‘(a) Even if the SoS thinks it expedient in the public interest to wind up a company, the Court still has a discretion whether or not to make an order. (b) Before making an order the Court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to wind the company up. (c) The burden of proof lies on the SoS to persuade the Court (having proved matters of fact to the requisite civil standard) that it is just and equitable to wind the company up. (d) The Court must balance competing reasons why the company should be wound up and why it should not be wound up upon a consideration of the totality of the evidence … (e) As a result of undertaking that exercise the Court must be able to identify for itself the aspects of the public interest which would be promoted by making a winding up order in the particular case … (f) It is not necessary for the business of the company to involve illegality. As Millett LJ said in Re Senator Hanseatische Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH[1997] 1 WLR 515 at 522h;[1997] BCC 112 at 117B: “On the contrary the phrases used (namely “expedient in the public interest” and “just and equitable”) to my mind indicate that Parliament did not intend to impose such a restriction but instead simply decided to leave to the Secretary of State to form a view as to what was expedient in the public interest and the court then to decide on the material before it whether the justice and equity of the case dictated that the company concerned should be wound up”. (g) Where the business of the company does not involve the commission of illegal acts or breaches of regulatory requirements the company may nonetheless be wound up if its business is “inherently objectionable” because its activities are contrary to a clearly identified public interest. So in Re Abacrombie & Co Ltd[2008] EWHC 2520 (Ch) the company operated a debtor advisory service. David Richards J explained: “the purpose of the company’s business as it related to clients with equity in their residential property was, prior to the client’s bankruptcy, to sell the equity to the client’s spouse or partner at as low a price as possible and to use the proceeds to fund the company’s charges which were both excessive and unjustifiably charged to the debtor client. The effect, as the company .. well appreciated, was to deprive the debtor’s estate of any substantial return of value from the debtor’s beneficial interest which was likely to have been the only asset of any substance. The effect was detrimental to creditors and undermined the proper administration of the bankruptcy of the debtor” (see paragraph [60]). He had earlier at paragraph [15] held: “The arrangements, as operated by the company, in my judgement, subverted the proper functioning of the law and procedures of bankruptcy”. (h) Such conduct is sometimes described as disclosing “a lack of commercial probity”, and whilst this frequently might involve preying on the public and inducing individual members of the public to participate in transactions which are without benefit to them, it can also involve prejudice to the public generally (for example by casting burdens on the general body of taxpayers). An illustration of this may be found in Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills v PGMRS Ltd[2010] EWHC 2983 (Ch) ;[2011] BCC 368 in which four companies traded at the expense of HMRC (by not paying either VAT or PAYE) until such time as they were insolvent, conduct that the judge held represented a lack of commercial probity. (i) However in making the judgement whether a business is inherently objectionable “the court has to be careful of being priggish” (see Re Forcesun Ltd[2002] EWHC 443 (Ch) at [26], a point which Mr Chivers QC reinforced with a submission that this was a court of law and not a court of morals. If this is simply a submission that I am bound to decide the case according to law and by reference to principle and precedent I unhesitatingly accept the submission. If this is a submission that the law in this area is devoid of moral content, then I disagree. Concepts such as “inherent objectionability” or “want of commercial probity” are bound to have some moral content, though that content is not the subjective moral perception of the individual judge, but must be informed by any discernible policy of the law and guided by the view of other judges in other cases. (j) Finally, to wind up an active and solvent company is a serious step, and the Court must be satisfied that reasons of sufficient weight have been advanced to justify taking that course (Re Walter L Jacob & Co Ltd(1989) 5 BCC 244 (above) at 252C-E)’