“It is well established that the court has jurisdiction under Pt 26 CA 2006 to sanction a scheme which includes a mechanism (usually the execution of a deed of release by an attorney appointed under the scheme) under which scheme creditors are required to release claims against third parties where such a release is necessary in order to give effect to the arrangement between the company and the scheme creditors. That test is most clearly satisfied where the scheme compromises debts which are guaranteed and where, absent such a release, pursuit of the guarantor by a scheme creditor would undermine the compromise between the creditor and the company: see Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (No.2)[2009] EWCA Civ 1161 ; [2010] Bus. L.R. 489; [2010] B.C.C. 272 at [65] (Patten LJ).”
“The court may, on an application under this section, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of members (as the case may be), to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.”
“In each case the answer to that question will depend upon analysis (i) of the rights which are to be released or varied under the scheme and (ii) of the new rights (if any) which the scheme gives, by way of compromise or arrangement, to those whose rights are to be released or varied.”
“What is now ordinarily adopted as the starting point is to identify the appropriate comparator: that is, what would be the alternative if the scheme does not proceed. In Re British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd[2006] 1 BCLC 665 ;[2005] EWHC 1621 (Ch) , Lewison J (as he then was) considered this to be “critical to deciding whether all the policyholders form a single class”; and in Re Apcoa Parking (UK) Ltd[2014] EWHC 997 (Ch) I agreed that “that will necessarily inform, and in many if not most cases be the most important factor in, the discussions”
“…The golden thread of these authorities, as I see it, is to emphasise time and again … [that] in determining whether the constituent creditors’ rights in relation to the company are so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest the court must focus, and focus exclusively, on rights as distinct from interests. The essential requirement is that the class should be comprised only of persons whose rights in terms of their existing and the rights offered in the replacement, in each case against the company, are sufficiently similar to enable them to properly consult and identify their true interests together. I emphasise this point because it … enables the court to take a far more robust view as to what the classes should be and to determine a far less fragmented structure than if interests were taken into account.”
“The modern approach...is to break the question into two parts, and ask first whether there is any difference between the creditors in point of strict legal right...and if there is, to postulate, by reference to the alternative if the scheme were to fail, whether objectively there would be more to unite than divide the creditors in the proposed class, ignoring for that purpose any personal or extraneous motivation operating in the case of any particular creditor(s).”
“… a material difference in legal rights does not necessarily preclude their respective holders from being included in a single class: for the second part of the test enables that provided that they are not “so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest”
“In this case, as I have explained, the appropriate comparator is a formal insolvency process, most likely in the form of a distributing administration. In such an administration, the rights of all the relevant creditors would be the same. They hold unsecured claims against the Company and thus would rank pari passu with each other for a dividend or dividends from the insolvent estate, payable at the same time for all. It is irrelevant that the contractual terms as to interest and maturity dates under the existing facilities and notes differ as between different creditors. No interest accruing post-commencement is payable on debts unless there is a surplus having paid all proved debts, which is not a practical likelihood here. As I have noted, all dividends are payable at the same time, irrespective of the contractual date for payment of the proved debt.” (2) See also: Re Obrascon Huarte Lain SA[2021] EWHC 859 (Ch) at [26]-[27] per Adam Johnson J. The expert evidence of Spanish law explains that no post-insolvency interest would be recoverable if the principal debt is not repaid in full, which is the expected outcome in the present case. It follows that the apparent differences between the existing contractual rights of the Scheme Creditors (as regards interest rates) are irrelevant. In substance, they have the same rights. It is therefore appropriate for them to be given the same rights under the Scheme (namely the New SSNs). (3) Customary confirmations. Scheme Creditors will be required to make certain customary confirmations with respect to US securities legislation in order to certify their ability to receive their allocation of New SSNs and New Shares. If a Scheme Creditor is unable to make such customary confirmations, it may nominate a person to receive its allocation of New SSNs and New Shares on its behalf. If a Scheme Creditor fails to nominate such a person, then the New SSNs and New Shares for that Scheme Creditor will be transferred into a “holding trust” for up to 12 months. If the New SSNs and New Shares still have not been claimed at the end of that period, then they will be sold and the net proceeds will be distributed to the relevant creditor. This structure does not, in my judgment, fracture the class. It is a customary feature of schemes that involve the issuance of new debt or equity securities. The Scheme Creditors have the same rights in relation to the New SSNs and New Shares under the Scheme. An inability to give the customary confirmations required to be given to receive an allocation of New SSNs and New Shares goes merely to the enjoyment of those rights, creating a potential fairness, not class, issue: see Re Lecta Paper UK Ltd[2019] EWHC 3615 (Ch) at [19] per Zacaroli J; Re Obrascon Huarte Lain SA[2021] EWHC 859 (Ch) at [28] per Adam Johnson J; Re Swissport Fuelling Ltd[2020] EWHC 3064 (Ch) at [82]-[83] per Trower J. (4) Consent Payment.A consent fee is payable to Scheme Creditors who acceded to the Lock-Up Agreement by 5pm on31 March 2022 (the Consent Payment). The Consent Payment is a sum equal to 0.5% of the principal amount of the New SSNs to be received by the relevant Scheme Creditor under the Scheme. The Consent Payment will be payable in cash upon the implementation of the Scheme. Consent fees of this type are common, and at this level do not – given the value at risk - fracture the proposed class. Of course, this is a matter that is fact dependent, and the fees incurred in bringing forward a scheme, and the basis on which they are to be paid, are always going to be matters the court ought to bear in mind. More specifically: (a) Some of the authorities suggest that, where a consent fee is made available to all creditors in advance of the scheme meeting, it cannot fracture the class. If each creditor had a right to obtain the fee, then there is no difference in rights that is capable of fracturing the class: see Re HEMA UK I Ltd[2020] EWHC 2219 (Ch) and Re Swissport Fuelling Ltd[2020] EWHC 3064 (Ch) at [72] per Trower J, among many other cases. I am a little doubtful as to the weight of this point, since the critical question is how the class will vote at the meeting, and the factors that might impair that vote. (b) Some of the authorities suggest that even if a consent fee was made available to all, it is necessary to consider whether the quantum of the consent fee is material. On this view, if a consent fee would be unlikely to exert a material influence on the relevant creditors’ voting decisions (having regard to the amount that creditors would receive in the comparator to the scheme and the value of the rights conferred by the scheme), then the fee does not fracture the class: see Re Primacom Holding GmbH[2013] BCC 201 at [57] per Hildyard J, among other cases. It is this, second, factor that is persuasive – at least in the present case, although I would be troubled if the potential for a consent fee were not available to all members of the class. To that extent, selectivity may be a negative factor, requiring of explanation. In the present case, all of the financial creditors were given an opportunity to sign the Lock-Up Agreement and receive the Consent Payment (if they acceded by 5pm on31 March 2022 ). More importantly, the Consent Payment (which represents only 0.5% of the New SSNs to be received by the relevant Scheme Creditor) would not, in my judgment, exert a material influence on the Scheme Creditors’ voting decisions. The difference between the “Scheme outcome” and the “comparator outcome” is far greater than 0.5% and it would be fanciful to suppose that anyone would vote for the Scheme in order to receive the Consent Payment. (5) Advisers’ fees. The legal and financial advisers to the Ad Hoc Group have carried out a significant amount of work to assist in devising the transaction structure and drafting the restructuring documents (which are lengthy and complex). The fees, costs and expenses incurred by the legal and financial advisers to the Ad Hoc Group in connection with the Scheme will be met by the Group in accordance with certain fee letters entered into by the applicable parties. Again, the key question is whether the payment of the fees may distort the process of obtaining the informed consent of the class. In many previous cases, it has been found that the payment of fees incurred by a creditor’s professional advisers does not fracture the class. Often, such fees fall into a different category from consent fees, since they do not confer any bounty or net benefit on the relevant creditor: they simply defray expenses and disbursements that a creditor has incurred as a result of the restructuring transaction and would not otherwise have incurred. See Re Lecta Paper UK Ltd[2019] EWHC 3615 (Ch) at [18] per Zacaroli J; Re ColourOz Investment 2 LLC[2020] BCC 926 at [113] per Snowden J; Re ED&F Man Treasury Management plc[2020] EWHC 2290 (Ch) at [13] per Zacaroli J; and Re Codere Finance 2 (UK) Ltd[2020] EWHC 2441 (Ch) at [68]-[69] and [101]-[104] per Falk J. In this case, In addition, any “benefit” arising from the payment of professional fees is de minimis in comparison to the wider benefits of the Scheme. In my judgment, in this case, no class issue arises. (6) Work Fee. The Lock-Up Agreement provides that a fee of€250,000 (the Work Fee) will be paid to each member of the Ad Hoc Group (subject to an aggregate cap of€1,250,000 ) to compensate the members of the Ad Hoc Group for their assistance and endeavours in structuring and negotiating the terms of the Scheme. The Work Fee is also paid to compensate the members of the Ad Hoc Group for their inability to trade the Existing SSNs for a substantial period of time when the Scheme was being negotiated (since they had access to confidential information which had not yet been disclosed to the market), which resulted in a loss of trading opportunities. Work fees are not uncommon in schemes of arrangement, and in previous cases, they have not caused the class to fracture: Re DTEK Finance plc[2017] BCC 165 at [7] per Newey J; Re Far East Capital Ltd SA[2017] EWHC 2878 (Ch) per Snowden J; Re Bibby Offshore Services plc[2017] EWHC 3402 (Ch) at [26]-[27] per Arnold J; Re Noble Group Ltd[2019] BCC 349 at [121], [141] and [142] per Snowden J; Re NN2 Newco Ltd[2019] EWHC 1917 (Ch) at [46] per Norris J; Re Codere Finance 2 (UK) Ltd[2020] EWHC 2441 (Ch) per Falk J; Re KCA Deutag UK Finance plc[2020] EWHC 2779 (Ch) per Trower J; Re Petra Diamonds US$ Treasury plc[2020] EWHC 3565 (Ch) per Sir Alastair Norris. I do not consider this case to be any different, and find that the Work Fee does not fracture the class. There are two key points in this regard. First, the Work Fee is very small in comparison to the benefits of the Scheme, and far smaller than the work fees charged in other cases. Second, the Work Fee is paid in consideration of the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group, which requires significant time to be spent by senior management at the relevant creditor entities, and in consideration of their inability to trade the Existing SSNs during the period when the Scheme was being negotiated. The Work Fee is not a form of bounty or disguised consideration, but is simply a fee for a commercial service that benefited all Scheme Creditors by enabling the Scheme to be negotiated and implemented. (7) Nomination rights. The members of the Ad Hoc Group are entitled to nominate the initial two independent non-executive directors to be appointed by the holders of Class B Shares on the Recapitalisation Effective Date to the board of the New Parent (the Initial Class B Shareholder Directors). In my judgment, this does not fracture the class. The Ad Hoc Group has the right to nominate two Initial Class B Shareholder Directors on the Recapitalisation Effective Date for administrative purposes only. The Class B Shareholder Directors will be independent directors, rather than representatives of or otherwise associated with any member of the Ad Hoc Group, and their appointment would not give the Ad Hoc Group any additional rights regarding the management of the New Parent. As the Company and its advisers are currently in contact and negotiating the Recapitalisation with the Ad Hoc Group and their advisers, the Group considered it efficient and appropriate for the Ad Hoc Group to appoint the Initial Class B Shareholder Directors. In the event that the remaining Class B Shareholders disagree with the Ad Hoc Group's selection of the Initial Class B Shareholder Directors, they are able to replace them after the Recapitalisation Effective Date. This is not, in my judgment, a material difference in rights which fractures the class. This is consistent with authorities in which similar (and more extensive) nomination rights were conferred on an ad hoc group or coordinating committee, e.g. Re Pizza Express Financing 2 Ltd[2020] EWHC 2873 (Ch) at [44] per Sir Alastair Norris and Re Swissport Fuelling Ltd[2020] EWHC 3064 (Ch) at [71] per Trower J. (8) Information access. In Re Port Finance Investment Ltd[2021] EWHC 378 (Ch) at [101], Snowden J said: “Without further explanation, I also initially was concerned that the Group might be planning to allow (and indeed pay for) what was described as “due diligence” to be carried out by the Financial Adviser for the benefit of certain Noteholders rather than others. The scheme process and the formulation of classes depends on an assumption that all creditors who attend and vote in a class meeting should do so on the basis that the necessary information has been provided to them all in the same explanatory statement. Even if not within the conventional class test based on a comparison of rights, I think it would be highly relevant to the question of whether the court ought to convene a single class meeting on the basis of the proposed explanatory statement if there was also to be a parallel process for provision of additional information to some, but not all, creditors: see the similar concerns I expressed in re Sunbird Business Services Limited[2020] EWHC 2493 (Ch) ; [2020] Bus LR 2371.”