Charles Roberts v Kseye Capital No.1 Limited & Anor [2023] EWHC 2927 (Ch)

[2023] EWHC 2927 (Ch)Case No CH-2023-000162IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESCHANCERY DIVISIONCase No 42 of 2021ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT CROYDONVenue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 17 November 2023GRAEME M C PHERSON KCSitting as a Deputy High Court Judge
CHARLES ROBERTS(1) KSEYE CAPITAL NO.1 LIMITEDRespondent(2) KSEYE CAPITAL NO.2 LIMITEDRespondent
MR DUNCAN MACPHERSON (instructed by Treon Law) for AppellantMS BRIDGET WILLIAMSON (instructed by Anthony Gold LLP) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 7 November 2023
APPROVED JUDGMENTThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Friday 17 November 2023 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and release to the National Archives.
[23]Since [Mr Roberts] had accepted liability as principal obligor, the above principal applies. Accordingly, the question whether a demand had been served upon him was not one that needed to be answered in order to determine whether there was a valid petition for the purposes of section 271 Insolvency Act 1986’. 67). In his skeleton argument Mr Macpherson’s opposed the Principal Obligor Case on two bases: a) Firstly, on the basis that no liability on the part of Mr Roberts qua primary debtor had been triggered under Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee because any irrecoverability of the Guaranteed Obligations from GBQ had not occurred as a result of any of the causes listed in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee b) Secondly, he took issue with Ms Williamson’s unqualified submission that ‘an agreement by a debt to pay on demand does not require the service of a demand before liability arises’. His skeleton argument therefore implicitly challenged Kseye’s assertion that it was entitled to petition for Mr Roberts’ bankruptcy based on Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee even if no demand in the form of the 5 February 2020 Demand had in fact been made by Kseye. 68). The second of those matters ultimately became a non-issue during the course of the appeal: a) Mr Macpherson’s skeleton argument had helpfully set out detailed submissions on how the more recent authorities relevant to the issue of whether (and if so when) a demand was needed to trigger the liability of a primary debtor in a case such as this – in particular, MS Fashions Ltd v BCCI[1993] Ch 425 (both at first instance and in the Court of Appeal); TS & S Global[2007] EWHC 1401 (Ch);Levin v Tannenbaum[2013] EWHC 4457; and Barclays Bank v Price [2018] EWHC 2719 (Comm) - should be construed b) Properly construed, he submitted, those authorities should be read not as affirming the existence of an inviolable principle that an agreement by a guarantor qua primary obligor to pay on demand does not require the service of a demand before liability arises, but rather as affirming that whether a demand is required before liability arises in such a case will always depend on how the instrument said to give rise to the liability is properly to be construed, applying the well-established rules for interpreting a contractual document c) During her oral submissions Ms Williamson accepted that whether a demand was or was not required as a pre-condition to liability was essentially a matter of construction of the relevant instrument, albeit that she continued to submit that the line of authority referred to above provided a strong indication that the mere presence of the words ‘on demand’ in an instrument would seldom be sufficient to require service of a demand before the liability of a guarantor qua primary debtor was triggered d) Having heard that clarification of Kseye’s position Mr Macpherson indicated that he no longer saw any need to make submissions on the second of the two matters on which he had previously relied to oppose the Principal Obligor Case. That was because he accepted on Mr Roberts’ behalf that, on a proper construction of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee, it was not in fact necessary for a demand to have been served on Mr Roberts in this case in order for him to have become liable as a primary obligor under the Guarantee. 69). As a result, the only point of contention between the parties on the Principal Obligor Case was whether in fact Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee applied so as to trigger a liability on the part of Mr Roberts to Kseye as a primary debtor in an amount sufficient to justify the bankruptcy order. The answer to that question depended, the parties agreed, on a) Whether the Guaranteed Obligations had ceased to become recoverable from GBQ ‘by reason of illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution or any other reason’, and in particular b) Whether insolvency of GBQ occurring after the date of the execution of the Loan Facility and after the date of the Guarantee fell within the scope of the words ‘any other reason’. 70). Before I address that question, I should deal with one preliminary matter. As I have said above, the Principal Debtor Obligor was not raised by Kseye before the District Judge when, it is common ground, it could have been so raised by Kseye. Had it been raised before the District Judge she would have been tasked at the 30 May 2023 hearing not with determining the Principal Obligor Case per se, but rather with determining whether there the Principal Obligor Case gave rise to any genuine issue on substantial grounds for Mr Roberts to oppose the Amended Petition. Since I am effectively being asked to consider the Principal Obligor Case for the first time, it seems to me that that is the test that I should apply, and that is the test that I do apply. 71). Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee is in the following terms (with emphasis added for the reasons explained below) ‘If the Guaranteed Obligations are not recoverable from [GBQ] by reason of illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution or any other reason, [Mr Roberts] shall remain liable under this guarantee for the Guaranteed Obligations as if [Mr Roberts] were a principal debtor.’ 72). Kseye’s position is that the underlined words of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee should be construed expansively. In essence it contends that a) If for any reason, the Guaranteed Obligations are not recoverable by Kseye from GBQ, Mr Roberts becomes liable under the Guarantee for the Guaranteed Obligations as if he were a principal debtor, and b) Insolvency of GBQ subsequent to execution of the Loan Facility and the drawing down of sums under the Loan Facility, resulting in the Guaranteed Obligations thereby becoming irrecoverable from GBQ, suffices to trigger Mr Roberts’ liability under the Guarantee for the Guaranteed Obligations as if he were a principal debtor. 73). Mr Roberts takes issue with Kseye’s interpretation of the underlined words. His position is that, applying the Ejusdem Generis principle – that if one ‘can find that the things described by particular words have some common characteristic which constitutes them a genus, you ought to limit the general words that follow them to things of that genus’: Lambourn v McLellan [1903] 2 Ch 268 per Vaughan Williams LJ @ 275-276 – the words ‘or any other reason’ should be interpreted restrictively and only in a manner consistent with the words ‘illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution’ that precede them. 74). The justification for, and modern application of, the Ejusdem Generis principle has been considered in a number of relatively recent authorities. A number of those authorities are helpfully summarised in Lewison on The Interpretation of Contracts (7th ed) at 7.130-7.142). For present purposes the key matters to be derived from those authorities are as follows: a) The task of a court when interpreting a provision in a contract, especially a commercial contract, is to determine objectively what the parties meant and intended by the language used in the document in the light of the factual situation that existed (often called the ‘factual matrix’) at the time that the contract was entered into by the parties. The fundamental principles to be applied in that regard have been confirmed in recent years by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions: Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v Barrington Support Services Ltd [2016] UKSC 57 and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24 b) The Ejusdem Generis principle remains a valuable aid to carrying out that construction exercise in an appropriate case c) The primary justification for the application of the Ejusdem Generis principle is the presumption against surplusage:
‘The Court should not give one word in an interrelated, overlapping list of expressions a meaning that is so broad as to be inconsistent with adjoining words or that renders those words irrelevant’
Lend Lease Real Estate Investments Ltd v GPT Re Ltd [2006] NSWCA 207 at paragraph 31 d) There is no agreed view on the face of the authorities as to whether or not there is a presumption for or against the application of the Ejusdem Generis principle. The likelihood is that there is no presumption either way e) The Ejusdem Generis principle can only have any application when the words that precede the ‘general words’ can properly be described as having some common characteristic that constitutes them a genus; if there is no common genus, the Ejusdem Generis principle can have no application and words such as ‘any other cause’ or ‘any other reason’ cannot be limited by the principle: Tillmanns & Co v SS Knutsford Ltd [1908] 2 KB 385; CFH Clearing Ltd v Merrill Lynch International [2019] EWHC 963 (Comm) f) Defining how to determine what will and will not constitute a genus has on occasion proved challenging to the Courts. Paragraph 7.143 of Lewison on the Interpretation of Contracts cites the following test used by McCardie J in SS Magnhild v McIntyre Brothers and Co [1920] 3 KB 32:
‘… whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category. By this [is meant] that the specified things must possess some common and dominant feature’. 75). Mr Macpherson submitted a) That each of the identified bases of non-recoverability of Guaranteed Obligations identified in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee by the words ‘illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution’ share two common characteristics: i) First, each concerns a characteristic of or quality of GBQ ii) Secondly, each relates to a state of affairs that existed as at the date of execution of the Loan Facility, i.e. a historic state of affairs pre-dating the Guarantee b) That those words comprise a genus such that the words ‘or any other reason’ should be construed as being limited to other reasons, sharing those same common characteristics, that made the Guaranteed Obligations irrecoverable from GBQ from the very outset of the Loan Facility c) That Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee is thus to be construed as a backwards-looking provision directed at characteristics of GBQ or states of affairs that existed at the date of execution of the Loan Facility, meaning that the addition of the words ‘or any other reason’ should be interpreted as triggering a liability on the part of Mr Roberts as a principal debtor only if the irrecoverability of the Guaranteed Obligations was the result of some other ‘characteristic’ of GBQ or state of affairs that existed as at the date of GBQ’s entry into the Loan Facility d) That since the insolvency of GBQ occurred only subsequent to GBQ’s entry into the Loan Facility (and was not a state of affairs or a characteristic of GBQ that existed at the date of GBQ’s entry into the Loan Facility), GBQ’s insolvency is not an event i) that fell within the scope of the ‘any other reason’ provision in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee, or ii) that triggered a liability on the part of Mr Roberts under Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee as if he was a principal debtor in respect of the Guaranteed Obligations. 76). Despite the attractive way in which Mr Macpherson presented his submissions, I reject the suggestion that the words ‘or any other reason’ in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee should be construed in the manner for which he contends: a) First, as I have said above, the task for the Court is to construe Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee using the well-established principles of construction to be found in the authorities so as to ascertain the mutual intention of the parties at the date when the Guarantee was entered into. While that of course requires analysis of the words in question, it also requires a consideration of the Guarantee as a whole and the factual matrix which existed at the time the Guarantee was entered into b) As at the date of the Guarantee i) GBQ had already made a substantial repayment to Kseye under the Loan Facility without asserting that the Guaranteed Obligations were irrecoverable from it by reason of any characteristic or state of affairs that had existed as at the date of entry into the Loan Facility, and ii) GBQ was already substantially in default under the Loan Facility, suggesting that its financial position and ability to repay the Guaranteed Obligations as at that date and in the future were (at best) uncertain c) In those circumstances, in the absence of clear words to such effect it would seem inherently unlikely that Kseye and Mr Roberts intended to include a provision in the Guarantee that would trigger a liability on the part of Mr Roberts as a primary debtor i) Only in the event that at some point in the future it was established that a historic state of affairs, dependent on a characteristic of GBQ, existing at the date of GBQ’s entry into the Loan Facility made the Guaranteed Obligations irrecoverable from GBQ, and ii) Not in the event that the Guaranteed Obligations become irrecoverable from GBQ because GBQ had become financially unable to meet those Guaranteed Obligations. As Ms Williamson put it, a key element of the factual matrix against the background of which the Guarantee was entered into was Kseye’s wish to ensure that, one way or another, it would be paid the Guaranteed Obligations despite GBQ already being in default under the Loan Facility d) Secondly, while the words ‘illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution’ certainly can relate to a characteristic of GBQ and/or a state of affairs in existence at the date of execution of the Loan Facility, it does not appear to me that it can be said that the parties must have intended those words to only relate to the same: i) While ‘illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers’ can refer to a state of affairs existing as at the date of GBQ’s entry into the Loan Facility, any of those states of affairs could equally come into existence after the date of the Loan Facility. If Mr Roberts’ position was the correct one, irrecoverability because one of those states of affairs had come into existence at any time after the date of entry into the Loan Facility (whether before or after the date of the Guarantee) would not suffice to trigger liability of Mr Roberts as a principal debtor. I see no logical reason for interpreting the words of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee as drawing that distinction ii) During the course of his submissions Mr Macpherson sought to contrast Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee with Clause 3.2 of the Guarantee (under the heading ‘Lender Protections’) which, he suggested, was a ‘forward-looking’ provision identifying events that might occur and states of affairs that might come into existence after the execution of the Loan Facility (or after the execution of the Guarantee) which the parties had agreed would not adversely affect Mr Roberts’ liability under the Guarantee. However (1) Clause 3.2.6 of the Guarantee identifies ‘incapacity’ of GBQ as one such occurrence or event. That is a state of affairs listed in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee (2) Clause 3.2.7 of the Guarantee identifies ‘any invalidity, illegality, unenforceability [or] irregularity … of any actual or purported obligation of, or Security held from, GBQ … in connection with the Guaranteed Obligations’ as further such occurrences. Once again, those are states of affairs listed in Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee iii) So, if Mr Macpherson was correct in his submissions, the same words would have to be construed as being only backward-looking for the purpose of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee and being only forward-looking for the purpose of Clause 3.2 of the Guarantee. Absent the clearest possible wording (which is not present in this case), it cannot be inferred that that was the mutual intention of the parties. Rather, the words in Clauses 2.2 and 3.2 are in my view each to be construed as being both backward looking and forward looking, describing events and states of affairs both before and after the date of the Guarantee e) Thirdly (although I accept that this is a factor of limited importance) there is nothing in the remainder of the Guarantee or in the Side Letter to support the interpretation of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee for which Mr Roberts contends. There is nothing in the Guarantee and Side Letter consistent with the parties having intended Mr Roberts’ liability to Kseye to be dependent on why GBQ could not or would not meet its liabilities under the Loan Facility. The Guarantee and Side Letter are consistent with the parties having intended that Mr Roberts’ liability both qua guarantor and qua primary obligor would exist, irrespective of the reason why Kseye was unable to recover the Guaranteed Obligations from GBQ. 77). It follows from the above that I reject Mr Macpherson’s submission that the words ‘illegality, incapacity, lack or exceeding of powers, ineffectiveness of execution’ constitute a genus of the type contended for by him. In my view those words do not have a sufficient common and dominant characteristic of the type contended for by Mr Roberts to justify a) Classifying them as a genus, or b) Applying the Ejusdem Generis principle to limit the ambit of the words ‘or any other reason’
. In my view Kseye’s position is the correct one – the words ‘or any other reason’ are expansive, such that if for any reason the Guaranteed Obligations became irrecoverable from GBQ (whether that reason resulted from a state of affairs that existed as at the date of the Loan Facility, from an event or state of affairs that came into existence after the date of the Loan Facility or from an event or state of affairs that came into existence subsequent to the date of the Guarantee) Mr Roberts’ liability under the Guarantee as if he were a principal debtor would be triggered. 78). Accordingly, had I had to determine the Principal Obligor Case I would have determined it in favour of Kseye and would have concluded that the Principal Obligor Case did not give Mr Roberts any genuine interest on substantial grounds for opposing the Amended Petition. (E). The Discretion Case 79). In light of my findings above it is unnecessary for me to determine the Discretion Case. Furthermore, in my view it is undesirable for me to set out any finalised view on how I might have decided the Discretion Case had I needed to do so. There are three principal reasons for that: a) First, although my attention was drawn to the Court of Appeal decision in Owo-Samson v Barclays Bank plc [2003] EWCA Civ 714 and the decision of Miles J Dusuruth v Orca Finance UK Limited [2023] EWHC 1050 (Ch), each of those authorities concerned the ambit and exercise of the court’s discretion when considering whether to annul a bankruptcy order pursuant to section 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986 b) In such cases it is the wording of section 282 (‘The Court may annul a bankruptcy order …’ (emphasis added)) that provides the court with its discretion. However, section 282 is of no application here. This is an appeal brought pursuant to CPR Part 52, and I am far from satisfied on the material before me that i) Had I concluded that the decision of the District Judge was wrong because she ought to have concluded (1) That Mr Roberts had satisfied her that there were genuine issues on substantial grounds, and so (2) That the Amended Petition should therefore be dismissed, and ii) Had I then allowed the appeal (as compelled to do in such circumstances by CPR Part 52.21(3) – ‘The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower could was … (a) wrong’ (emphasis added)) I would nonetheless have had power under CPR Part 52.20 to keep the Order in place. I certainly would not have been prepared to conclude that I did have such a power without more detailed argument on the matter c) Secondly, the factual basis for the Discretion Case was that ‘there is no evidence that [Mr Roberts] is able to meet his liabilities’. But i) Had Mr Roberts succeeded before me, it would have been on the basis (1) that Mr Roberts’ Demand Case had succeeded, meaning that it was yet to be determined that Mr Roberts had any liability to Kseye qua guarantor under the Guarantee, and (2) that Kseye’s Principal Obligor Case had failed, meaning that it was yet to be determined that Mr Roberts had any liability to Kseye qua principal debtor under the Guarantee ii) It would have followed that I could not be satisfied what ‘liabilities’ Mr Roberts in fact had to Kseye at the present time, and so iii) I struggle to see how in such circumstances I could have been satisfied that Mr Roberts was unable to meet his liabilities d) Thirdly there was little argument or evidence before me as to whether Mr Roberts could in fact meet whatever liabilities might in fact be owed to Kseye. In such circumstances, even if I had accepted that I had a discretion to do so, I would have been reluctant to keep the Order in place. (F). Conclusion 80). I dismiss the appeal. Had I been minded to allow the appeal on the Grounds set out in Mr Roberts’ Notice of Appeal I would in any event have refused to set aside the Order on the ground that, in the light of Clause 2.2 of the Guarantee, the Order could properly have been made on the Amended Petition despite the absence of any demand being made of Mr Roberts.