“The same approach has been followed by the Supreme Court of Cyprus in Theodoros Pirillis v. Eleftherios Kouis(2004) 1 CLR 136 and subsequently in Yiannis G. Mammous and others v Willstrop and others(2012) 1 CLR 90 . Under Cyprus law, the derivative action is not simply another form of litigation but a unique procedural and equitable mechanism governed by well-established common law principles and provides minority shareholders with the opportunity to enforce the company's rights in cases where a wrong has been committed against the company which amounts to fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers themselves control the company's affairs.”
“A derivative action is an exception to the elementary principle that A cannot, as a general rule, bring an action against B to recover damages or secure other relief on behalf of C for an injury done by B to C. C is the proper plaintiff because C is the party injured, and, therefore, the person in whom the cause of action is vested. This is sometimes referred to as the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 when applied to corporations, but it has a wider scope and is fundamental to any rational system of jurisprudence. The rule in Foss v. Harbottle also embraces a related principle, that an individual shareholder cannot bring an action in the courts to complain of an irregularity (as distinct from an illegality) in the conduct of the company's internal affairs if the irregularity is one which can be cured by a vote of the company in general meeting. We are not concerned with this aspect of the rule. The classic definition of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is stated in the judgment of Jenkins L.J. in Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064 as follows. (1) The proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a corporation is, prima facie, the corporation. (2) Where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the corporation and on all its members by a simple majority of the members, no individual member of the corporation is allowed to maintain an action in respect of that matter because, if the majority confirms the transaction, cadit quaestio; or, if the majority challenges the transaction, there is no valid reason why the company should not sue. (3) There is no room for the operation of the rule if the alleged wrong is ultra vires the corporation, because the majority of members cannot confirm the transaction. (4) There is also no room for the operation of the rule if the transaction complained of could be validly done or sanctioned only by a special resolution or the like, because a simple majority cannot confirm a transaction which requires the concurrence of a greater majority. (5) There is an exception to the rule where what has been done amounts to fraud and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company. In this case the rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority, who are allowed to bring a minority shareholders' action on behalf of themselves and all others. The reason for this is that, if they were denied that right, their grievance could never reach the court because the wrongdoers themselves, being in control, would not allow the company to sue.”
“(1) The proper plaintiff is prima facie the company. (2) Where the wrong or irregularity might be made binding on the company by a simple majority of its members, no individual shareholder is allowed to maintain an action in respect of that matter. (3) There are however recognised exceptions, one of which is where the wrongdoer has control which is or would be exercised to prevent a proper action being brought against the wrongdoer: in such a case the shareholder may bring a derivative action (his rights being derived from the company) on behalf of the company. (4) When a challenge is made to the right claimed by a shareholder to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company, it is the duty of the court to decide as a preliminary issue the question whether or not the plaintiff should be allowed to sue in that capacity. (5) In taking that decision it is not enough for the court to say that there is no plain and obvious case for striking out; it is for the shareholder to establish to the satisfaction of the court that he should be allowed to sue on behalf of the company. (6) The shareholder will be allowed to sue on behalf of the company if he is bringing the action bona fide for the benefit of the company for wrongs to the company for which no other remedy is available. Conversely if the action is brought for an ulterior purpose or if another adequate remedy is available, the court will not allow the derivative action to proceed.”
“Is there a prima facie case that the claim falls within the exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle? 32. The rule inFoss v. Harbottle is, so far as relevant, that the right to sue a director for a breach of his duty owed to the company is a right which is vested in the company and which cannot normally be pursued by a shareholder of the company. The relevant exception to the rule is that a shareholder will be allowed to bring such a claim, by way of a derivative action, where there is a “fraud on the minority”. 33. If the wrongdoing amounts to actual fraud, then there is clearly “fraud” for the purposes of the exception. If the wrongdoing does not involve actual fraud but consists of a breach of fiduciary duty or negligence, then it must be shown that there is a prima facie case that there was a benefit or profit for the wrongdoer. … 37. I next consider the contentions as to whether this is a case of wrongdoer control. Currently, the directors of BBL, BDL and BL are Jat and Rajinder. As one of two directors, Jat has negative control of the boards of all three companies as he can prevent there being a majority on any resolution of the board as to whether BBL or BDL should sue Jat. Jat has 41 per cent of the shares in BL and so does not by himself have control of BL in general meeting. However, Jat and Rajinder have 78 per cent of the shares in BL, whereas Inder has only the remaining 22 per cent of those shares. Between them Jat and Rajinder can block any resolution of the shareholders of BL to authorise BBL and BDL to sue Jat. Mr Chaisty submits that Inder has not shown the necessary wrongdoer control in this case because he does not allege that Rajinder is a wrongdoer. I do not agree. It is true that Inder has not joined his mother as a defendant and he does not wish to do so. However, the substance of his allegation against Jat implicates Rajinder in the alleged wrongdoing. I consider that enables Inder to show a prima facie case of wrongdoer control exercised by Jat and Rajinder.”
“9. The general rule is that a cause of action vesting in a company should be pursued by the company and not by its shareholders. A derivative action is an exception to that rule to deal with the particular circumstances when the company cannot or will not bring an action against the alleged wrongdoer. It is to address those circumstances that the court may allow a member of the company to pursue that action for the benefit of the company and thus, indirectly, all its shareholders. 11. … There is nothing to suggest that the Act intended such a radical reversal of long-standing and fundamental principles. It is relevant that this part of the Act has its genesis in the Report of the Law Commission on Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No.246 (1997)). That report states at the outset in paragraph 1.2: “The focus of the project was on the remedies available to a minority shareholder who is dissatisfied with the manner in which the company of which he is a member is run.” 12. The Report proceeded to set out “Guiding Principles” that the Law Commission applied as governing its proposals for reform of the law. The first of these is expressed as follows at para.1.9: “(i) Proper plaintiff Normally the company should be the only party entitled to enforce a cause of action belonging to it. Accordingly, a member should be able to maintain proceedings about wrongs done to the company only in exceptional circumstances.” 13. Although this part of the Act does not completely mirror the approach to be found in a combination of the Law Commission’s draft bill and draft procedure rules, it clearly reflects the overall approach in the Law Commission’s proposal and, in my view, one would expect very different language in the Act if it were adopting such a radically different approach that involved discarding the Guiding Principle that I have quoted. Indeed, in the Act the governing provision for the grant of permission by the court to continue a derivative claim is s.261(4) which makes clear that this is a discretion resting in the court. 14. Whilst the discretion must, of course, be exercised in accordance with established principles, in my judgment this is one such principle. I would not go so far as to say that it could never be appropriate for a derivative claim to be brought by a shareholder holding the majority of the shares in a company. A judge must be cautious about using the word “never” when faced with a statutory discretion and when this is not one of the enumerated circumstances in s.263(2) in which permission must be refused. And faced only with the facts of the instant case, it is impossible to envisage all the factual circumstances that might arise in other cases. But in my judgment, only in very exceptional circumstances could it be appropriate to permit a derivative claim brought by a shareholder in control of the company. For my part, I find it difficult to envisage what those exceptional circumstances might be.”
“Nor . . . can we endorse a rule that leave can only be granted where the directors whose breach of duty is in issue were and remain in majority control: in practice, that is likely to be the position in many cases where leave is appropriately granted, but, as we have explained, one of the objects of the 2006 Act was to introduce more flexible criteria than the former ‘fraud on the minority’ exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. The common law requirement of ‘wrongdoer control’, in particular, had given rise to difficulty in a number of cases . . . and is not repeated in section 268.”
“(1) The claimant must show a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of an unjustified dissipation of assets. In this context dissipation means putting the assets out of reach of a judgment whether by concealment or transfer. (2) The risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence; mere inference or generalised assertion is not sufficient. (3) The risk of dissipation must be established separately against each respondent. (4) It is not enough to establish a sufficient risk of dissipation merely to establish a good arguable case that the defendant has been guilty of dishonesty; it is necessary to scrutinise the evidence to see whether the dishonesty in question points to the conclusion that assets [may be] dissipated. It is also necessary to take account of whether there appear at the interlocutory stage to be properly arguable answers to the allegations of dishonesty. … (6) What must be threatened is unjustified dissipation. The purpose of a WFO is not to provide the claimant with security; it is to restrain a defendant from evading justice by disposing of, or concealing, assets otherwise than in the normal course of business in a way which will have the effect of making it judgment proof. A WFO is not intended to stop a corporate defendant from dealing with its assets in the normal course of its business. Similarly, it is not intended to constrain an individual defendant from conducting his personal affairs in the way he has always conducted them, providing of course that such conduct is legitimate. If the defendant is not threatening to change the existing way of handling their assets, it will not be sufficient to show that such continued conduct would prejudice the claimant's ability to enforce a judgment. That would be contrary to the purpose of the WFO jurisdiction because it would require defendants to change their legitimate behaviour in order to provide preferential security for the claim which the claimant would not otherwise enjoy. (7) Each case is fact specific and relevant factors must be looked at cumulatively.”