Bernadette Rogers v Andrew Wills [2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 1711 (Ch)Case No PT-2023-BRS-000077IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEVenue BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BRISTOLPROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)Venue Bristol Civil Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GRDate 7 July 2025
Before
HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
Between
BERNADETTE ROGERSClaimantANDREW WILLSDefendant
Ben Haseldine (instructed by Kleyman & Co Solicitors Ltd) for ClaimantOliver Ingham (instructed by Lawcomm Solicitors) for DefendantApplication for costs, dealt with on paper
This judgment was handed down remotely at noon on 7 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National ArchivesHHJ Paul Matthews :

Introduction

[1]On 6 June 2025 I handed down judgment on the liability trial of this claim: see [2025] EWHC 1367 (Ch). I decided that the claimant had made out her case that there was a contract for "a reasonable price" between herself and her late mother in respect of the care given by her to her mother in the 2 ½ years before the mother's death. I also held that, if I were wrong about that, then the claimant would be entitled to the value of the services rendered by virtue of the doctrine of unjust enrichment. So, unless the parties are able to settle the value of the "reasonable price" or the services provided, for example through mediation or other ADR, there will have to be a further, "quantum" trial to decide the exact amount to be paid.

Claimant’s application for costs of liability trial

[2]In the meantime, the claimant has applied for an order that the defendant pay her costs of the liability trial. The defendant resists that, essentially on two bases. First, he says that the decision on costs can only be taken after the quantum trial is over, because there is a possibility that the overall "winner" for costs purposes is the defendant rather than the claimant. Second, he says that there may have been "without prejudice" communications between the parties, and the judge cannot know about those until after the quantum trial is concluded.[3]The rules about costs generally are well known. I can summarise them for present purposes by saying that costs are in the discretion of the court (CPR rule 44.2(1)), but, if the court decides to make an order, the general rule is that the losing party, the unsuccessful party, will pay the costs of the successful (CPR rule 44.2(2)(a)). However, that is subject to the proviso that the court may make a different order (CPR rule 44.2(2)(b)). So, the operation of the general rule usually requires the court to establish which is the successful and which the unsuccessful party. But in exercising its discretion the court will take into account the parties’ conduct, their relative success and any admissible offer to settle (CPR rule 44.2(4)).

Costs of split trials

[4]Here the case is complicated by the fact that the litigation has been divided into two separate stages, liability and quantum. This is a so-called “split trial”. Each of the two stages is self-contained, and has its own procedural steps, such as disclosure, preparation of witness statements, preparation of expert reports and finally trial. When the liability trial was prepared and heard, there was no certainty that there would ever be a quantum trial.[5]Were the matter free from authority, I should be inclined to treat each as a separate piece of litigation, and decide the question of costs separately for each. This is because the parties engage in only one part of the litigation, and risk only the costs of that part, at a time. By merely entering on the first stage, they do not risk the costs of any further stage. At the end of the first stage, the costs of that part can be dealt with, without having to be concerned about any costs which fall under the second part. After all, that second part may never happen. This is in stark contrast to the case of a trial of both liability and quantum. In such a case the parties risk the costs of everything at the same time, in a single, continuous piece of litigation. In such a case it is right to deal with the costs of the whole litigation in a single exercise.

Mean Fiddler

[6]But the matter is not free from authority. I have been referred to two authorities at first instance, both of which refer to a third at appellate level. So, I should begin with the third case. This was Weill v Mean Fiddler Holdings Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1058. In that case there was a trial on liability, in which the claimant was successful. But the judge declined, as a matter of discretion, to make an immediate order for costs in favour of the claimant in respect of the liability trial, and postponed any such order until after the trial of the remaining issues. The claimant appealed. Lightman J (with whom Ward and Tuckey LJJ agreed) said:
“32. … with some hesitation I reach the conclusion that on this appeal it is not possible to say that the Judge's decision was clearly one which he was not entitled to reach.”
[7]Lightman J explained his reasoning thus:
“33. The fact that only nominal damages are awarded after a single trial of the issues of liability and damages in the circumstances of a particular case may constitute grounds for refusing the claimant his costs or his full costs of the issue of liability. There is much to be said for the view that the incidence of costs should be the same whether or not for case management reasons there has been an order for a split trial and whether or not the order for a split trial was made on the initiative of the claimant or the defendant. If this is so, in the case where there is a split trial and it is left uncertain until conclusion of the trial on quantum whether the claimant will recover more than nominal damages, it may be proper for the trial judge to defer making any order for the costs of the trial of the issue of liability until the final outcome of the action is known. This may be the case whenever the judge considers that there is a real possibility that the outcome of the assessment of damages may affect the merits of the parties' entitlement to the costs of the issue of liability. If the Judge forms the view that it does, he must consider carefully whether justice to the defendant requires him to postpone any decision on costs until the final outcome of the action is known. I do not think that the Judge's decision in the exercise of his discretion to follow this course in this case and postpone the decision on costs can or should be disturbed.”

Fluor Ltd

[8]Mean Fiddler was cited in the second case, Fluor Ltd v Shanghai and Zhenhua Heavy Industries Ltd [2016] EWHC 2500 (TCC), a decision of Edwards-Stuart J. In this case the claimant had succeeded at the trial on liability, although by no means on the whole of its claim. It sought its costs of the liability trial. The defendant resisted this, and sought to postpone the question of costs until after the trial on quantum, although it did not suggest that damages would be nominal or in an amount that could be regarded as de minimis. The judge said that “13. … before deciding what order to make there are two factors that I should bear in mind. First, it is clear that if I consider that the circumstances warrant it I can properly conclude that the costs of the liability trial should be deferred until all the issues relating to quantum have been determined: see Weill v Mean Fiddler Holdings [2003] EWCA Civ 1058; Shepherds Investment Limited v Andrew Walters [2007] EWCA Civ 292. Second, the fact that there has been a split trial of liability and quantum should not affect the decision.” The judge then set out most of the passage from the judgment of Lightman J already quoted above.

Langer – first instance

[9]Mean Fiddler was also cited in the third case, Langer v McKeown [2021] EWHC 451 (Ch). This was also a case in which there was a split trial, although here the claim was a petition under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (conduct unfairly prejudicial to a member of a company). The first part, concerning the question whether there had been conduct unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, and the question of the remedy to be awarded, had been tried. The petitioner had been successful, and had obtained an order that her shares be bought out, but at a valuation to be determined. The second part of the litigation (determining the valuation) was yet to take place. The petitioner sought her costs of the first stage. The deputy judge (Nicholas Thompsell, as he then was) considered the decision in Mean Fiddler, quoting from the judgment of Lightman J, and summarised it by saying that “14. … the normal position is that the trial judge should make a payment for costs at this stage but the judge has discretion not to.”[10]The petitioner made submissions in favour of an immediate costs order. the deputy

judge said:

“16 … I find those points persuasive having regard to the principle enunciated in Phonographic. Even if the Respondent is successful at the next stage in showing that the valuation to be placed on the shares is much lower than expected, the fact remains that the Petitioner has been put to considerable effort, expense and delay through the Respondent taking points in relation to liability which have proved to be without merit and the Petitioner, in such circumstances, should be entitled to her costs in relation to this stage of the proceedings. 17. I take the view then that, subject to any other considerations, it is open to me to award costs at this stage and that I should do so.”
[11]He then went on to take into account an earlier open offer to purchase the petitioner’s shares for £25,000. However, the deputy judge concluded that “24. … it is highly unlikely that [the petitioner’s] ultimate recovery at the next stage will leave her in a lesser position than she would have been had she accepted the £25,000 offers when they were made and I do not think that the small prospect of that happening is a good enough reason to overturn the normal principle that she should be entitled to her costs at this stage.”[12]Then the deputy judge dealt with an offer suggested to have been made without prejudice save as to costs (a Calderbank offer), though he was not told which party had made the offer or what its terms were, except that it was not an offer complying with the terms of CPR Part 36. The petitioner wished to put the relevant correspondence before the court. The respondent opposed this. The deputy judge said that “30. … I do not think that the Respondent is entitled to have it both ways by withholding admission of the evidence of the offer but still asking the court to take account of it.”[13]The deputy judge went on to conclude that the offer was inadmissible, and said that “33. … Even if it were open to me to consider an inadmissible offer to settle, I do not know how I would consider it. So I think that I should ignore this offer to settle in making the order today and I see no reason for delay. I propose to make an award of costs now and for costs to be assessed, if not agreed, at the earliest convenience of the court.”

Langer – on appeal

[14]The respondent to the petition in Langer was refused permission to appeal against the liability judgment. But he did succeed in obtaining permission to appeal against the costs judgment, albeit on a narrow point, concerning the impact of offers without prejudice save as to costs as compared with that of Part 36 offers. In fact, the deputy judge’s approach to the costs question was upheld, and the appeal failed: [2022] 1 WLR 1255. Despite the narrowness of the point actually in play, Green LJ (with whom Lewison and Nugee LJJ agreed, made some general points about the principles informing costs orders.[15]These included the following:
“37. … there is a general ‘salutary’ rule that costs follow the issue rather than the ‘event’. This is because an overly robust application of a principle that costs should follow the final event discourages litigants from being selective as to the points they take in litigation and encourages an approach whereby no stone or pebble, howsoever insignificant or unmeritorious, remains unturned: Phonographic (ibid page [1523A]); Mean Fiddler Holdings Limited (ibid paragraph [30]); and Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp & Ors [2014] EWHC 3920 (Ch) ("Merck") where Nugee J (as he then was) stated at paragraph [6]) that it was "… in general a salutary principle that those who lose discrete aspects of complex litigation should pay for the discrete applications or hearings which they lose, and should do so when they lose them rather than leaving the costs to be swept up at trial". [Emphasis in original.] 38. Secondly, the making of discrete issue-based costs orders encourages professionalism in the conduct of litigation, which is an objective sought to be achieved by the Overriding Objective in CPR 1.1 and 1.2 and which parties are under a duty to facilitate pursuant to CPR 1.3. … 39. Thirdly, the principle of equality of arms plays a part … An inequality of arms can be manifested in a variety of different ways, such as in an asymmetry of information as between the parties … In some types of litigation, of which minority shareholders' suits might be an illustration, a claimant may be poorly placed to assess the reasonableness of an offer to settle not being in possession of the internal financial documents of the company … It is consistent with the above considerations that costs rules should encourage the making of reasonable offers to settle such that a refusal by a litigant to accept a reasonable offer can militate against the making of a costs order in the successful party's favour … ”

Conclusion on the law

[16]In my judgment, in the light of these authorities, the decision to make or not make a costs order is an exercise of judicial discretion, but the general policy of the costs rules is to deal with the costs of discrete applications or parts of the litigation as they are concluded, as Nugee J said in the Merck case, quoted by Green LJ above. There will be cases however where that may not happen, because there is, in the words of Lightman J, “a real possibility that the outcome of the assessment of damages may affect the merits of the parties' entitlement to the costs of the issue of liability”. For example, the judge may consider that the claimant who has won on liability may not obtain anything, or at any rate any more than a nominal sum, when it comes to quantum, and, if the whole litigation had been fought in one go, that would usually mean that the successful party for the purposes of the general rule was the defendant. In other words, those are cases where what happens at the quantum stage affects the costs of the liability stage, because of a policy – or apparent policy – that there should be no overall difference between costs of a case tried in stages and the costs of a case tried all together.[17]In the present case I have held that the claimant made a contract with her mother to provide care services “for a reasonable price”. Whatever that price is, it will not be nothing, or purely nominal. It will be more than that. The claimant’s claim in her claim form was for £135,000. In my decision on liability I found (at [137]) that the defendant had set aside £150,000 of the estate’s funds to cover the costs of the deceased’s care. In his letter to the claimant dated 9 September 2020 the defendant accepted that she “should receive compensation” for her care of the deceased. The only difficulty was to quantify the amount. In my judgment it is not appropriate to wait until the quantum stage is concluded. The costs of the liability stage should, subject to any other countervailing considerations, be dealt with now.

Offers to settle

[18]The only other countervailing consideration put forward by the defendant is that relating to possible offers to settle. CPR rule 44.2(4) refers to admissible offers to settle. Part 36 contains a separate regime for offers which fulfil stringent criteria. It is not relevant here. Unlike the deputy judge in the Langer case, who was told that there had been a Calderbank offer made, I have not even been told that. All I have been told is that there may have been "without prejudice" communications between the parties. In the Langer case, as noted above, the deputy judge ignored the Calderbank offer of whose existence (but not terms) he knew, on the basis that it was inadmissible, as he had no information about it.[19]In the Court of Appeal, Green LJ said:
“32. In the present case the parties agreed that the offer at that stage in the litigation could not be looked at and this was the basis for the appellant's argument that the entire exercise should be deferred. On the express terms of CPR 42.2 a judge is entitled to conclude that an offer should not be taken into account yet proceed to make an interim order. [ … ] 35. I agree with [the judge’s] analysis. The appellant's submissions turn the language of CPR 44.2 upon its head. It entails the proposition that a Calderbank offer that is prima facie inadmissible: (i) becomes admissible; and (ii) acquires such compelling probative value that it ousts all the considerations that are otherwise required to be taken into account under CPR 44.2(4); and (iii) leads (subject only to exceptional circumstances) to a decision not to make any immediate costs order … The appellant's submissions lead to these conclusions even though the court remains ignorant of the terms of the offer and whether, had it been disclosed, it would have made any difference to the outcome. The appellant's submission is, in my view, inconsistent with the clear and express language of CPR 44.2.”
[20]In my judgment, the claimant’s position in the present case is stronger than was that of the petitioner in Langer. I do not even know that there have been any offers, only that there may have been without prejudice communications. Just as the deputy judge in Langer was entitled to decide whether to make a costs order in respect of the liability trial without being fettered by a Calderbank offer, so too I consider that I am able to make such a decision when I do not even know that there have been any such offers. So far as I am concerned, there is no admissible offer to settle which I can take into account.

Decision

[21]This is a case where significant costs have been incurred. The approved costs budget for the claimant for the liability trial was £84,085. I think I should make a costs order in respect of the costs of that trial. In my judgment, the claimant is the successful party and the defendant the unsuccessful. I see no reason not to apply the general rule. Accordingly, I will order the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs on the standard basis, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. That means that, unless there is a good reason not to do so, I must also order the defendant to pay the claimant “a reasonable sum” on account of such costs: CPR rule 44.2(8). In a case where there is an approved costs budget, the court will have more confidence as to what the costs once assessed may be. In Thomas Pink Ltd v Victoria’s Secret UK Ltd [2014] EWHC 3258 (Ch), the judge made an order for a payment on account equal to 90% of the approved budget. That leaves a modest margin for any reduction made on assessment. I shall do the same. That amounts to £75,685.50.

The position of the defendant

[22]The defendant’s costs submissions make a brief reference to a possible disparity in funding between the parties. This follows a suggestion in the claimant’s costs submissions that the defendant has been funding his legal costs from the estate. I do not think that this should or does make a difference to my decision. But I do think that I should make the following comments in order to dispel any erroneous impressions. The costs liability of the defendant towards his own solicitors, and also any liability which he incurs towards the claimant (as I have now ordered), are of course the personal liabilities of the defendant, recoverable by the claimant from the defendant’s own assets if he does not pay them. This is because he is the party concerned. The deceased’s “estate” is not a person in law, and cannot be a party to the litigation, or indeed a solicitor’s client.[23]Whether the defendant is then entitled to be indemnified out of the estate of which he is the personal representative for either the costs that he pays his solicitor or those that must pay to the claimant is a separate question, and will depend on other matters as to which I have no information and on which I have not been addressed. His entitlement to an indemnity is governed by much caselaw, as well as CPR rule 46.3 and PD 46 paragraph 1, setting out circumstances in which he is or may not be so entitled. Even if he is entitled to be indemnified out of the estate for these costs, the risk of an insufficiency of estate assets to pay the claimant’s costs falls on him, and not on the claimant. As to his own legal costs, I do not know whether, before paying these out of the estate, he sought and obtained a Beddoe order from the court (see Re Beddoe [1893] 1 Ch 547, CA). If he did not, then an issue may arise as to those costs too. But I am not concerned with that.