“(i) supervision of labour, supplier supervision and payments; (ii) tracking and verification of delivery of materials at the Property…” (2) By clause 6.1 the parties acknowledged: “that the relationship between them established in this Agreement is of independent contracting parties and nothing contained in this Agreement shall be interpreted as establishing a relationship of employment, association, partnership, joint venture or similar relationships” (3) Clause 6.3 contained an entire agreement clause and stated: “This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and replaces and cancels all agreements and understandings maintained until then between the parties, whether written or oral, in relation to the subject matter of this Agreement.” (4) By clause 6.5 any modifications or changes to the Service Agreements: “shall be valid through a written instrument signed by the parties”; (5) Clause 6.9 stated that the Service Agreements: (6). Clause 6.10 provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Lisbon: “The Parties elect the jurisdiction of Lisbon, Portugal to settle any disputes arising from this Agreement, waiving any other jurisdiction, however privileged it may be.”
“I tried many times to defend myself and explain what happened but unfortunately they were not willing to listen. I met with Sampaio more than 3 times to explain and prove that things did not happen the way he was trying to present…” “I had issues with some invoices but it was something related to my company, of tax related adjustments. I know I was wrong but at the time I thought it was the easiest way to solve the money issues to meet payment deadlines. But I have explained each invoice and it was never to take advantage. In the end, they were all reconciled and I had sent all invoices to the auditors because I didn’t think they would take into consideration the invoices altered and would only take into consideration the invoices sent to CPOD.”
“I appreciate that CPOD’s solicitors are suspicious of that but since the loss of the Dias Family as a client, I have limited liquidity and must trade with what I have.”
“The Claim is for damages or an account of profits, declarations, an account and inquiry and interim relief arising out of a fraudulent scheme in relation to the recharging of supplier invoices: (1) against all the Defendants, damages or an account of profits for deceit and conspiracy to injure by unlawful means; (2) against the Second and Third Defendants, damages or an account of profits for breach of fiduciary duties and/or breach of contract; (3) against the First, Second and Third Defendants, restitution of payments made under mistake giving rise to unjust enrichment and declarations of constructive trust and an account and inquiry; (4) against the First Defendant, damages or an account of profits for knowing receipt and procuring or instigating breach of contract, asset preservation orders and/or freezing injunctions; (5) against the First and Fourth Defendants, damages for dishonest assistance; …”
“As my Lord said, it is a strong order, but the plaintiff’s case is that there is a trust fund of$3,500,000 . This has disappeared, and the gentlemen against whom orders are sought may be able to give information as to where it is and who is in charge of it. A court of equity has never hesitated to use the strongest powers to protect and preserve a trust fund in interlocutory proceedings on the basis that, if the trust fund disappears by the time the action comes to trial, equity will have been invoked in vain. That is why orders of this sort were made long before the recent orders for discovery and they are at the heart of the Chancery Division’s concern, and it is the concern of any court of equity, to see that the stable door is locked before the horse has gone.”
“Now these case provide ample authority that, in an action in which the plaintiff seeks to trace property which in equity belongs to him, the court not only has jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining disposal of that property; it may in addition, at the interlocutory stages of the action, make orders designed to ascertain the whereabouts of that property. In particular, it may order a bank (whether or not party to the proceedings) to give discovery of documents in relation to the bank account of a defendant who is alleged to have defrauded the plaintiff of his assets; and it may make orders for interrogatories to be answered by the defendants or their employees or director.”
“Where, as in those three cases, the defendant against whom an order is sought is, albeit wholly innocently, ‘mixed up in’ the wrongdoing of other defendants, there is a risk of some conflation of the two types of jurisdiction…However, this does not seem to me to alter the fact that there are, in reality, two separate jurisdictions, albeit that in many cases they will overlap.”
“12. The Bankers Trust jurisdiction arises where there is strong evidence that the claimant’s property has been misappropriated. The case decided that where there is such evidence the court will not hesitate to make strong orders to ascertain the whereabouts of property and to prevent its disposal, and those orders may intrude into what would otherwise be confidential customer information.”
“In my judgment it remains the basic principle that disclosure of information occurs by the familiar procedures applicable to proceedings commenced between the relevant parties. Rule 31.16 provides for the exceptional circumstances to which it refers, but again in an adversarial or potentially adversarial context between applicant and respondent. Norwich Pharmacal relief is the third and last port of call restricted in its application in the respects I have sought to summarise.” “In my judgment it remains the basic principle that disclosure of information occurs by the familiar procedures applicable to proceedings commenced between the relevant parties. Rule 31.16 provides for the exceptional circumstances to which it refers, but again in an adversarial or potentially adversarial context between applicant and respondent. Norwich Pharmacal relief is the third and last port of call restricted in its application in the respects I have sought to summarise.”
“26.1 Inability of the claimant to plead a case without this relief This is the main purpose of this application, says Mr McGregor. As a matter of fact I am not able to accept that that is the case. The 24 witness statements already exchanged, the exhibited documents and the summaries that I have already referred to in the claimant’s two skeleton arguments suggest to me that there is already a case, and after all the claimants themselves currently call it a good one, against these defendants which could be pleaded now. It would, of course, be incomplete and partial, but it would serve to set in motion the proceedings within which, dependent on the terms of any defences forthcoming, disclosure and further information can be sought in the normal way. I see no reason here to subvert the normal accusatorial basis of our litigation, where the horse precedes the cart, into an inquisitorial one starting from an assumption that guilt has been proved, and saying to the defendants, “Tell us everything you and others have done which was wrong.”