“I believe that the claimant knew of these loans at the time, although I do not claim that he agreed with them as my mother and father did.”
“I believe that the claimant knew of these loans at the time and agreed.”
“3. We are slightly concerned about this receipt because it seems that Jat borrowed£440,000 from BBL on behalf of his private company being Torex (we believe). Our client is unaware as to the shareholding but knows that neither he nor his parents have shares in the organisation. Is it true that Jat did borrow this money? If so, could you please provide a copy of the board minute authorising it. 4. … 5. The concern is clearly one which needs to be explained with the supporting board minutes. The tax position is unclear. We understand that Jat is attempting to arrange bank facilities to discharge the current tax liability, but it seems that he owes or his company owes BBL around£300,000 . If this is the case why does his company [not] simply pay BBL back so that [the tax liability can be paid without the need for further facilities]?”
“…where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be.”
“The relevant principles could be summarised as follows: (i) a company director was in breach of his fiduciary or statutory duty under s.175 of the 2006 Act if he exploited for his personal gain: (a) opportunities which came to his attention through his role as director; or (b) any other opportunities which he could and should exploit for the benefit of the company; (ii) if the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts consented to the director exploiting those opportunities for his own personal gain, then that conduct was not a breach of the fiduciary or statutory duty; (iii) if the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts acquiesced in the director’s proposed conduct, then that may constitute consent. However, consent could not be inferred from silence unless: (a) the shareholders knew that their consent was required; or (b) the circumstances were such that it would be unconscionable for the shareholders to remain silent at the time and object after the event; (iv) for the purposes of (ii) and (iii) full knowledge of the relevant facts did not entail an understanding of their legal incidents, i.e. the shareholders needed not appreciate that the proposed action would be characterised as a breach of fiduciary or statutory duty. (Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46 followed; Re Duomatic Ltd[1969] 2 Ch. 365 , Re Home Treat Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 165 and Knight v Frost [1999] B.C.C. 819 applied.)”
“122. In view of Mr Page’s detailed challenge to the judge’s finding of dishonesty, it is necessary to set out the relevant parts of his judgment in some detail. They begin in the earlier part of the judgment (para 20ff), where the judge made certain “Preliminary Observations”
“It is the duty of a trustee to manage the trust property and deal with it in the interests of the beneficiaries. If he acts in a way which he does not honestly believe is in the interests of the beneficiaries then he is acting dishonestly.”
“which requires that before there can be a finding of dishonesty it must be established that the defendant's conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and that he himself realised that by those standards his conduct was dishonest.” (paras 27, 38) …” “… connotes at the minimum an intention on the part of the trustee to pursue a particular course of action, either knowing that it is contrary to the interests of the company or being recklessly indifferent whether it is contrary to their interests or not.” and added: “It is the duty of a trustee to manage the trust property and deal with it in the interests of the beneficiaries. If he acts in a way which he does not honestly believe is in the interests of the beneficiaries then he is acting dishonestly.”
“1157 Power of court to grant relief in certain cases (1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against– (a) an officer of a company, … it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit.” it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit.”