LIMITEDApplicant

ALBERT GOODMAN LLPRespondent

Richard Ascroft (instructed by Couchman Hanson) for Applicant

Govinder Chambay (instructed by Squire Biggs) for Respondent

Hearing Hearing dates: 19 th and 23 rd December 2024

JUDGMENT

HHJ Michael Berkley:

[1]This is a short judgment in respect of the Applicant’s (“PSF”) application for an injunction restraining the advertisement of the Respondent’s (“AG”) winding-up petition issued on 5 November 2024.

[2]An ex-parte injunction was made by HHJ Matthews, sitting as a Judge of the High Court on 12 December 2024. The return date was 19 December 2024 but was inadequately listed for 1 hour. Despite two hours of hearing, the parties needed more time and I listed a further hearing on 23 December 2024 which took a further two hours. I am due to leave the country on 28 December for an extended period and so I issue this short judgment in the very limited time available. As such, I reserve the right to expand on my reasoning and/or clarify any points should the matter go any further. I will not change the thrust of my decision.

[3]The note of HHJ Matthews’ comprehensive but concise history of the matter taken at the first hearing is a useful starting point, which I gratefully adopt. Judgment of HHJ Matthews This is an application by notice of 11 December to restrain advertisement of a petition to wind up issued on 5 November, but only served on the Company on 3 December. The petition is based on a stat demand served 22 August 2024 in respect of debts said to be evidenced by two invoices: number 103770 dated 30 Sept 22 and number 111288 dated 30 April 2023. Those invoices have a total value of £27,840, but when you add VAT they come to £33,408. This application is supported by two witness statements from Daniel Couchman- one dated yesterday and one today, and two further witness statements- Geoffrey Smith and Michael Smith. Both are dated yesterday. There is no evidence formally filed by the Respondent, but certain correspondence was sent to court and court I was asked to look at it, and indeed I have. This application is urgent as the Respondent will be free to advertise the petition from tomorrow, which may have adverse consequences in short term for the Company. The Respondent has been asked for undertakings as to that and has not given them. This application is made on short notice so is essentially a without notice application and an injunction is only sought until the return date – probably next week. This matter stems from the engagement of the Respondent as the Company’s accountant. There were other engagements before, but this one dates to July 2022. I have seen the engagement letter dated 28 July 2022. That engagement letter gives certain details and attaches terms and conditions. It is clear that the accountants will act in accordance with guidelines of Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and gives certain details in the letter. One thing the letter does not do is set out a fee estimate or fix a minimum number of hours to be done, or indeed a maximum, even though details of hourly rates are given. The two invoices that are the subject of this stat demand were prepared and served. 30 September 2022 for £14,750 and 30 April 2023 £13,090 (both before VAT). These were not paid, and there was a meeting held to discuss them at the Respondent’s office in June. It appears that the Respondent says an agreement was come to whereby the Company agreed to pay by way of standing order over 12 months. Two payments were subsequently made of equal amounts – I note they are 10% of total of the two invoices without VAT. This is not quite consistent with the agreement alleged that the bills would be paid over 12 months. There was then correspondence in August 2023. The Company asked for timesheets to enable them to check the amount of time spent. The Respondent sought payment of another £2,784 in September. The Company continued to chase timesheets. The Respondent chased the Company for payment. Finally, in July 2024 a letter of demand was sent and in August 2024 a stat demand was made. The Company then sent a 7-page letter setting out why the stat demand process can’t be used – in effect, saying there is a dispute in good faith on substantial grounds. The short reply of the Respondent said there was no merit to this. I think this is rather a short way of dealing with a 7-page letter. The petition was presented on 5 November and served nearly a month later, on 3 December. On same day another email was sent by the Company disputing the debt on substantial grounds. On 10 Dec solicitors for the Company informed the Respondent they would apply for an injunction. I have been taken to the case of Re a Debtor No. 32 of 1991 (No. 2) and a passage within that at 527 where Mr Justice Vinelott provides that: These principles are particularly important where a demand is made for a payment of reasonable remuneration for services rendered or for a reasonable price for goods supplied. I do not say that a statutory demand can never properly be presented in such case-that the creditor must always quantify his claim by obtaining a judgment before serving a statutory demand. There may be cases where the minimum sum due can be ascertained by reference to some objective standard. There may be cases where the rate of charging is agreed and the minimum time that had to be spent on the task for which remuneration is sought can be similarly established; or advance or periodic payments may have been agreed. But these cases must be regarded as exceptional. In the instant case the charges were based solely on the assertion of the creditor as to the time that had been spent and as to the quality of the staff employed to do the work. I was also referred to Mrs Justice Proudman in Truex v Toll – a case on solicitors fees-

[2009] 1 WLR 2121

– there are a number of aspects to that case- but it concerned a stat demand served for unpaid solicitors fees. Paragraph 16 of that judgment provides: The petition is founded on section 267 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which provides that a petition may be presented if, but only if, certain requirements are met at the date of presentation. For present purposes the relevant requirements are as follows.(a) The debt is at least equal to the bankruptcy level of £750;

(b) the debt is for a liquidated sum;

(d) there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand served in respect of the debt. Section 268 deals with service of a statutory demand. A statutory demand which is neither complied with nor set aside enables the petitioning creditor to satisfy the court as to inability to pay under section 267(2)(c) . It is common ground that it does not assist him as to whether the debt founding the petition is for a liquidated sum. Two questions arose in relation to this; even though the letters from the Company solicitor refer to the claimant debt being disputed in good faith on substantial grounds, there is also a question as to whether amount claimed is indeed a liquidated sum. Mrs Justice Proudman went on to consider whether the solicitors fees were claims for a liquidated sum. She said generally they are unliquidated. The become liquidated once fees are assessed by a costs judge or determined in an action. What else can convert a solicitor’ bill into a liquidated sum? The conclusion she came to is at paragraph 36: In my judgment whether a sum is liquidated and whether there is a defence to the claim are separate issues and the first must be determined before the second is addressed. Accordingly any admission, acknowledgment or agreement converting the amount claimed from an unliquidated to a liquidated sum must be one from which the client has bound himself not to resile. A mere acknowledgment would be insufficient to bind him to forego judicial assessment or determination. Then she goes on to say it was not possible to say the debt was quantified or quantifiable by the bankruptcy court. As this was an appeal, she then refers to the judgment below and concludes that it appears the registrar confused the two questions (whether the debt is disputed on substantial grounds, and whether it is for a liquidated sum). She found the sum as a whole did not fulfil s.267. It seems clear to me in circumstances where there is no agreement for a fixed sum, or even minimum hours, there is no liquidated sum. There is no liquidated sum being claimed here. The question, therefore, is whether there is anything else which could convert the unliquidated sum to a liquidated sum? That is the argument put forward by the Respondent, which is said to be evidence of an agreement formed in the meeting of June 2023. I am not in a position to resolve that question at this stage, and I am not required to – this is an interim injunction application. The threshold I consider I must reach is in my judgment is that set out in American Cyanamid – whether there is a serious issue to be tried, would damages be adequate compensation, and if not where does the balance of convenience lie. I have no doubt there is a serious issue here as to whether there can be said to be a liquidated sum. If there is not, the petition cannot proceed. I can’t decide that now, but there is a serious issue to be tried. Damages would clearly be inadequate compensation for the Company itself – it would suffer the usual prejudice if the petition were advertised tomorrow. It may be that the Respondent would suffer some prejudice -but given the injunction is sought over a short period- I do not see that damages would not be adequate. I consider the balance lies in favour of granting injunction. I propose to grant an injunction to restrain for 7 days, until next Thursday. I think there is already another application to be heard on that day. That is the appropriate disposition today.

[4]Since then, further witness statements have been filed, one from Mr Richard Bugler, a partner in AG and one in response, a third statement from Mr Couchman of PSF’s solicitors. Counsel provided skeleton arguments for both 19 and 23 December and hearings. Mr Ascroft of Counsel represented the Applicant and Mr Chambay of Counsel represented the Respondent. I am grateful to both for their assistance.

[5]The law on what test is to be applied on an application such as this was not seriously in dispute in relation to a disputed debt, and so I shall quote from Mr Ascroft’s skeleton argument16. Although in some cases the test for restraining presentation of a pending petition has sometimes been equated with the test for restraining presentation, there is a clear distinction between the two tests: see In re a Company (Nos 007923 and 007924 of 1994)

[1995] 1 WLR 953

at 956 H – 957 E per Nourse LJ; p 960 A-E per Waite LJ.

17. That said, advertisement of a petition already on the file which constitutes an abuse of process will be retrained in like manner as its presentation: ibid at 957 D per Nourse LJ.

18. It is perhaps because applications to restrain advertisement are frequently based on a contention that the petition debt is disputed on substantial grounds that the test is often expressed in such terms: see, for example, Angel Group Ltd v British Gas Trading Ltd

[2012] EWHC 2702

;

[2013] BCC 265

at [22] (followed in Bridger & Co Ltd v Specialist Lending Ltd (t/a Duologi)

[2023] EWHC 2562 (Ch)

at [5]).

[6]It is common ground that a correction to the factual history needs to be made. Rather than making two payments of £2,784 in June and July 2023 following the 5 June meeting, PSF in fact paid £5,000 as a payment on account referencing the September 2022 invoice on 30 June 2023 and then a further £568 on 30 July 2023 to bring the combined payments to 2 x £2,784.

[7]The payments came about as follows. Following the 5 June 2023 meeting, AG sent PSF (I refer to the parties rather than the individuals for ease of reference; no agency issue was raised as regards Mr Geoffrey Smith, as being a consultant and not a director of PSF thereby being unable to bind PSF) an email timed at 16:33 on 5 June: Dear Geoff It was good to see you on Friday and to catch up today. I appreciated the opportunity to talk through the work Jon and I have been doing on PSF affairs over the past 12 months or so. As discussed, I am happy for our invoices 103770 and 111288 to be settled by way of standing order over 12 months. May I suggest that is £2,784 per month (including VAT) running from June 2023 to May 2024.

[8]This email was forwarded by Mr Smith to PSF’s financial controller, Emma Smith (Geoffrey’s daughter) without comment, save for “FYI”.

[9]A follow up email was sent to Geoff on 27 June 2023: Dear Geoff Portland Stone Firms Limited Account Balance £37,326.00 Further to below, please can you advise if SO [standing order] is in place from this month to clear Invoice 103770 + 111288. I have also attached a copy of invoice 109803 which is overdue for payment and not covered by the SO arrangement. I trust all is in good order, please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further information.

[10]Mr Geoff Smith did not reply or demur from this email.

[11]On 5 July 2023, Emma Smith sent Bruce Johnson (AG’s credit controller) the following email: HiBruce Thanks for getting the invoices sent over to me. Dad has forwarded Richard Payment plan for MS’s invoices to me (I was not aware of this), so next month my POA will only be £568 as I over paid last month. Thanks Em I read “POA” as meaning payment on account.

[12]Mr Johnson wrote to Emma Smith on 21 August 2023: Dear Emma Following a review, please can you advise when the attached fees are scheduled to be paid as they are not covered by the payment arrangement agreed with Richard.

[13]The reply was: Hi Bruce These will be paid month end. Please could I ask for the timesheets / billings for invoices 103770 and 111288. [the two invoices in question].

[14]Mr Johnson disputes receiving that email, but an apparently legitimate copy of that email has been appended to one of the witness statements in support of the application.

[15]On 2 October 2023, when the request for time sheets had been established, Mr Bugler wrote to Geoff Smith as follows: Dear Emma Bruce passed me your email below, I had assumed our fees had been agreed at the meeting Jon Tate and I had with Geoff on 5th June 2023. Following the signing by Mervyn and Geoff of our terms of engagement, we incurred time costs of approximately £32K and billed two amounts, one on 30 September 2022 and a second invoice on 30 April 2023 totalling £27,840 plus VAT, copies of our hours recorded are attached as requested. Jon and I met with Geoff on 5th June to discuss the work that we have done, we then agreed that the total amount outstanding could be settled by way of 12 monthly standing orders, a copy of the email confirming this is below. I hope this clarifies matters so the standing order can be reinstated.

[16]Not very much happened between then and June 2024 (save for a further meeting in April 2024 when representatives from the two parties are said by the Respondents to have met and Geoff Smith is said to have confirmed again that payments in full would be resumed. However, there was not much focus on that meeting in submissions). As the dispute was coming to the fore, AG’s solicitors wrote to PSF a letter of claim which contained the following passage: On or around 5 June 2023, and following a request from Geoff Smith, an arrangement was entered into between PSFL and AG pursuant to which AG agreed to accept payment of the total invoiced by way of 12 monthly instalments of £2,784 including VAT over a 12-month period from June 2023 to May 2024 by way of standing order. Given the passage of time it does not matter whether this arrangement is/was considered a legally binding variation to the payment terms set out in the letter of engagement or a waiver by AG of its legal rights to enforce the payment terms or simply an informal, non-binding arrangement. Whatever the situation, AG is entitled to be paid in full for the work done now.

[17]There is one other observation on HHJ Matthew’s note of judgment: the sum of £2,784 is, by a coincidence, not only 10% of the ex-VAT sum said to be owing under the two invoices, but in fact 1/12 of the VAT inclusive sum of £33,408, so the payment plan does make mathematical sense.

[18]The basis of the application is referred to in the note of HHJ Matthews’ judgment. PSF allege(a) that the sum claimed is not a liquidated sum (it being comprised of two invoices for services rendered which have not been adjudicated on and are thus subject to challenge as to reasonableness) and therefore that AG cannot rely on a statutory demand to support the petition and

(b) there is no event to turn the unliquidated sum into a liquidated sum, PSF contending that the event relied on (5 June 2023 meeting) was not an agreement of sufficient certainty and/or of a binding nature to achieve that aim (see Truex v Toll

[2009] EWHC 396 (Ch)

, as cited above by HHJ Matthews). Mr Ascroft produced a supplemental skeleton argument dealing with the petition’s alternative foundation, namely s123(1)(e) (unable to pay its debts as they fall due) which was not apparently addressed at the ex-parte hearing. Mr Ascroft submitted that PSF has produced ample evidence that it is obviously solvent and the failure to pay one debt (albeit over two invoices) cannot overcome that. The whole of the debt is disputed, he says, and that to allow a petition to proceed on that basis would be wholly improper as being the basis for a claim that the company cannot pay its debts based on an unsubstantiated and unliquidated damages claim.

[19]Mr Ascroft submits that where a petitioner relies upon s123(1)(e), he bears the initial evidential burden of establishing that the relevant company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. If that burden is discharged, the evidential burden shifts to the company: Synergy Agri Holdings Ltd v Agform Ltd

[2020] EWHC 343 (Ch)

at [32(2)]. Although Mr Ascroft accepts that it is the case that an inability to pay debts as they fall due (s 123(1)(e)) may be established by non-payment of a single debt (see, for example, Cornhill Insurance plc v Improvement Services Ltd

[1986] 1 WLR 114

), the relevant debt must, he submits, be one in respect of which there is no dispute (or other challenge) which is not the case here.

[20]Mr Chambay, Counsel for the Respondent, made a novel (so far as I am aware) submission that a statutory demand in a company winding-up case does not have to be based on a liquidated sum. He argued this from first principles, stemming from the lack of a reference to a liquidated demand in ss122-124 of the Insolvency Act 1986 as compared to s266-268 of the 1986 Act in relation to personal bankruptcy proceedings. For reasons that will become apparent, I do not have to resolve this issue on this injunction application.

[21]Referring to the well-known passage of Norris J from Angel Group Ltd v British Gas Trading Ltd

[2012] EWHC 2702 (Ch)

@ [22], Mr Chambay submitted that this was a classic case of a debtor setting up a cloud of objections when in fact they have obviously agreed that the invoices were due in full; they had agreed a payment plan and had even started to make payments accordingly, before they even disputed the debt. A cursory glance at the evidence demonstrates this, he said. He relied on Agform Ltd v Fine Organics Ltd

[2018] EWHC 2211 (Ch)

@ [12]:

“(4) Nor is it enough for the company simply to allege that the debt is disputed or "merely to raise a cloud of objections." The company must properly explain the basis of the dispute and provide evidence to show that it is a substantial one. If it can be seen from the papers that there is no dispute, or no dispute as to part of the debt, then ordinarily the petitioner will be allowed to proceed; Revenue & Customs Commissioners v Rochdale Drinks Distributors [2012] 1 BCLC 748. (5) The court will be prepared to consider the evidence in detail, even if in performing that task the court may be engaged in much the same exercise as would be required for a court facing an application for summary judgment (6) A dispute will not be substantial if it has really no rational prospect of success, in Re a Company (No 0012209 of 1991) [1992] 1 WLR 351 and 354 B. … (8) Finally, where a company has previously requested time to pay a debt but subsequently suddenly asserts that the debt is disputed, its assertion of a dispute should be regarded with what has been described as "acute suspicion"; Delaine Property Limited v Quarto Publishing PLC [1990] 3 ACSR 81.'”

[22]In relation to s123(1)(e), Mr Chambay relied on Taylor's Industrial Flooring Ltd v M&H Plant Hire (Manchester) [1990] B.C.C. 44 at [50-51], a similar authority to Cornhill Insurance in support of the proposition that the failure to pay a single (undisputed) debt is sufficient to support a petition. This allows it to be presented. It is only at the hearing of the petition that the evidence has to be weighed up, he submitted.

[23]In the context of applications for an injunction to prevent advertisementof the petition, Mr Chambay relied on Harada Limited, Berkeley Credit & Guarantee Limited v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

[2013] EWHC 4155 (Ch)

at [15]: 15. As to any evidence that may have been presented or any submissions that the applicants are, in fact, solvent, the case of Cornhill Insurance plc v Improvement Services Ltd

[1986] 1 WLR 114

makes it clear that notwithstanding the solvency of the company, if there is an undisputed debt, or if there is a debt in relation to which there is not a substantial dispute on bona fide grounds, then evidence of the solvency of the company is not sufficient to support an application to restrain the presentation of a winding-up petition.” (Emphasis added).

[24]Further and in any event, Mr Chambay submitted, the evidence is such that PSF cannot seriously argue that a sum in excess of £750 of the outstanding invoice sum is owing which is enough to allow the petition to continue to be heard. AG is a creditor for the purposes of s124, even if the debt is unquantified (see Wolf Rock (Cornwall) Ltd v Langhelle

[2020] EWHC 2500 (Ch)

at [48]).

Discussion and Conclusion

[25]On the material that I have seen, I am sceptical about the Applicant’s position on the disputed debt and the 5 June 2023 meeting and agreement. If there was a binding agreement, then it would have transformed the unliquidated claim to a liquidated one. In my judgment, there is strong prima facie evidence that a concluded agreement was reached. There is some doubt cast on that by the words of Mr Bugler that he “had assumed” the invoices had been agreed (see his email of 2 October 2023) and the words of AB’s solicitors in their letter of 15 July 2024 (regarding the uncertain nature of the agreement). They cast just enough of a doubt for the purposes of this hearing for me to refrain from coming to a conclusion on the issue. The complete absence of demur from Mr Geoff Smith (and his son, Mike, the director) when dealing with the emails of June-September 2023 raise my suspicions further.

[26]However, because this is an application for an injunction to prevent advertisement of a petition, the application can be dismissed on the following grounds alone.

[27]I am quite satisfied that more than £750 will be owing under these invoices. There is no dispute that AG were engaged by PSF on a complex transaction which required significant work. No issue with the September 2022 invoice was raised before the June 2023 meeting, and indeed not at all until September of 2023. PSF acknowledge (email 26 June 2024) that AG have charged “06.09 to 15.12.2022 JT hours total 52 hours @ £ 138/hr = £7,176.00p + VAT” and stated “The Company have paid £5,568 as a consideration for the period 06.09 to 15.12.2022” (ibid.) The only question over that figure was as to whether the rate included an “uplift” for a leadership role.

[28]The objections raised in the 7-page letter which HHJ Matthews referred to were not wholesale objections, but objections to parts of the sub-headings in the invoices as compared to the Letter of Engagement which had never been raised before. It contains complaints that the AG had not complied with ICAEW standards (never raised in the preceding 12 months) regarding a lack of fee quotes and similar. It must be noted that AG have been PSF’s accountants for over 20 years and, although this was a specific project (restructuring of the businesses within the overall company), a good working relationship would suggest that a nit-picking comparison of the Letter of Engagement with the summary of work done in the invoices is highly unlikely to achieve such a wholesale reduction in the sums due from £33,408 to £6,319 (£5,568 + £751). Similarly, in a relationship of such length, it is perfectly understandable that the strict ICAEW requirements of fee estimates might have been waived. These smack of “raising a cloud of objections”, and I query the substantive value of the ICAEW points in the overall scheme of the invoices. The complaint that AG failed to advise PSF to obtain independent legal advice before agreeing to the alleged payment plan is bewildering given the commercial nature of their relationship.

[29]One objection acknowledges that “Drafting Heads of Terms” is an item in the Letter of Engagement, and yet the letter of objection queries the need for a Heads of Terms. That is a rather late challenge given the Letter of Engagement.

[30]Another objection refers to “duplication” of work which, as Mr Chambay submitted, presupposes that one set of such work was required.

[31]Standing back, I am prepared to accept that there have been some disputes raised which, if there has not been a binding agreement, will reduce the level of fees if successful. However, the objections are highly unlikely to bring them below the level of £750. Mr Ascroft submitted that there may be nothing owing under these invoices, although he accepted, too, that the full amount could be owing. That was the point, he said: the court is not in a position to carry out that exercise at this stage.

[32]In Angel Group, Norris J held inter alia as follows:28. The fourth argument advanced by Counsel for Angel was that unless I can specify an exact sum which is due from Angel to BG then I must grant an injunction to restrain further proceeding on the petition: and that I can only reach that exact sum by undertaking a line by line examination of each of the invoices rendered on the Corporate Account and the SME Account for the entire duration of the relationship between Angel and BG. Only in this way would the exact sum and its precise constitution be established, and only in this way could Angel know how much it had to pay and what liabilities were thereby discharged.

29. I do not accept this submission. On this application the question is whether or not there is an indisputable debt owed by Angel to BG sufficient to support a winding up petition. There may be uncertainty about the precise sum: but the court at this stage is not concerned to determine what could be proved in a winding up. It is concerned to see that the petitioner is indisputably a creditor in a sum exceeding the statutory minimum and so entitled to present a winding-up petition. It will be for the parties to agree or make their own respective judgements about what cannot be disputed and what can properly be disputed (and the court will be alert to identify every case where the winding up process is being used to exert pressure to pay a debt that is bona fide disputed on substantial grounds rather than to litigate it). In Re A Company No.2340 (2001) Mr Justice Blackburne held:— “At the end of the day the question is whether or not there is a debt owed by [the Debtor] to [the Creditor] over and above £750, sufficient therefore in amount to support a winding up petition, which is not bona fide disputed on substantial grounds. In my judgment, there clearly is. Even making allowance for the various points which [Counsel] has raised, on any view further substantial sums are owing. In my judgment therefore, it cannot be said that if [the Creditor] were now to present a petition to wind up [the Debtor] it would be an abuse of process. True it is that there is a dispute as to the precise amount of the sum to which [the Creditor] is entitled but, on the evidence I have seen, I am satisfied that there is no genuine dispute … as to the existence of an indebtedness on the part of [the Debtor] to [the Creditor] amply sufficient in amount to support a winding up petition. I propose therefore to dismiss this application”. My approach is the same.

[33]Norris J carried out an overview of the much more complex situation in that case but was satisfied that, whilst it was not the case that some of the objections and disputes had no rational prospects of success, they would be unlikely, on the balance of probabilities, to reduce the amount owing to below £750 and therefore refused to grant an injunction to prevent British Gas from advertising the petition.

[34]It appears that the petitioner in that case petitioned on the grounds of the inability of the debtor to pay its debts as they fell due. Thus it was not relying on a liquidated sum as founding a statutory demand. Mr Ascroft agreed that that appeared to be the case from the report.

[35]The combined authorities of Harada, Cornhill, Wolf Rock and Angel Group is that AG is a creditor of PSF for the purposes of s124 of the IA 1986. A sum in excess of £750 is plainly owing on the invoices as an undisputed sum, even if the precise sum cannot be calculated. Non-payment of such a debt is sufficient evidence to give AG locus standi to present the petition and to legitimately aver that there is evidence that PSF cannot pay its debts. That allows AG to present its petition, even if the prospects of successfully persuading a court that PSF is insolvent are not high: this is not the hearing of the petition. An application for an injunction to prevent the petition from being advertised should not be successful when the above elements are present: the petitioner should be allowed to proceed with the presentation of its petition.

[36]Mr Ascroft all but conceded during the course of submissions that, if I was persuaded that at least £750 was likely to be owing on the invoices, the effect of Angel Group would mean that the advertisement of the petition should not be restrained.

[37]Accordingly, I intend to refuse to grant the application. I am circulating this draft judgment in the usual way under embargo, which will give time, as Mr Ascroft sought from the court, for the parties to take such steps as it is advised to do in respect of the petition. I ask for filing of corrections etc. in the usual way in (preferably) a single marked-up Word document to be supplied by 3 January 2025 after which I will arrange for handing down a perfected judgment in my absence. If the date for corrections causes difficulties, I will consider extending the time for compliance. Counsel should approach my clerk or, in the circumstances, me direct by email.

[38]For the avoidance of doubt, the interim injunction will continue until this judgment is handed down.