"[19.] The process of civil litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases. The nature of litigation is such that witnesses often have a stake in a particular version of events. This is obvious where the witness is a party or has a tie of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to a party to the proceedings. Other, more subtle influences include allegiances created by the process of preparing a witness statement and of coming to court to give evidence for one side in the dispute. A desire to assist, or at least not to prejudice, the party who has called the witness or that party's lawyers, as well as a natural desire to give a good impression in a public forum, can be significant motivating forces. [20.] Considerable interference with memory is also introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for trial. A witness is asked to make a statement, often (as in the present case) when a long time has already elapsed since the relevant events. The statement is usually drafted for the witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does nor does not say. The statement is made after the witness's memory has been "refreshed" by reading documents. The documents considered often include statements of case and other argumentative material as well as documents which the witness did not see at the time or which came into existence after the events which he or she is being asked to recall. The statement may go through several iterations before it is finalised. Then, usually months later, the witness will be asked to re-read his or her statement and review documents again before giving evidence in court. The effect of this process is to establish in the mind of the witness the matters recorded in his or her own statement and other written material, whether they be true or false, and to cause the witness's memory of events to be based increasingly on this material and later interpretations of it rather than on the original experience of the events."
“[22.] In the light of these considerations, the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is, in my view, to place little if any reliance at all on witnesses' recollections of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. This does not mean that oral testimony serves no useful purpose – though its utility is often disproportionate to its length. But its value lies largely, as I see it, in the opportunity which cross-examination affords to subject the documentary record to critical scrutiny and to gauge the personality, motivations and working practices of a witness, rather than in testimony of what the witness recalls of particular conversations and events. Above all, it is important to avoid the fallacy of supposing that, because a witness has confidence in his or her recollection and is honest, evidence based on that recollection provides any reliable guide to the truth.”
“[276.] Fixed boundaries. If it is desired to indicate on the filed plan or General Map, or otherwise to define in the register, the precise position of the boundaries of the land or any parts thereof, notice shall be given to the owners and occupiers of the adjoining lands, in each instance, of the intention to ascertain and fix the boundary, with such plan, or tracing, or extract from the proposed verbal description of the land as may be necessary, to show clearly the fixed boundary proposed to be registered; and any question of doubt or dispute arising therefrom shall be dealt with as provided by these rules. ……. [278.] General boundaries. (1) Except in cases in which it is noted in the Property Register that the boundaries have been fixed, the filed plan or General Map shall be deemed to indicate the general boundaries only. (2) In such cases the exact line of the boundary will be left undetermined—as, for instance, whether it includes a hedge or wall and ditch, or runs along the centre of a wall or fence, or its inner or outer face, or how far it runs within or beyond it; or whether or not the land registered includes the whole or any portion of an adjoining road or stream. (3) When a general boundary only is desired to be entered in the register, notice to the owners of the adjoining lands need not be given. (4) This rule shall apply notwithstanding that a part or the whole of a ditch, wall, fence, road, stream, or other boundary is expressly included in or excluded from the title or that it forms the whole of the land comprised in the title.”
“Any boundary dispute which leads to litigation as protracted as the dispute has been in this case is regrettable. But no workable system of conveyancing can be expected to eliminate entirely the opportunity for disputes to arise about boundaries. In most cases neighbours are content to accept that absolute precision is unattainable. They recognise that a certain amount of latitude must be given to whatever method has been used to fix the boundaries of their land. That also is the view which has been taken by the legislature. The original system of precise guaranteed boundaries under theLand Registry Act 1862 gave rise to considerable difficulty. It had to be abandoned in view of the expense which was involved in a survey of the precise boundaries and the many disputes which arose between neighbours who had been content until then to accept a certain amount of vagueness as to the precise line of their common boundary. The result, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann has explained, was the introduction of the general boundaries rule now contained in r 278 of theLand Registration Rules 1925 , SR & O 1925/1093.”
“Whatever the date of registration, the primary source of the boundary line between any two properties is the conveyance whereby their ownership was divided, though subsequent conveyances may still be relevant if no original conveyance dividing the properties can be found. While many building plots have been laid out in recent years, there are also many boundaries which go back hundreds if not thousands of years. Nevertheless the first step when presented with a boundary dispute is to try to identify and inspect this first conveyance or transfer. This may seem obvious, but it is by no means universally practised. Many is the boundary dispute where the parties seem to think it enough to look at their own Land Certificate or conveyance without looking back further. Registration of title is not intended to change the boundary with adjoining properties. A boundary dispute may arise on first registration, or on a transfer or simply where an owner or occupier has decided to annex land in the belief that he is entitled to do so or even in the hope that he will get away with it. Even if the Land Certificate or Transfer appears to be plain, it may conflict with the neighbouring title. Therefore it may be necessary to go behind the registration to discover the true and original boundary…………..[T]he basic principles are the same whether the land is registered or unregistered.”
“AND UPON the Claimants having informed the court that they accept that the hedges which exist in the vicinity of both the eastern and western boundaries of their property are ancient hedges which, in the case of the western hedge was in existence prior to 1839, and in respect of the southern hedge came into existence in or about 1854.”
“The allottee [of Allotment 12] was not entitled to plant the hedge upon [Allotment 11], for this would have amounted to a trespass upon land which had been allotted in favour of Dorothy Richardson. The allottee [of Allotment 12] therefore had to plant the hedge upon [their] own land.”
“If an examination of those conveyances coupled with any evidence that is admissible for the purpose of construing them shows what the boundary is, there is no room at all for the operation of that presumption….. … when the conveyance is looked at, the boundaries on which are traced by reference to the ordnance survey, and the acreage of which is fixed by reference to the ordnance survey, it is established beyond possibility of question what the boundary is….”
“[43.] The principles applicable to the interpretation of a transfer of real property are not open to serious doubt. A transfer, like any other contractual document, must be interpreted in the light of the background facts reasonably available to the parties……….. [44.] The question is one to be answered objectively: what would the reasonable layman think he was buying?....”
“i) When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. It does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the contract, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the contract, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions; ii) The reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision; iii) When it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, the clearer the natural meaning, the more difficult it is to justify departing from it. The less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning. However, that does not justify the court embarking on an exercise of searching for, let alone constructing, drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning; iv) Commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made; v) While commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the court thinks that they should have agreed. Accordingly, when interpreting a contract a judge should avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party; vi) When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties.”
“[13.] …..if the conveyance of land on one side purports to convey land beyond the pre-existing boundary, then it is to that extent a brutum fulmen. The seller cannot convey that to which he has no title.”
“[66.] … the mere maintenance of existing boundary features, such as a fence or a ditch or a hedge, is not an act which unequivocally asserts exclusive control over land. That is important in a case, such as the present, where the ditches and hedges that bordered the fields on the disputed land were all features that were present when [the claimant] moved onto the disputed land.”
“The Western boundary to Hillsway is defined by a continuous ditch of variable depth (partially waterfilled in its southern half while the northern half is largely obscured by dense undergrowth and partially infilled at its northern extent) and a treelined hedge bank – its course runs roughly north-south and meanders slightly along its length. Cartographic evidence shows that it defined the western edge of Lees Green Common at least since the early 19th century (and probably earlier); its form and alignment suggest that it may represent a natural watercourse which was adapted to function as a drainage feature and the western boundary of the common prior to its inclosure in 1854, although the origins of this feature could not be positively confirmed based on the available cartographic, documentary and photographic records.”
“The 1839 Tithe Map of the Parish of Dalbury (otherwise Dalbury Lees) (fig. 2) shows a sinuous field boundary running continuously north to south along the western extent of Lees Green Common. This continuous boundary stretches from Long Lane in the north, dividing Lees Green Common (Plot 8) from the enclosed fields to its west. The common is recorded to be in the ownership of unspecified freeholders. Most relevant amongst the enclosed fields to the west are ‘Big Cote Close’ (Plot 7) and ‘Far Plough Close’ (Plot 90), both of which were in the ownership of William Peach and abut the later enclosed areas of the common now known as Hillsway and Brookfields. Due to the fair reliability of this cartographic source, it can reasonably be concluded the western boundary to Hillsway existed at this date, being part of the meandering western boundary of Lees Green Common. Nothing about the form of this boundary can be concluded based on this source, as the tithe map does not explicitly show whether the boundary was defined by a watercourse, ditch or hedge; however, the sinuous, meandering form of the boundary may reasonably be interpreted to indicate a watercourse.”
"In my view, it is not possible to disregard the ordinary understanding of the T-marks. The natural implication is that they were intended to represent existing boundary features, and that those features were to belong to Clock House. This implication is consistent with the Judge's finding, for which there was evidence, that there was a "hedge" along the disputed boundary." [14.] In the subsequent case of Avon Estates Ltd v Evans & Anor[2013] EWHC 1635 (Ch) HH Judge Cooke (sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division) expressed the view that the presence of "
"In my judgment, there is no single meaning or default meaning established by the evidence or authority that can be attached to T marks where a meaning cannot be ascertained by reference to the body of the conveyance or other admissible material. It may well be that the parties to the 1955 conveyance subjectively intended some meaning to be attached, but if they did, given the range of possibilities as to what it might be and the absence of any evidence to enable the court to identify what their intention might have been, that intention has not been carried into effect." [15.] A similar approach is recommended in the recent version of Land Registry Practice Guide 40 to plans and boundaries which states at [9] that: "
“Mr Powell ……expressed the view that this responsibility necessarily implied ownership, [but] it seems to me that is not necessarily so. It will no doubt commonly be the case that the appropriate person to maintain a feature is the owner of it, but the attribution of such responsibility is a matter for agreement between parties to a conveyance and there is nothing to stop them agreeing any terms they choose. One could envisage a range of rights or obligations that parties might agree in relation to a boundary feature depending on the circumstances; "maintenance" is an obvious one but even if that is intended, the exact content of the obligation is not necessarily self explanatory. In the present case for instance, it might be speculated that parties would have considered defining which of them should be responsible for replacing the stockproof fence running along the boundary, whether or not the existing fence was precisely on the boundary.”
"….. A boundary agreement may, I think, be registrable, or it may not, depending on the nature of the agreement. The only suggested head of registration is as an estate contract, Class C (iv). Bysection 10 (1) of the Land Charges Act 1925 , this is defined as: “any contract by an estate owner or by a person entitled at the date of the contract to have a legal estate conveyed to him to conveyor create a legal estate;” ……. Now a boundary agreement may constitute a contract to convey land. The parties may agree that in return for a concession by A in one place, straightening the line of division, B will make a concession in another place; and the agreement may thus be one for the conveyance of land. But there is another type of boundary agreement. This does no more than identify on the ground what the documents describe in words or delineate on plans. Nothing is transferred, at any rate consciously; the agreement is to identify and not to convey. In such a case, I do not see how the agreement can be said to constitute a contract to convey land. In general, I think that a boundary agreement will be presumed to fall into this latter category. This view is supported by words of Lord Hardwicke L.C. in Penn v Lord Baltimore, a case concerning an agreement relating to the boundaries between Pennsylvania and Maryland. There the Lord Chancellor said: "
"It is not a contract for the sale or conveyance of lands. It has no ingredient of such a contract."
"[147] . . . the judge's conclusion that the Settlement Agreement together with the Stephenson Report prepared pursuant to the Settlement Agreement was a boundary agreement that does not provide for a conveyance of land is not wrong. It does not bind successors in title. Mr Wilmshurst's example of the local authority's compulsory purchase is based on a false premise. In light of the judge's conclusion at paragraph 53 of the Judgement, he is clearly correct to conclude at paragraph 55 that the Settlement Agreement fell outside the scope of section 2 of the 1989 Act. . . . [150] . . . I agree with Mr Loveday that the declaration simply establishes the contractual position as between the parties to the Settlement Agreement. It has no proprietary effect binding third parties . . ." b. The Defendants argued that that Murray J’s suggestion that boundary demarcation agreements do not bind successors in title was not part of the ratio of his decision, and even if it was it was per incuriam. A long line of binding authorities confirm that successors in title are bound including more recently Haycocks v Neville[2007] EWCA Civ 78 where Lawrence Collins LJ said this: “[25] … an agreement to demarcate an unclear boundary is binding on the parties and binds successors entitled (sic) without the need for a written agreement: Neilson v Poole(1969) 20 P&CR 909 , recently applied in Joyce v Rigolli[2004] EWCA Civ 79 . The evidence was that the Wykes Plan had been drawn up to clarify the boundary following discussions between the Haycocks and the Campbells and was drawn at a scale of 1:200. If the Haycocks had pleaded and proved that they and the Campbells had agreed in 1992 that the Wykes Plan represented the boundary, then that would have been binding not only on them but on successors in title, such as the Nevilles."
“[53.] Where does that leave us? Drawing all of the authorities together, it seems to me that as Megarry J first explained, there are two types of boundary agreement. The first is an agreement the purpose of which is to move a boundary so as to transfer land from one neighbour to another. That first type is subject to the formalities necessary for the transfer of land. The second type is an agreement, the purpose of which is to define a previously unclear or uncertain boundary, even if it includes the conscious or unconscious transfer of a trivial amount of land. It is presumed that the land transferred is trivial unless the presumption is rebutted. This second type, a boundary demarcation agreement, binds the parties to it for the reasons explained by Briggs LJ in Nata Lee Ltd at [32]. The consideration for the agreement is the substitution of certainty for uncertainty and the avoidance of the risk of future disputes. Although in many cases, the parties will act upon the agreement, for example, by building a wall or erecting a fence, there is no need for anything more in order to render it binding as between them. That is clear, not only from Neilson v Poole itself which has been consistently endorsed in the Court of Appeal, but also from Stephenson where it was stated that it was unnecessary to consider the estoppel argument in addition to the implied boundary demarcation agreement, from the clear obiter dicta of Lawrence Collins LJ in Haycocks and the approach adopted by Briggs LJ in Nata Lee Ltd. [54.] Such an agreement has proprietary effect and, as a result, also binds successors in title. It does so because of its very nature. It defines and delineates the boundary between the properties as from the root conveyance or transfer. Such an agreement is, of its very nature, a delineation of the property transferred or conveyed and is so for all purposes. As no one is able to transfer or convey more than they own, such an agreement effectively “binds” successors in title whether or not they have knowledge of it. It does so because it defines what they purchase. As “Ruoff and Roper on the Law and Practice of Registered Conveyancing” explains at paragraph 5.020, a legal boundary does not move because the land is subsequently conveyed or transferred. The boundary demarcation agreement is ancillary to the conveyance or transfer. As Megarry J explained at 919 of Neilson v Poole, the boundaries established are, in the words of Lord Hardwick L.C. in Penn v Lord Baltimore, “presumed to be the true and ancient limits”
“Boundary disputes are a particularly painful form of litigation. Feelings run high and disproportionate amounts of money are spent. Claims to small and valueless pieces of land are pressed with the zeal of Fortinbras's army. It is therefore important that the law on boundaries should be as clear as possible.”
“[1.] This appeal is mainly about the application to a particular set of facts of the pair of rebuttable presumptions which conveyancers call the "hedge and ditch rule". While, to many modern (and in particular urban) lawyers, this rule might at first sight appear to be something of a quaint chancery conceit, it continues to serve a valuable purpose, not least as a means of enabling neighbouring owners of rural land to avoid what is almost always the wholly disproportionate cost and stress of having to litigate a boundary dispute. The blood, toil and sweat which has been devoted to this litigation would even have horrified Prince Hamlet who, watching Fortinbras march away with his army, observed: "…while, to my shame, I seeThe imminent death of twenty thousand menThat, for a fantasy and trick of fameGo to their graves like beds, fight for a plotWhereon the numbers cannot try the cause,Which is not tomb enough and continentTo hide the slain? O, from this time forthMy thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!”” "…while, to my shame, I seeThe imminent death of twenty thousand menThat, for a fantasy and trick of fameGo to their graves like beds, fight for a plotWhereon the numbers cannot try the cause,Which is not tomb enough and continentTo hide the slain? O, from this time forthMy thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!””
“….a boundary agreement is, in its nature, an act of peace, quieting strife and averting litigation, and so is to be favoured in the law.”
“BROOKFIELDS [20.] I have refreshed my memory from the planning application documents in the 'List of Documents' section below. [21.] The idea to build Brookfields first came from Jim's parents. Their idea was to build a residential house to live in during their retirement. I think they made their planning application in about 1988, but it was refused. Instead, Jim's parents bought a place at Mercaston and they retired to live there in 1989. [22.] In 1999, our son Matthew made an application to build a residential house on the site. If he had been successful, it was our idea to gift him the land as a wedding present. However, his application was also refused. [23.] I do not think either of these previous applications was for a house for an agricultural worker. [24.] By 2003, I recall that we were really struggling to find staff to work at Trusley Wood Farm. Without a house to offer with the job, we could only attract workers who lived locally, and no-one suitable seemed to be available. So, Jim and I had the idea of making an application to build Brookfields for an agricultural worker. [25.] I was the 'project manager' for the planning application and the build. I discussed and agreed everything with Jim, but he was busy farming, so I was more involved than he was. The planning application was made in Jim's name. [26.] I do not remember much about the registration of Brookfields at HM Land Registry; I think Jim dealt with this, not me. [27.] Our 2003 planning application was for outline permission, but it was refused. We appealed, and our appeal was allowed in 2004. The planning permission for Brookfields has an agricultural occupancy condition. [28.] When the more detailed plans were drawn up by our surveyor in about 2005, I went round to Hillsway to show them to Joe Morley and his wife ('the Morleys'). We had known of the Morleys for a long time through the local farming community. Hillsway is on higher ground, Brookfields was going to be visible from there, so we felt it was only courteous to let them know what design we had in mind, and to talk about any concerns they might have. [29.] At that time, I am sure our idea was to remove the section of hedge alongside the house and replace it with a wall. Brookfields is a very narrow plot and Jim and I were worried about how close the hedge was to the house, especially the kitchen window; we thought a wall would be easier to maintain, we also thought a wall would give the house more privacy than the hedge. [30.] I know the plans I showed the Morleys only showed the wall because I remember Joe Morley ('Joe') saying he would prefer it if we kept the hedge. I cannot remember if he explained why, perhaps because he preferred to look out onto a green hedge than a brick wall? We discussed other things about the design too, like the colour and type of the house bricks and I remember Mrs Morley saying she did not want us to build a yellow house like Talland! [31.] I am sure Joe did not think the hedge was his; I remember him saying that if we kept it, we could cut it as often as we liked because it was ours. [32.] Jim and I decided to change the plans because we thought of a compromise that would give Brookfields privacy and give Joe a green hedge to look at. Our compromise was to keep the hedge and put a wall up along the house on our side of the hedge; we later changed the wall to a panel fence. We definitely did not change our plans because we thought any part of the hedge belonged to Hillsway. [33.] Jim and I have looked for the version of the surveyor's plan that just shows the wall, but cannot find it. I think it might have been submitted for approval, but I am not sure, it could just have been an early draft version. Our solicitor is checking if the planning department have a copy. [34.] None of the words and measurements used on our later surveyor's plans and letters mean that I thought Hillsway owned the hedge; I always thought it belonged to Brookfields. [35.] The builders started work on Brookfields as soon as we got full planning permission. We built the whole of the shell and then stopped. By then, Jim had found a farm worker who already lived locally, so the need to house an agricultural worker was not so urgent anymore. [36.] Years later, when Jim and I started to think about winding down for retirement, we begun work on the inside of Brookfields. We decided we would live there ourselves. It needed everything; stairs, electrics, plumbing, kitchen, bathroom and everything else. The house was finished by 2016 and we moved in.”
“Finally I have to say that having seen some of the emails from the prospective purchaser I consider his attitude to be offensive, arrogant and downright rude. I cannot believe that this person is already causing friction and upset with his prospective neighbours before he moves in!”
“In response to the communication from my solicitor (See email below) I am unfortunately not receiving a clear answer to the questions I have raised so as to enable us to exchange. It follows that there will not be any completion if exchange does not take place as completion date is confirmed on exchange. There is one open issue and that relates to the boundaries but it seems from the response that the Archers and Robinsons have not even been consulted on my solicitors note. My comments are as follows:- My comments are as follows:- 1. If you want to exchange urgently then the reasonable questions and points I have put via my solicitor need to be actually answered urgently and this means actually engaging with the Archers and the Robinsons. It is the sellers responsibility to ensure that the [PIF] is accurate and so far the [PIF] 1.1 has been anything but accurate; 2. The suggestion made by your solicitor that the Archer's will have seen their own documents is an assumption and suggests that you have not sent them the attached documents. We therefore do not know whether their opinion is formed from definitively having seen these documents which clearly indicates that the boundary responsibility is silent in their title documents; 3. The reference to the ditch in respect of the Archers relates to the rear boundary alone and not the left hand boundary. The [PIF]1.1 stipulated that the rear boundary was 50/50% and not Archers owned. Are Freeth's now representing the Archer's in arguing a case having not consulted them or sticking to the original [PIF] on the rear of 50/50 ownership which is what I am suggesting but for the right, rear and left. Is the hedge and ditch argument for the rear actually being put forward by the Archer's or by your solicitor without any express authority to do so. Can I suggest that your solicitor sticks to her brief. 4. There is no comment on the left boundary at all. For the avoidance of doubt we will not be exchanging until we get a clear and specific response acknowledging from the Archers and the Robinson's the possible conclusion regarding the legal boundary ownership I have put forward in the absence of any evidence to the contrary being provided :- • "As no evidence has been provided by the Archer's or the Robinson's that supports their assertions and the land registry title documentation for Brookfields, Archer's land (to the rear) and Hillsway is silent on boundary ownership then in keeping with boundary convention and the maintenance custom and practice observed it can only be concluded that the left, right and rear hedgerow boundary features are most likely to be jointly owned" Failing this then it would be necessary for you to obtain a boundary survey (at your cost) to get a boundary determination. I am trying to be reasonable and sensible about the situation considering custom and practice on the ground and the balance of probabilities here but now is not the time for ambiguous responses if exchange is actually going to take place in a timely manner. We are trying to work through this in a timely manner but our due diligence spending£557 k plus fees will not be compromised because of an exchange deadline that we did not create. This will also be formally communicated through the solicitors and I look forward to a fully considered and prompt response in due course having actually consulted the Archers and Robinsons.”
“I have received instructions from my clients this morning who have spoken to the neighbours again. The neighbours are not willing to provide anything further. If your clients wish to proceed with this purchase, my instructions are that my clients require exchange of Contracts by 12pm on Thursday29th August 2019 with completion on30th September 2019 ; otherwise the property will be remarketed.”
“[7.] The Defendants, it is alleged, have and continue to materially and unreasonably interfere with the Claimants’ comfort and convenience of living through actions in private nuisance as a consequence of :- a. Mr.Archer, on9th September 2020 , threatening on two separate occasions to chop down the B-C hedge with a chain saw in a malicious attempt to coerce the Claimants to acquiesce to the Defendants’ false claim. The Claimants thereafter lived with the prospect of this threat being carried out. The Defendants, thirteen months later, admitted in a solicitor’s letter of27th October 2021 that such a threat had been made. b. Intentional conduct in holding open a “live neighbour dispute” and false claim after it was the confirmed by solicitor’s letter of27th October 2021 that the Defendants were not going to issue a Letter Before Claim or commence legal proceedings. The Defendants were fully aware that a “live neighbour dispute” is disclosable to a potential buyer and that this could affect the Hillsway property value should the Claimants decide to sell in the future.” a. Mr.Archer, on9th September 2020 , threatening on two separate occasions to chop down the B-C hedge with a chain saw in a malicious attempt to coerce the Claimants to acquiesce to the Defendants’ false claim. The Claimants thereafter lived with the prospect of this threat being carried out. The Defendants, thirteen months later, admitted in a solicitor’s letter of27th October 2021 that such a threat had been made. b. Intentional conduct in holding open a “live neighbour dispute” and false claim after it was the confirmed by solicitor’s letter of27th October 2021 that the Defendants were not going to issue a Letter Before Claim or commence legal proceedings. The Defendants were fully aware that a “live neighbour dispute” is disclosable to a potential buyer and that this could affect the Hillsway property value should the Claimants decide to sell in the future.”
“[1-001] The tort of deceit (sometimes known as fraudulent misrepresentation) is the actionable wrong most closely identified with the civil law concept of fraud. It is also an area in which “law and morality are inextricably interwoven.”
“[6.] The Claimants submit under tort of deceit that the Defendants have knowingly or recklessly, by emails of 7th and19th August 2019 and solicitor letters of17th December 2020 and3rd March 2021 ,29th June 2021 made false statements of fact and a false claim of exclusive ownership and maintenance of the B-C and A-B hedges contrary to the Defendant’s knowledge of and reliance on specific title deeds certified in 1984 and 2003 land registrations. ……. d. The Claimants aver that the Defendants, through the aforementioned false statements of fact…… knowingly and purposely intended and do currently intend to induce the Claimants into a boundary agreement which extends the Defendants rights in contradiction to both parties’ title deeds and to the Claimants’ detriment, either directly or through acquiescence to the Defendants actions on the ground.”