“54. It would be open to this court to allow the appeal against the judge's refusal to strike out the petition on that ground alone. But, for my part, I would allow that appeal on a second, and additional, ground. I adopt, as a general principle, the observations of Millett J in Logicrose Ltd v Southend United Football Club Ltd (The Times,5 March 1988 ) that the object of the rules as to discovery is to secure the fair trial of the action in accordance with the due process of the court; and that, accordingly, a party is not to be deprived of his right to a proper trial as a penalty for disobedience of those rules – even if such disobedience amounts to contempt for or defiance of the court – if that object is ultimately secured, by (for example) the late production of a document which has been withheld. But where a litigant's conduct puts the fairness of the trial in jeopardy, where it is such that any judgment in favour of the litigant would have to be regarded as unsafe, or where it amounts to such an abuse of the process of the court as to render further proceedings unsatisfactory and to prevent the court from doing justice, the court is entitled – indeed, I would hold bound – to refuse to allow that litigant to take further part in the proceedings and (where appropriate) to determine the proceedings against him. The reason, as it seems to me, is that it is no part of the court's function to proceed to trial if to do so would give rise to a substantial risk of injustice. The function of the court is to do justice between the parties; not to allow its process to be used as a means of achieving injustice. A litigant who has demonstrated that he is determined to pursue proceedings with the object of preventing a fair trial has forfeited his right to take part in a trial. His object is inimical to the process which he purports to invoke. “55. Further, in this context, a fair trial is a trial which is conducted without an undue expenditure of time and money; and with a proper regard to the demands of other litigants upon the finite resources of the court. The court does not do justice to the other parties to the proceedings in question if it allows its process to be abused so that the real point in issue becomes subordinated to an investigation into the effect which the admittedly fraudulent conduct of one party in connection with the process of litigation has had on the fairness of the trial itself. That, as it seems to me, is what happened in the present case. The trial was ‘hijacked’ by the need to investigate what documents were false and what documents had been destroyed. The need to do that arose from the facts (i) that the petitioners had sought to rely on documents which Nigel Tobias had forged with the object of frustrating a fair trial and (ii) that, as the judge found, Nigel Tobias was unwilling to make a frank disclosure of the extent of his fraudulent conduct, but persisted in his attempts to deceive. The result was that the petitioners' case occupied far more of the court's time than was necessary for the purpose of deciding the real points in issue on the petition. That was unfair to the Blackledge respondents; and it was unfair to other litigants who needed to have their disputes tried by the court. “56. In my view, having heard and disbelieved the evidence of Nigel Tobias as to the extent of his fraudulent conduct, and having reached the conclusion (as he did) that Nigel Tobias was persisting in his object of frustrating a fair trial, the judge ought to have considered whether it was fair to the respondents – and in the interests of the administration of justice generally – to allow the trial to continue. If he had considered that question, then – as it seems to me – he should have come to the conclusion that it must be answered in the negative. A decision to stop the trial in those circumstances is not based on the court's desire (or any perceived need) to punish the party concerned; rather, it is a proper and necessary response where a party has shown that his object is not to have the fair trial which it is the court's function to conduct, but to have a trial the fairness of which he has attempted (and continues to attempt) to compromise.”
“72. We accept that, in theory, it would have been open to the judge, even at the conclusion of the hearing, to find that Mr Masood had forged documents and given fraudulent evidence, to hold that he had thereby forfeited the right to have the claims determined and to refuse to adjudicate upon them. We say “in theory” because it must be a very rare case where, at the end of a trial, it would be appropriate for a judge to strike out a case rather than dismiss it in a judgment on the merits in the usual way. 73. One of the objects to be achieved by striking out a claim is to stop the proceedings and prevent the further waste of precious resources on proceedings which the claimant has forfeited the right to have determined. Once the proceedings have run their course, it is too late to further that important objective. Once that stage has been achieved, it is difficult see what purpose is served by the judge striking out the claim (with reasons) rather than making findings and determining the issues in the usual way. If he finds that the claim is based on forgeries and fraudulent evidence, he will presumably dismiss the claim and make appropriate orders for costs. In a bad case, he can refer the papers to the relevant authorities for them to consider whether to prosecute for a criminal offence: we understand that this was done in the present case.”
“We agree with the Court of Appeal in Masood v Zahoor at para 72 quoted above that, while the court has power to strike a claim out at the end of a trial, it would only do so if it were satisfied that the party's abuse of process was such that he had thereby forfeited the right to have his claim determined. The Court of Appeal said that this is a largely theoretical possibility because it must be a very rare case in which, at the end of a trial, it would be appropriate for a judge to strike out a case rather than dismiss it in a judgment on the merits in the usual way. We agree and would add that the same is true where, as in this case, the court is able to assess both the liability of the defendant and the amount of that liability.”
“As on the28th December 2010 and in accordance with the Loan Agreement dated the 3rd of July 2000, the sum of£2,600,000 is due from you and to secure our interest, we have instructed our Solicitors to place a charge on your properties. “Please note that from 28th of December 2010 interest is charged at 9.5% compound on the total outstanding Loan. “Our solicitors will write to you with the details.”
“No, I paid my mortgage. I paid everything from the money he was giving me every month, right. I was going shopping. I was making sure to pay for my bills, to pay my mortgage … by Alan giving me all this years he didn’t own me. He didn’t own my life. He didn’t own the lipstick I bought. So I was just in a relationship where the man he took care of me and he did.”
“My interest lay in maximising the profits that would accrue to Maureen’s flats. Huda and her associates in Lebanon would also benefit from the increased value that would be attained by the flats Ebonair owned.”
“Mr Ward had told me that his wholly owned company Ebonair had loaned himself and Mrs Ward the sum of£1.85M in July 2000 from funds ultimately provided from his father’s estate in Iraq. Mr Ward told me those funds that were used [sic] to invest in Mr Ward’s various property developments. “Mr Ward explained that the charges were secured over all of Mrs Ward’s properties to protect his investment in case his wife left him due to his mistress Ms Dorobat being known to her. “Mr Ward provided a purported loan account statement for Ebonair which set out the outstanding loan balance and alleged interest payments made by Mrs Ward. However, this must be a work of fiction as Mr Utip [an English solicitor who has held a power of attorney for Ebonair since August 2016] has now stated that Ebonair does not have and never has had a bank account in any jurisdiction. “On17 September 2013 Hoffman Bokaei Solicitors drafted a witness statement for me to sign outlining a claim against Mrs Ward, for the recovery of loaned monies against her properties based upon the loan account statement provided by Mr Ward. “Mr Ward confirmed to me that the witness statement drafted by Hoffman Bokaei was a true reflection of the loan agreement between himself, his wife and Ebonair. “Mrs Ward did not contest the application and an order was obtained through the Court for Ebonair to sell Mrs Ward’s properties.”
“Paragraph 31 is denied. Mr IW Keen has been told by Mr Donnellan and believes that Ebonair was at all material times aware through its beneficial owner Mr Ward of each of the said payments, which were made with its knowledge and consent. Mr IW Keen’s sole involvement in the events giving rise to these proceedings has been to receive the monies alleged and to forward them to his daughter Ms Howard in connection with her acquisition of Flats 2, 3 and 4 Creative House. Mr IW Keen believes from Mr Donnellan and Ms Howard that the same was done with the consent of Ebonair and its beneficial owner, Mr Ward. “Mr IW Keen avers that, as he believes Ebonair and its beneficial owner Mr Ward know and knew, both at the time and throughout the time since, he, Mr IW Keen, has retained none of the said sums as has been demonstrated to Ebonair by the provision, (after the issue of the Part 20 Claim) to its solicitors of both his bank accounts and those of Ms Howard for the relevant period.”
“I’m going to draw up an agreement for you both to sign on Monday that you both agree to this arbitration process so that we can reach some agreement and close this off. To be honest my initial reaction was not to do this as I don’t want to get caught in any crossfire between you. However, if I can help solve this situation I will do it. I’m going to be completely fair and go through my numbers with you, giving you time to challenge and present additional information / evidence for me to take away to consider. I will then present my final findings to you both. Thank you.”
“Please see attached final file in respect of the request for a fair calculation of payment for Ricky’s investment in Manor Road, Norbury Road, and funds that he paid towards Battersea works. The bottom line number for Ricky is circa£460k , including the agreed 18% interest.”
“Good afternoon Ali and Ricky, I have returned from my break and I am pleased to say that I have now received a signed copy of the Arbitration Agreement from Ricky. I have attached copies of both agreements and the final file for you both. My file is now closed Kind regards, Bobi”
“Arbitration Agreement The undersigned hereby consents to voluntarily agree to submit any dispute with Ricky Keane and Alan Ward to final and binding arbitration. You agree that any and all controversies, claims, or disputes arising out of, relating to or concerning any interpretation, construction, performance or breach of the Manor Road agreement by and between you and the company entered into as of1st April 2014 . You further consent that any arbitration will be administered by Bobi Howard for the sum of£200 . You also agree that the arbitrator shall have the power to award any remedies applicable following investigation. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties of arbitration. You acknowledge and agree that you are executing this agreement voluntarily and without any duress and undue influence by company or anyone else.”
“On the other hand, partnership depends on agreement. While partnership is ‘more than a simple contract’, it is ‘a consensual arrangement based on agreement’ (Lord Millett in Hurst v Bryk[2002] 1 AC 185 , at 194). Co-ownership need not be the result of agreement, but ‘[p]artnership is’ (to use words of Lord Lindley quoted in Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 19th ed., at paragraph 5-08). In McPhail v Bourne[2008] EWHC 1235 (Ch) , Morgan J noted (at paragraph 256) that ‘it is a precondition to the existence of a partnership that there is a binding contractual relationship between the parties’. If I am right in thinking that no binding contract was concluded between the parties, no partnership can have come into being either.”
“In numerous conversations between Donnellan and Ward, those parties agreed to carry on the business of the redevelopment of Creative House, the two of them in common with a view of profit, and, additionally, such other properties as they might acquire and/or develop and/or invest in and/or hold and/or sell, thereby creating a relationship of partnership between them (“the Partnership”) – see also the Claimant’s Revised Further Information dated19 August 2019 at Responses 7 & 8. “The Partnership was agreed orally; there being no written partnership agreement or deed, it was one to which the provisions of thePartnership Act 1890 (‘the Act’) applied and was a partnership at will. “It was expressly agreed in the course of the said conversations that Donnellan and Ward would share in the profits and losses of the redevelopment of Creative House and such other properties as they might acquire and/or develop and/or invest in and/or hold and/or sell in the proportion 25%/75% in Ward’s favour. “It was further agreed in the course of the said conversations that Donnellan would be entitled to drawings of£50,000 a year and that Ward would be entitled to drawings of£150,000 a year – see also the Claimant’s Revised Further Information dated19 August 2019 at Responses 9 to 12 inclusive.”
“Request 7: When is it on the Claimant’s case that the Claimant says a partnership was first agreed? What were the words said? “Response 7: The partnership was agreed on27th April 2012 . The Further Information actually states27th April 2019 , rather than27th April 2012 , but it is agreed that this is a typographical error and I have therefore corrected the quoted text. Following the successful procurement of investment and subsequent rejuvenation of the development (and the prevention of foreclosure), Mr Ward came to the Claimant offering a full time partnership arrangement. Mr Ward said “if I had been in partnership with you [the Claimant] 10 years ago we would be worth at least£100m and would be flying around in private jets” and that “if you [the Claimant] had been my partner at the time of the Coldharbour lane [sic] development in Brixton and the Southville development in Vauxhall, you could have prevented the repossession of both sites”. “Request 8: at the time of agreement is it the Claimant’s case that partnership assets were agreed and if so what were they? “Response 8: Mr Ward was in a weak position financially and had no means of refinancing the roof space and ground floor leases through his offshore company Ebonair. The whole of Creative House was unoccupied and producing no income at all and in need of total refurbishment, due to lack of funding. Mr Ward therefore required the Claimant’s help to raise the necessary funds to redevelop the whole of Creative House. It was agreed that the proceeds of the income and eventual sale of the whole of Creative House would be split 75/25% in Mr Ward's favour. The partnership assets were the whole of Creative House.”
“During March and April 2012, following the successful procurement of investment and subsequent rejuvenation of the development (and prevention of foreclosure), Mr Ward came to me offering a full time partnership arrangement. “Mr Ward told me that had I been in partnership with him ten years ago “we would be worth at least£100m and would be flying around in private jets” and he further said, had he been his partner at the time of his Coldharbour lane [sic] development in Brixton and his Southfield development in Vauxhall, I could have prevented the repossession of both sites.”
“No, there was a meeting all the way through and it was suggested that once Ricky completes then the Partnership comes into effect. Because if the money wasn’t drawn down and Ricky didn’t go on the mortgages, there wouldn’t have been a Partnership, or if there was money raised somewhere else with another party or Ward didn’t accept it.”
“Hi David, Tony, my business partner, Sent you some details for the above site. We are very anxious to start work on the planning issues and it will be very helpful to meet with you to discuss. Regards, Alan Ward”. b. By an email dated29 July 2016 , with the subject “Chronicle heights, 152 olive road”, Mr Ward emailed Mr Vango at Barnard Marcus estate agents, saying: “Dear Mr Vango, My business partner Anthony and myself received your e mail regarding the valuation for the above site. Please note that these are just initial thoughts from us and nothing more, and we do not expect to see the site or these figures appearing anywhere on your site or otherwise. Finally, I would like to thank you for your co operation in this matter. Regards, Alan Ward”
“Ali, I agree that you are entitled to 75% of the true net profits of all our development sites. In addition I am to receive£50,000 per annum in income from the service apartment business in Battersea which was agreed in 2012. The net profits needs to be calculated once all the finance costs legal fees and other expenses are taken into account, and the true cost of the building work is known and agreed. As you know large sums of money have not been accounted for. I am confirming this at your request, but it has always been agreed that you have no voting rights in Old street homes ltd and that will continue to remain so.”
“Where an English law contract is signed by a person in his own name then, although the question is one of construction of the written document, prima facie he is deemed to contract personally and not as agent. In order to prevent personal liability from arising, the signatory must be able to demonstrate from other portions of the contract that he did not intend to bind himself as principal. The position stated in Bowstead & Reynolds is that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict the written contract, unless it is evidence of custom or usage or is to rectify the bargain or to demonstrate mistake and hence that no contract has come into existence at all. The House of Lords in Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson has now authoritatively restated this to be the position. Where a contract is in writing, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict the written document, but where a contract is equivocal as to whether a person has signed as agent or not, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve this question.”
“Please see attached final file in respect of the request for a fair calculation of payment for Ricky’s investment in Manor Road, Norbury Road, and funds that he paid towards Battersea works. The bottom line number for Ricky is circa£460k , including the agreed 18% interest.”
“Good afternoon Ali and Ricky, I have returned from my break and I am pleased to say that I have now received a signed copy of the Arbitration Agreement from Ricky. I have attached copies of both agreements and the final file for you both. My file is now closed Kind regards, Bobi”
“A declaratory judgment is a formal statement by a court pronouncing upon the existence or non-existence of a legal state of affairs. It is to be contrasted with an executory, in other words coercive, judgment which can be enforced by the courts. In the case of an executory judgment, the courts determine the respective rights of the parties and then order the defendant to act in a certain way, for example, by an order to pay damages or to refrain from interfering with the claimant’s rights; if the order is disregarded, it can be enforced by official action, usually be levying execution against the defendant’s property or by imprisoning him for contempt of court. A declaratory judgment, on the other hand, pronounces upon a legal relationship but does not contain any order which can be enforced against the defendant. Thus the court may, for example, declare that the claimant is the owner of certain property, that he is a British subject, that a contract to which he is a party has or has not been determined, or that a notice served upon him by a public body is invalid and of not effect. In other words, the declaration simply pronounces on what is the legal position.”
“If a party to arbitral proceedings takes part, or continues to take part, in the proceedings without making, either forthwith or within such time as is allowed by the arbitration agreement or the tribunal or by any provision of this Part, any objection – (a) that the tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction, (b) that the proceedings have been improperly conducted, (c) that there has been a failure to comply with the arbitration agreement or with any provision of this Part, or (d) that there has been any other irregularity affecting the tribunal or the proceedings, he may not raise that objection later, before the tribunal or the court, unless he shows that, at the time he took part or continued to take part in the proceedings, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection.”