“i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a “realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of success. ii) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable. iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”. iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents. v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case. vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction.”
“The objects for which the Masjid is established are to promote for Muslims residing in the London Borough of Brent and surrounding area as defined herein (“the Community”): (a) The advancement of religion of Islam in accordance to the Qur’an and Sunnah and the belief in the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him); (b) The advancement of education including instruction in the Islamic faith; (c) The relief of poverty; (d) To provide facilities for daily prayers, the Friday prayer, Eid prayers and other religious activities on special Islamic days, including teaching classes in Arabic and Urdu languages including Qur’anic studies; (e) To provide facilities for the advancement of and to promote the social welfare of the Community and to provide recreation and leisure with the object of upliftment and improving the conditions of the Community. In furtherance of these objects but not further or otherwise the Masjid shall also have the following powers: (i) To provide legal advice and social welfare and services to poor Muslims unable to obtain such advice elsewhere; (ii) To provide and maintain a library and reading rooms for the study of Islamic literature; (iii) To raise funds and invite and receive contributions from any person or persons whatsoever by way of subscription and otherwise provided that the Masjid shall not undertake any permanent trading activities in raising funds for its primary charitable objects; (iv) To provide and organise funds for the relief of persons in need following disasters within the UK and abroad.”
“Any Muslim, whatever the Country of his/her origin with a belief in accordance to the Qur’an and the belief in the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad (May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) shall be entitled to be a member of the Masjid if he/she agrees to subscribe to the aims and objects of the Masjid and abide by the rules and regulations and contribute a subscription to the Masjid’s fund. The Management Committee shall have the right to accept or refuse a membership application without assigning reasons.”
“(a) The administration of the Masjid, decision regarding but not limited to the domain of Madressa, Speaker’s Engagement, Event Hosting, Employee Contracts, Ramadan Ifthar Planning, Notice Board Management, day to day administration issues, Announcements, New Projects were all to be taken by the Management Committee through setting out in the agenda of Management Committee Meeting and asking members opinion regarding that and following simple voting method if needed. Then allot it to a subcommittee for execution which finally reports back to management committee. The Management Committee which shall consist of a maximum of eleven (11) members including the Chairman, Vice Chairman, General Secretary, Treasurer and Education Secretary. (b) These 11 members shall be elected at the Annual General Meeting but so that the members of the Management Committee shall not be less than five (5) nor more than eleven (11) which shall include the five (5) Office Bearers of the Masjid (Chairman, Vice Chairman, General Secretary, Treasurer and Education Secretary). (c) The Management Committee shall elect amongst themselves the five (5) Office Bearers to their appropriate positions once in office. The Office Bearers shall hold their appropriate positions for one year. The Management Committee may in its absolute discretion choose either to elect new Office Bearers or permit the existing ones to continue… (e) The Management Committee shall have the right to co-opt additional members to the Committee for urgent and special work or filling up vacancies as and when required. The maximum number allowed to be co-opted for special work, excluding filling up vacant spaces for core members, shall be four (4). (f) The members of the Management Committee shall remain in office until the AGM or Elections ending their term of appointment. (g) The outgoing Management Committee shall at least three months before the expiry of its term of office, formulate election procedures, frame rules and undertake measures for a free and fair elections. An independent election forum or an individual referred to in Clause 1(d) shall be assigned to preside over and conduct the elections. (h) The elections of the Management Committee shall take place every three years…… (j) The election of the Management Committee shall be by secret ballot….. (t) The Management Committee shall have the right to call for explanation from either a general member or a committee member and temporarily suspend or cancel his/her membership provided that the member concerned is given the opportunity to be heard or to make written representations and written reasons are given for his/her suspension or cancellation of his/her membership…... (v) The Management Committee shall be competent to frame bye-laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. The bye-laws so framed shall come into operation immediately and shall be incorporated into the body of the Constitution after notification by the AGM by single majority vote.”
“The real property and all assets of the Masjid shall be vested in the name of ‘Wembley Central Masjid and not in the name of any Trustee, Trustees, an individual or individuals.”
“He is not an Office Bearer or a member of the Management Committee.”
“Arbitration: In case of a dispute arising between the Masjid and any member thereof or any person claiming to be a member thereof or on the Constitution or application of the rules and regulations of the Charity such dispute shall be referred to the adjudication by an independent solicitor or a barrister of not less than 10 years’ standing to be nominated by the Management Committee for arbitration and his decision shall be final provided that any decision so reached shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution.”
“The Property is registered in the name of four members of the Masjid, who hold it on trust for the Masjid. The Masjid to [sic] is entitled to operate from the Property as a result of this beneficial interest (either by virtue of the charitable trust of land and/or under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act section 14) and/or a licence from the freeholders. Further, prior to and after2 February 2019 , the Masjid was in possession of the Property giving it possessory title.”
“Following code of conduct is to be practised as approved by the Management Committee to facilitate worship in peace and harmony as well as to ensure safety of the attendees, employees, volunteers and Masjid Property. Without the permission of the Management Committee: • No personal and/or private activities is [sic] permitted within WCM premises. • No individual and/or group teaching within WCM Premises of any kind is permitted. • No distribution of flyers, literature, leaflets, books including food or clothing, posting and/or placement of flyers, literature, leaflets, books, signs, notices, posters etc within WCM Premises is allowed. • No sales or distribution of food products or any kind of merchandise anywhere on WCM Premises is allowed. • Adhan and/or leading salah shall be by appointment only. • No sleeping in the Masjid or anywhere on the property or overnight stay within WCM Premises. • No overnight parking. • No lectures, No public speaking, No announcement of any kind, No speeches, No use of PA systems etc. • Zero Tolerance: Violent, aggressive or abusive behaviour towards any committee member or employee will not be tolerated. Any exception to the above must be approved by the Committee. All rights are reserved by the Management Committee. Violation of the above code of conduct will not be tolerated and will be dealt with by the appropriate Law Enforcement. Legal action may be taken and the violator will be expelled from the Masjid without any notice.”
“Mr Sattar reacted aggressively and threw the letter away. After a further attempt to give the letter to Mr Sattar, the latter shouted at Mr Shaikh and Mr Sattar’s supporters started shouting, surrounding and pushing Mr Shaikh. Mr Muhammed (the Education Secretary and one of the Management Board of the Masjid) attempted to de-escalate the situation but was similarly pushed. In addition to Mr Sattar, the Second Defendant was involved in the attack.”
“5.3 After prayers, the Third Claimant repeatedly tried to hand me a copy of the dismissal letter which I had already received by email. I told him that I did not want to speak to him and asked him to be quiet whilst gesturing with my finger. I did not shout at him… 5.4 I assumed from morning prayer that a new Imam had not yet been appointed and, therefore, I could lead prayers in a voluntary capacity as many of the worshippers often do when the employed Imam is not present. Based on this understanding, I occupied the Imam’s spot shortly before the start of afternoon prayers at 13:00. 5.5 Around 12.50, the Third Claimant came to the front and informed me that a new Imam had been appointed. I immediately stood up and vacated the Imam’s spot. I did not speak to him, let alone shout at him…5.6 I led the overdue afternoon prayers at 13.10 around 10 minutes later than the scheduled time. The new Imam was not present as he left the prayer hall around 12.55…”
“A general notice was posted on the gate to the Masjid stating that those ‘involved in the disorder will not be allowed to enter the Masjid at prayer times until further notice.’ The Defendants were not specifically notified of the prohibition so did not know if it applied to them. In any event, it would not be enforceable as per the advice the Claimants received from the Police.”
“We understand that, before leaving, the CCTV recording devices were removed to avoid potential criminal allegations.”
“I am 70 years old and you have closed the doors of the Masjid and prevented us from praying.”
“The Commission’s view is that decisions made by or actions taken by the trustees within the law and the provisions of the Charity’s Governing Document are for trustees to take (and justify) and they have very wide freedom to do so. The Commission does not have discretion to overrule a charity’s decision, validly taken within its powers, on the grounds that others take a different view, however strongly held.”
“Section 97(1) of the Act of 1993 contains a definition of “charity trustees.”
“A number of simple points might be made about this application. First, it is brought by only two of the three Registered Proprietors so any property-based rights must be viewed with some caution until such time as the third Registered Proprietor is added to the claim, either as a claimant or as a defendant to be bound by the outcome of the decision. That is something that must be done urgently. Secondly, in so far as property-based rights are concerned, the Registered Proprietors do not hold the land for their own benefit. They hold it (as the title registered discloses) as charity trustees. They are bound to permit the Mosque to be occupied and enjoyed as a place for the public worship of Allah and for preaching and teaching the precepts and teachings of the Muslim faith. It is, accordingly, to be open to the public who wish to enter for the purpose of enjoying the benefits of the charity. Of course, if there were individuals whose presence disrupted the achievement of the objectives of the charity, there is little doubt that they could be excluded. If indeed there were a resumption of any violent conduct or any attempt to occupy the Mosque or to take over the management of the Mosque in anything that was not a constitutional way, no doubt the claimants could obtain relief.”
“Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise.”
“Now, in order to construe the section, we must examine carefully the words of it; and it is apparent from the initial language that actions at common law are not within the scope of the section, which applies simply to suits, petitions, or other proceedings for obtaining relief, order, or direction concerning or relating to any charity. Those were not, at the date of this statute, 1853, apt words for dealing with or describing common law actions, and it follows, in my opinion, that no common law action, or, in other words, no action brought solely to enforce a common law right, whether such right arises out of contract or out of common law obligation, or common law duty, is within the section.”
“But if that is so, must we not go a step further, and ask ourselves whether it is possible that the Legislature can have enacted such an anomaly as not to require the consent of the Commissioners for actions for enforcing common law rights, but to make the obtaining their consent a necessity in such equitable suits as are merely instituted for the purpose of obtaining relief with regard to common law rights? Is it possible that such a construction of the statute can be reasonable? That would lead to the singular conclusion that, although a man was not obliged to obtain the consent of the Commissioners before prosecuting an action for breach of contract, he was obliged to obtain the consent of the Commissioners before he came to the Court of Chancery, or to the Chancery Division of the High Court, to appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent such a breach. It would lead to this curious conclusion—that although a man was not obliged to obtain the consent of the Commissioners before instituting an action for trespass, in which action the sole question would be his title to possession under the deeds of trust, he would nevertheless be obliged to obtain the consent of the Commissioners before he obtained an injunction to prevent the trespass being committed. That would be a curious anomaly, and one which, unless the language of the Legislature constrained one, one would scarcely adopt.”
“But it strikes me that the Plaintiff's case really is one of contract only or of common law right. He may be entitled so long as he is an authorized school teacher to hold the schoolhouse; but it is in virtue of the appointment which he holds from the managers, which is really a contractual employment by him to teach. He is simply enforcing here, or seeking to enforce, what he considers to be his common law right, not to be dismissed by those who have not employed him, and to hold premises which he has received from persons who are authorized to deal with the possession against the unlawful and unauthorized usurpation of those who are strangers altogether in the matter. That is his case. It may be that incidentally the question whether these are managers of the school may be decided. We cannot help that, nor can the Plaintiff help it. He is dealing with his masters, or with those who profess to be his masters. He declares that those who are seeking to exclude him from these premises are not the persons who are lawfully entitled to possession. The common law question may involve the construction of a deed, or may incidentally involve the question whether the managers who are seeking to oust him are really properly appointed. But, as I said before, the mere fact that such questions incidentally arise does not seem to me to bring the case within the section.”
“Before going further into the criticism made of the commissioners I will consider the general principles applicable to the exercise of powers of investment by charity trustees. It is axiomatic that charity trustees, in common with all other trustees, are concerned to further the purposes of the trust of which they have accepted the office of trustee. That is their duty. To enable them the better to discharge that duty, trustees have powers vested in them. Those powers must be exercised for the purpose for which they have been given: to further the purposes of the trust. That is the guiding principle applicable to the issues in these proceedings. Everything which follows is no more than the reasoned application of that principle in particular contexts.”
“I think one has to be careful of the use of the word “beneficiary” in this context. A charitable trust, as such, does not have beneficiaries in the same sense as beneficiaries under a private trust. No individual has any proprietary interest in the charity's assets and funds as such, but a person may become a beneficiary in a loose sense as an object of the charitable trust. The advancing of the Ethiopian Orthodox faith would, in one sense, embrace all those of that faith. That would not, I think, be sufficient to make all members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, anywhere in the world, who are very considerable in number, persons interested in this charity, but I do think that regular worshippers, who have contributed as such to the acquisition of the assets of the charity, as well as worshipping at the church in its various forms over many years, are undoubtedly interested persons for this purpose.”
“D1 (Mr Abdul Sattar) was the Iman during the period of about 22 years prior to 1.2.19. He promoted the inclusive approach, welcoming Muslims from different traditions within the community. The previous MC (elected in 2014) sought to change the Masjid’s inclusive policy. This caused unhappiness and resentment among large numbers of the worshippers, and there were many complaints to the charity commission. The 2014 MC failed to call the election due in 2017. Following intervention from the Charity Commission, an election was held in March 2018. There were 2 groups standing for election: (1) the candidates supported by the 2014 MC, who were followers of a movement known as Tablighi Jamaat, which promotes a highly-orthodox approach to Islam, and (2) the candidates who favoured a more inclusive approach. However, prior to that election, a new membership list was prepared, and (say Ds) many members and prospective members were unreasonably and unaccountably excluded from membership. The candidates supporting a more inclusive policy withdrew from the election in protest. As a result, the remaining candidates were elected unopposed. They then co-opted members of the 2014 committee onto the new committee (including C1). This led to protests and demands for a fair election and arbitration. The 2018 committee, which is comprised solely of followers of the strict Tablighi Jamaat movement, has continued and developed the highly orthodox and anti-inclusive policy of the 2014 committee. On 1.2.19, it attempted to increase divisions further by terminating the employment of D1 as Iman and appointing as a replacement an Iman who supports Tablighi Jamaat. D1 was a popular Iman and, as the MC doubtless anticipated, the termination of D1’s employment after 22 years caused great unhappiness among many of the worshippers.”
“a. Ds say that the actions of the MC are part of a deliberate strategy to transform the Masjid from being inclusive, into a narrow, sectarian and fundamentalist place of worship. b. To that end, say Ds, the 2014 committee wrongly excluded from membership those who were known to favour more open and inclusive worship, in order to engineer the election of those supporting the more fundamentalist faction. Having achieved that end, the 2018 committee then set about terminating the employment of the Iman of 22 years and provoking division in the congregation. c. Cs now seek to exclude Ds from access to the Masjid for the same reasons: effectively, to exclude moderates and reinforce the Tablighi Jamaat faction. Ds say they have been singled out because they have been vocal in their complaints about poor governance. Cs’ actions are not to further purposes of charity but rather to prevent open discussion about the future direction of the Charity and to silence legitimate questions and scrutiny. d. The attempt to exclude Ds from access to the Masjid – including by the bringing of these proceedings and the application for summary judgment – is a breach of duty because Cs are not exercising their powers as charity trustees for the purposes for which they were given. Ds say that Cs are seeking to exercise powers for the reasons set out in sub-para c above, not for the purposes for which they are given and to further the purposes of the Charity.”
“I am enquiring about a case that was heard, although not completed, on 2nd September. The complainant was The Wembley Central Mosque (may have been named as Wembley Central Masjid). Case reference is BL-2019-00354. The case revolved around the banning of a number of members of the community. The community have stated that it was found in their favour however were unable to produce anything to confirm this. We are currently engaged in an operation to police protests and public order incidents outside the mosque. Can you confirm whether a final judgement has been made, what the judgement was and which court it was heard at as this will influence how we respond to the protest on Friday.”