"39. Once the Chief Registrar had decided (as he did) that in the absence of clear evidence one way or the other he had to determine the issue by reference to the burden of proof then (there being no dispute that the company had made the payments to the Directors) the benefit of any doubt had to be given to the Joint Liquidators (not to the recipients of the company's money). This is entirely in accordance with principle. Directors who receive money from the company cannot be heard to say: - "
"14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. … 16 The approach of the judge in this case was to seek to test the evidence by reference to both the contemporary documentary evidence and its absence. In my judgment, this was an approach that he was entitled to take. The evidence of the liquidator established a prima facie case and, given that the books and papers had been in the custody and control of the respondents to the proceedings, it was open to the judge to infer that the liquidator's case would have been borne out by those books and papers."
"17 Put another way, it was not open to the respondents to the proceedings in the circumstances of this case to escape liability by asserting that, if the books and papers or other evidence had been available, they would have shown that they were not liable in the amount claimed by the liquidator. Moreover, persons who have conducted the affairs of limited companies with a high degree of informality, as in this case, cannot seek to avoid liability or to be judged by some lower standard than that which applies to other directors, simply because the necessary documentation is not available."
"119 A statement of a directors' duties is now embodied in ss.171 – 177 CA 2006. Directors owe fiduciary duties to act within their powers ( s.171 ); to act in the way the director considers, in good faith, would be most likely promote the success of the company ( s.172 ); to exercise independent judgment ( s.173); to avoid conflicts of interest, whether actual or potential and direct or indirect ( s.175 ); not to accept benefits from third parties ( s.176 ); and, to declare any interest, direct or indirect, in proposed transactions ( s.177 ). The hallmark of these fiduciary duties is acting in the interests of and showing loyalty to the company. There is a further duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence ( s.174 ). In relation to the company's assets the directors are in a position akin to trustees and they must account for any assets they receive."
"23 Moreover, fiduciary duties are stringent. A director is liable to account for a profit that he obtained from a breach of duty even if the company has suffered no loss: see, for example, Murad v Al-Saraj[2005] EWCA Civ 959 . This is a harsh result. Equity has not developed exceptions to avoid this because there is a strong deterrent element in the imposition of liability for breach of fiduciary duty."
"(a) Where the duty extends to consideration of the interests of creditors, their interests must be considered as “paramount”... (b) …the subjective test only applies where there is evidence of actual consideration of the best interests of the company. Where there is no such evidence, the proper test is objective, namely whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned could, in the circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transaction was for the benefit of the company… (c) …where a very material interest, such as that of a large creditor (in a company of doubtful solvency, where creditors’ interests must be taken into account), is unreasonably (i.e. without objective justification) overlooked and not taken into account, the objective test must equally be applied."
"Paragraph 4 – I dispute that all these relate to private expenditures. Some of these undoubtedly (sic) do relate to private expenditure, but others were spent on Company matters. Without seeing the details Company records which are in your possession, then it is difficult to separate business expenditure to personal expenses, so I would be grateful if you could please send me copies of all the vouchers in question so I can answer your questions fully. … I do admit the payment to Thapers of£815.15 is regrettably personal also some of the elements of the retail expenditure, however the statement of affairs shows I am owed£12,000 which will more than cover these personal amounts."
"1157 Power of court to grant relief in certain cases (1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against – (a) an officer of a company, or (b) a person employed by a company as auditor (whether he is or is not an officer of the company), it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit. (2) If any such officer or person has reason to apprehend that a claim will or might be made against him in respect of negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust – (a) he may apply to the court for relief, and (b) the court has the same power to relieve him as it would have had if it had been a court before which proceedings against him for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust had been brought."