“I have set out the history of allegations of antisocial behaviour and other complaints and behaviours very extensively – perhaps too extensively – for fear of not painting a fair picture of what the Claimant’s staff and contractors, neighbours and others such as Forest Care staff have had to deal with from the Defendant over the years. In fact it does not paint a full picture because the sheer volume of calls, voicemails, texts and their abusive content to staff and contractors cannot be understood from my history, and nor, no doubt, can the extent of difficulties, disruption and abuse that has been experienced by the neighbours. The Defendant has made those over-55 neighbours, some elderly and vulnerable themselves, who have been assessed as suitable for sheltered housing, feel unsafe and insecure in their homes such that some of them have asked to leave it. They and other users of the Tunstall system have been put in danger by the Defendant’s excessive use of, and damage to the Tunstall system. When it is damaged it cannot be used by some residents to call if they fall or have another emergency, it puts the fire warning and monitoring system at risk: these are real dangers.”
“6. The expert evidence on the issue of whether the Defendant has a disability within the meaning ofs.6 Equality Act 2010 shall be limited to a single expert Consultant Psychiatrist jointly instructed by the parties. If the parties cannot agree by17 September 2021 who that expert is to be, either party may apply for further directions. Unless the court orders otherwise, the cost of the psychiatrist shall be borne by the parties equally; 7. The parties are to send a joint letter of instruction to the expert by 4pm on22 October 2021 (in default of agreement as to the letter, separate letters of instruction are to be send, but copied to the other party); 8. The report of the expert shall be filed at the court no later than 4pm on26 November 2021 ; 9. The time for service of questions to the expert is not later than 4pm on10 December 2021 . Any such question shall be answered by 4pm on7 January 2022 ;”
“1. What effect do you consider these proceedings and/or the threat of homelessness proceedings have had on Ms Holland, in light of her disability? 2. What impact would homelessness have on Ms Holland, in light of her disability?”
“(5) The Defendant’s eviction from the Property without suitable alternative accommodation being available to her on eviction would not be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (6) If the Claimant secures that suitable alternative accommodation in Reading will be available to the Defendant upon her eviction, then eviction will be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (7) The Claimant will arrange a multi-agency meeting to consider options for securing suitable accommodation, inviting representatives of its homelessness prevention team and social services department, and the Community Mental Health Team, together with Ms Nicola Rogers and the Defendant’s legal representatives (8) In the event of a dispute as to the suitability of alternative accommodation, the issue may be determined by the court, in accordance with the principles set out in HA 1985, Schedule 2, Part IV, read as though paragraph 1(1) of that Part referred to “a secure tenancy or an introductory tenancy”
“I am satisfied in reaching the decision to seek possession, and to continue with the possession proceedings, they [the Respondent] did give due regard to the factors and have complied with the PSED.”
“110. I am satisfied after considering all the evidence and carrying out a balancing exercise that eviction of the Defendant without alternative suitable accommodation is a proportionate means of achieving what is accepted to be a legitimate aim, and maintaining her tenancy until suitable alternative accommodation can be found in the Borough of Reading would be disproportionate and cause unacceptable risk to the neighbours and others, and to property, all of which rely on the Claimant to protect them from those risks.”
“If TH is evicted she would have to present to our Housing Advice team as homeless and then they would have to make decision whether or not we have duty to house but, on the basis that TH is to be evicted on breach of tenancy through ASB grounds, the likelihood is that she would be found intentionally homeless and would need to seek alternative accommodation herself more than likely through the private sector, which will not work well for TH.”
“(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to— (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.” (a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; (b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; (c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”
“A significant factor in determining whether a public authority is able to justify what may be indirect discrimination is the extent to which the authority has complied with their public sector equality duties.”
“Understandably the Deputy District Judge in this case did not approach the question in the structured way laid down by the Supreme Court. Had he done so he would, in my judgement, have reached the following conclusions at least at the summary stage. First, as was common ground, Mr Stephenson was disabled. Secondly, based on Ms Burrows’ evidence it was at least arguable that there was a sufficient causal link between his mental disability and the conduct on which the decision to evict him was based. That was enough to raise a prima facie case of discrimination on the ground of disability. The burden would then shift to the council to establish that evicting Mr Stephenson was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. It must not be forgotten that the deputy district judge was told that in Mr Stephenson’s case eviction meant that he would be homeless. The deputy district judge did not mention the question of proportionality at all. By a respondent’s notice the council argued that the case on proportionality both was and is overwhelming and seeks to rely on further instances of noise nuisance. Mr Baker said that the fact of the anti-social behaviour was not contested. Mr Stephenson had simply apologised. In view of his medical condition he said it was unlikely that the behaviour would abate. He argued that the nature of the anti-social behaviour was so serious and prolonged and had had such a serious effect on Mr Stephenson’s neighbour that eviction was the only real solution. He may turn out to be right. Since the burden was on the council to show that no less drastic action would be appropriate, it is in my view incumbent on the council to at least show that alternatives have been considered and reasons given for their rejection.”
“Thus, in my judgement, the flaw in both the deputy district judge’s approach and the council’s respondent’s notice is to treat the question of proportionality as a binary choice between eviction, on the one hand, and doing nothing on the other hand. Clearly something must be done for the well being of Mr Stephenson’s neighbour. However there may well be intermediate steps that could be taken short of throwing Mr Stephenson out on the street. For example, he could be given support from social services in reminding him of appointments that have been made for him to receive medication. He might be given support from mental health professionals. His medication could be changed or its dosage increased. Sound attenuation measures could be installed in his flat. There could be specific agreement on permitted hours for the playing of music rather than the general prohibition on anti-social behaviour contained in the tenancy conditions. The council might seek an injunction prohibiting the anti-social behaviour under the Anti-social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act which would require supervised compliance. Or the council might provide him with more suitable alternative accommodation.”
“23 I do not say that all or indeed any of these steps are feasible. However, in my judgement, they cannot be summarily ruled out. It will be for the council to show that nothing less than eviction will do. I do not consider that it is so obvious that Mr Stephenson should be deprived of the opportunity to defend the claim.”
“56 All this is very different from the home-related, but otherwise far less specific and targeted, article 8 defence. Thus, the protection afforded by section 35(1)(b) is an extra, and a more specific, stronger, right afforded to disabled occupiers over and above the article 8 right. It is also worth mentioning that this conclusion ties in with what was said in the Pinnock case[2011] 2 AC 104 , para 64, namely that as suggested by “the Equality and Human Rights Commission . . . proportionality is more likely to be a relevant issue _in respect of occupants who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or learning disability, poor health or frailty”, and that “the issue may also require the local authority to explain why they are not securing alternative accommodation in such cases””
“Application of the PSED (i) When a public sector landlord is contemplating taking or enforcing possession proceedings in circumstances in which a disabled person is liable to be affected by such decision, it is subject to the PSED. Nature and scope of the PSED (ii) The PSED is not a duty to achieve a result but a duty to have due regard to the need to achieve the results identified in section 149. Thus when considering what is due regard, the public sector landlord must weigh the factors relevant to promoting the objects of the section against any material countervailing factors. In housing cases, such countervailing factors may include, for example, the impact which the disabled person's behaviour, in so far as is material to the decision in question, is having upon others (e.g. through drug dealing or other anti-social behaviour). The PSED is "designed to secure the brighter illumination of a person's disability so that, to the extent that it bears upon his rights under other laws it attracts a full appraisal". Making inquires (iii) The public sector landlord is not required in every case to take active steps to inquire into whether the person subject to its decision is disabled and, if so, is disabled in a way relevant to the decision. Where, however, some feature or features of the information available to the decision maker raises a real possibility that this might be the case then a duty to make further enquiry arises. The importance of substance over form (iv) The PSED must be exercised in substance, with rigour and with an open mind and should not be reduced to no more than a "tick-box" exercise. Continuing nature of the duty (v) The PSED is a continuing one and is thus not discharged once and for all at any particular stage of the decision making process. Thus the requirement to fulfil the PSED does not elapse even after a possession order (whether on mandatory or discretionary grounds) is granted and before it has been enforced. However, the PSED consequences of enforcing an order ought already to have been adequately considered by the decision maker before the order is sought and, in most cases, in the absence of any material change in circumstances (which circumstances may include the decision maker's state of knowledge of the disability), the continuing nature of the duty will not mandate further explicit reconsideration. The timing of formal consideration of the PSED (vi) Generally, the public sector landlord must assess the risk and extent of any adverse impact and the ways in which such risk may be eliminated before seeking and enforcing possession and not merely as a "rear-guard action" following a concluded decision. However, cases will arise in which the landlord initially neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known of any relevant disability. [I omit the remainder of this factor, given that the present case is not one where the Respondent was unaware that the Appellant had a disability when the Respondent decided to make the claim for possession] Recording the discharge of the duty (vii) An important evidential element in the demonstration of the discharge of the PSED is the recording of the steps taken by the decision maker in seeking to meet the statutory requirements.8 Although there is no duty to make express written reference to the regard paid to the relevant duty, recording the existence of the duty and the considerations taken into account in discharging it serves to reduce the scope for later argument. Nevertheless, cases may arise in which a conscientious decision maker focussing on the impact of disability may comply with the PSED even where he is unaware of its existence as a separate duty or of the terms of section 149. The court must not simply substitute its own views for that of the landlord (viii) The court must be satisfied that the public sector landlord has carried out a sufficiently rigorous consideration of the PSED but, once thus satisfied, is not entitled to substitute its own views of the relative weight to be afforded to the various competing factors informing its decision. It is not the court's function to review the substantive merits of the result of the relevant balancing act. The concept of 'due regard' requires the court to ensure that there has been a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria, but if that is done, the court cannot interfere with the decision simply because it would have given greater weight to the equality implications of the decision than did the decision maker. In short, the decision maker must be clear precisely what the equality implications are when he puts them in the balance, and he must recognise the desirability of achieving them, but ultimately it is for him to decide what weight they should be given in the light of all relevant factors.”
“23 While it is legitimate for a reviewing officer to consider housing conditions in the locality, when he does so through the lens of the public sector equality duty it is not adequate simply to refer to the generality of persons who are not living in ideal conditions. The reviewing officer did not consider whether any of those who were not living in ideal conditions had disabilities. That, too, shows that there was not the required sharp focus on Mr Kannan's disability and the impact it had on his housing needs. 24 As in Lomax, I do not consider that the decision is saved by the reviewing officer's subsequent reference to the public sector quality duty. The mere recitation of Lord Neuberger's formula in para.28 of the decision letter is no substitute for actually doing the job.”
“28 As I have said, I reject the submission that functions in s.49A(1) are limited to functions under some particular aspect of a public authority’s operations. The decision to seek possession of the school house was an exercise of a function of the public authority. It seems to me that knowing, as the Council did, that if successful this could pose potentially serious problems for Sam, who had been safely housed at the school house with the help of adaptations provided by the Council itself, it was incumbent on the Council to have regard to the need to take steps to take account of her disability. To what conclusion this would lead the Council is not for the court to say and of course the need for the premises to be used by a new caretaker was highly relevant. 29 In support of that approach, Mr Read referred us to [64] of Lord Neuberger’s judgment in Manchester City Council v Pinnock[2010] UKSC 45 ; [2010] 3 W.L.R. 1441, which was said about art.8 but seems to me to be relevant also by analogy to section 49A of the DDA: “Sixthly, the suggestions put forward on behalf of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, that proportionality is more likely to be a relevant issue ‘in respect of occupants who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or learning disability, poor health or frailty’, and that ‘the issue may also require the local authority to explain why they are not securing alternative accommodation in such cases’ seem to us well made.” 30 For his part Mr Fullwood referred us, by contrast, to [52] and [54] of the same speech. I accept that, as he submitted, there is a high burden on a defendant who relies on art.8 as a defence to a claim for possession. Nevertheless, in relation to a disabled person for whose benefit the s.49A(1)(d) duty has to be undertaken, in the present sort of context, the obvious question is where that person is going to live after the possession order to be sought has been obtained and has taken effect. Of course, Pt 7 is particularly relevant, as it would not always be for a defendant to possession proceedings, because Sam would be a person in priority need for the purposes of Pt 7. But it does not follow that s.49A(1)(d) allows the Council to leave the question of her future accommodation and provision over to be coped with under Pt 7 in the end, if it comes to that.” “Sixthly, the suggestions put forward on behalf of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, that proportionality is more likely to be a relevant issue ‘in respect of occupants who are vulnerable as a result of mental illness, physical or learning disability, poor health or frailty’, and that ‘the issue may also require the local authority to explain why they are not securing alternative accommodation in such cases’ seem to us well made.”
“However I accept the submission of Ms McKeown for the Claimant that the EA and PSED should not be looked at in isolation. As Mr Clarke accepts in closing, compliance with the PSED does not have to be achieved by a formal document and can even be achieved without the employees of the public sector body understanding that they are complying with the PSED, per Hotek [Hotak]. 92. What can be seen from the comprehensive review of the history and documentation of this case is that by the time Ms Langran carried out this assessment and a decision was made the same day to serve a notice seeking possession, the Claimant knew the Defendant very well. They had been involved with her and supporting her even before the tenancy of Flat 24.”
“93. In fact the tenancy of Flat 24 was offered to her after her tenancy at Chartfield Road broke down because of antisocial behaviour and threats against her neighbour, and her temporary accommodation gave rise to similar problems as those that she went on to have at Flat 24. The evidence is that she was offered it after much thought and a full assessment of her needs, as I have set out, which included her diagnoses, her mental health issues, behaviours arising from her disabilities including difficulties in managing her anger. It was considered to be suitable because it was in a small block of 4 so there were few neighbours; it was on the first floor which she preferred; it was sheltered housing which would provide support staff on site and support services such as the emergency Tunstall system and where it was hoped that the older age of the neighbours would provide a calmer environment; because it had green space around and was set back from the road which it was hoped would be quieter than other blocks, and it was hoped that it would build up her confidence. In my judgment, that shows the Claimant putting in sharp focus, and taking steps to meet, the specific needs of the Defendant arising from her disability and to remove or minimise disadvantages arising from her disability. Once in Flat 24 the Claimant sought to put in place access to volunteering opportunities which it had been advised would be beneficial and go to Reading Recovery College: that is in my judgment encouraging the Claimant to participate in public life.”
“94. Before coming to Flat 24 she had support from Alana house, was known to CMHT, and Crisis, had input from psychiatry; afterwards the Claimant made multiple referrals to CMHT and Crisis, Talking Therapies and Reading Recovery College, tried to assist her to have medication reviews, access therapy, reduce or manage her alcohol intake, put in place identified support workers who rang and visited her regularly, reminded her about medication, etc. The documentation shows that all of this was with a sharp focus on the Defendant’s diagnoses including EUPD and that they did so to try and improve the Defendant’s ability to manage her relationships with neighbours, support staff and others; to improve her confidence and mood, settle her emotionally, etc. That, in my judgment, shows continuing compliance with the PSED whether or not all or any of the Claimant’s employees labelled her diagnoses and difficulties as a disability under section 15 EA, and that continued throughout her tenancy.”
“the equality duty, in the context of an exercise such as a section 202 review, does require the reviewing officer to focus very sharply on (i) whether the applicant is under a disability (or has another protected characteristic), (ii) the extent of such disability, (iii) the likely effect of the disability, when taken together with any other features, on the applicant if and when homeless, and (iv) whether the applicant is as a result ‘vulnerable’.”
“95. The Defendant engaged and then disengaged with support workers and services and mental health services; took medication when she felt she needed it but often did not and still does not really believe that she needs it; failed on occasion to attend medical and support appointments so they were closed to her, etc. The Claimant sought to support her, change their approach, have discussions with various services, try again. I have set out the history. I am satisfied that at all times during her tenancy at Flat 24 up to the decision to begin possession proceedings the Claimant knew of the Defendant’s mental health issues, focussed on those in substance and with rigour and did so with due regard to the section 149(1) aims, thus satisfying the PSED.”
“96. What of the decisions to serve a NOSP and then issue possession proceedings? That is what I must determine. Those decisions were taken in the context of the history I have set out and the findings that I have just made.”
“The Defendant submits that the Claimant has failed properly to consider the likely effects of eviction on the Defendant in light of her disability. I do not agree that this is so.”
“98. The whole focus of the Claimant’s employees in dealing with the Defendant is to seek to support her to manage her relationships, anger, emotional lability, drinking etc to enable her to keep her tenancy and avoid eviction, because it is understood that settled accommodation is important for her management of her vulnerabilities arising from her disability. It is acknowledged in documented discussions that eviction would “not go well” for her and would be “catastrophic” for her. It is important to remember the context: the Defendant has been evicted once before, and it was the Claimant who had to house her in temporary accommodation. That did not go well. The Defendant criticises the Claimant for not documenting anywhere exactly what the effect of eviction will be, but even the two medics in this case do not speak in specifics. Dr Ahmad said he was “very concerned” about a possible eviction given the Defendant’s vulnerability and mental state. Dr Iles says that eviction without alternative accommodation “would not be helpful”
“104. The Claimant is very concerned about the neighbours, some of whom have asked to be moved out of the property; it is also very concerned about the effect of the Defendant’s use and abuse of the Tunstall system on the ability of others to use it in case of emergency, and for it to be an effective fire monitoring and lift monitoring service. These are all material countervailing factors which the Claimant has weighed up against waiting for the Defendant to be offered, access and complete further therapies over an unknown time period as is the fact, that Mr Iles makes clear, that the Defendant must take personal responsibility for her choice to carry out these actions of antisocial behaviour. She is able to regulate her behaviour: she did so when the first injunction of DJ Parker was in place, she was polite and courteous and attentive in Court for two days. I cannot criticise the Claimant for choosing to continue with the possession proceedings in those circumstances. Akerman-Livingston at [32] says that the relevant question is ‘Has the local authority done all that can reasonably be expected of it to accommodate the consequences of the disabled person’s disability?’ I believe they have done all that can reasonably be expected of it. I am satisfied in reaching the decision to seek possession, and to continue with the possession proceedings, they did give due regard to the factors and have complied with the PSED.”
“The court accepted that this assessment [the EA Assessment] was deficient in various respects, although it was common ground that, in assessing compliance with the PSED, the court was not limited to this (or any) formal assessment, but rather had to consider R’s actions overall (judgment para 90-91)”
“If TH is evicted she would have to present to our Housing Advice team as homeless and then they would make decision whether or not we have duty to house but, on the basis that TH is to be evicted on breach of tenancy through ASB grounds, the likelihood is that she would be found intentionally homeless and would need to seek alternative accommodation herself more than likely through the private sector, which will not work well for TH.”
“I do feel that it would be catastrophic for her to lose her home at Flat 4, 24 Liebenrood Road and become homeless.”
“109. As regards the balance between the disadvantage to the Defendant of being evicted against the benefits to the Claimant, their employees and contractors, and the neighbours if the antisocial behaviour is stopped by an eviction: I accept that eviction without alternative accommodation will be very bad for the Defendant’s mental and physical health and particular vulnerabilities arising from her EUPD particularly. I have set out the history of allegations of antisocial behaviour and other complaints and behaviours very extensively – perhaps too extensively – for fear of not painting a fair picture of what the Claimant’s staff and contractors, neighbours and others such as Forest Care staff have had to deal with from the Defendant over the years. In fact it does not paint a full picture because the sheer volume of calls, voicemails, texts and their abusive content to staff and contractors cannot be understood from my history, and nor, no doubt, can the extent of difficulties, disruption and abuse that has been experienced by the neighbours. The Defendant has made those over-55 neighbours, some elderly and vulnerable themselves, who have been assessed as suitable for sheltered housing, feel unsafe and insecure in their homes such that some of them have asked to leave it. They and other users of the Tunstall system have been put in danger by the Defendant’s excessive use of, and damage to the Tunstall system. When it is damaged it cannot be used by some residents to call if they fall or have another emergency, it puts the fire warning and monitoring system at risk: these are real dangers.”
“99. The Defendant submits that Claimant did not adequately consider alternative suitable accommodation in the EA Assessment or otherwise [So far as that] is concerned, I do not accept that submission.”
“100.Firstly, Flat 24 can be seen as an attempt to put in place alternative suitable accommodation, and the same problems carried from previous accommodation to this despite all the many hours of effort from the Claimant and the many services they sought for the Defendant to engage with. 101. Secondly, at most times since 2020 onwards, save for short periods when she has thought otherwise, the Defendant has expressed a wish to move to Devon. The Claimant acknowledged that she was changing her mind about this regularly but when the Defendant said she had absolutely made up her mind and would like support to enable her to bid for housing, the Claimant put that support in place, though her usual support workers but also through their Housing Support Department. It looked for a while as though that would be successful and an offer would be made to her in Barnstable, but it fell through. Although the Claimant then issued possession proceedings, the Defendant continued to express a desire to move to Devon, very soon after those proceedings started and up to 4 November. I accept the Claimant’s submission that there would be no purpose to searching for suitable alternative accommodation in Reading if the Defendant was set on moving to Devon to be closer to her family. For those reasons, that criticism is misplaced., in my judgment.” has thought otherwise, the Defendant has expressed a wish to move to Devon. The Claimant acknowledged that she was changing her mind about this regularly but when the Defendant said she had absolutely made up her mind and would like support to enable her to bid for housing, the Claimant put that support in place, though her usual support workers but also through their Housing Support Department. It looked for a while as though that would be successful and an offer would be made to her in Barnstable, but it fell through. Although the Claimant then issued possession proceedings, the Defendant continued to express a desire to move to Devon, very soon after those proceedings started and up to 4 November. I accept the Claimant’s submission that there would be no purpose to searching for suitable alternative accommodation in Reading if the Defendant was set on moving to Devon to be closer to her family. For those reasons, that criticism is misplaced., in my judgment.”
“85. The Defendant has, generally speaking, continued to express her desire to move to Devon, save that by the time of a housing triage assessment completed by Mr Roberts-Doyle on3 May 2022 , the Defendant was saying that she would rather stay in Reading than move to Devon. However just a month or so later, on10 June 2022 she had reverted to saying that she does want to move to North Devon, because “Reading is too much for her head now” and “She never wanted to be in Berkshire.” 86. It was noted in a November 2022 update to a Housing Triage assessment of5 May 2022 that she is in two minds about Devon: “one minute she wants to go there and one minute she wants to stay in Reading” but says that “She has come to the decision she wants to be in Devon not Reading… on home choice for Barnstable council.”
“I am satisfied in reaching the decision to seek possession and to continue with the possession proceedings, they did give due regard to the factors and have complied with the PSED.”
“However looking at the possibility of a move within Reading for the purposes of proportionality, Mr Clarke raised various possibilities: the Claimant could move the Defendant to a flat without a Tunstall system (that would solve only a part of the problem); the Claimant could move the Defendant to accommodation with sufficient support but without proximate neighbours (if such a thing exists in Reading). Mr Roberts-Doyle’s evidence was that Flat 24 was an attempt to provide such accommodation and he could not, in the witness box, think of any other such supported accommodation, without any proximate neighbours, which exists in the borough. Of course such accommodation would also have to be available. Ms McKeown submits that it cannot be the case that the Claimant is required to maintain the Defendant in her current tenancy indefinitely to await housing in such accommodation which may not exist and I accept this as a risk to be weighed in the balance.”
“The Claimant has treated this case as one where eviction should try to be avoided at all costs (that too is documented) because of the detrimental impact it will have on the Claimant’s mental health.”
“108.I have already considered and dealt with the Defendant’s main submissions that there were other, less drastic means of solving the problem. It is of key relevance that the Defendant has accepted that eviction with suitable alternative accommodation arranged would be proportionate, and so her argument on the third and fourth stages is limited to a submission that disproportionality arises from the failure to arrange suitable alternative accommodation. I have already explained that I do not think criticism of the Claimant’s failure to offer alternative accommodation, by way of management move or otherwise, is fair in circumstances where the Defendant has repeatedly stated that she does not want to stay in Reading and wants to move to Devon. The Claimant, of course, has no power to arrange suitable alternative accommodation in Devon although it has been assisting the Defendant in her search there. However looking at the possibility of a move within Reading for the purposes of proportionality, Mr Clarke raised various possibilities: the Claimant could move the Defendant to a flat without a Tunstall system (that would solve only a part of the problem); the Claimant could move the Defendant to accommodation with sufficient support but without proximate neighbours (if such a thing exists in Reading). Mr Roberts-Doyle’s evidence was that Flat 24 was an attempt to provide such accommodation and he could not, in the witness box, think of any other such supported accommodation, without any proximate neighbours, which exists in the borough. Of course such accommodation would also have to be available. Ms McKeown submits that it cannot be the case that the Claimant is required to maintain the Defendant in her current tenancy indefinitely to await housing in such accommodation which may not exist and I accept this as a risk to be weighed in the balance.”
“110.I am satisfied after considering all the evidence and carrying out a balancing exercise that eviction of the Defendant without alternative suitable accommodation is a proportionate means of achieving what is accepted to be a legitimate aim, and maintaining her tenancy until suitable alternative accommodation can be found in the Borough of Reading would be disproportionate and cause unacceptable risk to the neighbours and others, and to property, all of which rely on the Claimant to protect them from those risks.”
“I have set out the history of allegations of antisocial behaviour and other complaints and behaviours very extensively – perhaps too extensively – for fear of not painting a fair picture of what the Claimant’s staff and contractors, neighbours and others such as Forest Care staff have had to deal with from the Defendant over the years. In fact it does not paint a full picture because the sheer volume of calls, voicemails, texts and their abusive content to staff and contractors cannot be understood from my history, and nor, no doubt, can the extent of difficulties, disruption and abuse that has been experienced by the neighbours. The Defendant has made those over-55 neighbours, some elderly and vulnerable themselves, who have been assessed as suitable for sheltered housing, feel unsafe and insecure in their homes such that some of them have asked to leave it. They and other users of the Tunstall system have been put in danger by the Defendant’s excessive use of, and damage to the Tunstall system. When it is damaged it cannot be used by some residents to call if they fall or have another emergency, it puts the fire warning and monitoring system at risk: these are real dangers.”