"31. … Although the words used by TCP are those normally appropriate to an outright gift - 'I give to X' - in the present context there is no breach of the principle in Milroy v. Lord if the words of TCP's gift ( ie to the Foundation) are given their only possible meaning in this context. The Foundation has no legal existence apart from the trust declared by the Foundation trust deed. Therefore the words 'I give to the Foundation' can only mean 'I give to the Trustees of the Foundation trust deed to be held by them on the trusts of Foundation trust deed'. Although the words are apparently words of outright gift they are essentially words of gift on trust. 32. But, it is said, TCP vested the properties not in all the Trustees of the Foundation but only in one, ie TCP. Since equity will not aid a volunteer, how can a court order be obtained vesting the gifted property in the whole body of Trustees on the trusts of the Foundation. Again, this represents an over-simplified view of the rules of equity. Until comparatively recently the great majority of trusts were voluntary settlements under which beneficiaries were volunteers having given no value. Yet beneficiaries under a trust, although volunteers, can enforce the trust against the trustees. Once a trust relationship is established between trustee and beneficiary, the fact that a beneficiary has given no value is irrelevant. It is for this reason that the type of perfected gift referred to in class (b) above [that is, a declaration of trust by the settlor] is effective since the donor has constituted himself a trustee for the donee who can as a matter of trust law enforce that trust. 33. What then is the position here where the trust property is vested in one of the body of Trustees viz TCP? In their Lordships' view there should be no question. TCP has, in the most solemn circumstances, declared that he is giving (and later that he has given) property to a trust which he himself has established and of which he has appointed himself to be a Trustee. All this occurs at one composite transaction taking place on 17th February. There can in principle be no distinction between the case where the donor declares himself to be sole trustee for a donee or a purpose and the case where he declares himself to be one of the Trustees for that donee or purpose. In both cases his conscience is affected and it would be unconscionable and contrary to the principles of equity to allow such a donor to resile from his gift. … "
“Guess who had to do it? Me”
“I never saw none of that”
“why had she not said anything before?”
“I can almost guarantee that Irving has worked Great Knowle Farm all his life from what I have seen, whenever I would drive past the Farm, he was running it with Elwyn, father and son running the Farm. Everyone could see that”
“Under different circumstances, we may be able to act in the creation of lifetime trusts, we have certainly done so in the past. In this case, however, having discussed the matter with my fellow partners we considered it was too high risk. The timescales involved are very short. Whilst your email with Heads of Terms is dated 30.3.22 I was not in the office and only saw it the following day. … I also felt uncomfortable especially because Caroline and I got off on the wrong foot. Plus I am concerned about undue influence since I have had no instructions from the client. Nothing at all from Mary Cleave. I have told Caroline that I have declined to act as she is not my client.”
“You say that you want the deeds and the Will given to you on completion of the two transactions, you’ve received a very snooty letter and you’re not very happy with how you have been treated. I apologise for this and so that it is but it is best to speak to Claire or whoever the letter was from. You say that they will not even speak to you. I do apologise but hope you have been happy with my service.”
“It’s not true … just a minute … my mother never gave it to Irving – it had to go down the line. I inherited that property. I said we couldn’t Farm that all the way apart. I spoke to Elwyn. We gave it to Irving for a back-up. Mother did not give that to Irving.”
“No – it’s all lies. I haven’t got my father’s deeds or anything. Trosswell came to me and I gave it to Irving.”
“Yes, my mother had pensions. Mother never said anything at all. I did it of my own free will. It was only nice to give Irving something – a start in life. She was asked whether her mother wanted Irving to inherit the Farm, and she said, “She never said anything about it – we were farmers with one son – we were not going to give it to anyone else – it was never discussed.”
“To my son Irving John Cleeve I leave the Home Farm to him alone, Great Knowle bought by my Father and Mother (in 1926) Albert Neck [sic] Bowden and Mary Elizabeth Bowden, and their wish is their Granson [sic] Irving should have it, which I agree with and carry out. (all bought and Paid for).”
“I never touched that side of the work, but yes. I was doing NFU work – what was going on be between them I don’t know – I can’t tell you.”
“I was diving in the back of the sheep. Not Elwyn or Irving. I was farming to the last day we had stock”
“Life was sheer hell. I don’t want to go outside, I don’t want a knife shoved into me. The answer is NO to everything. They thought I was gone but I didn’t want to die. No one could live in the Annexe – I have been told that her ex-husband is living in it.”
“He came back when he came back”
“The car referred to in the Letter was a Ford Sierra Cosworth purchased by dad and I on5 November 1990 for approximately£13,000.00 . We made equal contributions to the purchase price and it has always been owned by the both of us jointly. For the last 28 years the car had not been driven at all. Prior to his death, dad suggested I sell the car and invest the money into the Barn, as mentioned above. I listed the car for sale on eBay and it sold for£26,600 less£1,600 in commission.”
“… it is long-established practice that an equitable remedy should not be granted to an applicant who does not come before the court with ‘clean hands’. The grime on the hands must, of course, be sufficiently closely connected with the equitable remedy that is sought in order for an applicant to be denied a remedy to which he ordinarily would be entitled. And whether there is or is not a sufficiently close connection must depend on the facts of each case.”