‘32. I find this quite difficult. The trouble is respecting the purpose of the majority in number test required by the statute. This aims to give shareholders big or small a certain amount of equality in terms of the voting. However, Snowden J’s solution gives priority to value which is, in any event, covered by the 75 per cent majority test. However, it would still be vulnerable, in principle, to small shareholders deciding to convert and get themselves on the register for the purposes of the headcount at the meeting. It is therefore still possible for them to exert the influence that the statute gives them. It is just that they need to get on the register in time for the meeting. The position can also, it seems to me, still be reviewed at the sanction stage if it is felt that the situation has been taken unfair advantage of by a majority shareholder. 33. I therefore think that, on balance, in these circumstances it is best to adopt Snowden J’s test and to allow the nominee shareholders to vote in accordance with the majority wishes of their underlying beneficial holders and that is what I will direct.’