“Accounts: please send me the detailed profit and loss account now. I am not concerned about any minor changes and I really do not think I need to wait for a signed copy or the PDF version from the auditors… Bryan has been on more effective drugs over the last few months which have had a huge positive effect on his health and have reversed most of the damage done over the past seven years. Foundry: my understanding is that you would like to sell your shares and have nothing more to do with Foundry as soon as possible. I doubt that John Stallard would still be interested in buying Foundry now, unless it was dirt cheap. We will not be selling in the foreseeable future. I hope that you will be happy to hear that the extended Ansell family will be fulfilling more active roles in Foundry. I called at the factory on Friday … and took Neil [Littlewood] to lunch… I pressed Neil about what is happening at the factory. We need to talk about Matt; he should not be in charge of any factory. You probably already know this and have been unable to find a suitable replacement. We have had Neil here this weekend and are very alarmed about a lot of what he has told us, shown us and the damage being done to Foundry's reputation as a business concern. The models and rules we have seen are of such poor quality that they will destroy any reputation Foundry has left forever. As of Monday, Neil will be reporting directly back to Bryan and I (sic) Neil will inform Matt on Monday that he … will no longer have any contact with any creatives and this role will ultimately revert to Bryan.”
“some special underlying obligation of his fellow member(s) in good faith, or confidence, that so long as the business continues he shall be entitled to management participation, an obligation so basic that, if broken, the conclusion must be that the association must be dissolved.”
“There is little authority on the extent to which negligent or incompetent management of a company's business may constitute conduct which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members for the purposes of s 459. Mr Chivers referred me to Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd[1966] 1 All ER 242 ,[1966] 1 WLR 745 , where Buckley J held that allegations that the chairman and managing director of a company had been unwise, inefficient and careless in the performance of his duties could not without more amount to allegations of oppressive conduct for the purposes ofs 210 of the Companies Act 1948 . Mr Chivers rightly conceded, however, that that authority afforded little guidance in a case under s 459, because the concept of oppressive conduct in s 210 was narrower than the concept of unfairly prejudicial conduct in s 459. Mr Nurse referred me to a paragraph in Gore-Browne on Companies (44th edn, 1986) vol 2, p 28.021 which reads as follows: 'Another aspect of the enforcement of directors' duties by means of a petition under section 459 which remains unclear is the directors' duty of care. It would seem that the Jenkins Committee intended that the reformed statutory remedy might be used in this regard, although the courts decided otherwise in the case of the old section 210.' Then there is a reference to Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd: 'Where serious mismanagement causes real economic harm to the Company's business (and therefore to the value of the members interests) the general conceptual developments examined earlier should enable the courts to hold that unfair prejudice has been established. The terminology in section 459(1) (referring to “any actual or proposed act or omission of the Company including an act or omission on its behalf” where this “is or would be so prejudicial”) should be of assistance here. Once again, however, a petition in the case of a public listed company may present greater difficulty.' Lastly I was referred, on this point also, to the judgment of Peter Gibson J in Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd at the end of which (see[1990] BCLC 80 at 89,[1990] Ch 682 at 694) he said that he had no doubt that the court would ordinarily be very reluctant to accept that managerial decisions could amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct. The point for which that judgment is mainly authority is, of course, that conduct may be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders even if those responsible for that conduct may, as members of the Company, have suffered the same or even greater prejudice. That point is relevant here. I do not doubt that in an appropriate case it is open to the court to find that serious mismanagement of a company's business constitutes conduct that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority shareholders. But I share Peter Gibson J's view that the court will normally be very reluctant to accept that managerial decisions can amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct. Two considerations seem to me to be relevant. First, there will be cases where there is disagreement between petitioners and Respondents as to whether a particular managerial decision was, as a matter of commercial judgment, the right one to make, or as to whether a particular proposal relating to the conduct of the Company's business is commercially sound. I heard much evidence, including the expert evidence of Dr Rhodes, directed to issues of that kind arising from decisions made by Mr Purslow, or from decisions that it was said he should have made but did not make. In my view, it is not for the court to resolve such disagreements on a petition under s 459. Not only is a judge ill-qualified to do so, but there can be no unfairness to the petitioners in those in control of the Company's affairs taking a different view from theirs on such matters. Secondly, as was persuasively argued by Mr Chivers, a shareholder acquires shares in a company knowing that their value will depend in some measure on the competence of the management. He takes the risk that that management may prove not to be of the highest quality. Short of a breach by a director of his duty of skill and care (and no such breach on the part of either Mr Purslow or Mrs Purslow was alleged) there is prima facie no unfairness to a shareholder in the quality of the management turning out to be poor.”
“[61] The general trend of authority over the last 15 years appears to us to support that as the starting point, while recognising that there are many cases in which fairness (to one side or the other) requires the court to take another date. It would be wrong to try to enumerate all those cases but some of them can be illustrated by the authorities already referred to: (i) Where a company has been deprived of its business, an early valuation date (and compensating adjustments) may be required in fairness to the claimant (Meyer). (ii) Where a company has been reconstructed or its business has changed significantly, so that it has a new economic identity, an early valuation date may be required in fairness to one or both parties (OC Transport, and to a lesser degree London School of Electronics). But an improper alteration in the issued share capital, unaccompanied by any change in the business, will not necessarily have that outcome (DR Chemicals). (iii) Where a minority shareholder has a petition on foot and there is a general fall in the market, the court may in fairness to the claimant have the shares valued at an early date, especially if it strongly disapproves of the majority shareholder's prejudicial conduct (Cumana). (iv) But a claimant is not entitled to what the deputy judge called a one-way bet, and the court will not direct an early valuation date simply to give the claimant the most advantageous exit from the Company, especially where severe prejudice has not been made out (Elgindata). (v) All these points may be heavily influenced by the parties' conduct in making and accepting or rejecting offers either before or during the course of the proceedings (O'Neill v Phillips).”