‘64. In this case, the JPLs have not come before this Court tainted by uncertainty as to the next step forward. They fervently wish to proceed with the APA on their professional view that this is the only commercially viable option available to preserve all that could be rescued of the Company’s assets. It is not to be forgotten that the APA follows various unsuccessful attempts for a restructuring. Equally, it is not to be overlooked that the Company’s access to funding is finite and flails month to month. This is all evidence which underpins the logic in the decision to sell the Company’s business. 65. I have no reason to conclude that an obviously better decision is open to the JPLs to make. The alternative proposals put forth by the Petitioner are broad ideas as to an approach for possible solutions, much of which has already been explored through previous restructuring efforts. This is not a case where the JPLs have ignored more advantageous offers on the table. So, this Court is in no position to find that the JPLs have acted unreasonably in wanting to proceed with the only sale offer which is available to the Company having been exposed to the open market within a timeframe commensurate to the Company’s survival period. For that reason, the JPLs have reasonably accepted the only finalized bid. To withhold this Court’s sanction would be tantamount to accelerating the Company’s journey to what would be an inevitable commercial dead-end. I see no reason why the JPLs should be compelled to gamble and conjure the expense of a second bidding process without any real prospect for a more optimal result. I accept that the APA is the only rescue vessel in sight.’
‘3.10 BMK has confirmed to the Plan Company that it is no longer prepared to provide unconditional funding to the Plan Company or MOSA if the Plan is not sanctioned. BMK has also confirmed that it only intends to fund the costs associated with an eventual liquidation of MOL which may arise if it ceases to provide any funding to MOL. 3.11 Whilst I am conscious that BMK may perhaps be motivated to make this statement simply to assist the Plan Company in furthering its objectives under the Plan, I have no evidence to suggest it is untrue, and in my professional judgment it is not an unreasonable position for BMK to adopt given the financial position of the Plan Company and MOSA and the Guarantee Liabilities owed to Outrider by the Plan Company and MOSA.’
“Section 206(2) of the Act is dealing with what is described as a “compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or a company and its members.”
“... in contrast to a scheme under Part 26, s.901G permits the court to sanction a restructuring plan which is binding on a class of dissenting creditors under section 901G on the basis that none of the dissenting class would be any worse off than they would be in the event of the relevant alternative. Mr Smith’s argument was that if creditors or members in such a case would receive nothing in respect of their existing rights in the event of the relevant alternative, then it must follow that a plan could be sanctioned under section 901G which also provided them with nothing in exchange for the release or cancellation of their existing rights.” 30 I have concluded that I do not have to decide this point in the present case, although I will say that it seems to me that the argument that was made by Mr Smith has real substance. The reason I do not have to decide the point in the present case is that I agree with Mr Weaver’s submission that the way in which contingent creditors are now treated under the plan are similar to what occurred in Smile Telecom. It means that the court can be satisfied that there is a sufficient give and take for what is proposed to qualify as a compromise or arrangement. There is to be a£14,000 fund which is to be available for the payment of a dividend, albeit a small one, to each of the contingent creditors. Whether it is appropriate for contingent creditors to be dealt with in that way is a matter for the sanction hearing, but I am satisfied that the jurisdictional issue that otherwise might have arisen in relation to the satisfaction of the conditions is satisfied.’ “Section 206(2) of the Act is dealing with what is described as a “compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors or a company and its members.”