“22 Until all the Units (except in Molasses House and Cotton Row) shall have been let to Owners the Subscribers, the freeholders of the Estate from time to time and their respective nominees and personal representatives shall have the power to nominate, remove and replace up to four Directors (in aggregate) to whom the regulations in Table A concerning the retirement of Directors by rotation shall not apply. 23 The qualifications of a Director (other than the first Directors or any Directors appointed under Regulation 22) shall be the holding of one share in the Company and upon a Director ceasing to be an Owner his office shall automatically be vacated. 24 After all of the Units (except in Molasses House and Cotton Row) shall have been let to Owners the Directors shall retire from office at the next following Annual General Meeting and at every Annual General Meeting thereafter one-third of the Directors for the time being or of their number is not three or a multiple thereof then the number nearest one-third shall retire from office but shall nonetheless be eligible for re-election. 25 Unless and until otherwise determined by the Company in General Meeting the number of Directors shall not be less than one nor more than nine.”
“25. There shall only be one director appointed per Unit. A director shall only be eligible for office if he or she lives in the Unit for a minimum of 6 weeks per annum. 26. In order to qualify to be a director of the company (other than the first directors, the directors appointed under Article 24 [Freeholder Directors] and the MH Director appointed subject to Article 27 below) each ‘Qualifying Director’ must be an Owner and hold one B Ordinary share in the company or be the spouse or civil partner of a holder of one B Ordinary share in the company. Upon a director ceasing to be an Owner his or her office or that of a spouse or civil partner shall automatically be vacated. A director may not vote in board meetings if he or she (or his or her spouse or civil partner) is indebted to the company.”
“The nature and degree of harm and inconvenience that are likely to be sustained in these two events by the defendant and the plaintiff respectively in consequence of the grant or the refusal of the injunction are generally sufficiently disproportionate to bring down, by themselves, the balance on one side or the other; and this is what I understand to be the thrust of the decision of this House in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. Where, however, the grant or refusal of the interlocutory injunction will have the practical effect of putting an end to the action because the harm that will have been already caused to the losing party by its grant or its refusal is complete and of a kind for which money cannot constitute any worthwhile recompense, the degree of likelihood that the plaintiff would have succeeded in establishing his right to an injunction if the action had gone to trial, is a factor to be brought into the balance by the judge in weighing the risks that injustice may result from his deciding the application one way rather than the other.”
“I doubt whether any of these things would happen; but, whether they happen or not, this action is never likely to be taken to trial if the plaintiffs obtain an injunction... But the overriding consideration for present purposes is that, if an injunction is granted, the effective contest between the parties is likely to have been finally decided summarily in favour of the plaintiffs. This being the position, the question is then whether, on the material before the court, the plaintiffs can justify such a result at this stage. As was pointed out by Eveleigh LJ during the argument, what the plaintiffs are in effect asking is for summary judgment in their favour. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have strong inferences about the defendants' real motives on their side. There are considerable grounds for suspicion. But Global has strong evidence on oath on its side, and, when this is read together with the exhibits, it is quite clear that Global has a fully arguable case, which it is entitled to have tested on its merits at a full trial. As was pointed out during argument, if this position were viewed as an application for summary judgment under RSC Ord 14, then it would be clear beyond argument that Global must be given unconditional leave to defend, because it would obviously be entitled to a full trial. However, the grant of an injunction would preclude this, so far as can be foreseen at present, for the reasons already stated. In these circumstances it seems to me that it would be wholly wrong for this court, in effect, to decide the entire contest between the parties summarily in the plaintiffs' favour on the untested material before us. This does not present any overwhelming balance on the merits in the plaintiffs' favour, or any other overriding ground for an immediate injunction without a trial. There is only a triable issue whose outcome is doubtful; and that issue should be tried and not pre-empted.”
“I think that the articles of association of the company should be regarded as a business document and should be construed so as to give them reasonable business efficacy, where a construction tending to that result is admissible on the language of the articles, in preference to a result which would or might prove unworkable.”
“[22] Another aspect of the principle that articles are a business document is the principle that articles should be construed so as to make them workable. This was the approach of Jenkins LJ in Holmes v Keyes [Arden LJ then quoted the passage set out above.] [23] With that approach, I agree. The approach to be adopted in interpreting articles of association in this respect is very much the same approach as is to be applied to other commercial documents. The one qualification is that referred to by Miss Kyriakides that it is not in general possible to have regard in the interpretation of articles of association to extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, articles of association cannot be rectified. (On these points, see Buckley on the Companies Acts (15 edn, T[A i.4])). Moreover, it is to be noted that Jenkins LJ held that a document can only be construed so as to give it reasonable business efficacy where that is admissible on the language…”
“[15] When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to ‘what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean’, to quote Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd[2009] AC 1101 , para 14. And it does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words, in this case clause 3(2) of each of the 25 leases, in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the lease, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence [16] For present purposes, I think it is important to emphasise seven factors. [17] First, the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances (e g in Chartbrook[2009] AC 1101 , paras 16—26) should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision. of any party’s intentions… [19] The third point I should mention is that commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made… [21] The fifth point concerns the facts known to the parties. When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time that the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties…”
“It is a well-known canon of construction, that where a particular enumeration is followed by such words as ‘or other’, the latter expression ought, if not enlarged by the context, be limited to matters ejusdem generis with those specially enumerated.”
“To: the directors of Plantation Wharf Management Limited (Company) 21a Kingly Street, London, W1B 5QA In accordance withsection 303(1) of the Companies Act 2006 , we, the undersigned, require you to proceed to convene a general meeting of the Company, within 21 days from the date you receive this requisition, for the purpose of considering changes to the criteria for appointing board members, the removal of all Freeholder Directors in accordance with article 24 of the articles of association of the Company, the appointment of Dr Vanessa Brady to the board of directors of the Company, amendments to the articles of association of the Company and for the purpose of considering and, if thought fit, passing the following resolutions which are being proposed as one special resolution and one ordinary resolution respectively: PROPOSED RESOLUTION 1) THAT with effect from the conclusion of the meeting the articles of association of the Company be amended by deleting article 24 and also deleting article 22 and 26 and replacing them with the following new articles 22 and 26. a) [Article 22] Unless otherwise determined by ordinary resolution, the number of directors shall not be less than four (to be made up of three Qualifying Directors and up to one director who is not a Qualifying Director) nor more than ten (to be made up of eight Qualifying Directors (to include the MH Director) and up to two directors who are not Qualifying Directors). Directors who are not Qualifying Directors may be any suitable person that is appointed by a members’ special resolution. b) [Article 26] In order to qualify to be a director of the company (other than the MH Director appointed subject to Article 27) each “Qualifying Director” must be an Owner and hold one B Ordinary share in the Company or be the spouse or civil partner of a holder of one B Ordinary share in the company. Upon a director ceasing to be an Owner his or her office or that of a spouse or civil partner shall automatically be vacated. A director may not vote in board meetings if he or she (or his or her spouse or civil partner) is indebted to the company. 2) THAT with effect from the conclusion of the meeting and the passing of resolution 1 a) above Dr Vanessa Brady be appointed as a director of the Company and also as Chair of the board of directors until the next annual general meeting. We confirm that we are members representing at least 5% of the total voting rights of all members of the company having a right to vote at extraordinary general meetings of the company. Date:21st January 2025 ”
“305 Power of members to call meeting at company's expense (1) If the directors– (a) are required under section 303 to call a meeting, and (b) do not do so in accordance with section 304, the members who requested the meeting, or any of them representing more than one half of the total voting rights of all of them, may themselves call a general meeting…”
“Under the previous law, it was held that where the requisition clearly stated the purpose of the meeting and to entertain certain consequential (unspecified) resolutions, it was valid even though some of these resolutions could not be passed at the meeting. But where the requisition was construed as only apply to considering two specific, ineffective, resolutions and no other business, it was set aside. That is clearly a matter of construction and a different approach was taken in PNC Telecom PLC v Thomas, where the objects of the requisition were clear (to dismiss the directors) and could be achieved by means other than the resolutions specified.Since the Companies Act 2006 still requires the general nature of the business to be specified in the requisition and only allows, rather than requires the text of a specific resolution to be stated, the pre-Act cases would seem to still apply.”
“If the object of a requisition to call a meeting were such that in no manner and by no machinery could it be legally carried into effect, the directors would be justified in refusing to act upon it. But if the object stated in the requisition be such that by any form of resolution or by any machinery sanctioned by the Act, it can be carried into effect, then it is the bounden duty of the directors to call the meeting.”
“24. PNC contends that the form of requisition went beyond just stating the objects of the meeting and indicated that the intention was to move just one resolution for the appointment of four directors and another resolution for the removal of five. It is contended that as such resolutions must be invalid, there is no purpose in convening a meeting for that purpose. 25. An equivalent submission was upheld by Neuberger J in Rose v McGivern [1998) 2 BCLC 593. But the circumstances of this case are quite different. There is no doubt that the fax of November 8 indicated clearly the object of the meeting the signatories sought to convene, but there was no obligation to set out the resolutions in final form. That was done by the notice and circulars sent to the members on December 6. Those documents indicated the intention to move nine separate resolutions for individual appointment or removal. So what this objection boils down to is whether I should construe the requisition as confining the business of the meeting to a consideration of but two resolutions: one for removal and one for appointment. I see no reason to do so. The letter refers to resolutions in the plural. The nine individuals are named in separately lettered sub-paragraphs. Even without resort to the maxim commonly expressed in Latin but which may be translated as requiring the court to construe a document so as to validate rather than invalidate it if it can, I see no reason why in the context of the document as a whole and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances I should attribute to the author of this requisition the intention to specify such number of resolutions as would ensure that the requisition was ineffective. The requisition is equally, if not more, consistent with an intention to move nine resolutions, which no one has suggested would not be valid, as with an intention to move two only, which would be ineffective, at least with regard to the appointment of directors. 26. It was made plain by the Court of Appeal in Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin (1884) LR 25 ChD 320, that it is only if the requisition states an object which is incapable of being effectively achieved that the directors are entitled to refuse to act on it. This requisition is not in my judgment, of that sort…”
“After all of the Units… shall have been let to Owners the Directors shall retire from office at the next following Annual General Meeting and at every Annual General Meeting thereafter one-third of the Directors for the time being or if their number is not three or a multiple thereof then the number nearest one-third shall retire from office but shall nonetheless be eligible for re-election.”
“31. At each annual general meeting following the third anniversary from the original date of appointment of each director (excluding the MH director and the freeholder director(s)), the director must retire from office and may offer themselves for reappointment by the members. 32. In the event that more than three directors are up for re-election, a majority of those directors shall retire by agreement amongst themselves or in the event that an agreement cannot be reached as determined by the Chairman. The director(s) who have not been subject to the re-election as a result of this decision must stand down and offer themselves for re-appointment by the members at the following years' annual general meeting.”