“An evaluation of all the circumstances surrounding the offers shows that none of them rendered Dr Potamianos‟ exclusion from the Company fair. They could not be relied on to defeat Dr Potamianos‟ petition and it would make no difference to that conclusion that an expert might now value the shares as at the time the offers were made at less than the£1.34 million or£1 million offered …We do not think that the expert evidence of valuation, whatever its result, will be capable of producing a result that would deny Dr Potamianos any relief upon his petition. That is not to say that the offers made may not have some bearing upon costs questions, depending upon the outcome.”
“It is unfortunate that Mr Prescott considered it worthwhile to take time over this issue”. (5). Second, there was an issue as to whether the cost of staff to replace Mr Prescott and Dr Potamianos which should be inserted into the calculation was (a)£37,000 for each of the years 2016, 2017 and 2018, as Dr Potamianos contended, or (b)£120,000 for 2016, increased to£122,520 for 2017 and further to£126,564 for 2018, as Mr Prescott contended. I decided that the correct figure was£37,000 plus£45,000 for each of those three years. This constituted, arithmetically at least, a determination which was approximately half way between the rival contentions of the parties. (6). Third, there was an issue as to whether the saving of the cost of a salesman at£50,000 per annum should be added back for the years 2017 and 2018, as contended by Dr Potamianos. I decided that issue in favour of Mr Prescott. (7). Fourth, there was an issue as to whether the correct value of SEL‟s surplus cash was£450,000 , as agreed by the experts for both parties, or£755,000 as contended by Dr Potamianos. This was a major item of dispute, as any difference fed directly into the calculation of the total value of SEL. I decided that issue in favour of Mr Prescott. With regard to the arguments advanced by Mr Pavlovich on behalf of Dr Potamianos, I observed (at [110]): “Although these points were attractively put, I am not persuaded that they provide any proper basis upon which to reject the clear, cogent and considered views of not only Mr Prescott‟s expert but also Dr Potamianos‟ expert”
“261. When it became apparent that SEL on the one hand and BDL and Dr Potamianos on the other had a difference of understanding as to the rights to the Source Code, and when SEL asked where it was and how SEL could access it, I consider that Dr Potamianos was not entitled to act in a manner that was detrimental to SEL by being evasive or misleading, including by dissembling as to those matters. SEL was entitled to be provided with a candid statement of his position, so that it had an opportunity to decide how to respond to it, for example by working round his denial of rights and access. 262. Regrettably, Dr Potamianos saw things differently, and did not comply with this duty. A single illustration suffices: … (7) This reflects, and I so find, that right up to August 2016, while Mr Prescott was being open and clear about SEL‟s position both as to ownership of the Source Code and as to the right to access it, Dr Potamianos was not being direct, frank or remotely helpful about those matters. On the contrary, Dr Potamianos was professing a standpoint which contradicts the stance that he has adopted in these proceedings, and was then avoiding answering a direct and simple question by professing a lack of understanding of what was being asked of him that I am certain he did not have, and by asking questions which he knew to be irrelevant. (8) There was nothing unclear about Mr Prescott‟s email dated25 August 2016 , but even if there had been, any lack of clarity was resolved by his email dated26 August 2016 . However, Dr Potamianos did not reply to that second email. (9) Moreover, his suggestion that software issues had not been discussed at the meeting was disingenuous, especially as he suggested (at a time when he did not know the meeting had been taped) that he could back this is up with “full notes”
“380. In the present case, the allegations of unfair prejudice are based on alleged failure to consult/exclusion from management of Dr Potamianos and alleged resultant mismanagement of SEL and SRL in relation to (1) the first decision to terminate Mrs Macdonald‟s contract (2) the second decision to terminate Mrs Macdonald‟s contract (3) the engagement of Mr Pearson (4) the Business Plan (5) the engagement of Mr Levine/his company to review the Business Plan (6) the engagement of Mr Levine as SEL‟s business development and marketing manager (7) the engagement of Mr Levine‟s company to perform marketing and similar functions for SEL (8) the retention of Dr Fells (9) the termination of the Bardac project (10) ceasing to pay BDL‟s invoices after15 July 2016 (11) the establishment of the Sub-Committee and (12) the continued employment of Mr Van Der Wee (the costs of which Mr Prescott promised to pay personally on 16 and17 March 2015 , and which he has not in fact paid, but in respect of which he said “I am quite happy for it to be considered [on] quantum eventually.”). 381. A further allegation, that excess sums were spent on renovation of Peregrine House, was pursued by Dr Potamianos until the close of evidence, but was then abandoned. 382. In addition to the above, there is the fundamental complaint that Dr Potamianos has been removed as a director of SEL. Indeed, that was one of the two central planks that were identified at the outset of Dr Potamianos‟ opening submissions. The other plank, which I have rejected, related to the Source Code claim, which was said to be invented. The opening paragraph of Dr Potamianos‟ written submissions before me allege: “This trial concerns a boardroom coup perpetrated by Mr Prescott …against his fellow director and shareholder, Dr Potamianos. The result is that [Mr Prescott] has unfairly and unlawfully deprived [Dr Potamianos] of his right to participate in management. Furthermore, [Mr Prescott] and SEL seek retrospectively to invent a right to obtain the source code of certain computer “firmware” developed by Dr Potamianos‟ service company, BDL. They thereby seek to obviate the need to retain BDL‟s services and to exclude [Dr Potamianos] from the business more generally.” 383. While Dr Potamianos submits that the Court “only needs to accept the most severe kind of prejudicial conduct in order to establish unfair prejudice”, he also argues that “the earlier conduct is still relevant because it affects the extent of the prejudice and the relief to which [he] should be entitled”
“There will, however, be cases where the excluded minority has brought his exclusion upon himself by his own wrongful or unconscionable conduct. The courts then have to wrestle with the individual facts of particular cases to determine whether the majority were justified in excluding the minority …” “… In the case of quasi-partnerships where the minority has been unfairly excluded from management, there is a strong presumption that no discount should be applied … It has been suggested obiter, however, that a discount may be applied if the petitioner‟s conduct has contributed to the actions on the part of the majority of which complaint is made, but this seems anomalous, although there is no reason in principle why a court should not apply a discount in such circumstances if the justice of the case exceptionally so required …” 387. These arguments have to be viewed in the context that the court is not in a position to second-guess or interfere with matters of commercial and managerial judgment, and that what needs to be shown is mismanagement which is sufficiently serious to justify the intervention of the court (see, for example, Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd[1994] 2 BCLC 354 , Arden J at 404i-405a). 388. As to the allegations of breaches of directors‟ duties, Mr Prescott denies that there were any breaches. If, contrary to his primary case, he is found to have acted in breach of duty, he contends that he is entitled to relief under section 1157 of the CA because he acted honestly and reasonably and having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Discussion and conclusion 389. In the present case, I have given careful consideration to all the allegations upon which the petition is based, much of the history of which is apparent from the documents that I have summarised above. I think that there is force in the submission that in many instances Dr Potamianos was consulted, or at least apprised of what was happening. However, even if it were to be assumed in respect of each matter complained of that he was entitled to be consulted and that he was not consulted, I am not persuaded that any of the matters alleged amounted to mismanagement, let alone serious mismanagement. Nor am I persuaded, to the extent that Dr Potamianos was not consulted, that it would have made any or any material difference in any instance if he had been consulted. 390. I am also entirely unpersuaded that in any of the instances complained of Mr Prescott was not acting bona fide and in what he perceived to be the best interests of SEL (and SRL) but was instead acting for ulterior motives such as to fortify his position vis-à-vis Dr “This trial concerns a boardroom coup perpetrated by Mr Prescott …against his fellow director and shareholder, Dr Potamianos. The result is that [Mr Prescott] has unfairly and unlawfully deprived [Dr Potamianos] of his right to participate in management. Furthermore, [Mr Prescott] and SEL seek retrospectively to invent a right to obtain the source code of certain computer “firmware” developed by Dr Potamianos‟ service company, BDL. They thereby seek to obviate the need to retain BDL‟s services and to exclude [Dr Potamianos] from the business more generally.”
“But the unfairness does not lie in the exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable offer. If the respondent to a petition has plainly made a reasonable offer, then the exclusion as such will not be unfairly prejudicial and he will be entitled to have the petition struck out. It is therefore very important that participants in such companies should be able to know what counts as a reasonable offer. In the first place, the offer must be to purchase the shares at a fair value. This will ordinarily be a value representing an equivalent proportion of the total issued share capital, that is, without a discount for its being a minority holding. ……. Secondly, the value, if not agreed, should be determined by a competent expert. The offer in this case to appoint an accountant agreed by the parties or in default nominated by the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants satisfied this requirement. One would ordinarily expect the costs of the expert to be shared but he should have the power to decide that they should be borne in some different way. Thirdly, the offer should be to have the value determined by the expert as an expert. I do not think that the offer should provide for the full machinery of arbitration or the half-way house of an expert who gives reasons. The objective should be economy and expedition, even if this carries the possibility of a rough edge for one side or the other (and both parties in this respect take the same risk) compared with a more elaborate procedure…. Fourthly, the offer should, as in this case, provide for equality of arms between the parties. Both should have the same right of access to information about the company which bears upon the value of the shares and both should have the right to make submissions to the expert, though the form (written or oral) which these submissions may take should be left to the discretion of the expert himself. Fifthly, there is the question of costs. In the present case, when the offer was made after nearly three years of litigation, it could not serve as an independent ground for dismissing the petition, on the assumption that it was otherwise well founded, without an offer of costs. But this does not mean that payment of costs need always be offered. If there is a breakdown in relations between the parties, the majority shareholder should be given a reasonable opportunity to make an offer (which may include time to explore the question of how to raise finance) before he becomes obliged to pay costs. As I have said, the unfairness does not usually consist merely in the fact of the breakdown but in failure to make a suitable offer. And the majority shareholder should have a reasonable time to make the offer before his conduct is treated as unfair. The mere fact that the petitioner has presented his petition before the offer does not mean that the respondent must offer to pay the costs if he was not given a reasonable time.”
“22. Quite apart from the special circumstances of an unfair prejudice petition, the court should, in assessing the conduct of the parties with regard to costs, take account of the absence of any intention to settle the matter. In Painting v Oxford[2005] EWCA Civ 161 , Maurice Kay LJ said this: "22…at no stage did Mrs Painting manifest any willingness to negotiate or to put forward a counter-proposal to the Part 36 payment. No one can compel a claimant to take such steps. However to contest and lose an issue of exaggeration without having made ever a counter-proposal is a matter of some significance in this kind of litigation. It must not be assumed that beating a Part 36 payment is conclusive. It is a factor and will often be conclusive, but one has to have regard to all the circumstances of the case…" 23. Longmore LJ agreed: "27… that it is relevant that Mrs Painting herself made no attempt to negotiate, made no offer of her own and made no response to the offers of the University. That would not have mattered in pre-CPR days but, to my mind, that now matters very much. Negotiation is supposed to be a two-way street, and a claimant who makes no attempt to negotiate can expect, and should expect, the courts to take that into account when making the appropriate order as to costs…"” "22…at no stage did Mrs Painting manifest any willingness to negotiate or to put forward a counter-proposal to the Part 36 payment. No one can compel a claimant to take such steps. However to contest and lose an issue of exaggeration without having made ever a counter-proposal is a matter of some significance in this kind of litigation. It must not be assumed that beating a Part 36 payment is conclusive. It is a factor and will often be conclusive, but one has to have regard to all the circumstances of the case…" "27… that it is relevant that Mrs Painting herself made no attempt to negotiate, made no offer of her own and made no response to the offers of the University. That would not have mattered in pre-CPR days but, to my mind, that now matters very much. Negotiation is supposed to be a two-way street, and a claimant who makes no attempt to negotiate can expect, and should expect, the courts to take that into account when making the appropriate order as to costs…"”
“62. Throughout the Spring and Summer of 2015, Mr Prescott and Dr Potamianos made efforts to explore a sale to a third party. An email from Dr Potamianos to Mr Prescott dated23 September 2015 records that Dr Potamianos had told an adviser at Baker Tilly that “our business is being affected by 10 to 15% down (being conservative)” and that the adviser had immediately replied that this would affect the selling price. Mr Prescott‟s evidence is that in a telephone call that they had with Baker Tilly not long after this, Baker Tilly advised that they would struggle to sell the business at all, and that if they did manage to do so, it would be for no more than£2.5m . 63. On30 September 2015 Mr Prescott and Dr Potamianos had a meeting at which they agreed they “would explore three possible changes to group structure a) EP purchase AP shares in SR b) EP purchase SE off SR c) EP purchase SE off SR and AP purchase EP share in Peregrine House”
“do their best to agree a fair value for whatever solution is deemed appropriate. In general for SE this means considering: a) An element of multiplier on profit (AP suggested 4, EP thought this seemed right) b) Spare cash to be a separate element c) Excess stock to be considered d) Taking account of previous higher performing years to provide a fair value not only based on the current low year.” 64. On16 October 2015 , Mr Prescott offered to purchase Dr Potamianos‟ shares by way of share buyback for£1.34m using a methodology “guided by our previous discussions”
“139. When considering the proper case management of a petition, the court should also take into account that the effect of a reasonable offer is not binary in the sense that either it leads to the petition being dismissed or it is to be disregarded altogether. Once the court has considered the reasonableness of an offer, it may take one of four courses. If the offer made was entirely reasonable and the petitioner acted unreasonably in rejecting it, it is open to the court to conclude that the unfair prejudice petition fails. The court should bear in mind the potentially draconian effect of that conclusion if the petitioner is then forced indefinitely to remain a minority shareholder in a business in the management of which he is no longer involved. Secondly, it is open to a court to conclude that the unfair prejudice petition succeeds but that the appropriate remedy is an order directing the buy out of the shares at the price that was offered, perhaps subject to adjustments to take account of the passage of time and changes in the market or to redress the impact of the unfairly prejudicial conduct on the value of the company. This course would have the advantage of avoiding the delay and expense of a subsequent hearing and the instruction of experts to value the shares. Thirdly a court may conclude that the fair response is to treat the offer as a factor relevant to the award of costs following the conclusion of the proceedings. It may be appropriate in some cases to modify an order that costs follow the event so as to recognise the making and rejection of the offer. This is an approach recognised by Lord Hoffmann in O'Neill v Phillips: see p. 1106E - H. Fourthly, of course, the court could conclude that the making of the offer has no effect on the success of the petition, the appropriate method for valuing the shares for the buy out order or the petitioner's entitlement to his costs of the proceedings. 140. Applying those principles to the present case, we have concluded that the judge erred in deciding at paragraph 376 that he could not assess the reasonableness of the offers and of Dr Potamianos's response to them without expert valuation evidence and hence that the issue had to be postponed to the second hearing in accordance with the order of Snowden J. In our judgment there was sufficient material to establish that the making and rejection of the offers were not factors that defeated Dr Potamianos's petition by making his exclusion from the Company fair. 141. The October 2015 Offer and the Increased Offer were made at a time when it was not apparent that the quasi-partnership had irretrievably broken down. Mr Prescott was still offering to negotiate a new shareholder agreement with Dr Potamianos in January 2016: see the email quoted at paragraph 69 of the judgment, and he was urging Dr Potamianos to cooperate with the development of the software. Dr Potamianos was fully engaged in discussions about the validity of the contentious business plan and in trying to redirect the business of the Company for several months after those offers were made and rejected. It was also not clear whether the ultimate outcome might be that Dr Potamianos would buy out Mr Prescott rather than the other way around. The ability of Mr Prescott to obtain funding for the offer of£1.34 million was in doubt and there was a possibility of offering the business to a third party buyer. 142. As to the proposal in November 2016 that an expert valuer be appointed to determine the price, one condition set by Mr Prescott was that the valuer would be instructed to assume that all Dr Potamianos's allegations of unfairly prejudicial conduct were unfounded and that SEL owned the source code and was entitled to insist that BDL deliver it up. By that time the issue about the ownership of the Source Code, the outcome of which would clearly affect the value of the Company's assets, was thus already joined. Even though Dr Potamianos ultimately failed in the Source Code Claim, the judge found that the claim had been put forward in good faith and that Dr Potamianos had been entitled to dispute SEL's claim to the code. That was an issue which needed to be determined before a proper valuation of the Company could be calculated. 143. The price of£1 million offered in February 2017 was put forward without any explanation as to why it was substantially less than the Increased Offer. If the reduction was intended to reflect the possibility of a minority discount being applied at the end of the legal proceedings, then we have held that such a deduction would have been inappropriate. The Source Code Claim was still hotly disputed between the parties. The offer of£1 million was a "take it or leave it" one, open for 21 days only. Six days later (23 February 2017 ) notice was given of the meetings of the Boards on7 March 2017 to consider the possible removal of Dr Potamianos as a director of SEL in the light of "concerns" relating to him which were not particularised until 23 March. We have related above the outcome of those meetings and the subsequent events. The offer expired only 2 days after the 7 March meetings. Given what had passed, we do not consider that Dr Potamianos's failure to accept this final offer can be judged with hindsight to have been so unreasonable to result in denial to him of any relief upon his petition to which he might otherwise be entitled.”
“At a meeting on28 January 2015 (the minutes of which were later recorded as agreed on3 February 2015 ) Mr Prescott and Dr Potamianos discussed their options. Option 1 was “Ed buys out Aris‟ share in the whole business, or Aris buys out Ed‟s share in the whole business”
“The offer is made subject to contract and is subject to our client being able to raise adequate finance, which he would seek upon confirmation that the offer is acceptable in principle”