“162. I can deal with prejudice shortly. Prejudice is made out by Mr Hashmi for at least four reasons. First, Mr Hashmi was removed from the office of director unlawfully. Secondly, he has been prevented from accessing the Company systems since24 February 2021 (prior to the alleged resolution). Thirdly, he has been excluded from financial information. Lastly, the Consultancy Agreement was terminated without regard to its terms. 163. Mr Reed makes the following submissions all of which are made out (see generally paragraph 39 above): i) As CEO Mr Lorimer-Wing has never called a general meeting. ii) In breach of the Investment Agreement Mr Lorimer-Wing has failed to cause the Company to prepare and send to the shareholders monthly management accounts within 20 business days of the end of each month. iii) There has been a general failure to provide management accounts and other financial information when requested. iv) On5th January 2022 Mr Lorimer-Wing was asked to provide the Company’s register of members pursuant tosection 116(2) of the Companies Act 2006 and copies of the Company’s records of resolutions pursuant tosection 358 of the Companies Act 2006 . A copy of the register of members and two resolutions were provided over a year later on24th February 2023 . 164. I do not consider any of the purported failings of Mr Hashmi’s reduces the effect of the prejudice he suffered. Mr Lorimer-Wing has failed to make good his case that Mr Hashmi wished or had decided to resign as director or otherwise cease to have any involvement in the Company. The prejudice is substantial.”
“165. Mr Hashmi, as member of the Company, succeeds on the Petition that the Company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to his interests for the reasons I have given. 166. I will hear submissions as to the next stage of this petition at the consequential hearing which is to be fixed.”
“1. The First Respondent shall purchase the Petitioner’s shares in the Company at fair value on the basis that: i) there is a willing seller and willing buyer, ii) 100% value of the shares in the Company are to be valued as a going concern taking into account the assets (including goodwill), profitability and future prospects of the Company at a date properly selected and (iii) there is no discount for minority.”
“[114] Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva plc[1977] RPC 1 ; Piglowska v Piglowski[1999] 3 All ER 632 , [1999] 2 FCR 481,[1999] 1 WLR 1360 ; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd[2007] UKHL 23 ,[2007] 4 All ER 765 ,[2007] 1 WLR 1325 ; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria)[2013] UKSC 33 ,[2013] 3 All ER 929 ,[2013] 1 WLR 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie[2013] UKSC 58 ,[2013] 1 WLR 2477 . These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many. They include: i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed. ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show. iii) Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case. iv) In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping. v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence). vi) Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done.”
“In the present case, Mr. Phillips fought the petition to the end and your Lordships have decided that he was justified in doing so. But I think that parties ought to be encouraged, where at all possible, to avoid the expense of money and spirit inevitably involved in such litigation by making an offer to purchase at an early stage. This was a somewhat unusual case in that Mr. Phillips, despite his revised views about Mr. O'Neill's competence, was willing to go on working with him. This is a position which the majority shareholder is entitled to take, even if only because he may consider it less unattractive than having to raise the capital to buy out the minority. Usually, however, the majority shareholder will want to put an end to the association. In such a case, it will almost always be unfair for the minority shareholder to be excluded without an offer to buy his shares or make some other fair arrangement. The Law Commission Report on Shareholder Remedies, at pp. 30-37, paras. 3.26-56 has recommended that in a private company limited by shares in which substantially all the members are directors, there should be a statutory presumption that the removal of a shareholder as a director, or from substantially all his functions as a director, is unfairly prejudicial conduct. This does not seem to me very different in practice from the present law. But the unfairness does not lie in the exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. If the respondent to a petition has plainly made a reasonable offer, then the exclusion as such will not be unfairly prejudicial and he will be entitled to have the petition struck out. It is therefore very important that participants in such companies should be able to know what counts as a reasonable offer.”
“156. To exclude Mr Hashmi was on the face of it unfair for the same reasons. 157. I have used the term “on the face of it” as unfairness does not lie in exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. In closing Mr Lorimer-Wing took me to an offer made to Mr Hashmi for his shares at what he says was “fair value” as assessed by auditors acting for the Company. 158. At this stage I do not know if the offer was reasonable. It can be said that it was not made in a timely manner or on2 March 2021 .”
“2. Our client’s position remains that his removal as a director was unlawful and unfairly prejudicial, substantially for the reasons set out in our letter of8 March 2021 and our brief email exchange on14 April 2021 ). 3. Until the disputed matters are resolved, please confirm that no attempt will be made to divest our client of his shareholding in the Company. Our client reserves his rights to take such steps as may be necessary to protect his shareholding, including applying to the Court for interim relief”
“Share Valuation In order to assist the process of concluding the dispute, our client has decided that the parties should continue to follow the procedure laid down in the Articles of Association, which includes provisions at Article 12 for the valuation of shares in the case of a Transfer Event. Our client considers that, if your client has a true understanding of the value of his shares, it will assist greatly the resolution of the dispute. Our client will therefore forthwith appoint the Company’s auditors (Price Bailey) to value your client’s A shares under Article 12. It is thought that the cost will be£7,500 plus VAT. The Company will ask Price Bailey to consider whether the parties should share the cost of the valuation. We are instructed that the valuation process will take a two or three weeks to conclude. We suggest that no precipitate action be taken before the share valuation has been issued. Should you have any observations about what is proposed, we request that you make them by return.”
“159.When this was brought to my attention Mr Reed invited the court to make findings of fact in respect of the removal and exclusion so that the parties may have an opportunity to discuss how they proceed or seek directions at the hand down of this judgment. Mr Lorimer-Wing did not disagree with the approach. 160. Following trial both parties e-mailed the court. Mr Lorimer-Wing wanted to know if the issue of fairness remained outstanding and solicitors for Mr Hashmi explained that Mr Lorimer-Wing’s late submission does not feature in his defence, that the legal team engaged by Mr Hashmi were not prepared to answer the issue when it was raised in closing and invited the court to ignore the submission.”
“161. In my judgment the purported resolution to remove Mr Hashmi, his defacto loss of office and the e-mail dated2 March 2021 that expressly referred to Mr Hashmi as a “bad leaver” answers the issue raised following trial. It was the intention of Mr Lorimer-Wing to receive the shares owned by Mr Hashmi at a value referrable to the “bad leaver” provisions. That was unfair. If he at a later stage made an offer for Mr Hashmi’s shares that was for a “reasonable offer” and Mr Hashmi failed to accept the offer there may well be cost consequences but that does not alter the earlier unfair event.”
“I am not able to advise Mr Lorimer-Wing but the essence of his understanding is correct both in terms of the decision being final. Time to appeal runs from the date of hand-down. I shall make more clear in my final judgment that although prejudice is made out unfairness is subject to paragraphs 157 and 158.”
“I shall not deal with submission in writing from either party. The hearing of consequential matters is the time to make submissions.”
“131. Even if Mr Lorimer-Wing is correct there was no valid resolution by the Company’s board of directors. No agenda was circulated to the directors and there was a failure to give notice of the Meeting to the directors in accordance with Model Article 9. There was a failure to comply with Model Article 10 to allow each director “to communicate to the others any information or opinions they have on any particular item of the business of the meeting”.”
“Requests 44. Does the First Respondent accept that Article 7(1) of the model articles as applied to the Company requires that any decision of the directors must be a majority decision at a meeting and that Article 9 of the model articles as applied to the Company requires that notice of a directors’ meeting must be given to each director?”
“Reply: Not entitled. This is a matter for submissions and is in any event explained at para. 61.b. of the pleaded Defence.”
“152. Lastly, given Mr Lorimer-Wing’s admission that he had in mind the bad leaver provision within the Bespoke Articles when attempting to remove Mr Hashmi I conclude that he would knowingly gain an advantage by obtaining the shares owned by Mr Hashmi at nominal value. This is evident from the extraordinary letter he wrote on2 March 2021 to Mr Hashmi informing him that he had been removed as a director, his bad leaver status and how his shares would be purchased. There is no evidence that Mr Lorimer-Wing disclosed the advantage before or at the Meeting in breach of duty.”
“Requests 34. Please identify with as much particularity as will be relied upon at trial the meetings it is alleged that the Petitioner missed. Reply: This is not a necessary or proportionate request for information required to understand the pleaded Defence. To the extent relevant, this is a matter for evidence.”
“9. The First Respondent shall pay the Petitioner’s costs of the proceedings up to and including the handing down of judgment on liability. Such costs shall be the subject of detailed assessment, if not agreed. However, the detailed assessment may not be commenced until the determination of the value of the Petitioner’s shares either by the Court or by agreement between the parties. 10. Consideration of whether to order the First Respondent to pay a reasonable sum on account of the costs ordered at paragraph 9 above, as required byCPR rule 44.2 (8), is adjourned until the determination of the value of the Petitioner’s shares either by the Court or by agreement between the parties.”
“157. I have used the term “on the face of it” as unfairness does not lie in exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. In closing Mr Lorimer-Wing took me to an offer made to Mr Hashmi for his shares at what he says was “fair value” as assessed by auditors acting for the Company. 158. At this stage I do not know if the offer was reasonable. It can be said that it was not made in a timely manner or on2 March 2021 .”
“161. In my judgment the purported resolution to remove Mr Hashmi, his defacto loss of office and the e-mail dated2 March 2021 that expressly referred to Mr Hashmi as a “bad leaver” answers the issue raised following trial. It was the intention of Mr Lorimer-Wing to receive the shares owned by Mr Hashmi at a value referrable to the “bad leaver” provisions. That was unfair. If he at a later stage made an offer for Mr Hashmi’s shares that was for a “reasonable offer” and Mr Hashmi failed to accept the offer there may well be cost consequences but that does not alter the earlier unfair event.”
“16. Ground 14 concerns costs and the impact of the offer to buy-out Mr Hashmi. Mr Lorimer-Wing argues that if Mr Hashmi fails to do better than the offer that should be relevant at least to costs. The judge ordered that Mr Lorimer-Wing should pay the full costs of the trial on liability. This is arguably inconsistent with para 161 of the Main Judgment where the judge said “If [Mr Lorimer-Wing] at a later stage made an offer for Mr Hashmi’s shares that was … a “reasonable offer” and Mr Hashmi failed to accept the offer there may well be costs consequences but that does not alter the earlier unfair event.”
“19. In the Final Judgement it is stated that “there may well be cost consequences” if Mr Hashmi failed to accept a “reasonable offer”. 20. Given that the offer was made on1 April 2021 , pre-action, that a further offer made to participate in a valuation exercise, again pre-action on5 August 2021 , that any costs of the liability trial be stayed until the establishment of the valuation of the Company. 21. It would be unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable to make one party incur substantial costs where it was all avoidable had the “reasonable offer” being accepted by the Petitioner. 22. The court should not be used to simply prove a point without regard for the court’s time and disproportionate quantum of resources involved. 23. As stated above I would like to rely on the Price Bailey valuation report and Fair Value Certificate but have no objection to any firm Mr Hashmi selects for the Valuation Trial, provided it is a top 30 firm by revenue. The costs however must be borne by Mr Hashmi who is the party that distrust the findings of Price Bailey.”
“26. Mr Hashmi has always known the true value of the Company because he is an intelligent man. He voluntarily left the Company as he could see the writing on the wall, but it would appear that he took offence at his removal by Mr Gilbert and myself. Given that he comes from a family of extreme wealth, he has wanted to and has so far succeeded in showing his financial power in hurting me and my young family, knowing full well that I have very little. 27. I urge the court to see through this whole charade, to wait until we have the additional expert valuation (in addition to the Price Bailey report), and only then, to determine the consequences of what should, if justice is served, be at best, a pyrrhic victory for Mr Hashmi.”
“32. If this Respondent, or indeed any litigant, wishes to protect himself in costs they are free to do so by making an offer under Part 36. There are also other possibilities in an action of this type (an unfair prejudice action) to make an O’Neill offer. Had the Respondent wanted to protect himself in costs at this stage, knowing that this was going to be a split trial, he could have protected himself by one of those routes, so I do not accept the principle that because Part 36 offers are considered to be a good idea, that costs principles applicable to those offers should be read across to other more informal types of offers. 33. Where an offer of this type is made, unlike a Part 36 offer which has set costs consequences, the existence of an admissible offer is one that need to be taken account of in the judge’s discretion. The judge may look at the offer and may decide that despite the offer being there it will not affect his decision to award costs at all or at this stage.”
“37 First, there is a general ”salutary” rule that costs follow the issue rather than the “event”
“39 Thirdly, the principle of equality of arms plays a part as was recognised by Lord Hoffman in O’Neill[1999] 1 WLR 1092 , 1107H. This is also reflected in the overriding objective atCPR r 1.1 (2)(a) which instructs courts, when exercising any of the powers in the CPR, to have regard to the object of “ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings . . .”
“28. In defending the judge’s approach and in answer to the question as to what apart from paying into court the defendants could do to protect themselves against an order for costs on the liability issue, Mr Dunning QC robustly argued, it was open to them to concede liability, and if they chose not to do so then liability for costs followed if they lost the issue. If that approach is right it seems to discourage the arguing of preliminary points. 29. The contrary approach is that parties should be encouraged to make Part 36 payments in and/or offers; they should also be encouraged to try preliminary points if that could lead to the saving of costs overall. If payments in are to be totally ignored at the conclusion of the trial of a preliminary issue, that will discourage applying for the trial of the same, and may even discourage part 36 offers where preliminary issues have been ordered. The proper approach at the conclusion of a trial of a preliminary issue where there has been a part 36 payment in or a part 36 offer, should therefore normally be to adjourn the question of costs pending the resolution of all the issues including damages, at which stage the quantum of the Part 36 offer can be revealed and the discretion in relation to costs exercised in the knowledge of it. 30. I have no doubt that the provisions of Part 36 and of Part 44 encourage the latter approach. Mr Dunning strove manfully to argue that the provisions allowed the judge to take the view he did. He argued (1) even where there had been a payment in, there was no rule which expressly prevented the judge dealing with the costs of the trial of the issue of liability or which required him to reserve the question of costs until after the issue of damages had been resolved; (2) the modern approach was to encourage stage based orders; (3) it was the defendants who wanted a split trial and the claimants resisted it; (4) the defendants could have admitted liability but chose to fight it; (5) the claimants were entirely successful; (6) it was a case where the dispute was about what was said, and the evidence of HSS had been entirely accepted, and the witnesses of the defendants had been severely criticised – Mr Harrison was described as “disingenuous” and Mr Sowton as “totally unreliable”, and reference was made toCPR 44.3 (4) under which it was material to take into account the conduct of the parties; (7) it is the judge who has heard the issue who is based placed to deal with the costs. Thus he argued that the judge having been correctly informed of the fact that there had been a payment in as he was entitled to be underCPR 36.19 (3)(c), was equally entitled to hold that it was immaterial.”