“The Claimant and the Defendant are siblings and the only two children of Niki Ieropoullos (“the Deceased”). The Deceased, who was divorced, lived with the Defendant and the Defendant’s spouse for some years prior to her death. The Defendant says that:- i. On5 September 2011 , the Deceased transferred her property at 9 Harewood Crescent, North Hykeham, LN6 8JB into trust by way of deed (“the Trust Deed”), appointing the Defendant and her husband as trustees. ii. The Deceased’s last known Will is dated10 January 2003 (“the 2003 Will”) which leaves one quarter of the estate to the Deceased’s sister Skevoulla Christofides, and the remaining three quarters of the estate to the Defendant. iii. The last Will prior to the 2003 Will is dated1 June 1995 (“the 1995 Will”), which does not make provision for the Claimant. Under the terms of the 1995 Will, the Deceased left her estate solely to the Defendant. iv. As at the date of death, the Deceased’s estate amounted to£8,560.03 following the deduction of funeral expenses. The Deceased also jointly held an account in Cyprus worth approximately€26,000 with the Defendant (and so which falls outside the estate). By his Amended Particulars of Claim, it appeared that the Claimant seeks provision from the Deceased’s estate under theInheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”), and contends that the Trust Deed and 2003 and 1995 Wills were procured by undue influence and/or that the Deceased did not have capacity to execute them and/or did not know and approve of the contents of those documents. However, at the CCMC on 24.02.23 District Judge Pema confirmed to the Claimant that a separate claim form (which claim could be heard with the present claim) would be required for any claim under the 1975 Act. A separate claim form and an amended claim form were recently issued as the Claimant seeks provision from the Deceased’s estate under theInheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) by reason of want of knowledge and approval and undue influence. The Defendant opposes the Claimant’s claims on the basis set out in the Amended Defence, but in brief that the Trust Deed and Wills were and are valid, and that no provision should be made for the Claimant from the Deceased’s estate. A joint medical expert, Dr Hugh Series, has prepared a medical report detailing their opinion on the capacity of the Deceased in relation to the 1995 Will, the 2003 Will and the Trust Deed. In brief, the report says that “the medical records do not provide any reason to doubt” the Deceased’s capacity at the time of the 2003 Will or the Trust Deed. The Deceased’s treatment at the time of the 1995 Will “raises a question” about the deceased’s capacity at that time, and the medical expert marked with a double asterisk (**) numerous items which in his view could provide evidence of lack of capacity via the paginated medical records bundle. He also marked with a single asterisk (*) numerous items which in his view could point towards vulnerability to undue influence via the paginated medical records bundle.”
“As a general rule, it has been laid down, that when property is given absolutely to any person, and the same person is, by the giver who has power to command, recommend, or entreated or wished, to dispose of that property in favour of another, the recommendation, entreaty or wish shall be held to create a trust. First if the words were so used, that upon the whole, they ought to be construed as an imperative; secondly, if the subject of the recommendation or wish is certain; and thirdly, if the objects or persons intended to have benefit of the recommendation or wish also be certain.”
“i). In a case of a testamentary disposition of assets, unlike a lifetime disposition, there is no presumption of undue influence; ii). Whether undue influence has procured the execution of a will is therefore a question of fact; iii). The burden of proving it lies on the person who asserts it. It is not enough to prove that the facts are consistent with the hypothesis of undue influence. What must be shown is that the facts are inconsistent with any other hypothesis. In the modern law this is, perhaps no more than a reminder of the high burden, even on the civil standard, that a claimant bears in proving undue influence as vitiating a testamentary disposition; iv). In this context undue influence means influence exercised either by coercion, in the sense that the testator’s will must be overborne, or by fraud. v). Coercion is pressure that overpowers the volition without convincing the testator’s judgment. It is to be distinguished from mere persuasion, appeals to ties of affection or pity for future destitution, all of which are legitimate. Pressure which causes a testator to succumb for the sake of a quiet life, if carried to an extent that overbears the testator’s free judgment discretion or wishes, is enough to amount to coercion in this sense; vi). The physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the will. The will of a weak and ill person may be more easily overborne than that of a hale and hearty one. As was said in one case simply to talk to a weak and feeble testator may so fatigue the brain that a sick person may be induced for quietness’ sake to do anything. A “drip drip” approach may be highly effective in sapping the will…”
“Son has been to Nicky’s house and changed the locks. Daughter contacting a solicitor, Nicky wailing and wringing her hands. Refused to be appeased …”