“(1) The duty is a function of due process, and therefore of justice. Its rationale has two principal aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the parties - especially the losing party - should be left in no doubt why they have won or lost. This is especially so since without reasons the losing party will not know (as was said in Ex p. Dave) whether the court has misdirected itself, and thus whether he may have an available appeal on the substance of the case. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mind; if it is fulfilled, the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundly based on the evidence than if it is not. (2) The first of these aspects implies that want of reasons may be a good self-standing ground of appeal. Where because no reasons are given it is impossible to tell whether the judge has gone wrong on the law or the facts, the losing party would be altogether deprived of his chance of an appeal unless the court entertains an appeal based on the lack of reasons itself. (3) The extent of the duty, or rather the reach of what is required to fulfil it, depends on the subject-matter. Where there is a straightforward factual dispute whose resolution depends simply on which witness is telling the truth about events which he claims to recall, it is likely to be enough for the judge (having, no doubt, summarised the evidence) to indicate simply that he believes X rather than Y; indeed there may be nothing else to say. But where the dispute involves something in the nature of an intellectual exchange, with reasons and analysis advanced on either side, the judge must enter into the issues canvassed before him and explain why he prefers one case over the other. This is likely to apply particularly in litigation where as here there is disputed expert evidence; but it is not necessarily limited to such cases. (4) This is not to suggest that there is one rule for cases concerning the witnesses’ truthfulness or recall of events, and another for cases where the issue depends on reasoning or analysis (with experts or otherwise). The rule is the same: the judge must explain why he has reached his decision. The question is always, what is required of the judge to do so; and that will differ from case to case. Transparency should be the watchword.”
“There was some confusion as to precisely how these monies were paid. Mr Rafique said in evidence that largely they were paid in cash, but also that some payments were made by way of credited sums due to him in other respects, whereas in other documentation it is suggested that all these sums were paid in cash. I accept his evidence in this regard. He came across as a patently honest witness trying his best to recall what had been going on in what he described as hectic times. When the undertaking was given Mr and Mrs Rafique had four very young children, including their youngest who had been born in April beforehand, at about the same time when their works of extension had been commenced. He said that he would not have gone for the most expensive builders, and that he chose a builder to minimise his expenses. It seems to me a telling point he made in his evidence was that at this stage he did not know whether he would recover these extra expenses or not, and so it was not in his interest to do anything other than seek to minimise the cost, and that part of his evidence and indeed all other parts in my judgment had the ring of truth about it and I accept it.”