Christopher Agard Pocza & Anor v Suni Chopra [2025] EWHC 1668 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 1668 (Ch)Case No PT-2024-0001122
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)
Venue The Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, LondonDate 28 April 2025
EC4A 1NL
Before
MASTER MARSH (sitting in retirement)
Between
CHRISTOPHER AGARD POCZAClaimantsARTHUR AGARD POCZAClaimantSUNI CHOPRADefendant
RICHARD DEW (instructed by Boodle Hatfield LLP) for ClaimantsJAMIE HOLMES (instructed by Branch Austin McCormick LLP) for Defendant
DRAFT JUDGMENTDigital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDEEmail: info@martenwalshcherer.comWeb: www.martenwalshcherer.com

MASTER MARSH:

[1]The disposal hearing in this Part 8 claim which came before the court on 25 April 2025. This is my judgment following that hearing.[2]The claimants seek an order for the removal of the defendant as an executor of the estate of Patricia Agart Adams under Section 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985. If that order is made, it will leave the first claimant as the sole executor of her estate. The defendant resists the claim. He says the first claimant and he can work together to administer the estate. He says, in summary, that he is bound to honour Patricia’s wishes that he acts as her executor. However, if an order is made for his removal, he says that both he and the first claimant should be removed and an independent solicitor appointed.[3]Richard Dew appeared for the claimants and Jamie Holmes appeared for the defendant. I am grateful to both of them for their clear and succinct submissions which were of considerable assistance to me.[4]Patricia Adams died on 15 October 2024, leaving a will dated 11 December 2018. The claimants, Christopher and Arthur, are two of her three children. Christopher lives in Singapore and works in the field of business development and coaching. Arthur lives in the United States and is a management consultant. They are both highly qualified. Christopher has a PhD and Arthur has an MBA.[5]The defendant, Mr Chopra, is a chartered accountant with his own practice, which he says is busy and successful. Relevantly, he holds an ICAEW certificate in Probate and Trust Administration. He was Patricia’s accountant for many years and he had what I will describe as a long-standing ‘trusted advisor’ friendship with Patricia. There is no question about his professional ability.[6]Patricia executed Property and Affairs and a Health and Well-being LPA’s in 2015, under which she appointed her husband, Anthony Gilbert Johns and Mr Chopra as her attorneys. Her husband died in 2018 and in the last two years of her life, Patricia became less able to manage her affairs and to make decisions, with the result that Mr Chopra exercised powers as her attorney. There is some contention about particular events before Patricia's death, but it has proved to be unnecessary to dwell on those events themselves for the purposes of this judgment.[7]Patricia was moderately wealthy. Her estate comprises her home, Riber House in Northamptonshire, an investment portfolio valued about £840,000 managed by investment advisers and a property portfolio with 11 investment properties, valued at about £4 million. However, there is lending from Wetherby Bank of about £1.7 million secured against the properties. When the interest payable to the bank on lending and other expenses are running the portfolio are taken into account, it is running at a loss. The portfolio is managed by agents, Austin Wyatt. It is clear that steps will need to be taken to reduce or pay off the indebtedness to the bank as soon as possible.[8]Patricia left a will dated 11 December 2018. Under her will, her residuary estate is left to Christopher and Arthur. Their brother Conrad benefits from a gift of chattels and there are two legacies of £15,000 and £10,000 to former employees. In essence, Christopher and Arthur are the beneficiaries of the estate, and they are the people with the most direct interest in its administration. Mr Chopra is not a beneficiary.[9]Clause 2 of Patricia's will appointed Mr Chopra and Patricia's solicitor, Mr Hitchon, as one of her executors. It went on to provide that if Mr Chopra or Mr Hitchon predeceased her or were unable or unwilling to act as her executor, she appointed Christopher to act in their place. Mr Hitchon renounced his role as executor just 10 days after Patricia’s death and Christopher has taken his place.[10]In his witness statement, Mr Chopra conjectured that Mr Hitchon may have renounced his role as executor because he was intimidated by Christopher and Arthur. This was an extraordinary allegation to make without any evidence to support it and there is no basis at all to to believe the assertion to be correct. Mr Holmes sought to persuade me that by making Christopher as an alternate executor, Patricia did not intend him to act on his own, which would be the effect of the relief he and Arthur are seeking. On a strict reading of the will, he may be right, but it is clear that Patricia was content for Christopher to be her backup executor, and in my judgment, it is also clear that if Mr Chopra and Mr Hitchon had renounced, Christopher would have been the sole executor. I will return to the question of the weight to be given to the choice of executor in the will. Procedure[11]Christopher and Arthur have made witness statements and witness statements in reply, and Mr Chopra has provided a witness statement too. He sought permission to file an additional witness statement to deal with matters raised in the evidence in reply and, unusually, for the claim to proceed to a trial with cross-examination. Those requests were refused.[12]Since the decision in Schumacher v Clark [2019] EWHC 1031, it is the almost invariable practice for Section 50 claims to be dealt with at a disposal hearing without the evidence being tested by cross-examination. I do not need to explore the rationale for that approach in this judgment. I need only say that the need for a swift determination about who has title to administer Patricia’s estate supports the notion that a summary process without a full trial strikes the right balance.[13]I am content that the issues before the court have been capable of resolution in a way that is fair to both sides without a trial. The corollary, of course, is that I will not be making findings of fact where there are points of factual dispute (and indeed there are many) between the parties.[14]Before I deal with the relevant law, I record that Mr Drew opened his submissions by saying that this is an extremely plain case for removal. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I agree. The law[15]Section 50 provides a broad power to remove and appoint administrators; but the Act does not say how the power is to be exercised. However, there is no doubt about the principles that are to be applied. Section 50 provides a power with great utility which can be used to ensure that an estate is administered in the best interests of the beneficiaries. There could be many reasons why a person appointed as executor who has not renounced should be replaced. The same can be said about a person who is appointed or is in line to be appointed under an intestacy. There may be, as in this case, a tension between the wishes of beneficiaries and a desire on the part of an executor nominated in the will to perform the role. It is for the court to resolve that tension and to decide whether to exercise of the power under section 50. The court will not do so lightly and not merely at the request of beneficiaries, without there being proper grounds.[16]Judicial guidance about the exercise of the power under Section 50 has been given in a number of cases and there is no issue between the parties about the sources of that guidance. Reference has been made to Harris v Earwicker [2015] EWHC 1915 at [9] and Long v Rodman [2019] EWHC 757 at [18-27]. More recently in Osborne v Osborne [2025] EWHC 455, Leech J approved the guidance in those two cases.[17]The guidance is of course helpful, but it is useful to have clearly in mind two points. First, almost every case that is brought under section 50 is different, and the guidance in those cases will never map directly on to the facts of any other case. Secondly, at heart, the jurisprudence in this area is very straightforward. The test for the application of section 50 is derived from the Privy Council decision in Letterstedt v Broers (1894) 9 AC 371, as it was more recently considered in the judgment of Lewison J (as he then was) in Thomas v Agnes Carvel Foundation [2008] Ch. 395 at [44-47].[18]The court should decide whether and, if so, how to exercise the power under Section 50 by having regard to what is in the best interests of the beneficiaries. It is really as simple as that. As it was put by Lord Blackburn in Letterstedt in relation to trustees, “In exercising so delicate a jurisdiction as that of removing trustees, their Lordships do not venture to lay down any general rule, beyond the very broad principle, above enunciated, that their main guide must be the welfare of the beneficiaries. Probably it is not possible to lay down any more definite rule in a matter so essentially dependent on details, often of great nicety. But they proceed to look carefully into the circumstances of the case.” Later in his judgment Lord Blackburn said:
“As soon as all questions of character are as far settled as the nature of the case admits, if it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those beneficially interested or those who act for them from working in harmony with the trustees, the trustee is always advised by his own counsel to resign and does so. If, without any reasonable ground, he refused to do so, it seemed to their Lordships that the court might think it proper to remove him.”
[19]It does not follow that the court will always do what a majority of the beneficiaries, or even all the majorities, want. There are wider considerations in play. It is not open to beneficiaries merely to come to the court and say that they seek an order for removal because they do not like or trust the person in question. They must show grounds for holding that view. The grounds must be of substance and be held in good faith. On the other hand, if it is clear that those in office are unable to work together, the court, as Lord Blackburn indicates, is likely to intervene.[20]It seems to me that, looking at the authorities, the two principal considerations in this case, in addition to the underlying question of what is in the best interests of the beneficiaries, are:(1) Patricia's wishes, so far as they can be discerned; and(2) Has there been a breakdown of relations between Christopher and Mr Chopra? In some cases, a further consideration will be whether by removal there may be additional cost to the estate, but it seems to me that is not an issue of great significance here. There is no evidence of additional cost if Mr Chopra were to be removed. But even if there were, the only person or persons who would suffer from that additional cost are the persons who are seeking removal. It is therefore not a matter about which they can have any basis for complaint. Chronology[21]I turn to deal with the chronology. Patricia died on 15 October 2024. This claim was issued on 11 December 2024. The gap between those two events is very short. It is unusual for the court to be asked to intervene after such a short period. Clearly, one of the considerations in this case is whether the claim is premature. Mr Holmes has sought to demonstrate, and has succeeded in doing so to some degree, that the ground set out in the initial communication from Boodle Hatfield, acting on behalf of the claimants, sent on 25 October 2025, have not been fully established. He accepted, however, that the claimants’ case at that stage was put forward in good faith. But it is common ground between the parties that the court must make its decision based upon the circumstances that pertain at the date of the hearing. It follows that even if the initial case put forward prior to issue of the claim is not fully made out, the court may still, in light of all the circumstances as they later appear to the court, exercise the power under section 50.[22]Turning then to the correspondence and referring to it where necessary, it opens with Boodle Hatfield's email to Mr Chopra sent on 25 October 2024. Although the email contains six, what are described to be non-exhaustive reasons for him to renounce his position, I have to say that the tone of the email is not unduly aggressive or inappropriate. Indeed, it is addressed to Mr Chopra using his given name. I would observe, however, that the period provided for Mr Chopra to respond to it was unduly short, and his solicitors were right to make that observation when they replied.[23]On 29 October 2024, three days later, Mr Hichon renounced his role as executor. As I have said, there was some speculation by Mr Chopra about his reasons for doing so. But there is no reason at all to conclude that he did so as a result of inappropriate behaviour by the claimants.[24]The response to the initial letter came from Branch Austin McCormick (BAM), instructed on behalf of Mr Chopra, on 5 November 2024. They informed Bootle Hatfield that Mr Chopra was not willing to renounce. In substance, the letter says that Mr Chopra was Patricia's choice and he felt duty-bound to respect her wishes. The letter explains his relevant qualifications, his knowledge and his experience. It is not clear at that stage whether he was aware of Mr Hitchon’s decision. It is, however, notable that Mr Chopra does not mention anywhere in this letter his ability or willingness to work with a co-executor. I think it is illuminating that the substance of the letter is about Mr Chopra himself.[25]Two important points can be made arising from that letter. First, BAM say on behalf of Mr Chopra that there was an immediate concern about financing the property portfolio. The letter goes on to say that Mr Chopra's negotiations with Wetherby Bank have led to the funding being extended for two years. It is now common ground that this was misleading and wrong. In fact, the bank lending had only been extended on an ad hoc basis. This perhaps illustrates a tendency on the part of Mr Chopra, as it was put by Mr Dew, to puff himself. Secondly, the letter talks about the support provided to Patricia by Mr Chopra's partner, Alison Azarang, and says that Mr Chopra had not raised a single invoice for that support. Although that was factually correct at the point the statement was made, subsequently the work undertaken by Ms Azarang has been charged to the estate. The same point about there being no fee charge is repeated in Branch’s letter dated 15 November 2024.[26]Boodle Hatfield replied to BAM’s letter of 5 November 2024 on 12 November 2024. Importantly, the letter includes a (distorted audio) information and disclosure. By then, it is clear that Christopher will be Mr Chopra’s co-executor. Boodle Hatfield made five requests for information. The third request was a request for a summary of the assets and liabilities in the estate. As the letter says, Mr Chopra should have had this information easily to hand.[27]Further correspondence from BAM on 15 November 2024 and subsequently on 22 November2024 is perhaps rather more emollient than the earlier letters. I should read what is said by BAM on 15 November 2024: “As my earlier letter to you set out, Mr Chopra has no interest in proceeding other than in a constructive and professional way. Consequently, it is not our intention to correspond in respect of matters which are no longer relevant and because it is clear we are making good progress in resolving the issues in the best interests of the estate. You mentioned in your letter that I have not dealt with your criticisms of Mr Chopra in my earlier letter. But, as I set out in my earlier letter, they are denied. But, as I say, we see little point in dwelling on such historical issues which remain in contention but are irrelevant. Mr Chopra is anxious to progress the administration of the estate. He has not done so as a courtesy to Mr Chris Poczka. I trust this can now take place. That work will include, in addition to the IHT filings, the following additional tasks that have to be undertaken by Mr Chopra...” [my emphasis][28]It then sets out three tasks and goes on:
“Mr Chopra has no issue in dealing directly with Mr Poczka. It is clearly in the interests of the estate that they both now work together and there should be no need for any further involvement between you and I as a result. There is a slight concern as to the practicalities of Mr Poczka being resident in Singapore but I anticipate these can be overcome.”
[29]It is right to observe that although there is a suggestion that Mr Chopra and Christopher will be able to work together, the work which Mr Chopra indicates needs to be undertaken is work which he says he is going to undertake. It is therefore not clear that he and his co-executor will work together as a team. More significantly, having been chased by Boodle Hatfield for a response to their request for information, BAM, in their letter of 22 November 2024, sought to justify why no information had been supplied and effectively to refuse to supply it:
“Whilst Mr Chopra continues to seek to progress the administration of the estate and to do so on an amicable basis, it seems that your client has a different view of how the matter should proceed. This is regretted. The sooner matters can be agreed, the sooner the administration of the estate can take place and payment made to the beneficiaries. Your client seeks a significant amount of information about the estate but, contrary to working to facilitate this, he refuses to cooperate in the administration of the estate. He explicitly states that the administration of the estate is not to take place, and challenges our client not to incur any costs. It is entirely unclear how our client is able to proceed to provide the information that you seek in these circumstances. Such conduct by your client inevitably gives rise to the question of whether he is in fact a suitable person to act as an executor where he is obstructing administration of the estate. It is of course appreciated that your client wishes to know how much he is to inherit, and he will do so in due course as soon as the administration of the estate can be started. It is not denied in any way that your client is entitled to the information he seeks. However, he now acts in such a way as to prevent Mr Chopra supplying that information to you.”
[30]In my judgment, this reasoning falls some way short of a proper response to a request for information from a co-executor. Mr Chopra is saying, and here I paraphrase, that I am not permitted to incur fees, so I am not going to provide the information. He also, in that letter, responds by accusing the claimants of the same default as he has been accused of, namely the failure to supply information. This is not helpful.[31]There then follows a letter of claim from Boodle Hatfield dated 29 November 2024. I do not need to go through that letter in light of the proceedings subsequently pursued and the evidence in it. I would only say that the tone of the letter was professional and measured, and in my judgment, provided a compelling case for Mr Chopra to agree to renounce.[32]There are three planks to the claimants’ case as it was put forward at the disposal hearing. First, that there is a background of hostility and that this is relevant to whether Mr Chopra and Christopher can work together. Mr Chopra acknowledges that there has been friction in the past. I had the impression that Mr Chopra does not take kindly to being challenged and resents the request that he stand down. Three points can be made about hostility.(1) The tone of Mr Chopra’s witness statement is forthright and he refers to issues in his witness statement that with more thought would not have been raised. I have in mind, in particular, paragraphs 26 and paragraph 44. Paragraph 44 raises a dispute about whether a Do Not Resuscitate request should have been made. He goes on to say, in language which is really unhelpful, that Patricia had been “allowed to die”. This was not a useful way to proceed in a response to an application for him to renounce with him saying in response saying that he and the claimants, and Christopher in particular, could work together.(2) Mr Chopra put forward a request to the court that he have the opportunity to cross-examine the claimants. The request being refused by the Master. I have to say it is surprising for an executor in Mr Chopra’s circumstances to consider that cross-examination of the principal beneficiaries was likely to support his case where he is seeking to hold on to office.(3) Two examples from the period prior to Patricia's death are striking. The first comes in June 2024. A message from the claimants to Mr Chopra and his partner, expressed in perfectly pleasant terms, was met with a pithy response. The sort of language used by the claimants was:
“It would be much appreciated if you could arrange for full time care and let us know what is feasible, understanding that the home care costs are substantial and will take time to put in place.”
The language they use could not be criticised. The response from Mr Chopra was rather more forthright. He said:
“Whilst we are happy to assist as we advised in our last Zoom call I attended, we are NOT your PA service. You must stop ordering us from USA to organise this and that. Patricia is your mother and you need to take full responsibility for her care in accordance with her wishes. It should be Chris and you who do all the legwork for home care. If that means you need to come to the UK then you must do so. To be clear, it feels to me that you are hiding behind the fact that I have the power of attorney and you cannot arrange care for your mother. Please do not hide behind this. Please arrange for her care and advise the cost and I will organise payment.”
In my judgment, that sort of response, well before these proceedings were contemplated, was downright aggressive and intemperate. Another example of what I would regard as an inappropriate response came in October 2024 at a time when Patricia was in hospital, although no-one was aware of it. There was again a very measured message from Christopher; but the response from Mr Chopra is:
“Chris, please read my last email again. These so-called capacity reports you keep referring to does not provide any authorisation from your mum to me to share her financial information with Arthur and you. Therefore, I ask that that cease giving me deadlines for reply to your emails.”
Again, it seems to me that is not a helpful response. It seems clear to me that Mr Chopra did not welcome the claimants’ involvement and would have been preferred to be left to deal with Patricia’s affairs, albeit with the considerable help provided by his partner Alison Asarang. The sort of approach adopted by Mr Chopra pre-death finds echoes in the position after Patricia's death.[33]The second plank of the claimants’ case concerns the failure to provide information. As I have indicated, Mr Chopra could easily have provided answers to all of the questions asked by Boodle Hatfield. It is striking that he declined to do so, citing the claimants’ unwillingness to proceed with the administration. He clearly had the information; a request from a co-executor for a schedule of assets and liabilities should obviously have been answered.[34]The third plank of the claimants’ case concerns claims or conflicts that either have arisen or may well arise in the position after Patricia's death. Several examples have the potential to create problems.(1) An invoice rendered by Mr Chopra's firm prior to Patricia's death was paid the day after her death. The invoice is for £4,200. The invoice, however, has never been provided.(2) The monthly retainer from Mr Chopra's firm continued after Patricia's death, even when the claimants asked for it to be terminated. The continuation at one point was a mistake by the bank. However, the need to pay the retainer, bearing in mind the portfolio is loss-making, meant a transfer from reserves. Not only has the retainer document not being provided but the sum involved has not been repaid to the estate.(3) On 3 April 2025 an invoice was rendered for £19,843.50 for time spent prior to Patricia’s death in relation to health and welfare. This contrasts markedly with what BAM said in the correspondence before proceedings were issued. To be fair, it was not said that there was no intention to charge, but much was made of the fact that no charge had in fact been made up to that date, and the reasonable inference at that point was that no charge would be made. The timing of 3 April 2025 invoice is also quite striking. On 31 March 2025 an order for costs was made against Mr Chopra personally, with a direction that Mr Chopra was not entitled to recover that sum from the estate. The payment date under the costs order was 14 April 2025. The decision to render an invoice on 3 April 2025 was clearly not a coincidence.[35]The claimants have, in addition, raised a number of concerns about the management of the property portfolio. The maintenance of the complete portfolio without steps being taken to reduce the borrowing by sale of one or more properties when the portfolio was run at a loss due to the incidence of bank interest, may well be a matter that needs to be looked into.[36]Mr Holmes’ submissions on behalf of Mr Chopra initially focused on demonstrating that the criticisms about Mr Chopra’s conduct before Patricia’s death are wrong. I accept there is some force in his submissions about criticisms relating to Mr Chopra’s conduct under the Power of Attorney. Other submissions made by Mr Holmes include:(1) Mr Chopra wishes to remain in post.(2) It is better for the estate if he does so in light of his knowledge, experience and skills.(3) Patricia appointed him under his will and her wishes should be respected.(4) Mr Chopra says he can and is willing to work with Christopher.(5) It is not accepted there is any potential claim or conflict involving him.(6) The claimants refused to agree to ADR.(7) There is an alternative way forward, which would be the removal of both Christopher and Mr Chopra, and an independent person to be appointed.[37]My conclusions can be stated fairly briefly. This is an unusual case because the application under section 50 was brought shortly after Patricia's death, and I accept there is force in Mr Holmes’ submissions that the six points in the initial email from Boodle Hatfield have only partly been made out. In some respects, they have been shown to be inaccurate. What is clear, however, is that the response from Mr Chopra to the claim has been hostile, and that echoes earlier hostility. Although relations between the claimants and Mr Chopra’s partner, Alison Azarang, appear to have been cordial and between them there was a satisfactory working relationship, the position concerning Mr Chopra was not the same.[38]I would make six points to underpin my determination in this case.(1) Mr Chopra has professional skills and knowledge that would be helpful in the administration of the estate. They are undoubtedly relevant, but he is not the sole executor here. It is not said that it would be impossible or especially difficult to administer the estate without Mr Chopra in post. The property portfolio is in the hands of managing agents. Patricia’s investments are in the hands of a professional investment firm. Dealings with the bank do not require specialist knowledge of the past. The main action that will need to be taken is sales of the portfolio, either in whole or in part to discharge the borrowing.(2) Patricia's choice is a factor, but it is merely one factor and does not override the principal consideration, namely what is in the best interests of the beneficiaries? The evidence points clearly to there being difficulties in Mr Chopra and Christopher having a satisfactory working relationship. Indeed, I am unable to have any real confidence that Mr Chopra and Christopher can work together. The contrary is far more likely. To decline to make an order removing Mr Chopra would, in my judgment, merely store up trouble for the future and in all likelihood lead to a claim at a later date.(3) The claimants’ case has strengthened as it has progressed from the initial email. The refusal, for inappropriate reasons, to supply information to a co-executor is particularly telling. It is troubling that Mr Chopra thought it appropriate at the outset to (a) provide misleading information about renewal of the bank lending and (b) imply that no charge will be made for health and welfare support, but only later to render a substantial bill(4) Mr Chopra should have reflected when asked to renounce. His approach has been to focus more on his position rather than on what would be in the interests of beneficiaries. They wish to take responsibility for their mother's estate. This is not an unreasonable stance on their part. Mr Chopra appears to have resented it, and the clear impression he gives that he is the only person with the knowledge and skills for the job.(5) Mr Chopra’s removal might, although this is not certain, lead to additional cost. That cost will be borne by the claimants and no one else is affected. It is therefore not a material consideration.(6) Although it is unusual for an application under Section 50 to be made so soon after the death, as it has turned out, the claim was not premature. I do not consider that declining to take up offers of ADR in the circumstances of this case should weigh in the balance. There was a real need for the claim to be determined without delay and the outcome, in reality, was a binary one. There was no sound basis, in the circumstances of this case for Mr Chopra to cling to office.[39]I am satisfied, therefore, that the balance comes down in this case firmly in favour of removing Mr Chopra. The estate will be left in safe and competent hands. Christopher and Arthur have strong vested interests in its efficient and cost effective management. Christopher has business skills and will be able to manage the estate despite being resident in Singapore. I consider that declining to make an order would be unwise, and I can see nothing to commend an order removing both executors, which is a step which would be unnecessary. I will therefore make an order removing Mr Chopra. I will hear submissions now about the form of the order and consequential issues. LATER:[40]I am now dealing with the costs of the claim. The claimants’ position is that they seek an order for costs against Mr Chopra on the indemnity basis. They have provided information about their costs, but not in the form of a costs schedule, and they invite the court to make an order on the indemnity basis for a detailed assessment with a payment on account. Mr Holmes questions whether an order for costs should be made against his client, and opposes on any view an order for indemnity costs. He also draws attention to statements made in the claimant’s evidence which he says are demonstrably wrong, and that should be a matter of censure that is reflected in the costs order. If there is to be an order for costs against his client, he seeks summary assessment today.[41]In my judgment, there is no other order that can be made in these circumstances than an order that the defendant pay the claimants’ costs of the claim. The conclusion I reached in my judgment was that in response to the letter of claim, before the claim was issued, the defendant should have accepted that he should have renounced his office as executor, all the more so having received the claim form and evidence in support. Even if he considered some of the assertions of fact were wrong, it was in this case completely inappropriate for Mr Chopra to set himself against the claimants who are the beneficiaries of the estate in circumstances where there was an acknowledged degree of hostility or difficulty between them.[42]In those circumstances, it is plain that the defendant should pay the claimant’s costs of the claim. As to whether there should be an order on the indemnity basis, I need to consider whether it can be said this case is out of the norm.[43]Mr Dew relies on without prejudice save as to costs correspondence between the parties. He submits that Mr Chopra used the negotiations to try to resolve the claim as a hostage to ensure that he received payment. It seems to me there is some force in those submissions. The correspondence becomes bogged down in looking at what should be paid to Mr Chopra’s firm for work undertaken. Matters reached a point on 14 February 2025 when Boodle Hatfield was simply asking to be told how much Mr Chopra was seeking as remuneration. Up to that point the claimants were willing to agree to settle on the basis for no order for costs and on the basis of payment for work properly undertaken as an accountant.[44]There was no reply to the without prejudice correspondence until 16 April 2025. Mr Holmes explains the gap by referring to open correspondence during that period, but it seems to me if there really was a wish on the part of the defendant to resolve this claim, it would have been extremely easy to have replied to Boodle Hatfield in short order stating the amount Mr Chopra was seeking as asking to be paid. There must have been a real prospect that the claim could have been resolved at that stage with no order for costs.[45]On the basis that(a) the defendant should have renounced before the claim was issued and(b) should have pursued the correspondence with greater alacrity, particularly from 14 February 2025, I consider that this case is out of the norm and it is appropriate for an order for costs to be made on the indemnity basis. Such an order may be relatively rare in the context of section 50, but this is not a straightforward or standard case. The sight of an office holder clinging to office, as has happened here, is unedifying.[46]Mr Holmes makes criticisms of the claimants, but it seems to me they do not sound significantly in costs. I have considered whether it might be appropriate to make a discount to the amount the claimants recover by way of costs. In the circumstances, the points that can be made are, in terms of the volume of work, minor ones and I do not consider that a realistic discount could be assessed. Overall, the right order is that an order should be made for costs against Mr Chopra on the indemnity basis.[47]As to whether I am in a position to summarily assess costs, having considered the information supplied by Boodle Hatfield which refers merely to invoices and rounded sums, I am not satisfied that I could properly undertake a summary assessment of those costs today. I appreciate a detailed assessment could lead to a greater sum payable by the defendant. It will, of course, be incumbent on him to take immediate steps to put forward a proposal to avoid interest running and to bring the costs issue to a conclusion. I express no view at this point about the quantum of the claimants’ costs, which will be dealt with by a costs judge. I will, however, make an order for a payment on account which will be a carefully measured sum and subject to any further submissions, I would propose 50% of the amount in Boodle Hatfield’s schedule, rounded to the nearest £5,000. - - - - - - - - - - - Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd., 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP. Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com