“[49] First, schemes of arrangement under Part 26 provide a flexible means by which companies in financial difficulties can be restructured with the consent of the specified majorities of their creditors and the sanction of the court. The statutory power to bind a dissentient minority to a scheme supported by the requisite majorities in order to give a struggling company a prospect of survival rather than collapse into formal insolvency is particularly valuable in the current uncertain economic climate. But from the earliest days of the scheme jurisdiction it has been repeatedly emphasised that, to use the words of Bowen LJ in Re Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd[1892] 2 QB 573 at 583, the scheme jurisdiction represents "a most formidable compulsion upon dissentient, or would be dissentient creditors". [50] As a consequence, the scheme jurisdiction and procedure contains a number of important safeguards to ensure that if the rights of dissentient creditors are to be modified or extinguished without their consent, this only takes place fairly and in accordance with due process. These safeguards include, at the convening stage, the jurisdictional requirement for creditors to be separated into different classes for voting purposes where their rights (either as against the scheme company or offered to them under the scheme) are sufficiently dissimilar that they cannot consult together in their common interest. [51] Secondly, and has also been repeatedly stressed, at the sanction stage, the court does not simply act as a "rubber-stamp" for the wishes of the majority as expressed at the court meeting. The decision of the meeting in favour of a scheme represents a threshold that must be surmounted before the sanction of the court can be sought, but in deciding whether to sanction the scheme or not, the court exercises an important discretion which provides a safeguard against oppression of the minority: see per Chadwick LJ in Re BTR plc[2000] 1 BCLC 740 at 747g. [52] The classic approach of the court to the exercise of this discretion was described by David Richards J in Re Telewest Communications plc (No.2)[2005] 1 BCLC 772 at [20]-[22] as follows, "[20] The classic formulation of the principles which guide the court in considering whether to sanction a scheme was set out by Plowman J in Re National Bank Ltd[1966] 1 WLR 819 by reference to a passage in Buckley on the Companies Acts, which has been approved and applied by the courts on many subsequent occasions: "In exercising its power of sanction the court will see, first, that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve. The court does not sit merely to see that the majority are acting bona fide and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but, at the same time, the court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considered the matter with a view to the interests of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot is found in the scheme." [21] This formulation in particular recognises and balances two important factors. First, in deciding to sanction a scheme under section 425, which has the effect of binding members or creditors who have voted against the scheme or abstained as well as those who voted in its favour, the court must be satisfied that it is a fair scheme. It must be a scheme that "an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve." That test also makes clear that the scheme proposed need not be the only fair scheme or even, in the court's view, the best scheme. Necessarily there may be reasonable differences of view on these issues. [22] The second factor recognised by the above-cited passage is that in commercial matters members or creditors are much better judges of their own interests than the courts. Subject to the qualifications set out in the second paragraph, the court "will be slow to differ from the meeting". [53] The reference by David Richards J to the qualifications set out in the second paragraph of the extract from Buckley on the Companies Acts relevantly include, for present purposes, the requirement that the class of creditors must have been "properly consulted". In this respect, the origins of the text in Buckley are to be found in the judgment of Lindley LJ in the Court of Appeal in Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank[1893] 3 Ch 385 at page 408-409, "Now, it is quite obvious from the language of the Act and from the mode in which it has been interpreted, that the Court does not simply register the resolution come to by the creditors or the shareholders, as the case may be. If the creditors are acting on sufficient information and with time to consider what they are about, and are acting honestly, they are, I apprehend, much better judges of what is to their commercial advantage than the Court can be. I do not say it is conclusive, because there might be some blot in a scheme which had passed that had been unobserved and which was pointed out later. While, therefore, I protest that we are not to register their decisions, but to see that they have been properly convened and have been properly consulted, and have considered the matter from a proper point of view, that is, with a view to the interests of the class to which they belong and are empowered to bind, the Court ought to be slow to differ from them. It should do so without hesitation if there is anything wrong; but it ought not to do so, in my judgment, unless something is brought to the attention of the Court to shew that there has been some material oversight or miscarriage." [54] In determining what amounts to "proper consultation", the starting point is section 897(1) of the Act which provides that every notice summoning a meeting of creditors convened by the court under section 896 must be accompanied by a statement complying with section 897. Section 897(2) then provides, "The statement must— (a) explain the effect of the compromise or arrangement, and (b) in particular, state— (i) any material interests of the directors of the company (whether as directors or as members or as creditors of the company or otherwise), and (ii) the effect on those interests of the compromise or arrangement, in so far as it is different from the effect on the like interests of other persons." [55] These provisions are supplemented by paragraphs 14 and 15 of the new Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement under Part 26 and Part 26A of theCompanies Act 2006 ) which came into force on the day of the Convening Hearing and which provide as follows, "14. Explanatory statements should be in a form and style appropriate to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the member and/or creditor constituency, and should be as concise as the circumstances admit. In addition to complying with the provisions of section 897 … the commercial impact of the scheme must be explained and members and/or creditors must be provided with such information as is reasonably necessary to enable them to make an informed decision as to whether or not the scheme is in their interests, and on how to vote on the scheme. Where a document is incorporated into the explanatory statement by reference, readers should be directed to the material part(s) of the document. "[20] The classic formulation of the principles which guide the court in considering whether to sanction a scheme was set out by Plowman J in Re National Bank Ltd[1966] 1 WLR 819 by reference to a passage in Buckley on the Companies Acts, which has been approved and applied by the courts on many subsequent occasions: "In exercising its power of sanction the court will see, first, that the provisions of the statute have been complied with, second that the class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class whom they purport to represent, and thirdly, that the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve. The court does not sit merely to see that the majority are acting bona fide and thereupon to register the decision of the meeting, but, at the same time, the court will be slow to differ from the meeting, unless either the class has not been properly consulted, or the meeting has not considered the matter with a view to the interests of the class which it is empowered to bind, or some blot is found in the scheme." [21] This formulation in particular recognises and balances two important factors. First, in deciding to sanction a scheme under section 425, which has the effect of binding members or creditors who have voted against the scheme or abstained as well as those who voted in its favour, the court must be satisfied that it is a fair scheme. It must be a scheme that "an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve." That test also makes clear that the scheme proposed need not be the only fair scheme or even, in the court's view, the best scheme. Necessarily there may be reasonable differences of view on these issues. [22] The second factor recognised by the above-cited passage is that in commercial matters members or creditors are much better judges of their own interests than the courts. Subject to the qualifications set out in the second paragraph, the court "will be slow to differ from the meeting". "Now, it is quite obvious from the language of the Act and from the mode in which it has been interpreted, that the Court does not simply register the resolution come to by the creditors or the shareholders, as the case may be. If the creditors are acting on sufficient information and with time to consider what they are about, and are acting honestly, they are, I apprehend, much better judges of what is to their commercial advantage than the Court can be. I do not say it is conclusive, because there might be some blot in a scheme which had passed that had been unobserved and which was pointed out later. While, therefore, I protest that we are not to register their decisions, but to see that they have been properly convened and have been properly consulted, and have considered the matter from a proper point of view, that is, with a view to the interests of the class to which they belong and are empowered to bind, the Court ought to be slow to differ from them. It should do so without hesitation if there is anything wrong; but it ought not to do so, in my judgment, unless something is brought to the attention of the Court to shew that there has been some material oversight or miscarriage." "The statement must— (a) explain the effect of the compromise or arrangement, and (b) in particular, state— (i) any material interests of the directors of the company (whether as directors or as members or as creditors of the company or otherwise), and (ii) the effect on those interests of the compromise or arrangement, in so far as it is different from the effect on the like interests of other persons." "14. Explanatory statements should be in a form and style appropriate to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the member and/or creditor constituency, and should be as concise as the circumstances admit. In addition to complying with the provisions of section 897 … the commercial impact of the scheme must be explained and members and/or creditors must be provided with such information as is reasonably necessary to enable them to make an informed decision as to whether or not the scheme is in their interests, and on how to vote on the scheme. Where a document is incorporated into the explanatory statement by reference, readers should be directed to the material part(s) of the document. 15. The court will consider the adequacy of the explanatory statement at the convening hearing. The court may refuse to make a meetings order if it considers that the explanatory statement is not in an appropriate form. However, the court will not approve the explanatory statement at the convening hearing, and it will remain open to any person affected by the scheme to raise issues as to its adequacy at the sanction hearing." [56] The references in the new Practice Statement to the need for an explanatory statement to provide creditors with an explanation of the commercial impact of the scheme and "such information as is reasonably necessary to enable them to make an informed decision as to whether or not the scheme is in their interests" reflect existing case law. [57] So, for example, in Re Heron International NV[1994] 1 BCLC 667 at 672g-i, Nicholls V-C said, "The second principal head of complaint relates to the absence of sufficient information to enable a creditor to exercise a reasonable judgment on whether the schemes are in his interest or not. An explanation of the effects of the schemes requires an explanation of how the schemes will affect a bond holder or creditor commercially. He needs to be given such up-to-date information as can reasonably be provided on what he can expect under the schemes … The extent of the information required to be supplied depends on the facts of the particular case…." [58] Likewise, in Re Ophir Energy plc[2019] EWHC 1278 (Ch) at [22] I observed, "The basic requirement is that an explanatory statement must be circulated to the members or creditors affected by a scheme, and that it must contain all the information necessary to enable such members or creditors to form a reasonable judgment on whether the scheme is in their interests or not, and hence how to vote: see e.g. Re Dorman Long & Co. Limited[1934] Ch 635 at 657; and Re Heron International[1994] 1 BCLC 667 at 672. The extent of the information required to be supplied will of course depend upon the facts of the particular case. But the process under Part 26 of the Act depends upon full and accurate information being provided to those who are to vote upon the scheme, so that if the members or creditors have been provided with materially inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise inadequate information, the Court will most likely not be able to place any reliance upon, or give effect to, an affirmative vote at the Court meeting." [59] In the context of a scheme for creditors which is put forward as an alternative to a formal insolvency process, it is certainly conventional for the scheme company to seek to fulfil these information requirements by putting forward a detailed analysis which estimates the likely returns for scheme creditors in such an insolvency and under the scheme, together with the likely timescales for such recoveries. That is because the reasonable creditor deciding how to vote, and the court which is asked to exercise its discretion to sanction the scheme in the interests of all creditors, will at the very least require to be satisfied that all creditors are being offered a realistic prospect of receiving a greater or faster return under the scheme than they are likely to receive in the alternative if the scheme is not sanctioned: see per David Richards J in Re T&N Limited[2005] 2 BCLC 488 at [82] and my own observations to similar effect in Re Noble Group[2019] BCC 349 at [90]. [60] But that is the bare minimum. The reasonable creditor will also want to be provided with the necessary information to understand how any different groups of creditors and any other relevant stakeholders are treated under the scheme and in any wider restructuring in order that he can reach an informed view upon whether the losses which have been suffered and the available value are being appropriately allocated between stakeholder groups. [61] So, for example, if creditors which would rank equally in a formal insolvency are being differently treated under the scheme, or are being left out of the scheme altogether so that they are not being required to accept a compromise of their claims at all, this should be fully disclosed and properly explained: see Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited[2020] EWHC 2376 (Ch) at [63]. [62] Such factors will also be particularly relevant in a scheme or restructuring such as the instant case in which the existing shareholders, who would, by definition, receive nothing in a formal insolvency, are being permitted to retain a material stake in the restructured company. In such a case it is likely to be essential for the scheme company to provide a detailed statement of the underlying assumptions and valuation methodology that are said to justify such an outcome so that creditors can reasonably assess, objectively, whether the allocation of losses and the division of benefits among stakeholders is appropriate and fair.”