“Section 11 – Byelaws under Act of 1949 and wardens. (1) The powers of the Park Authority to make byelaws and to appoint wardens under sections 90 and 92 of the Act of 1949 shall apply to the whole area of the commons to which under section 10(1) of this Act a right of access is given or such part thereof as may be specified in the byelaws as if the commons were land comprised in an access agreement in force under Part V of that Act.”
“Section 193 – Rights of the public over commons and waste lands. (1) Members of the public shall, subject as hereinafter provided, have rights of access for air and exercise to any land which is a metropolitan common within the meaning of the Metropolitan Commons Acts, 1866 to 1898, or manorial waste, or a common, which is wholly or partly situated within an area which immediately before1st April 1974 was a borough or urban district, and to any land which at the commencement of this Act is subject to rights of common and to which this section may from time to time be applied in manner hereinafter provided: […] (4) Any person who, without lawful authority, draws or drives upon any land to which this section applies any carriage, cart, caravan, truck, or other vehicle, or camps or lights any fire thereon, or who fails to observe any limitation or condition imposed by the Minister under this section in respect of any such land, shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding£20 for each offence.”
“2 Rights of public in relation to access land. (1) Any person is entitled by virtue of this subsection to enter and remain on any access land for the purposes of open-air recreation, if and so long as— (a) he does so without breaking or damaging any wall, fence, hedge, stile or gate, and (b) he observes the general restrictions in Schedule 2 and any other restrictions imposed in relation to the land under Chapter II.”
“Restrictions to be observed by persons having rights of access” and provides, so far as relevant: “….section 2(1) does not entitle a person to be on any land if, in or on that land, he— … (s) engages in any organised games, or in camping, hang-gliding or para-gliding,”
“In R (Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2022] UKSC 3 ;[2022] 2 WLR 343 , Lord Hodge DPSC in his leading judgment, with which all in the majority concurred, reiterated, at para 29, that the primary source by which meaning is ascertained is by way of conducting an analysis of the language used by Parliament. Lord Hodge DPSC stated, at para 31, that “Statutory interpretation involves an objective assessment of the meaning which a reasonable legislature as a body would be seeking to convey in using the statutory words which are being considered.”
“Other sources, such as Law Commission reports, reports of Royal Commissions and advisory committees, and Government White Papers may disclose the background to a statute and assist the court to identify not only the mischief which it addresses but also the purpose of the legislation, thereby assisting a purposive interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The context disclosed by such materials is relevant to assist the court to ascertain the meaning of the statute, whether or not there is ambiguity and uncertainty, and indeed may reveal ambiguity or uncertainty: Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation , 8th ed (2020), para 11.2. But none of these external aids displace the meanings conveyed by the words of a statute that, after consideration of that context, are clear and unambiguous and which do not produce absurdity.””
“However, such references are not a legitimate aid to statutory interpretation unless the three critical conditions set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper v Hart[1993] AC 593 , 640 are met. The three critical conditions are (i) that the legislative provision must be ambiguous, obscure or, on a conventional interpretation, lead to absurdity; (ii) that the material must be or include one or more statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill; and (iii) the statement must be clear and unequivocal on the point of interpretation which the court is considering.”
“Even in cases where some degree of interference with a person’s proprietary rights is clearly intended, legislation will be construed as interfering with those rights no more than the statutory language and purpose require…Perhaps the most severe interference with property rights is expropriation, where the courts are particularly likely to impose a strict construction. [The passage from Buckley LJ’s judgment is then cited]. The principle against expropriation or other interference with the enjoyment of property rights is likely to carry particular weight in cases where no compensation is payable.”
“It is unnecessary in my view to attempt a general reconciliation of these various conflicting strands of authority or to explore the full breadth of the principle which they illustrate. My own respectful view is that Lord Blackburn's more liberal view is supported by considerations of common sense and the principle of legal certainty. Where an Act has been interpreted in a particular way without dissent over a long period, those interested should be able to continue to order their affairs on that basis without risk of it being upset by a novel approach. That applies particularly in a relatively esoteric area of the law such as the present, in relation to which cases may rarely come before the courts, and the established practice is the only guide for operators and their advisers.”
“In my view this case provides an opportunity for this court to confirm that settled practice may, in appropriate circumstances, be a legitimate aid to statutory interpretation. Where the statute is ambiguous, but it has been the subject of authoritative interpretation in the lower courts, and where businesses or activities, public or private, have reasonably been ordered on that basis for a significant period without serious problems or injustice, there should be a strong presumption against overturning that settled practice in the higher courts. This should not necessarily depend on the degree or frequency of Parliamentary interventions in the field. As in the Anglesey case, the infrequency of Parliamentary intervention in an esoteric area of the law may itself be an added reason for respecting the settled practice. On the other hand it may be relevant to consider whether the accepted interpretation is consistent with the grain of the legislation as it has evolved, and subsequent legislative action or inaction may be relevant to that assessment.”
“I have even greater reservations about the so-called "customary meaning" rule. As just mentioned, a court should not lightly decide that a statute has a meaning which is different from that which the court believes that it has. Indeed, so to decide could be said to be a breach of the fundamental duty of the court to give effect to the will of parliament as expressed in the statute. Legal certainty and settled practice, referred to by Lord Carnwath in paras 94-97 are, as I see it, an aspect of customary meaning. Although Lord Bridge expressed himself as he did in Otter v Norman[1989] AC 129 , 145-6 (as quoted by Lord Carnwath in para 96), neither Barras nor Farrell was cited to him, and he relied on the fact that "for many years, many landlords and tenants have regulated their relationships on [the] basis that" observations in an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal were right. Even on that basis, I would wish to reserve my position as to the correctness of Lord Bridge's obiter observations.”
“the public shall have a right of access to the commons on foot and on horseback…”
“The Dartmoor Visitor Information for 1982” which stated: “…all land in the National Park, like land anywhere in Britain, has an owner and his or her permission is required before stopping for the night. This is nothing more than common sense and courtesy on enclosed land, but you may not realise that it also applies on the open moor. However, if it is solitude and wide open spaces that you want, landowners do not in practice normally raise objection to a single tent pitched on unenclosed land for a night out of sight of houses and roads. But if you are asked to move on, you will have to do so.”
“The public generally has no legal right to enter upon common land without the landowner’s consent. But on commons designated under theLaw of Property Act 1925 s 193 (on Dartmoor Spitchwick and Hayter Down Commons) commons lying wholly or partly in Borough or Urban Districts…a statutory or de jure right of access for air and exercise exists….On the remaining commons in the National Park, the public has for very many years enjoyed implied or de facto access. This was formally recognized when the area was so designated in 1951…”
“Permission of the landowner is the legal requirement. In ‘open country’ in the National Park, for individual walkers or for small parties on adventure or similar expeditions camping for a night, permission is deemed to exist owing to practical difficulties and long custom.”
“The practice of ‘camping wild’, that is on open land where no facilities exist, calls for no action where such campers are few in number and well-dispersed, but where concentrations of such campers occur in particular places, primitive means of rubbish disposal and sanitation may become objectionable. In such circumstances, the park authority should seek, in cooperation with landowners, to regulate this use of the land.”
“The second part of the Bill aims to give the public a right to walk and ride over the common land. That is clause 10. It sets an important precedent. The 1980 Bill gave the right only to walkers, but this Bill extends it to horse riders, who have enjoyed riding over the moor for centuries.”
“Although I have no right to be here, I am not a trespasser and you have no right to throw me off”
“[this] is not to affect permanent, authorised camping and caravanning sites or the use for those activities of enclosed land on the commons with the leave of the owner or of lands upon the environs of common land.”
“Q. By clause 10(3)(b) do you seek to prohibit that the owner of the farm or the smallholding who today may lawfully allow a camper and caravanner on his land occasionally from continuing to permit that practice? A. With common land in his ownership, yes. Q. Can you just tell me this for a moment. If a byelaw is made in accordance with…clause 10 that prohibits camping, whether in caravans or otherwise, that is going to affect, is it not, the owner of that part of the commons so far as his …ability to allow that camper or caravanner to go upon that land? A. That is right. … We are asking that there shall not be a situation in which any agent shall be capable of giving permission for the erection of a tent or the placing of a caravan on the common land of Dartmoor because of the problems that arise from that fact and the problem that immediately arises…is that some owners [are] willing to give permission and some owners [are not] willing to give permission.”
“For hundreds of years people have travelled over the moor by horse and on foot and no-one has objected to it. It is only because of the legislation that the matter has raised its head. The question is whether the landowner should have his right extinguished by an Act, or whether he should have some agreement with the county council that affords the walker or rider the same protection, but gives him the freedom to say that it is his land. The only snag is all the ramifications involved.”
“Having created a Commoners’ Council with National Park Authority representation, to produce the discipline and management of the commons which both the social and economic well being of Dartmoor and the maintenance of its natural beauty demand, the Bill then proposes a right of public access on foot and it carefully places the control of the consequences of that right on the National Park Authority…”
“…the essence of this Bill is a management and access agreement between the National Park Authority and all those farmers depending upon the common land of Dartmoor in the interests of the better management of the National Park, and an enhanced opportunity for recreation and enjoyment of natural beauty, space and solitude which Dartmoor can offer. If the parties concerned can regard themselves as joint stewards of Dartmoor’s future, this Bill tries to set up a framework for that stewardship.”
“There are a number of sites where people go because they are popular; they are unauthorised in the sense that they have not been set up on licensed sites, and damage is done-of course-litter is left, amongst other things- pollution is actually feared…notwithstanding that there is no right upon Dartmoor except in very special circumstances, there is considerable de facto use, pressure and harm; and it is for that reason…that it is thought right , if the public are now to be permitted, as a matter of law, to go onto the common, that there should be proper regulation of those activities.”
“This is not normally a problem. The only time it can become a problem is when nightfall comes at the edge of the road, and then the innocent backpacker starts a camp site, and is joined by other people-the British people have a tendency to join together in that sort of situation, they think ‘that must be a good place’ and they go there. That is the only time. It is the policy of the National Park Authority and its predecessor that back-pack camping is an obvious use of the high plateau on Dartmoor.”
“Private law issues must be decided in accordance with the rules of private law. The broader and less rigorous rules of administrative law should not without adjustment be applied to the resolution of private law disputes in civil proceedings. Public law, that is to say, the law governing public law entities and their activities, is a primary source of the principles applied in administrative law proceedings. The decisions of such entities are the normal subject matter of applications for judicial review. When the activities of a public law body, or individual, are relevant to a private law dispute in civil proceedings, public law may in a similar way provide answers which are relevant to the resolution of the private law issue. But after taking into account the applicable public law, the civil proceedings have to be decided as a matter of private law. The issue does not become an administrative law issue; administrative law remedies are irrelevant.”
“The camping and caravan clubs asked the Select Committee to delete the Park Authority’s bye-law making powers to control camping on common land. While the back-pack camper causes no problems those in caravans, dormobiles and highly coloured frame tents do. The Park Authority have actively encouraged the opening of new sites sometimes in cooperation with a camping organisation. There are now sufficient sites in and around the National Park to meet the demand and there is no need for casual camping by the roadside or on open common land. Such camping spoils the enjoyment of the open landscape for others, gives rise to a risk of disease in commoners’ animals and injury from certain types of litter. The Committee made no amendment.”
“As you know, we have been objecting to Clause 10 of the…Bill on the grounds that the byelaw powers sought could take away the rights of landowners enjoyed under public legislation to permit their land to be used for camping and caravanning.”