‘…in sufficient time to enable them to consider what is proposed, to take appropriate advice, and, if so advised, to attend the convening hearing. What is adequate notice will depend on all the circumstances. The evidence at the convening hearing should explain the steps which have been taken to give the notification and what, if any, response the applicant has had to the notification.’
‘In each case the answer to that question will depend upon analysis (i) of the rights which are to be released or varied under the scheme and (ii) of the new rights (if any) which the scheme gives, by way of compromise or arrangement, to those whose rights are to be released or varied.’
‘The test is based on similarity or dissimilarity of legal rights against the company, not on similarity or dissimilarity of interests not derived from such legal rights. The fact that individuals may hold divergent views based on their own private interests not derived from their legal rights against the company is not a ground for calling separate meetings … The question is whether the rights which are to be released or varied under the scheme or the new rights which the scheme gives in their place are so different that the scheme must be treated as a compromise or arrangement with more than one class.’
‘[I]t seems to me that the onus placed on the court in exercising its jurisdiction to make an order which will be given recognition elsewhere may well require it to be especially wary if, for example, the new choice is of a law which appears entirely alien to the parties’ previous arrangements and/or with which the parties had no previous connection; or if the change in law has no discernible rationale or purpose other than to advantage those in favour at the expense of the dissentients; or even more generally, where in its discretion the court considers that, in the places in which the parties are, the extent of the alteration of rights between the parties for which sanction is sought would be considered a “step too far”.’
‘52. The first is that the court will always wish to ensure that it does not act in vain… 54. The second principle is that the court will be unlikely to sanction a scheme if the condition is one which gives a discretion to a third party as to whether or not they will take some step necessary to render the scheme effective. Henderson J made this clear in the passage from Lombard Medical that I have already cited. In my view what he said was consistent with sound principle. If the satisfaction of a condition to the effectiveness of the scheme as a whole is left to the ultimate discretion of a third party, it is capable of cutting across the requirements of creditor approval, court sanction (in which the court not any other person is required to exercise a discretion) and registration, which are the three steps for plan effectiveness for which the statute provides. … 57. The third important principle of more general application is one of clarity and certainty. Provided that clarity and certainty are present on the face of the scheme or plan and no further decision‑making process is required, in other words it is self‑executing without the further intervention of an interested third party, there is much less likely to be a problem.’
‘[72] The second question raised by Mr Isaacs relates to issues of conditionality. In Re Smile Telecoms Holdings Ltd[2021] EWHC 685 (Ch) at [52]ff, having reviewed a number of the authorities, I explained that sufficient certainty is required so that the court will not act in vain. But this principle is normally applicable where failure to satisfy a condition means that the Scheme has no effect at all. It has less relevance where the scheme is effective, but the actual outcome may differ depending on the occurrence of a future event. In that type of case the issue has more to do with whether the scheme creditors have been properly informed as to what may or may not occur than it does with whether the court may have acted in vain. [73] In any event, the court does not require certainty that any conditions will be satisfied and it is clear that the degree of assurance that the court requires will depend on the circumstances of the case. It seems to me that the point which normally matters is what I expressed as the third principle in Smile Telecoms[2021] EWHC 685 (Ch) at [57]: 'The third important principle of more general application is one of clarity and certainty. Provided that clarity and certainty are present on the face of the scheme or plan and no further decision-making process is required, in other words it is self-executing without the further intervention of an interested third party, there is much less likely to be a problem.'’
‘The relevant principles are, I think, clear although the language in which they have been expressed has occasionally differed. But the words of a judgment are not to be treated in the same way as the words of a statute: and the concepts behind the modes of expression are clear. The principles seem to me to be these: i) The Court will not generally make an order which has no substantial effect and will therefore need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve its purpose: Re Magyar Telecom BV[2014] BCC 448 at [16] per David Richards J. ii) The Court will therefore need to be satisfied that the scheme will achieve a substantial purpose in the key jurisdictions in which the scheme company has liabilities or assets: Sompo Japan Insurance Inc v Transfercom Limited[2007] EWHC 146 (Ch) at [18]-[26] per David Richards J. iii) The English court does not need certainty as to the position under foreign law, but it does require some credible evidence that it will not be acting in vain: Re van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] Bus LR 1046 at [71] per Snowden J. iv) Such credible evidence must show that the scheme is “likely, or at least will have a real prospect, of having substantial effect” or “at least a reasonable prospect that the scheme will be recognised and given effect”: Re Codere Finance 2 (UK) Limited[2020] EWHC 2683 (Ch) at [34] per Falk J, Re KCA Deutag UK Finance plc[2020] EWHC 2977 (Ch) at [32] per Snowden J. This is not the “real prospect” standard that it is applied in procedural applications for striking out or for the grant of summary judgment or permission to appeal. Rather it is the degree of persuasion of which Hoffmann J spoke in Re Harris Simons Construction Limited[1989] 1 WLR 368 at 370-371 and is now regularly applied (for example) in the administration context in relation to paragraph 11(b) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act. “Reasonable prospect” captures it without further elaboration.’