Fortify Solent Limited v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 2953 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 2953 (Ch)Case No BL-2025-000896IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESINTERIM APPLICATIONS LIST (ChD)Venue The Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane, LondonEC4A 1NLDate 17/07/2025
Before
MR JUSTICE EDWIN JOHNSON
Between
FORTIFY SOLENT LIMITEDClaimantPERSONS UNKNOWN CLIMBING UPON, OR OTHERWISE ENTERING, OCCUPYING OR REMAINING ON SPITBANK FORT WITHOUT THE CLAIMANT’S PERMISSIONDefendants
MR MICHAEL WALSH KC (instructed by Steele Raymond LLP) for Claimant for THE DEFENDANTS did not attend and were not represented
APPROVED JUDGMENTIf this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDEEmail: info@martenwalshcherer.comWeb: www.martenwalshcherer.com

Introduction

[1]This is the hearing of a claim for an injunction to prohibit future acts of trespass on a fort constructed in the Solent known as Spitbank Fort, Solent, Portsmouth (which I shall refer to as “the Property”). The claimant, Fortify Solent Limited, is the registered freehold proprietor of the Property. The defendants are identified as persons unknown entering onto or remaining at Spitbank Fort without the claimant’s permission.[2]The Property itself is an unusual property. It is a sea fort which was built in 1878 and it is located in the Solent just off the coast of Portsmouth. The problem which has provoked this application is that the claimant’s evidence is that there have been frequent trespasses over recent years by persons referred to as urban explorers. Urban explorers, as I understand the expression, are individuals who typically explore manmade structures, especially in areas not generally open to the public, and post their videos online on social media to generate a profit.[3]It is the claimant’s case that in addition to these acts of trespass, in some cases the urban explorers have caused damage to the Property. It is also the claimant’s case that all of those persons described as urban explorers who have entered onto the Property since the claimant acquired the Property have done so without the licence or consent of the claimant and were thus trespassing.[4]The claim has been commenced by Part 8 claim form issued yesterday, that is to say on 16 July 2025. The claim form has not been served on any particular individual. It follows that the relief sought on this hearing is sought on a without notice basis. There has also been issued, yesterday, an application notice seeking the specific relief which is sought in the action. The claimant has been represented at this hearing by Mr Michael Walsh KC. There is no other person who has attended at this hearing or who has sought to be heard. As I understand the position, no steps have been taken, deliberately, to give notice of the application and the commencement of the action to any other person. As I have said, the application is made on a without notice basis.[5]I have had the benefit of a helpful skeleton argument provided by Mr Walsh, and I have also had the benefit of Mr Walsh’s oral submissions. The evidence in support of the application comprises a witness statement of Ms Katherine Bradbury, a director of the claimant company, dated 15 July 2025. There is an exhibit, a fairly lengthy exhibit, to that witness statement which contains a substantial amount of documentary evidence and, in particular, a number of links to videos which have been posted on social media of individuals who have made their way by boat or by paddleboard to the Property and have obtained access to the Property without the licence or consent of the claimant.

The factual background

[6]I should briefly explain the factual background which has given rise to this application. It is not necessary for me to go through the factual background in detail. What follows is only a summary of the factual background, which is largely drawn from the helpful summary provided by Mr Walsh in his skeleton argument.[7]As I have said, the Property comprises a sea fort located in the Solent which was constructed in 1878. It was owned by the Ministry of Defence until 1982. It was then open to the public as a museum until 2009, after which it was converted into a luxury hotel in 2012. The hotel closed in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The claimant then bought the property in July 2024; to be specific I see from the office copy entries for the Property that the claimant acquired the Property by a transfer dated 16 July 2024 and was registered as proprietor of the freehold interest in the Property on 7 August 2024. I have seen in the evidence a photograph of the Property.[8]As matters stand, the Property is unoccupied due to damage caused by water ingress and also possibly issues with legionella bacteria in the water supply. What is happening at the moment is that the claimant’s contractors are repairing and renovating the Property. As director of the claimant, Ms Bradbury’s evidence is that she visits the Property ever three weeks or so. The problem with urban explorers, as they are called, goes back to 2020 when the Property became unoccupied. It is apparent from the evidence that a number of urban explorers have visited the Property without the owner’s permission and have made videos of their excursions and have then posted them on social media sites.[9]As I have said, exhibit KB1 to Ms Bradbury’s witness statement contains a number of links to videos which have been posted on social media between 2020 and June 2024. They are still available and the evidence is that comments have been posted in relation to those videos as recently as 12 June 2025. Those videos, it is clear from the evidence, encourage other urban explorers to visit the Property and, as the claimant would say, trespass on the Property. The complaint is also made by the claimant that those videos give the misleading impression that the Property is abandoned and has been left open and can readily be accessed.[10]The instances of trespass which I have just described have continued after the claimant bought the Property. Again, exhibit KB1 contains links in respect of videos made of persons accessing the Property after the claimant’s acquisition of the Property. Some idea of the reach of these videos can be obtained from the claimant’s evidence that a video was posted on 1 May 2025 with 13.5 million views, 808,900 likes, 8,581 comments, 82,200 saves and 89,700 shares on TikTok. The claimant’s case is that these numbers are growing and that they fuel a general interest and fascination with the Property.[11]As I have said, the general theme of these videos is that the Property has been abandoned and that provokes comments on social media by others expressing the intention to visit the Property, or stay overnight, or even to squat on the Property. Examples of such comments are given by Ms Bradbury in her evidence. Ms Bradbury has, in fact, confronted some of these individuals on Facebook but the reaction has been that, in additional to denial that individuals intend to visit the Property, if there was to be a visit to the Property it would only be a civil trespass so the police would not get involved.[12]As matters stand, there is nothing to allay the claimant’s concern. There is a summer holiday approaching and at least so far this summer, and this may well continue, the weather and sea conditions have been such as to make it relatively easy for individuals to access the Property, although the point is stressed in the claimant’s evidence, and is a matter to which I shall come, that obtaining access to the Property is dangerous.[13]That brings me on to the dangers which are said to be posed to those people who visit the Property without the claimant’s authority or consent. For present purposes it is only necessary for me to summarise those dangers but they are as follows. First, there are challenging sea conditions. These are shallow waters which are subject, as I understand the evidence, to strong tidal conditions. There are nearby shipping lanes. It is no easy matter to obtain access to and egress from the Property by the sea. That was brought home to me by one of the videos I viewed which shows that there is quite a considerable swell around the fort, the Property, even on a relatively calm day. It was clear from the video that it is no easy matter to get off a paddleboard or a boat onto the steps which lead up to the Property.[14]There is also a risk of becoming trapped at the Property because, unless one is standing on what I believe to be the roof or the outer walls of the Property, there is no mobile phone signal. There is no reliable source of electricity, there are no fixed telephone lines and there are hazards within the Property which include marine diesel tanks, water ingress, possible legionella in the drinking water, an unmaintained sewerage system and the risk of electrocution. So it is in all those circumstances that the claimant has made this application for an injunction to restrain future acts of trespass by individuals onto the Property.

The law

[15]The application in the present case is an application for what is generally referred to as a newcomer injunction. The principles governing the grant of newcomer injunctions have been set out by the Supreme Court in the case of Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2023] UKSC 47, [2024] AC 983. The judgment in that case was given by Lord Reed PSC, Lord Briggs JSC and Lord Kitchin JSC in a joint judgment. Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Lloyd-Jones JSC agreed with that judgment. An explanation of this type of injunction was given in the judgment at [144] in the following terms:
“Cumulatively those distinguishing features leave us in no doubt that the injunction against newcomers is a wholly new type of injunction with no very closely related ancestor from which it might be described as evolutionary offspring, although analogies can be drawn, as will appear, with some established forms of order. It is in some respects just as novel as were the new types of injunction listed in sub-paragraph (viii) above, and it does not even share their family likeness of being developed to protect the integrity and effectiveness of some related process of the courts. As Mr Drabble KC for the appellants tellingly submitted, it is not even that closely related to the established quia timet injunction, which depends upon proof that a named defendant has threatened to invade the claimant’s rights. Why, he asked, should it be assumed that, just because one group of Travellers have misbehaved on the subject site while camping there temporarily, the next group to camp there will be other than model campers?”
[16]As I have said, the principles governing the grant of newcomer injunctions were set out by the Supreme Court in the Wolverhampton case. The distinguishing features of newcomer injunctions were identified at [143] in the judgment. At [167] the Supreme Court laid down a summary of the requirements which have to be satisfied before an injunction can be granted. In the Wolverhampton case, the Supreme Court were concerned with injunctions against travellers and gypsies, but the principles and the requirements have been helpfully summarised by the editors of the White Book in Volume 2 of Civil Procedure (The White Book Service 2025) at pages 2915 and 2916, as part of the editors’ commentary on newcomer injunctions. The summaries provided by the editors of the White Book have been adapted from what was said by the Supreme Court, amongst other reasons for the purpose of rendering those principles applicable or suitable to be applied in other cases which do not necessarily involve travellers or gypsies. The distinguishing features of newcomer injunctions, as identified by the editors of the White Book are in the following terms:
“The distinguishing features of newcomer injunctions are: 1. newcomer injunctions are made against people who are truly unknowable at the time of grant and potentially apply to anyone in the world; 2. they are always made on a without notice basis, although advertisement may constitute informal notice; 3. in the context of travellers and gypsies, the persons restrained are unlikely to have any right or liberty to do what is prohibited, save perhaps Convention rights to be weighed in a proportionality balance. The conduct restrained is typically trespass, breach of planning control or both; 4. while the injunction is always discretionary, there is generally unlikely to be a real dispute to be resolved, or a triable issue as to the claimant’s entitlement. “They and the proceedings in which they are made are generally more a form of enforcement of undisputed rights than a form of dispute resolution.”; 5. even where there might be a real dispute or triable issue, the newcomers would be unlikely to engage as active defendants even if joined; 6. the mischief against which the injunction is aimed is usually short term and liable, if terminated, to be repeated on a nearby site or by different travellers on the same site so that the usual processes of eviction or injunction against named parties provide inadequate means of protection; 7. the injunction (even when interim in form) is sought for its medium to long term effect rather than as a means of holding the ring in an emergency, ahead of some later trial process, or even a renewed interim application on notice (and following service) in which any defendant is expected to be identified, let alone turn up and contest; 8. the injunction is not designed (like a freezing injunction, search order, Norwich Pharmacal Co or Bankers Trust Co order, or anti-suit injunction) to protect or enhance some related court proceedings: “Its purpose, and no doubt the reason for its recent popularity, is simply to provide a more effective, possibly the only effective, means of vindication or protection of relevant rights than any other sanction currently available to the claimant local authorities.”
Wolverhampton at [143].” “Its purpose, and no doubt the reason for its recent popularity, is simply to provide a more effective, possibly the only effective, means of vindication or protection of relevant rights than any other sanction currently available to the claimant local authorities.” Wolverhampton at [143].”[17]Moving on to the requirements which have to be satisfied in relation to newcomer injunctions for their grant, those requirements are again summarised by the editors of the White Book in the following terms: [ I read into the transcript at this point the editors’ identification of the requirements which can be found at page 2915 and 2916 of Volume 2 of the White Book] “Injunctions against newcomer travellers are only likely to be justified if:• 1. there is a compelling need (demonstrated by evidence) for the protection of civil rights, the enforcement of planning control, the prevention of anti-social behaviour or other statutory objective in the locality which is not adequately met by any other measures;• 2. there is procedural protection for the rights, including Convention rights, of the affected newcomers sufficient to overcome the strong prima facie objection of subjecting them to a without notice injunction otherwise than as an emergency measure to hold the ring. This will need to include an obligation to take all reasonable steps to draw the application and any order made to the attention of all those likely to be affected by it; and the most generous provision for liberty to apply to have the injunction varied or set aside, and on terms that the grant of the injunction in the meantime does not foreclose any objection of law, practice, justice or convenience which the newcomer so applying might wish to raise;• 3. applicant local authorities can be seen and trusted to comply with the most stringent form of disclosure duty on making an application, so as both to research and then present to the court everything that might have been said by the targeted newcomers against the grant of injunctive relief;• 4. the injunctions are constrained by both territorial and temporal limitations so as to ensure, as far as practicable, that they neither outflank nor outlast the compelling circumstances relied upon;• 5. it is, on the particular facts, just and convenient that such an injunction be granted. It might well not for example be just to grant an injunction restraining travellers from using some sites as short-term transit camps if the applicant local authority has failed to exercise its power or, as the case may be, discharge its duty to provide authorised sites for that purpose within its boundaries. Wolverhampton at [167] and [238](iv), and elucidated further at [169]–[172] and [188]–[232].”[18]In Wolverhampton the Supreme Court recognised the important role of the lower courts in developing this kind of relief. In that context the Supreme Court, by the joint judgment, said this at [187]:
“We turn now to consider the practical application of the principles affecting an application for a newcomer injunction against Gypsies and Travellers, and the safeguards that should accompany the making of such an order. As we have mentioned, these are matters to which judges hearing such applications have given a good deal of attention, as has the Court of Appeal in considering appeals against the orders they have made. Further, the relevant principles and safeguards will inevitably evolve in these and other cases in the light of experience. Nevertheless, they do have a bearing on the issues of principle we have to decide, in that we must be satisfied that the points raised by the appellants do not, individually or collectively, preclude the grant of what are in some ways final (but regularly reviewable) injunctions that prevent persons who are unknown and unidentifiable at the date of the order from trespassing on and occupying local authority land. We have also been invited to give guidance on these matters so far as we feel able to do so having regard to our conclusions as to the nature of newcomer injunctions and the principles applicable to their grant.”
[19]The principles set out in the Wolverhampton case were reviewed by Ritchie J in the case of Valero Energy Ltd & Ors v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 134 (KB). Those principles were reviewed by Ritchie J in his judgment at [57] to [60], but Ritchie J also went on to add certain other requirements, including the need to demonstrate a cause of action, the need to demonstrate no realistic defence and the need to demonstrate that damages were not an adequate remedy. Those expanded principles, as it were, were applied in several subsequent protest cases, the most recent of which I was told was the case of The Master, Fellows and Scholars of the College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity within the Town and University of Cambridge of King Henry the Eighth’s Foundation v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1577 (Ch) at [59].[20]Those requirements were also applied by Ritchie J himself in the case of Multiplex Construction v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 239 (KB). The injunction granted in that case was then continued for a further period by Ritchie J in a subsequent judgment and was then further continued for 19 months by Ellenbogen J in a judgment which was delivered on 28 February 2025. That latter judgment is not available, but Mr Walsh has included in his bundle of authorities for this hearing a case digest of the decision of Ellenbogen J.[21]The submission of Mr Walsh is that the requirements which have to be met on a claim for a newcomer injunction of this kind are as set out by the Supreme Court in the Wolverhampton case and that it is not actually necessary to go on and demonstrate the further requirements which were added by Ritchie J in the Valero case. It is Mr Walsh’s submission that those additional requirements actually go beyond what actually has to be shown.[22]It is not appropriate for me, in an extempore judgment of this kind, to try to resolve a question of that kind, not least because the point is not important in the present case because Mr Walsh has submitted that the claimant is able to satisfy the additional requirements identified by Ritchie J in Valero, whether it is or is not the case that, as a matter of law, those requirements have to be demonstrated. Accordingly, I approach this matter on the basis that, effectively, the test for the grant of an injunction of this kind is to be found in the Wolverhampton case, but I also apply the additional requirements identified by Ritchie J in Valero leaving the decision for another case as to whether those additional requirements do, in fact, have to be satisfied.[23]There is one other authority to which I should refer in this particular case and that is the decision of Sir Anthony Mann sitting as a Judge at the High Court in the case of Jockey Club Racecourses Ltd v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 1786 (Ch). In his judgment in that case at [18] Sir Anthony, having considered the Wolverhampton case, identified the principles which govern applications of this kind in the following terms: “Later in the judgment the court returned to procedural safeguards to give effect to those matters of principle, and set out the following procedural and other matters. I omit some points that are relevant to Traveller cases and which have no counterpart in this case, and adjust others by omitting specific Traveller references and by making the wording applicable to the present (and similar) cases. i) Any applicant for an injunction against newcomers must satisfy the court by detailed evidence that there is a compelling justification for the order sought. There must be a strong possibility that a tort is to be committed and that that will cause real harm. The threat must be real and imminent. See paragraphs 188 and218. “Imminent” in this context means “not premature” – Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43 at 49E. ii) The applicant must show that all reasonable alternatives to an injunction have been exhausted, including negotiation – paragraph 189. iii) It must be demonstrated that the claimant has taken all other appropriate steps to control the wrong complained of – paragraph 189. iv) If byelaws are available to control the behaviour complained of then consideration must be given to them as a relevant means of control in place of an injunction. However, the court seemed to consider that in an appropriate case it should be recognised that byelaws may not be an adequate means of control. See paragraphs 216 and 217. v) There is a vital duty of full disclosure on the applicant, extending to “full disclosure of all facts, matters and arguments of which, after reasonable research, it is aware or could with reasonable diligence ascertain and which might affect the decision of the court whether to grant, maintain or discharge the order in issue, or the terms of the order it is prepared to make or maintain. This is a continuing obligation on any local authority seeking or securing such an order, and it is one it must fulfil having regard to the one-sided nature of the application and the substance of the relief sought. Where relevant information is discovered after the making of the order the local authority may have to put the matter back before the court on a further application.” – paragraph219. Although this is couched in terms of the local authority’s obligations, that is because that was the party seeking the injunction in that case. In my view it plainly applies to any claimant seeking a newcomer injunction. It is a duty derived from normal without notice applications, of which a claim against newcomers is, by definition, one. vi) The court made it clear that the evidence must therefore err on the side of caution, and the court, not the applicant should be the judge of relevance – paragraph220. vii) “The actual or intended respondents to the application must be identified as precisely as possible.” – paragraph221. viii) The injunction must spell out clearly, and in everyday terms, the full extent of the acts it prohibits, and should extend no further than the minimum necessary to achieve its proper purpose – paragraph222. ix) There must be strict temporal and territorial limits – paragraph 225. The court doubted if more than a year would be justified in Traveller cases – paragraph 125 again. In my view that particular period does not necessarily apply in all cases, or in the present one, because they do not involve local authorities and Travellers. x) Injunctions of this kind should be reviewed periodically – paragraph 225. “This will give all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.” xi) Where possible, the claimant must take reasonable steps to draw the application to the attention of those likely to be affected – paragraph 226. xii) Effective notice of the order must be given, and the court must disclose to the court all steps intended to achieve that – paragraphs 230ff. xiii) The order must contain a generous liberty to apply – paragraph 232. xiv) The court will need to consider whether a cross-undertaking in damages is appropriate even though the application is not technically one for an interim injunction where such undertakings are generally required.” consideration must be given to them as a relevant means of control in place of an injunction. However, the court seemed to consider that in an appropriate case it should be recognised that byelaws may not be an adequate means of control. See paragraphs 216 and 217.

The position in terms of notice and the question of interim or final relief

[24]Mr Walsh has taken the time in his skeleton argument to deal with the question of what notice is required to be given in relation to applications of this kind and also whether the application is to be approached on the basis that it is either an application for an interim injunction or a final injunction. In the Multiplex case, Ritchie J suggested that it might be necessary to have a two-stage process of interim and final relief in newcomer injunctions. Ritchie J put the matter this way in his judgment, at [10]:
“It seems to me, following the decision made in Wolverhampton Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers [2023] UKSC 47 and [2024] 2 WLR 45, that final injunctions can be granted but that power does not override the necessary notifications to persons unknown to bring a final hearing before the Court. It is not for me to advise on the appropriate methods, but one method that is available is through the summary judgment procedure. Another, of course, is to list the final hearing and to call witnesses or to have permission to rely on written witness statements, if that is granted. Neither of those procedures has been followed and so it seems to me that it would be improper for me to treat this as a final hearing, it being ex parte and no notification having been given through alternative service to any unknown persons. As for the appropriate method for alternative service for bringing a final hearing or for an application for summary judgment, that is a matter for the Claimants to consider and, if necessary, obtain the relevant order upon. Therefore, I refuse to consider a final order, but I do consider it correct to consider a further interim order.”
[25]It has, however, been said in other cases that there is not a sensible distinction to be drawn in this context between interim and final injunctions. The position was explained in the following terms by Sir Anthony Mann in his judgment in the Jockey Club Racecourses Ltd case at [15], where he said this, quoting from the Wolverhampton case:
“The court analysed the jurisdiction to grant injunctions against such persons and found that injunctions which in other contexts would be regarded as ‘final’ (as opposed to interim) were not in fact properly so regarded but were of a distinct kind. After an extensive review the court held: ‘139 … In sympathy with the Court of Appeal on this point we consider that this constant focus upon the duality of interim and final injunctions is ultimately unhelpful as an analytical tool for solving the problem of injunctions against newcomers. In our view the injunction, in its operation upon newcomers, is typically neither interim nor final, at least in substance. Rather it is, against newcomers, what is now called a without notice (ie in the old jargon ex parte) injunction, that is an injunction which, at the time when it is ordered, operates against a person who has not been served in due time with the application so as to be able to oppose it, who may have had no notice (even informal) of the intended application to court for the grant of it, and who may not at that stage even be a defendant served with the proceedings in which the injunction is sought. This is so regardless of whether the injunction is in form interim or final.’” ‘139 … In sympathy with the Court of Appeal on this point we consider that this constant focus upon the duality of interim and final injunctions is ultimately unhelpful as an analytical tool for solving the problem of injunctions against newcomers. In our view the injunction, in its operation upon newcomers, is typically neither interim nor final, at least in substance. Rather it is, against newcomers, what is now called a without notice (ie in the old jargon ex parte) injunction, that is an injunction which, at the time when it is ordered, operates against a person who has not been served in due time with the application so as to be able to oppose it, who may have had no notice (even informal) of the intended application to court for the grant of it, and who may not at that stage even be a defendant served with the proceedings in which the injunction is sought. This is so regardless of whether the injunction is in form interim or final.’”
[26]Mr Walsh has also drawn my attention to the cases of London City Airport v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2557 (KB) and Heathrow Airport v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2599 (KB) where Julian Knowles J granted five year injunctions subject to annual reviews. The judge held in that case that because the claims were brought against persons unknown and any person affected could apply to vary the order, no return date hearing or final hearing was required. In the last of the Multiplex Construction cases, where Ellenbogen J extended the relevant injunction for a further period of 19 months, the judge commented, according to the case digest which I have seen, that the distinction between interim and final injunctions was of no practical significance for newcomer injunctions.[27]It seems to me that it is not necessary for me to add to the jurisprudence, as it were, on whether there is any distinction and, if so, whether the distinction between interim and final injunctions has any part to play in the context of newcomer injunctions. It does appear clear from the authorities to which my attention has been drawn that I am entitled to treat this application as an application for what is, in effect, a single order granting an injunction where the ability of a party objecting to the injunction to have it set aside is provided for by a provision in the order which allows for application to be made for the discharge or variation of the injunction.[28]So far as notice is concerned, I accept that an application of this kind can be heard on a without notice basis and that, so far as the giving of notice of the order is concerned, that is a matter which falls to be addressed by the court by reference to the particular circumstances of the case in order to ensure, so far as possible, that notice is given of the order, if it is made, to all those who might be at risk of breaching the order.[29]This concludes my summary of the relevant legal principles. I now turn to apply those principles to the facts of the present case.

Is there a compelling need for the relief sought?

[30]In my judgment, and on the basis of the evidence which has been put before me, it is quite clear that there is a compelling need for an injunction. It is clear from the evidence that there have been multiple acts of trespass to the Property. It is clear that those acts of trespass are continuing and it is also clear that there are considerable dangers posed to those who access the Property unlawfully. At this point I come back to the dangers which have been identified in the evidence but, before I do so, it is convenient to make reference to what was said by Sweeting J in 1 Leadenhall GP v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 854 (KB) in relation to urban explorers.[31]In his judgment in that case, at [3], Sweeting J said this in relation to the activities of urban explorers, in the context of a construction site:
“I have previously granted an injunction in respect of a site at Elephant and Castle, also intended to prevent trespass on to a building site on which a tall building was being erected with the assistance of cranes. I quote from what I said in that judgment to give some background in relation to ‘urban exploring’: ‘Such activity is inherently dangerous and involves risks for other people such as the Claimants’ employees or contractors and the emergency services and others who have to assist if those attempting to scale cranes or buildings get into difficulties. There have been well publicised fatalities both in this country and elsewhere as a result of urban exploring leading to falls from high buildings and other structures. The Claimants’ experience is that when challenged urban explorers will often run away. Attempts to do so feature in videos posted online. This is in itself dangerous in the context of a construction site where there may be an elevated risk of falls and other injury to those who are not familiar with the layout, who have not received specific training and who are not wearing safety equipment. Where there is an incursion by trespassers, equipment and structures on site, including cranes, must be checked before work can resume. This means that one of the potential consequences of such trespass is delay and interruptions to work on site with associated financial loss.’”
[32]In that case it is true that Sweeting J was dealing with a construction site, but I accept the submission of Mr Walsh that the Property can be said to pose at least equivalent, if not greater, dangers than a normal construction site.[33]In terms of those dangers, I have already summarised them earlier in this judgment but, just giving a little more detail, the Property, as I have said, is located in relatively shallow waters. There is a risk of running aground if an inappropriate vessel is used. There are strong tidal movements which, to state the obvious, are especially hazardous to small boats or paddleboarders. A paddleboarder or someone in a small boat could be swept out to sea and/or could collide with other ships because the Property is near a main shipping route.[34]In terms of accessing the Property once one has crossed the water, that is no easy matter. One has to climb up a corroded and slippery ladder. Ms Bradbury describes an incident where her husband narrowly avoided injury when climbing a ladder. If a trespasser fell, they could drop into the sea and they could drown. If trespassers bring their own ladders there is a risk of those ladders collapsing or being blown over and, in one video, trespassers can be seen using a rope to climb over the outer wall. The rope was only loosely hooked onto a metal bar and the risk of the rope giving way or the individual falling is obvious.[35]Turning to the interior of the Property, there is no electricity unless someone turns on the generator. It would be dangerous to turn on the generator which is located there, if the person does not know how to use the generator. In fact, one of the generators there has actually been condemned because it is in a dangerous condition. If anyone was there at night without electricity, they would be in complete darkness and, amongst the hazards on the Property, there is a well which is 400 feet deep, which trespassers are at risk of falling into. There are two rooms full of diesel tanks which present a risk of fire and asphyxiation, and almost every room has water leaking into it. The sewage system is unmaintained and there is the possibility, which is currently being investigated, of contamination with legionella bacteria.[36]If an accident did happen inside, then there is no way of contacting the emergency services. There is no mobile phone signal within the Property and there are no phone lines, so if someone was injured who was stuck inside the Property they would have to wait for the claimant’s contractors to turn up, who come every two or three weeks, before they could be discovered. There is no helicopter landing pad, so rescue itself would not be straightforward. There are emergency flares stored in a locked room but if the flares are used inappropriately, that could result in burns or other injuries.[37]It is also important to note, from the evidence, that the doors and gates to the Property are kept locked. There is evidence that those locks have been forced and people have actually been breaking into the Property. There is also CCTV, but it is apparent from the evidence that the CCTV is not itself sufficient to do the job of deterring people from obtaining unauthorised access to the Property.[38]In summary, what is submitted on the evidence is that the Property is potentially an extremely hazardous trap for what are described as adventurous urban explorers. Whether those people who have been accessing the Property are correctly described as adventurous urban explorers or not, I accept the submission that the Property is extremely hazardous and presents significant dangers to those obtaining unauthorised access to the Property. I accept that an injunction is necessary to protect the safety of those who are trespassing or may in the future trespass into the Property.[39]I also accept, on the evidence, that there appears to be no other effective way of achieving the required protection against the activities which I have described above other than the grant of an injunction. As I have explained, doors and gates are kept locked but that has not deterred trespassers. There is CCTV but that has not deterred trespassers. Ms Bradbury has sought to engage with those who are trespassing online but that has not worked either. It appears to me, regrettably, that the position is one where an injunction is required to deter individuals from trespassing on the Property.

Procedural protection

[40]There is the need identified for procedural protection but I accept the submission of Mr Walsh that there are no particular human rights issues involved here. This is not a traveller case where the defendants may have a right to their way of living, nor is it a protest case where freedom of speech or assembly may be involved. Essentially what is happening here is that those described as urban explorers are trespassing on the Property to generate profit and/or interest by making videos of their excursions and posting them online.[41]So far as notice is concerned, the claimant has made proposals for notice to be given of the making of this order, if I am prepared to grant the relief sought. There will be warning notices, a draft of which I have seen in the evidence, posted on the Property itself. It is also intended to post warnings on various common wharves and quays from where boats trying to access the Property may set off. The posting of notices on wharves or quays would, of course, depend upon the consent of the owners of those premises but although this is not in evidence, I have been told by Mr Walsh, and I accept, that owners of certain marina facilities on the adjacent coastline have indicated agreement to display warning notices.[42]It is also intended to contact the local authority for its co-operation in publicising the notice. There is also a Spitbank Fort website on which the notice of the order, if it is granted, can be posted. It is also intended that there will be what Mr Walsh has described, legitimately as it seems to me, as generous liberty to apply provisions in the order. So, although the injunction is final in its effect, those likely to be affected by it will have the ability to apply to have it varied or set aside without demonstrating any change of circumstances.

Territorial and temporal limitations

[43]There is then the requirement of territorial and temporal limitations. There is an obvious territorial limitation, namely to the Property. So far as temporal limitation is concerned, it is proposed that the injunction should endure for a period of five years with annual reviews. The Supreme Court in Wolverhampton referred to a one year time limit but, in that case, they were concerned with traveller cases. A 19 month extension was granted by Ellenbogen J in the Multiplex case.[44]Five years is a generous period of time, a fairly long period of time for an injunction of this kind. It is however proposed that there be annual reviews. There is the liberty to apply for discharge or variation of the injunction. It seems to me that it would be disproportionate in the present case to require the claimant itself to come back to court other than by way of the annual reviews. In those circumstances, I am persuaded that on the facts of the present case a time limit of five years is one that can be permitted.

The additional guidelines in Valero

[45]As I have said, it is Mr Walsh’s submission that the additional requirements in Valero are not requirements which emerge from the Wolverhampton case and are not requirements which should actually have to be satisfied in cases of this kind. As I have also said, I do not propose to attempt to resolve that apparent conflict in the authorities because I accept the submission of Mr Walsh that, in the present case, the claimant is able to satisfy those additional requirements. There is a cause of action, namely trespass. It is hard to see what realistic defence any defendant could have to the claim in trespass.[46]Given the compelling requirement for an injunction, the balance of convenience favours the grant of the injunction and I accept that damages would not be an adequate remedy in lieu of an injunction, because of the risk of serious personal injury to persons trespassing on the Property. There are also sufficient procedural safeguards embedded in the order. So, whether or not what was said in Valero is a completely correct statement of the law following Wolverhampton, I accept that the claimant can satisfy the additional requirements laid down by Ritchie J in the Valero case.

Full and frank disclosure

[47]There is a need in cases of this kind for full and frank disclosure to be made, because this is an application which is made without notice. Mr Walsh has addressed the question of full and frank disclosure both in his skeleton argument and in his oral submissions. He accepts that there have been no known accidents to date suffered by those obtaining unauthorised access to the Property. CCTV cameras, I am told, were installed in May/June 2025. In one piece of CCTV footage it can be seen that trespassers did not enter the inside of the Property after seeing that the main door was locked. Although there is a concern that there are legionella bacteria present and they have been discovered in a nearby fort, their presence has not been confirmed in the Property.[48]The owners of a neighbouring fort known as No Man’s Fort do circumnavigate the Property in their boat to check for obvious signs of trespass when their staff visit No Man’s Fort but all they do is circumnavigate the Property, they do not actually go into the Property. There is some mobile phone signal at the Property but you need to stand on the top of the Property to get a mobile phone signal. The evidence is you cannot get a mobile phone signal inside the Property. So, those are the matters which are dealt with by way of full and frank disclosure. It does not seem to me that any of those matters alter the overall position, or affect my reasoning in this judgment.

Is it just and convenient to grant the injunction sought?

[49]I accept the submission of Mr Walsh that it is just and convenient to grant this injunction. It seems to me that there is a clear need for an injunction. As I have said, on the evidence it is clear that other methods have been tried to deter trespassers on the Property. Those methods have proved to be ineffective. The Property presents substantial hidden dangers to trespassers and, as I have said, there is plenty of evidence of both trespass in the past and the threat of trespass continuing in the future.[50]Indeed, it seems to me that if an injunction is not granted, on the evidence it is only a matter of time before someone is seriously injured trespassing on this Property. It seems to me very important that the court should do all it can in order to avoid such an occurrence. It seems to me that the court should do all it can, within the scope of its powers, to deter and prevent people from trying to obtain unauthorised access to the Property. I therefore accept that it is just and convenient to grant the injunction sought. Indeed, it seems to me that the case for the grant of an injunction is a compelling one.

Conclusion

[51]For the reasons which I have set out in this judgment, I am satisfied that there is a need for the grant of this injunction. I am satisfied that the conditions which have to be met for an injunction of this kind have been met, and I am satisfied that it is appropriate, indeed I would say necessary, that the court grant the injunctive relief sought. Subject, therefore, to going through the precise terms of the order with Mr Walsh, I am in principle prepared to grant the relief sought on this application.[52]That concludes my judgment. (For proceedings after judgment see separate transcript)