‘If that is correct, then the 95 documents are at least very strong evidence that Dr Wright is Satoshi Nakamoto, as is clear from their nature and contents.’
‘34. The White Paper LaTeX Files are therefore of the highest possible importance for the trial of the Identity Issue, and that issue cannot fairly be determined unless Dr Wright is entitled to rely on these documents and have his case on the significance of these documents addressed in expert evidence.’ c) The Documentary Credits Assignment Documents. These are relied upon to rebut an allegation by COPA that the version of this document already disclosed was backdated to 2007 by forgery. Ms Field says: ‘Given the seriousness of the allegation made by the Claimant, and the potential for these documents to answer that allegation, fairness requires that Dr Wright be permitted to rely on them.’
‘In advance of the hearing on Friday the Judge makes the following requests (having done some – but not complete - reading (which has included all the skeletons and most of the witness statements)): 1. He would like COPA and Dr Wright to consider whether there are practical limitations which can be imposed on each side’s case so as to enable the trial to proceed in the existing trial listing. 2. More specifically: a. COPA should consider which of their currently pleaded 50 allegations of forgery may be repetitious and nominate their principal allegations. b. Dr Wright must produce an updated list of his Reliance Documents, with an indication of which such documents are the most important for his case. c. Both sides should produce an updated estimate of how long it would take to conduct forensic analysis of the 97 new documents, assuming forensic images are provided, and/or Dr Wright’s selection of Reliance Documents from the 97. 3. He would also like an update as to Dr Wright's progress since1st December 2023 in responding to COPA's allegations of forgery. Specifically, to which documents has he been able to formulate his evidence in response?’
‘As explained in our Skeleton Argument, we are satisfied that forensic analysis of the 97 Documents cannot be completed before the scheduled start of trial. Having spoken to Dr Placks, he does not believe that he could complete the exercise of analysing the Additional Documents, including the 97 Documents, and examining the non-Reliance Documents alleged by COPA to be forgeries, before the end of January 2024 at the earliest. As already noted, Dr Placks will need to take account of Dr Wright’s factual evidence about the computer environment in which he was working at material times. In their joint report, Mr Madden and Dr Placks agree on the importance to their analysis of “contextual data regarding the provenance and transmittal of the subject files” {Q/2/2}. Dr Wright is working to provide such textual information in his reply evidence. Allowing sufficient time for completion of these exercises will be essential to the fairness of the trial. The exercise that Dr Placks is required to complete cannot be compared to the much shorter exercise carried out by Mr Madden to produce his third expert report (apparently in six days, although we note that Bird & Bird has subsequently accepted that Mr Madden had access to the relevant documents for longer than that and had carried out “preparatory” work).’
‘On the assumption that Dr Wright is given permission to rely on the majority/all of the Additional Documents and possibly some other active case management as well, the parties are requested to propose (and if possible, agree) a timetable to the following alternative trial listings: 1) Trial hearing commences on29th January 2024 with 1 day of oral openings, judicial pre-reading in the week before, evidence commencing on 30th January, and oral closing submissions on 5th-8th March 2024 . 2) Trial hearing commences on5th February 2024 with 1 day of oral openings, judicial pre-reading in the week before, evidence commencing on 6th February, and oral closing submissions on 12th-15th March 2024 .’
“20. Before I consider these points in turn, I would make some general observations on adjournments. Every tribunal or court has a discretion to grant an adjournment, and the exercise of such a discretion, going as it does to the management of a case, is one with which an appellate body is slow to interfere and can only interfere on limited grounds, as has repeatedly been recognised. But one recognised ground for interference is where the tribunal or court exercising the discretion takes into account some matter which it ought not to have taken into account … Although an adjournment is a discretionary matter, some adjournments must be granted if not to do so amounts to a denial of justice. Where the consequences of the refusal of an adjournment are severe, such as where it will lead to the dismissal of the proceedings, the tribunal or court must be particularly careful not to cause an injustice to the litigant seeking an adjournment. … 21. A litigant whose presence is needed for the fair trial of a case, but who is unable to be present through no fault of his own, will usually have to be granted an adjournment, however inconvenient it may be to the tribunal or court and to the other parties. That litigant's right to a fair trial underArticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights demands nothing less. But the tribunal or court is entitled to be satisfied that the inability of the litigant to be present is genuine, and the onus is on the applicant for an adjournment to prove the need for such an adjournment.” 47. In Terluk v Berezovsky[2010] EWCA Civ 1345 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the refusal of an application to adjourn, made on the eve of trial in a long-running case, to enable the defendant to obtain legal representation. The Court of Appeal made clear that the relevant question was whether the decision on the adjournment application was fair (§ 18). On the facts, the Court of Appeal said: “31. …The point on which Mr Davenport lays all emphasis is the fact that proper legal representation was now within the defendant's grasp if the judge would adjourn the case. If that meant three months' delay, it was, he submits, an entirely fair price to pay for equality of arms. 32. It is this which has given us the greatest pause. In deciding whether it was a factor which made it clearly unfair to proceed with the trial, however, it is necessary to look a little further. ... 33. What confronted Eady J, however, was an assertion that money, in a large sum and from a still mysterious source, was going to be available. What was strikingly absent was so much as a letter from McGrigors or any other firm of solicitors confirming their preparedness to act and the reliability of the promised funding. It is unsurprising in these circumstances that the judge took the view that there was “no clarity” about it. It was less significant in this situation that he was also dubious about counsel's availability. If sound evidence of dependable funding had been put before him, we might very well have held that individual counsel's availability was not a sufficient reason for denying the defendant the benefit of it. But what was critical for the judge, as it has to be for us, is that even on the Monday it appeared unlikely that an adjournment would achieve anything because there was no sufficient reason to believe that the promised money would materialise.”
“… the authorities make clear that, in reviewing the exercise of discretion, the Court of Appeal has to be satisfied that the decision to refuse the adjournment was not "unfair": for example, see Terluk v Berezovsky[2010] EWCA Civ 1345 (per Sedley LJ at paras 18-20), quoted below, particularly in circumstances where his right to a fair trial underArticle 6 ECHR is at stake” and the passages from Teinaz §§ 21 and 22 quoted above. On the facts, the court concluded: “44. In my judgment, therefore, this was one of the rare circumstances, as considered by Peter Gibson LJ in Teinaz, where an adjournment had to be granted, because not to do so amounted to a denial of justice. The consequences of the refusal of an adjournment in this case, apparently based on the judge's personal assessment of a litigant in person's health, notwithstanding the appellant's general practitioner's view that he was suffering from depression, were particularly severe. The appellant's defence was struck out and he was deprived of an opportunity to give live evidence, to cross-examine any of the respondents' witnesses or to call evidence on his own behalf. The respondents' evidence was adduced without any challenge since the two witnesses called did nothing more than state that their witness statements were true. Moreover, the appellant faced a claim for what, so far as he was concerned, was a substantial sum in damages and resultant legal costs. 45. I have no doubt that, on a proper evaluation of the relevant considerations, the appellant's Article 6 rights and the irreversible prejudice occasioned to him as a result of the refusal of an adjournment, clearly outweighed the costs and unavoidable inconvenience to the respondents that would have been occasioned by a short adjournment.” 49. In Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Tradition Financial Services Ltd[2021] EWCA Civ 221 , the Court of Appeal held that a trial should have been adjourned where an important witness for the defendant, who was accused of dishonesty, was unable to attend trial to give oral evidence for bona fide medical reasons, but (in the light of a new and much improved prognosis) there was every reason to think that she would be able to attend if the adjournment were granted. The court considered authorities including Teinaz, Terluk and Solanki, and made the following statements of principle: “30. … the guiding principle in an application to adjourn of this type is whether if the trial goes ahead it will be fair in all the circumstances; that the assessment of what is fair is a fact- sensitive one, and not one to be judged by the mechanistic application of any particular checklist; that although the inability of a party himself to attend trial through illness will almost always be a highly material consideration, it is artificial to seek to draw a sharp distinction between that case and the unavailability of a witness; and that the significance to be attached to the inability of an important witness to attend through illness will vary from case to case, but that it will usually be material, and may be decisive. And if the refusal of an adjournment would make the resulting trial unfair, an adjournment should ordinarily be granted, regardless of inconvenience to the other party or other court users, unless this were outweighed by injustice to the other party that could not be compensated for.” and (by reference to the appellant’s submissions): “49. Mr Scorey's propositions were as follows: (1) Whether as a matter of the common law's insistence on a fair trial, or the requirements of Article 6, or the application of the overriding objective, the test is the same, namely whether a refusal of an adjournment will lead to an unfair trial. I agree. This is a consistent thread from the early cases … which refer to a miscarriage of justice or an injustice, through Teinaz ("a denial of justice") to the more recent cases, which repeatedly identify the question as one of fairness: see in particular Terluk at [18] and Solanki at [32]. … (3) When considering whether a particular outcome is fair, it should not be assumed that only one outcome is fair. This is established by the authorities: Terluk at [20], Dhillon [Dhillon v Asiedu[2012] EWCA Civ 1020 ] at [33(b)]. But equally in some circumstances there is really only one answer: see Teinaz at [20] ("some adjournments must be granted"). (4) Fairness involves fairness to both parties. But inconvenience to the other party (or other court users) is not a relevant countervailing factor and is usually not a reason to refuse an adjournment. This is again established by the authorities. As to fairness involving fairness to both parties, see Dhillon at [33(a)], Solanki at [35]. As to the requirements of a fair trial taking precedence over inconvenience to the other party or other court users, see Teinaz at [21]. But Mr Scorey acknowledged, as can be seen from the earliest cases, that uncompensatable injustice to the other party may be a ground for refusing an adjournment.” 50. While Bilta and Solanki concerned adjournment for medical reasons, the same framework, in particular the guiding principle of fairness, applies also when considering an application to adjourn so as to enable the applicant to be professionally advised and represented. In both Bilta and Solanki, the Court of Appeal, when setting out the applicable principles, cited Terluk: which, as noted above, concerned legal representation. 51. As to the circumstances in which legal representation is required in order for a hearing to be fair, Dr Shetty refers to the case law the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which places the emphasis on effective participation….’ “20. Before I consider these points in turn, I would make some general observations on adjournments. Every tribunal or court has a discretion to grant an adjournment, and the exercise of such a discretion, going as it does to the management of a case, is one with which an appellate body is slow to interfere and can only interfere on limited grounds, as has repeatedly been recognised. But one recognised ground for interference is where the tribunal or court exercising the discretion takes into account some matter which it ought not to have taken into account … Although an adjournment is a discretionary matter, some adjournments must be granted if not to do so amounts to a denial of justice. Where the consequences of the refusal of an adjournment are severe, such as where it will lead to the dismissal of the proceedings, the tribunal or court must be particularly careful not to cause an injustice to the litigant seeking an adjournment. … 21. A litigant whose presence is needed for the fair trial of a case, but who is unable to be present through no fault of his own, will usually have to be granted an adjournment, however inconvenient it may be to the tribunal or court and to the other parties. That litigant's right to a fair trial underArticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights demands nothing less. But the tribunal or court is entitled to be satisfied that the inability of the litigant to be present is genuine, and the onus is on the applicant for an adjournment to prove the need for such an adjournment.” “31. …The point on which Mr Davenport lays all emphasis is the fact that proper legal representation was now within the defendant's grasp if the judge would adjourn the case. If that meant three months' delay, it was, he submits, an entirely fair price to pay for equality of arms. 32. It is this which has given us the greatest pause. In deciding whether it was a factor which made it clearly unfair to proceed with the trial, however, it is necessary to look a little further. ... 33. What confronted Eady J, however, was an assertion that money, in a large sum and from a still mysterious source, was going to be available. What was strikingly absent was so much as a letter from McGrigors or any other firm of solicitors confirming their preparedness to act and the reliability of the promised funding. It is unsurprising in these circumstances that the judge took the view that there was “no clarity” about it. It was less significant in this situation that he was also dubious about counsel's availability. If sound evidence of dependable funding had been put before him, we might very well have held that individual counsel's availability was not a sufficient reason for denying the defendant the benefit of it. But what was critical for the judge, as it has to be for us, is that even on the Monday it appeared unlikely that an adjournment would achieve anything because there was no sufficient reason to believe that the promised money would materialise.” “… the authorities make clear that, in reviewing the exercise of discretion, the Court of Appeal has to be satisfied that the decision to refuse the adjournment was not "unfair": for example, see Terluk v Berezovsky[2010] EWCA Civ 1345 (per Sedley LJ at paras 18-20), quoted below, particularly in circumstances where his right to a fair trial underArticle 6 ECHR is at stake” “44. In my judgment, therefore, this was one of the rare circumstances, as considered by Peter Gibson LJ in Teinaz, where an adjournment had to be granted, because not to do so amounted to a denial of justice. The consequences of the refusal of an adjournment in this case, apparently based on the judge's personal assessment of a litigant in person's health, notwithstanding the appellant's general practitioner's view that he was suffering from depression, were particularly severe. The appellant's defence was struck out and he was deprived of an opportunity to give live evidence, to cross-examine any of the respondents' witnesses or to call evidence on his own behalf. The respondents' evidence was adduced without any challenge since the two witnesses called did nothing more than state that their witness statements were true. Moreover, the appellant faced a claim for what, so far as he was concerned, was a substantial sum in damages and resultant legal costs. “30. … the guiding principle in an application to adjourn of this type is whether if the trial goes ahead it will be fair in all the circumstances; that the assessment of what is fair is a fact- sensitive one, and not one to be judged by the mechanistic application of any particular checklist; that although the inability of a party himself to attend trial through illness will almost always be a highly material consideration, it is artificial to seek to draw a sharp distinction between that case and the unavailability of a witness; and that the significance to be attached to the inability of an important witness to attend through illness will vary from case to case, but that it will usually be material, and may be decisive. And if the refusal of an adjournment would make the resulting trial unfair, an adjournment should ordinarily be granted, regardless of inconvenience to the other party or other court users, unless this were outweighed by injustice to the other party that could not be compensated for.” “49. Mr Scorey's propositions were as follows: (1) Whether as a matter of the common law's insistence on a fair trial, or the requirements of Article 6, or the application of the overriding objective, the test is the same, namely whether a refusal of an adjournment will lead to an unfair trial. I agree. This is a consistent thread from the early cases … which refer to a miscarriage of justice or an injustice, through Teinaz ("a denial of justice") to the more recent cases, which repeatedly identify the question as one of fairness: see in particular Terluk at [18] and Solanki at [32]. … (3) When considering whether a particular outcome is fair, it should not be assumed that only one outcome is fair. This is established by the authorities: Terluk at [20], Dhillon [Dhillon v Asiedu[2012] EWCA Civ 1020 ] at [33(b)]. But equally in some circumstances there is really only one answer: see Teinaz at [20] ("some adjournments must be granted"). (4) Fairness involves fairness to both parties. But inconvenience to the other party (or other court users) is not a relevant countervailing factor and is usually not a reason to refuse an adjournment. This is again established by the authorities. As to fairness involving fairness to both parties, see Dhillon at [33(a)], Solanki at [35]. As to the requirements of a fair trial taking precedence over inconvenience to the other party or other court users, see Teinaz at [21]. But Mr Scorey acknowledged, as can be seen from the earliest cases, that uncompensatable injustice to the other party may be a ground for refusing an adjournment.”
“18. When considering the exercise of such powers, the court must have regard to the overriding objective set out inCPR 1.1 , namely, that the court should deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. That includes, so far as practicable: (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence; (b) saving expense; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues and the financial position of each party; (d) ensuring the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; and (f) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. 19. No authority is needed for the proposition that there must be a fair hearing. The court must give the parties a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present their case. But that does not entitle a party to unlimited preparation and hearing time, particularly where that would result in unacceptable delay to resolution of the dispute or loss of a fixed trial date. When considering an application to adjourn a trial, the court must carry out a balancing exercise, endeavouring to manage the case so as to hold the trial date to which everyone has been working, whilst ensuring the least risk of irremediable prejudice to any party in all the circumstances of the case, which may necessitate revising the timetable or adjourning the trial.”
“24. Having decided that there is sufficient time between now and April 2024 to give the parties a fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare their respective cases, the court must balance the desire of the claimant to adjourn the trial against the consequences of any adjournment for the parties, the court and other court users. Mr. Stewart is correct that there are hidden costs to any adjournment which would only serve to increase the vast legal resources deployed on both sides in this case. Further, the court is always reluctant to adjourn a trial date that has been fixed for many months in circumstances where other court users have been deprived of the opportunity to have their cases heard at such earlier date. Of greatest significance, the allegations against the defendants are very serious, with potentially far reaching consequences; it is unfair to keep them, and in particular the individual defendants, in jeopardy for any longer than is absolutely necessary for a fair disposal of the case.”
“[On] such an application for permission, the matter does not proceed simply on a consideration of relief from sanctions. Wider issues have to be considered, such as why there was a failure to produce these documents in accordance with the disclosure regime, whether they can properly be dealt with, and whether it affects any trial that is listed.”
“I do not underestimate the importance of a finding adverse to the integrity to one of the parties. In itself, the risk of such a finding may provide a compelling reason for allowing a case to proceed to full oral hearing, notwithstanding the apparent strength of the claim on paper, and the confident expectation, based on the papers, that the defendant lacks any real prospect of success. Experience teaches us that on occasion apparently overwhelming cases of fraud and dishonesty somehow inexplicably disintegrate. In short, oral testimony may show that some such cases are only tissue paper strong.”
‘In this case the Additional Documents are critical to Dr Wright’s case, including his rebuttal of the serious allegations of fraud made against him. COPA does not and cannot deny the importance of these documents; to the contrary, the volume of evidence it has produced even for the purposes of the PTR demonstrates how important they are. The short point is that if the Additional Documents are authentic, they are likely determinative of the Identity Issue in Dr Wright’s favour.’
‘45. In the light of the developments set out above, Dr Wright cannot fairly or realistically meet the current deadlines for service of his reply witness statements of fact or completion of expert evidence on forensic document analysis. Further time is required to: 45.1. enable Dr Wright to address the Claimant’s forgery allegations, 45.2. enable him to disclose the further documents identified in paragraph 19.2 above [these are the LaTeX documents] and 45.3. enable the parties to produce the further expert evidence identified in paragraph 39 above [in three categories, two for the experts in forensic document analysis and the third for a new expert on LaTeX files]. 46. My firm believes that the service of reply witness statements of fact and completion of expert evidence on forensic document analysis needs to be postponed until at least12 January 2024 and recognise that this will inevitably require an adjustment to the start date of the trial. However, the additional matters identified above (i.e., provision of further disclosure by Dr Wright, preparation and service of reply witness statements and preparation and service of further expert evidence) could be completed in time for the trial to start on19 February 2024 .’
‘30. I wish to make it clear that I am not excluding the Developers from participating in the trial through the presence of leading counsel, but either shortly before or at the PTR, I will certainly be prepared to hear further submissions from the Developers as to the need, if they are so advised, as to the level and likely cost of their representation at the trial. 31. Even if I am persuaded that some representation by way of leading counsel is required at the trial, I will need significant evidence to persuade me that leading counsel will need to block out the entire trial period and be paid accordingly. I anticipate that insofar as the Developers need to make any representations at trial, the trial can be organised so as to accommodate any representations on behalf of the Developers at suitable points, and that is a matter of timing to be discussed further at the PTR.’