“(2) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign where because— (a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, or (b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the trade mark. (3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade, in relation to goods or services, a sign which— (a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, (b) [deleted by amendment] where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. (3A) Subsection (3) applies irrespective of whether the goods and services in relation to which the sign is used are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered. … (4) For the purposes of this section a person uses a sign if, in particular, he— (a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof; (b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the market or stocks them for those purposes under the sign, or offers or supplies services under the sign; (c) imports or exports goods under the sign; (ca) uses the sign as a trade or company name or part of a trade or company name; (d) uses the sign on business papers and in advertising; or (e) uses the sign in comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to the Business Protection fromMisleading Marketing Regulations 2008 .” (a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, or (b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, (b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the market or stocks them for those purposes under the sign, or offers or supplies services under the sign; (c) imports or exports goods under the sign; (ca) uses the sign as a trade or company name or part of a trade or company name; (d) uses the sign on business papers and in advertising; or (e) uses the sign in comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to the Business Protection fromMisleading Marketing Regulations 2008 .”
“i) the average consumer is a hypothetical person or, as he has been called, a legal construct; he is a person who has been created to strike the right balance between the various competing interests including, on the one hand, the need to protect consumers and, on the other hand, the promotion of free trade in an openly competitive market, and also to provide a standard, defined in EU law, which national courts may then apply; ii) the average consumer is not a statistical test; the national court must exercise its own judgment in accordance with the principle of proportionality and the principles explained by the Court of Justice to determine the perceptions of the average consumer in any given case in the light of all the circumstances; the test provides the court with a perspective from which to assess the particular question it has to decide; (iii) in a case involving ordinary goods and services, the court may be able to put itself in the position of the average consumer without requiring evidence from consumers, still less expert evidence or a consumer survey. In such a case, the judge can make up his or her own mind about the particular issue he or she has to decide in the absence of evidence and using his or her own common sense and experience of the world. …”
“58. … Where there is some overall similarity, even faint, then it is necessary to carry out the global assessment, taking account of all relevant circumstances. Moreover, in such cases, the enhanced distinctive character of the mark may play a role in increasing the likelihood of confusion. 59. On the other hand the cases do show that the General Court has said that where there is (a) average visual and phonetic similarity, but no conceptual similarity (Wesergold), or (b) a number of visual and phonetic features which precluded the signs from being perceived as similar (Ferrero), or (c) no visual or phonetic similarity but a low degree of conceptual similarity (Lufthansa), or (d) a common suffix (Kaul), there may yet be no similarity overall between mark and sign. I have no difficulty with these conclusions: it is only overall similarity which counts. 60. Thus I would summarise the position in the following way: i) The court should assess the phonetic, visual and conceptual similarity of mark and sign and decide whether, overall, mark and sign would be perceived as having any similarity by the average consumer. ii) If no overall similarity at all would be perceived, the court would be justified in declining to go on and consider the likelihood of confusion applying the global appreciation test, as Article 9(1)(b) is conditional on the existence of some similarity. Such situations are not likely to occur often in contested litigation, but where they do occur, it is not legitimate to take account of any enhanced reputation or recognition of the mark. iii) Where the average consumer would perceive some overall similarity, however faint, the court must go on to conduct the global appreciation test for the likelihood of confusion, taking account where appropriate of any enhanced reputation or recognition of the mark. iv) In conducting the global appreciation test the court must take forward its assessment of the degree of similarity perceived by the average consumer between mark and sign.”
“(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors; (b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question; (c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details; (d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements; (e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components; (f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark; (g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa; (h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it; (i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient; (j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; (k) if the association between the marks causes the public to wrongly believe that the respective goods [or services] come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.”
“…if, having regard to the perceptions and expectations of the average consumer, the court concludes that a significant proportion of the relevant public is likely to be confused such as to warrant the intervention of the court then it may properly find infringement.”
“If the mark and the sign have both been used and there has been actual confusion between them, this may be powerful evidence that their similarity is such that there exists a likelihood of confusion. But conversely, the absence of actual confusion despite side-by-side use may be powerful evidence that they are not sufficiently similar to give rise to a likelihood of confusion. This may not always be so, however. The reason for the absence of confusion may be that the mark has only been used to a limited extent or in relation to only some of the goods or services for which it is registered, or in such a way that there has been no possibility of the one being taken for the other.”