“…the judge has little choice but to fall back on considerations such as the overall plausibility of the evidence; the consistency or inconsistency of the behaviour of the witness and other individuals with the witness’s version of events; supporting or adverse inferences to be drawn from other documents; and the judge’s assessment of the witness’s credibility, including his or her impression of how they performed in the witness box, especially when their version of events was being challenged in cross-examination.”
“2. I have had discussions with my solicitors, Teacher Stern LLP, during meetings and by telephone on a number of occasions throughout 2020 and 2021. During the discussions with my solicitors, they made notes of my evidence and showed documents to me that have been provided in this case. This witness statement has been prepared by my solicitors, I have read it and understand its contents, which I confirm are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. 3. English is not my first language, but I have an understanding of it. My usual way communicating is by speaking a mixture of Punjabi and English. The meaning of certain words and phrases used in the case have been explained to me by my solicitors. The discussions I have had with my solicitors for the preparation of this witness statement have mostly been in English.”
“An inquiry (1) whether (i) any of the Partnership debts and liabilities have since been paid and by whom and out of what fund and (ii) of all income and expenses in relation to all partnership properties not otherwise provided for below from6 April 2011 to date.”
“An inquiry (2) as to the beneficial ownership of the freehold property known as 8 King Street, Southall, Middlesex UB2 4DA (Title Number NGL208705) and, specifically: (i) Whether the property is Partnership property or any part of it is held on trust for the First Defendant and/or the Second Part 20 Claimant; and (ii) If so, whether the First Defendant and/or the Second Part 20 Claimant should account to the Partnership for use and occupation of the property between 1972 and the present date.”
“…a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance.”
“38. Inevitably any case based on proprietary estoppel is fact sensitive; but before I come to a discussion of the facts, let me set out a few legal propositions: i) Deciding whether an equity has been raised and, if so, how to satisfy it is a retrospective exercise looking backwards from the moment when the promise falls due to be performed and asking whether, in the circumstances which have actually happened, it would be unconscionable for a promise not to be kept either wholly or in part: Thorner v Major[2009] UKHL 18 ; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 776 at [57] and [101]. ii) The ingredients necessary to raise an equity are (a) an assurance of sufficient clarity (b) reliance by the claimant on that assurance and (c) detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance: Thorner v Major at [29]. iii) However, no claim based on proprietary estoppel can be divided into watertight compartments. The quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance; reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and whether there is a distinct need for a “mutual understanding” may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood: Gillett v Holt[2001] Ch. 210 at 225; Henry v Henry[2010] UKPC 3 ; [2010] 1 All E.R. 988 at [37]. iv) Detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances: Gillett v Holt at 232; Henry v Henry at [38]. v) There must be a sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted. The issue of detriment must be judged at the moment when the person who has given the assurance seeks to go back on it. The question is whether (and if so to what extent) it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the person who has given the assurance to go back on it. The essential test is that of unconscionability: Gillett v Holt at 232. vi) Thus the essence of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result: Jennings v Rice[2002] EWCA Civ 159 ; [2003] 1 P. & C.R. 8 at [56]. vii) In deciding how to satisfy any equity the court must weigh the detriment suffered by the claimant in reliance on the defendant’s assurances against any countervailing benefits he enjoyed in consequence of that reliance: Henry v Henry at [51] and [53]. viii) Proportionality lies at the heart of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and permeates its every application: Henry v Henry at [65]. In particular there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid: Jennings v Rice at [28] (citing from earlier cases) and [56]. This does not mean that the court should abandon expectations and seek only to compensate detrimental reliance, but if the expectation is disproportionate to the detriment, the court should satisfy the equity in a more limited way: Jennings v Rice at [50] and [51]. ix) In deciding how to satisfy the equity the court has to exercise a broad judgmental discretion: Jennings v Rice at [51]. However the discretion is not unfettered. It must be exercised on a principled basis, and does not entail what HH Judge Weekes QC memorably called a “portable palm tree”: Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 F.L.R. 806 (a decision criticised for other reasons in Gillett v Holt ).”
“20. …Robert Walker LJ, at [45] to [47] contrasted (i) cases where the assurances, and the claimant’s reliance on them, had a consensual character falling not far short of an enforceable contract with (ii) cases where the claimant’s expectations were uncertain, or where the high level of the claimant’s expectations may have justified only a lower level of expectation. At [47] he said: “If the claimant’s expectations are uncertain (as will be the case with many honest claimants) then their specific vindication cannot be the appropriate test. A similar problem arises if the court, although satisfied that the claimant has a genuine claim, is not satisfied that the high level of the claimant’s expectations is fairly derived from his deceased patron’s assurances, which may have justified only a lower level of expectation. In such cases the court may still take the claimant’s expectations (or the upper end of any range of expectations) as a starting point, but unless constrained by authority I would regard it as no more than a starting point.”
“Even if the most generous examination of surrounding circumstances is permitted, any decision on interpretation must pay due regard to the explicitness of particular wording and the nature and strength of any circumstances suggested as putting a different complexion upon it.”
“I do note that you are registered as holding this property as “joint owners” which means that in the event of the death of either of you it will pass automatically to the survivor of you. Usually in business partnerships a set up with separate shares is made to ensure that in those circumstances the share of any deceased partner goes to his family. We can make arrangements for this now and please give the matter careful consideration….”
“WE, TARA SINGH SIDHU and JASWINDER SINGH BAHIA hereby declare that our joint tenancy of and in the freehold property 8 King Street aforesaid is henceforth severed in equity and on and from the date hereof we shall hold the property as tenants in common in equal shares.”
“We are further instructed and understand in relation to the shop and residential parts occupied by our client at 8 King Street, Southall that there is a constructive trust in our Client’s favour pursuant to which the Partnership holds the majority of that property on trust for our Client to include the entirety of the residential part occupied by our client (since purchase in 1972). This is based on the facts giving rise to the historic purchase of that property including the payment by our client of 90 percent of the purchase monies”
“…The facts should speak for themselves and the history is clear as our Client financed the purchase of that Property predominantly with his own money (to include a redundancy payment and the proceeds of sale of the family home) and sourced the balance of the purchase monies via loans from third party family members and friends…Our Client has occupied the upper part of the Property since the purchase of the property and never paid rental on the basis that he funded the purchase personally and is entitled to the entirety of the residence”
“…as far as we knew, that house belonged to my brother”, while Mrs Khosa’s evidence was that funds for the purchase had come from “her brother”
“An inquiry (3) as to the beneficial ownership of the freehold property known as 136 High Road, East Finchley, London N2 9ED (Title Number NGL274102) and whether the property is Partnership property, specifically, whether the beneficial owners are (i) the Claimant and the First Defendant (on behalf of the estate of Tara Singh Sidhu (the “Deceased”) in equal shares absolutely; or (ii) the Second Defendant absolutely.”
“An inquiry (4) whether the Deceased or the First Defendant on behalf the Deceased converted any of the following Partnership properties or the rental income derived therefrom to their own use and/or generated private or undisclosed profits for the purposes ofsection 29 of the Partnership Act 1890 and/or failed to account to the Partnership: (i) 136 High Road, East Finchley, London N2 9ED (Title Number NGL274102), from 2005 to5 April 2019 . (ii) 99 – 101 High Road, East Finchley, London N2 8AG (Title Numbers MX374345 and MX372197), from 2006 to5 April 2019 . (iii) 47 Stroud Green, Finsbury Park, London N4 3EF (Title Number LN243024), from 2006 to5 April 2019 . (iv) The self-contained residential flats at 8 King Street, Southall, Middlesex UB2 4DA (Title Number NGL208705), from 2009 to5 April 2019 . (v) 2 The Broadway, Ealing, London W13 0SR (Title Number MX176191), from 1997 to5 April 2019 .”
“I have assumed a rental figure of£475 pcm for Flat B because the amount being paid at the same time by Mr Gimes for Flat D (which is a smaller flat) was£420 pcm [in 2005/2006] (rising to£455 pcm in 2007/8)”
“Bank Giro Credit Ref Smith R”; they did not give details of the flat to which the rent relates. However, the Bahias had copies of similar bank statements setting out more detailed information and recording payments from R Smith as follows: “Bank Giro Credit Ref Smith R 47A Stroud Green”
“An inquiry (7) whether the Second Defendant was a Partnership asset and, if so, whether the Deceased and/or the First Defendant have accounted to the Partnership for all the profits generated by the Second Defendant from1 January 2009 to5 April 2019 .”
“given the sums involved here, especially when you’re exceeding£4,000 which is equivalent to 10,000 miles, you’d expect there to be significant documentation because this is an area that the Revenue would definitely question if they were to look at these accounts. So when you’re looking at this level of estimates or transactions, it does strike me as unusual”. c) Repairs: Figures for repairs were provided orally to the accountants at year end for the years 2013 onwards, for the most part in round sums and sometimes described purely as “miscellaneous expenses”
“Mr Sidhu’s director’s account was debited with the sums claimed. In the event credit is disallowed, the debit will remain”
“No, I had a proper look to make sure that I didn’t receive it, and I don’t recall receiving it”
“24/05/2010 £2020 – This was paid to Mr TS Sidhu as it was for reimbursement of Builders 13 Damsonwood£400 ; Carpet 13 Damsonwood£500 ; Builder 46 King Street£400 ; Door and Lock shutter for 46 King Street£720 . Total comes to£2020 .”
“£6,000 transfer from Barclays to A Star Rent A/C to T.S Sidhu”
“It’s in the same time period”
“An inquiry (9) into the withdrawal and payments made from Partnership funds to meet the Deceased’s mortgage repayments for his property known as 15 Aylmer Road, London N2 0PL in periods during 1989 and 1992 and 2001 and 2003.”
“An inquiry (10) as to such sums which may be due to the Partnership from the Defendant as a result of any tax liabilities of the Deceased which were discharged from Partnership funds between 1972 and February 2010.”
“An inquiry (12) as to whether the Claimant failed to account to the Partnership for rents received in relation to 44A and 48A King Street (including the Kiosk) between August 2004 and February 2009 and, where relevant, whether any settled accounts should be re-opened, surcharged and falsified on the basis of material error, concealment or misrepresentation. In considering whether the First Defendant should be granted the relief he seeks, whether the copy of the Diary relied upon by the First Defendant has been altered by the Deceased and/or the First Defendant to conceal (i) properly recorded expenses; (ii) the collection of rent by the Deceased; (iii) withdrawals made by the First Defendant; and/or (iv) monies withdrawn by the Deceased with the dishonest intention of formulating a false claim to reopen settled accounts and/or wrongfully claim adjustments from the Claimant in these proceedings. Further, whether the First Defendant and/or the Deceased’s conduct amounts to an abuse of process or otherwise precludes the Defendant from seeking such inquiries.”
“An inquiry (13) as to whether the Claimant failed to account to the Partnership for rents received from 2 and 2A The Broadway between January 2006 and 2013 and, where relevant, whether any settled accounts should be re-opened, surcharged and falsified on the basis of material error, concealment or misrepresentation.”
“An inquiry (14) as to whether the Part 20 Claimants received various distributions provided for in partnership accounts between 2000 and 2012, including figures expressly provided for in year-end accounts for 2003 to 2007 and, where relevant, whether any settled accounts should be re-opened, surcharged and falsified on the basis of material error, concealment or misrepresentation.”
“An Inquiry (15) as to whether the Deceased’s capital account was on30 November 2003 wrongly debited£11,000 for the purchase of a Jaguar vehicle for the Defendant and whether any settled accounts should be re-opened, surcharged and falsified on the basis of material error, concealment or misrepresentation.”
“An inquiry (17) as to whether the Part 20 Defendants failed to account to the Greatway Partnership on cessation of trading on or about13 December 2012 for various chattels belonging to the partnership.”