“[307] Mr Kagalovsky and Iota have breached, and aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to NMHC. …. [313] NMHC has established that Iota breached its fiduciary duties by agreeing to, planning, participating in, and covering up, the dilutions of IVL’s ownership interest in TVi and its trademarks to companies owned by Mr Kagalovsky’s family trusts, all without NMHC’s knowledge or consent. [314] Specifically, the dilutions of IVL’s ownership interest in TVi and its trademarks was a classic self-dealing transaction; Mr Kagalovsky stood on both sides of those transactions…. [315] Mr Kagalovsky completely dominated and controlled Iota, Aspida, and Seragill, and used his domination and control over those entities to dilute IVL’s ownership interest in TVi and its trademarks…. [316] Thus, Mr Kagalovsky’s actions are imputable to Iota, Aspida, and Seragill as his alter egos…. …… [319] NMHC also has established that Mr Kagalovsky aided and abetted Iota’s breach of fiduciary duties by knowingly agreeing to the dilution, funding the dilution, and creating and acquiring the companies necessary to effect the dilution… [320] As an aider and abettor, Mr Kagalovsky is jointly and severally liable for Iota’s breach of fiduciary duty….. … [322] Defendants’ actions had also have breached the express and implied terms of the IVL Agreement…. … [332] NMHC has established that Mr Kagalovsky tortiously interfered with the IVL Agreement: he had knowledge of Iota’s obligations under the IVL Agreement, and intentionally caused Iota to breach them by taking ownership and control of TVi and its trademarks without NMHC’s knowledge and consent, and without justification…..”
“[7] …. This was because the existence of the licence agreements precluded a claim for unjust enrichment against Mr Kagalovsky and because Mr Kagalovsky was not a defendant in the [NMDC] action at trial.”
“[62]… I reject the application for a declaration that the Court has no jurisdiction and/or that it should not exercise that jurisdiction. On the contrary, the Court does have jurisdiction and is mandated to exercise that jurisdiction. This is because Mr Kagalovsky is domiciled in London and since there is no express derogation relied upon by him from the basis of jurisdiction, namely his domicile in the UK, this Court is mandated to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation. There is no scope for the operation of the forum non-conveniens doctrine and specifically for a finding that the court of the State of New York is the appropriate forum.”
“…[the] final findings of the NY court… cannot be subject to a further dispute.”
“There are cases which refer to the possibility of a stay or dismissal based on an abuse of process. Instead of seeking rulings that there has been res judicata or merger or an abuse of process or the like, Mr Kagalovsky’s application was predicated on the basis that this Court should not rule about any of these matters and that the New York State Court is the appropriate forum to rule on them…… He submits that the courts of New York, which have been seised of proceedings of the same or a related nature, will be best placed to adjudicate in respect of matters such as whether the issues now being litigated have already been decided in the New York proceedings, whether the claim now advanced should have been advanced in the now concluded New York proceedings and whether the claim was compromised.”
“The English proceedings and the New York proceedings do not involve the same cause of action in that the cause of action in the English proceedings is under theInsolvency Act 1986 and is not a claim in contract or in tort in equity or restitution which was before the New York State court” (see paragraph 44(1) FJ). Mr Clive Freedman QC made clear that he was deciding nothing final as regards res judicata, merger, issue estoppel or abuse of process: “[64] The fact that I am dismissing the application for the reasons set out above is not intended to have an effect on the ability of Mr Kagalovsky to present his answer to the section 423 claim in the English Court. In reaching conclusions about the matters referred to in the preceding paragraphs, in view of the way in which the case has been presented by Mr Kagalovsky, I have noted that Mr Kagalovsky has not presented his case by seeking final findings in respect of res judicata or merger or issue estoppel or abuse of process (Henderson v Henderson) or by reason of the Settlement Agreement. It follows that my conclusions are not intended to preclude Mr Kagalovsky from raising these matters within the section 423 proceedings by way of a defence or a bar to the claim, nor NMDC from contending whether summarily or otherwise that these matters do not provide a defence or a bar. The conclusions which I have reached are limited for the purpose of dealing with the application currently before the Court.”
“Part XVIE+W Provisions Against Debt Avoidance (England and Wales only) 423 Transactions defrauding creditors.E+W (1) This section relates to transactions entered into at an undervalue; and a person enters into such a transaction with another person if— (a) he makes a gift to the other person or he otherwise enters into a transaction with the other on terms that provide for him to receive no consideration; (b) he enters into a transaction with the other in consideration of marriage or the formation of a civil partnership; or (c) he enters into a transaction with the other for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by himself. (2) Where a person has entered into such a transaction, the court may, if satisfied under the next subsection, make such order as it thinks fit for— (a) restoring the position to what it would have been if the transaction had not been entered into, and (b) protecting the interests of persons who are victims of the transaction. (3) In the case of a person entering into such a transaction, an order shall only be made if the court is satisfied that it was entered into by him for the purpose— (a) of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at some time make, a claim against him, or (b) of otherwise prejudicing the interests of such a person in relation to the claim which he is making or may make. (a) he makes a gift to the other person or he otherwise enters into a transaction with the other on terms that provide for him to receive no consideration; (b) he enters into a transaction with the other in consideration of marriage or the formation of a civil partnership; or (c) he enters into a transaction with the other for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by himself. (a) restoring the position to what it would have been if the transaction had not been entered into, and (b) protecting the interests of persons who are victims of the transaction. (a) of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making, or may at some time make, a claim against him, or (b) of otherwise prejudicing the interests of such a person in relation to the claim which he is making or may make. (4) In this section “the court” means the High Court or— (a) if the person entering into the transaction is an individual, any other court which would have jurisdiction in relation to a bankruptcy petition relating to him; (b) if that person is a body capable of being wound up under Part IV or V of this Act, any other court having jurisdiction to wind it up. (5) In relation to a transaction at an undervalue, references here and below to a victim of the transaction are to a person who is, or is capable of being, prejudiced by it; and in the following two sections the person entering into the transaction is referred to as “the debtor”. 424 Those who may apply for an order under s. 423.E+W (1) An application for an order under section 423 shall not be made in relation to a transaction except— (a) in a case where the debtor has been adjudged bankrupt or is a body corporate which is being wound up or is in administration, by the official receiver, by the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate or the liquidator or administrator of the body corporate or (with the leave of the court) by a victim of the transaction; (b) in a case where a victim of the transaction is bound by a voluntary arrangement approved under Part I or Part VIII of this Act, by the supervisor of the voluntary arrangement or by any person who (whether or not so bound) is such a victim; or (c) in any other case, by a victim of the transaction. (2) An application made under any of the paragraphs of subsection (1) is to be treated as made on behalf of every victim of the transaction. 425 Provision which may be made by order under s. 423.E+W (1) Without prejudice to the generality of section 423, an order made under that section with respect to a transaction may (subject as follows)— (a) require any property transferred as part of the transaction to be vested in any person, either absolutely or for the benefit of all the persons on whose behalf the application for the order is treated as made; (b) require any property to be so vested if it represents, in any person’s hands, the application either of the proceeds of sale of property so transferred or of the money so transferred; (c) release or discharge (in whole or in part) any security given by the debtor; (d) require any person to pay to any other person in respect of benefits received from the debtor such sums as the court may direct; (e) provide for any surety or guarantor whose obligations to any person were released or discharged (in whole or in part) under the transaction to be under such new or revived obligations as the court thinks appropriate; (f) provide for security to be provided for the discharge of any obligation imposed by or arising under the order, for such an obligation to be charged on any property and for such security or charge to have the same priority as a security or charge released or discharged (in whole or in part) under the transaction. (2) An order under section 423 may affect the property of, or impose any obligation on, any person whether or not he is the person with whom the debtor entered into the transaction; but such an order— (a) shall not prejudice any interest in property which was acquired from a person other than the debtor and was acquired in good faith, for value and without notice of the relevant circumstances, or prejudice any interest deriving from such an interest, and (b) shall not require a person who received a benefit from the transaction in good faith, for value and without notice of the relevant circumstances to pay any sum unless he was a party to the transaction. (3) For the purposes of this section the relevant circumstances in relation to a transaction are the circumstances by virtue of which an order under section 423 may be made in respect of the transaction. (4) In this section “security” means any mortgage, charge, lien or other security.”
“Mr Kagalovsky seeks to defend the present claim, which is a new and distinct cause of action, based on old failed allegations which were finally and conclusively rejected by the New York State Court… as unanimously affirmed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division… on an appeal made by Mr Kagalovsky.”
“… You can take it that our client does not admit that he is estopped from making any of the allegations listed in paragraph 1 of the draft Order attached to your Application Notice sealed on28 November 2016 , nor that those allegations amount to an abuse of process. As stated previously, our client consents to application for direction for a preliminary issue to be tried.”
“[36] An application to amend will be refused if it is clear that the proposed amendment has no real prospect of success. The test to be applied is the same as that for summary judgement underCPR Part 24 . Thus the applicant has to have a case which is better than merely arguable. The court may reject an amendment seeking to raise a version of the facts of the case which is inherently implausible, self-contradictory or is not supported by contemporaneous documentation.”
“7. Irrespective of whether the Court concludes that, in the present proceedings, I am not able to deny findings of Justice Ramos in relation to these issues [that is, the AE Issues, other than the Protective Purpose issue], I nevertheless at all material times honestly and reasonably believed to be true all of the facts stated in the Defence in relation to these issues and this was the basis for my belief that I needed to effect the Dilution in order to protect TVi from Mr Gusinski by removing TRS from his control. … 9. In summary, I considered that Mr Gusinski was deliberately seeking to operate TVi so as to derive substantial and unwarranted profits from IVL for himself via NMDC and the Licence Agreements.”
“[180] Mr Gusinski credibly denied ever representing to Mr Kagalovsky that NMDC would licence programming to TVi at or near cost. [181] Instead, Mr Gusinski and Mr Berezin credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky and Mr Gusinski discussed and agreed that NMDC would charge TVi market prices for its programming. Otherwise, Mr Gusinski would be subsidising [IVL] at NMDC’s expense; the partners provided [IVL] with equal funding, so Mr Gusinski would be contributing more to [IVL] financially than Mr Kagalovsky if Mr Gusinski caused NMDC to provide programming at below-market prices. [182] ….. Mr Kagalovsky and his attorney… were therefore aware from the outset that NMDC content would be charged “on market terms…. [183] Moreover, Mr Kagalovsky understood that the prices NMDC charged for its programming content could vary significantly regardless of production costs. For example [See further re free-to-air broadcasting below]… [184] In light of the above, Mr Kagalovsky’s testimony that Mr Gusinski agreed to supply NMDC programming “at or near his direct cost with only a nominal profit” was not credible. [185] Mr Kagalovsky has claimed that Mr Gusinski concealed that NMDC’s production costs for programming licensed for broadcast on TVi had already been paid for through contracts with Russian broadcasters. Both documents and testimony show otherwise. [186] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that he orally informed Mr Kagalovsky that the production costs for NMDC’s programming were already paid for through NMDC’s contracts with Russian television networks. [187] Additionally, on January 12, 2008, Mr Gusinski sent Mr Kagalovsky a Confidential Offering Memorandum for NMDC, dated September 25, 2007, so that Mr Kagalovsky could have a full understanding of how NMDC worked. The Offering Memorandum described NMDC’s cost structure in several places, and notes specifically that the rights to the series NMDC sold in Ukraine had very low marginal costs, since they were originally produced for the Russian market.. [194] Mr Kagalovsky approved of all the agreements that Mr Brown signed on IVL’s behalf, including all agreements with companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski. [200] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that before Mr Kagalovsky approved of licence agreements between the Partnership and NMDC, Mr Gusinski provided him with copies of NMDC’s licence agreements with other broadcasters in Ukraine so that he could review the prices NMDC was charging. Mr Kagalovsky admitted that he regularly discussed with Mr Gusinski the pricing for content aired on TVi. [203] In light of the above, Mr Kagalovsky’s testimony that he did not negotiate the terms of the April 10, 2009 Licence Agreement is not credible…. [205]-[212] [Details of the independent and objective information about programing including costings obtained by Mr Kagalovsky] [213] Mr Gusinski, Marc Kasher, and Chris Renaud credibly testified that NMDC licensed programming to [IVL] at or below market prices. [214] As Mr Gusinski and Mr Renaud credibly testified, while NMDC was licensing content to [IVL], the highest per-episode price NMDC charged [IVL] was lower than the lowest per-episode price that NMDC charged other Ukrainian broadcasters for similar programming content and broadcasting rights. [215] Mr Kasher also credibly testified that NMDC had the opportunity to sell content to much larger broadcasters for$23,000 to$24,000 per episode, but instead sold to [IVL] at$15,300 per episode. [220] Defendants have offered no competent or credible evidence that NMDC charged [IVL] anything but market prices for content. Even Mr Kagalovsky conceded that NMDC was providing content “at prices at least equal to… market rates”. [369] Defendants had full knowledge of, and consented to, all of [IVL’s] related-party transactions with companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski. Mr Kagalovsky actively participated in negotiations for NMDC programming content and was sent and approved of all agreements between [IVL] and entities affiliated with Mr Gusinski prior to their execution. Thus, none of the related-party transactions are in breach of any fiduciary duties….. [370] The related-party transactions are protected by the business judgment rule. See Solomon v Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115 (Del Ch.1999) (“[I]n a classic self-dealing transaction the effect of a fully-informed shareholder vote in favour of that particular transaction is to maintain the business judgment rule’s presumptions.”) Defendants have offered no credible evidence to rebut the business judgement rule’s presumptions. Indeed, the prices [IVL] paid NMDC for programming were at or below market rates. [371] Defendants also have not established that Mr Gusinski, [NMHC], or NMDC breached the duty of candor. For example, Defendants had knowledge of, and consented to, all major decisions affecting [IVL] and TVi, including all agreements between [IVL] and entities affiliated with Mr Gusinski, hiring decisions for TVi’s top managers, decisions concerning TVi’s operational budget and advertising, decisions concerning free-to-air distribution, and other TVi operational issues.” [181] Instead, Mr Gusinski and Mr Berezin credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky and Mr Gusinski discussed and agreed that NMDC would charge TVi market prices for its programming. Otherwise, Mr Gusinski would be subsidising [IVL] at NMDC’s expense; the partners provided [IVL] with equal funding, so Mr Gusinski would be contributing more to [IVL] financially than Mr Kagalovsky if Mr Gusinski caused NMDC to provide programming at below-market prices. [182] ….. Mr Kagalovsky and his attorney… were therefore aware from the outset that NMDC content would be charged “on market terms…. [183] Moreover, Mr Kagalovsky understood that the prices NMDC charged for its programming content could vary significantly regardless of production costs. For example [See further re free-to-air broadcasting below]… [184] In light of the above, Mr Kagalovsky’s testimony that Mr Gusinski agreed to supply NMDC programming “at or near his direct cost with only a nominal profit” was not credible. [185] Mr Kagalovsky has claimed that Mr Gusinski concealed that NMDC’s production costs for programming licensed for broadcast on TVi had already been paid for through contracts with Russian broadcasters. Both documents and testimony show otherwise. [186] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that he orally informed Mr Kagalovsky that the production costs for NMDC’s programming were already paid for through NMDC’s contracts with Russian television networks. [187] Additionally, on January 12, 2008, Mr Gusinski sent Mr Kagalovsky a Confidential Offering Memorandum for NMDC, dated September 25, 2007, so that Mr Kagalovsky could have a full understanding of how NMDC worked. The Offering Memorandum described NMDC’s cost structure in several places, and notes specifically that the rights to the series NMDC sold in Ukraine had very low marginal costs, since they were originally produced for the Russian market.. [194] Mr Kagalovsky approved of all the agreements that Mr Brown signed on IVL’s behalf, including all agreements with companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski. [200] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that before Mr Kagalovsky approved of licence agreements between the Partnership and NMDC, Mr Gusinski provided him with copies of NMDC’s licence agreements with other broadcasters in Ukraine so that he could review the prices NMDC was charging. Mr Kagalovsky admitted that he regularly discussed with Mr Gusinski the pricing for content aired on TVi. [203] In light of the above, Mr Kagalovsky’s testimony that he did not negotiate the terms of the April 10, 2009 Licence Agreement is not credible…. [205]-[212] [Details of the independent and objective information about programing including costings obtained by Mr Kagalovsky] [213] Mr Gusinski, Marc Kasher, and Chris Renaud credibly testified that NMDC licensed programming to [IVL] at or below market prices. [214] As Mr Gusinski and Mr Renaud credibly testified, while NMDC was licensing content to [IVL], the highest per-episode price NMDC charged [IVL] was lower than the lowest per-episode price that NMDC charged other Ukrainian broadcasters for similar programming content and broadcasting rights. [215] Mr Kasher also credibly testified that NMDC had the opportunity to sell content to much larger broadcasters for$23,000 to$24,000 per episode, but instead sold to [IVL] at$15,300 per episode. [220] Defendants have offered no competent or credible evidence that NMDC charged [IVL] anything but market prices for content. Even Mr Kagalovsky conceded that NMDC was providing content “at prices at least equal to… market rates”. [369] Defendants had full knowledge of, and consented to, all of [IVL’s] related-party transactions with companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski. Mr Kagalovsky actively participated in negotiations for NMDC programming content and was sent and approved of all agreements between [IVL] and entities affiliated with Mr Gusinski prior to their execution. Thus, none of the related-party transactions are in breach of any fiduciary duties….. [370] The related-party transactions are protected by the business judgment rule. See Solomon v Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1115 (Del Ch.1999) (“[I]n a classic self-dealing transaction the effect of a fully-informed shareholder vote in favour of that particular transaction is to maintain the business judgment rule’s presumptions.”) Defendants have offered no credible evidence to rebut the business judgement rule’s presumptions. Indeed, the prices [IVL] paid NMDC for programming were at or below market rates. [371] Defendants also have not established that Mr Gusinski, [NMHC], or NMDC breached the duty of candor. For example, Defendants had knowledge of, and consented to, all major decisions affecting [IVL] and TVi, including all agreements between [IVL] and entities affiliated with Mr Gusinski, hiring decisions for TVi’s top managers, decisions concerning TVi’s operational budget and advertising, decisions concerning free-to-air distribution, and other TVi operational issues.”
“[41] Mr Kagalovsky told Mr Brown that Mr Dementiev’s involvement in TVi ensured that Mr Kagalovsky maintained control over the financial and legal aspects of [IVL], particularly in Ukraine [202] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky was personally involved in selecting the television content that TVi licensed from NMDC and other content providers. Mr Gusinski credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky asked NMDC to send all of its series to him for him to watch, which NMDC did. Mr Gusinski also credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky always had his own opinion about whether a series was good or bad, and selected the programs he liked for inclusion in the licence agreements with NMDC. [204] Mr Kagalovsky’s testimony that he “deferred to [Mr Gusinski’s] judgment on all matters related to programming” is also not credible. Mr Kagalovsky admitted at trial that he was involved in the approval of specific programming schedules for TVi and discussed many proposed schedules for TVi’s programming. In April 2008, Mr Kagalovsky attended Mipcom, one of the largest markets for television programming held in Cannes, France, to investigate and determine the content that could be acquired for TVi. He also contacted Mikhail Galkin many times to discuss programming and scheduling. [205] With Mr Gusinski’s encouragement, Mr Kagalovsky obtained independent and objective information about NMDC’s programming. … [206] In 2008 and 2009, Mr Romanets and Mr Kagalovsky corresponded often about programming. Mr Kagalovsky sometimes would call up Mr Romanets to ask Mr Romanets’ opinion on programs that TVi was considering to show. Mr Kagalovsky also discussed programming acquisitions with Mr Romanets, and Mr Romanets sent Mr Kagalovsky proposed programming schedules and ratings for programs that TVi would potentially acquire, including from NMDC……. [207] In August 2008, Mr Romanets prepared for Mr Kagalovsky an analysis of the programs aired on TVi and the major Ukrainian television networks. Among other things, Mr Romanets reviewed TVi’s programming strategy and made suggestions about what TVi should air at different time slots. Mr Romanets also outlined the typical programming acquisition costs for the major networks… [208] At Mr Kagalovsky’s request, Mr Romanets also used his experience and professional judgment to grade the programs that NMDC made available for licensing. Mr Romanets communicated his grades to Mr Kagalovsky…… [209] Mr Knyazhitsky advised Mr Kagalovsky about the price of programming. Likewise, Mr Romanets and Mr Knyazhitsky regularly informed Mr Kagalovsky about prices for programming from non—NMDC providers…. [222] All major management decisions of [IVL] and TVi were made with Mr Kagalovsky’s knowledge and consent. Mr Kagalovsky called Mr Gusinski and his colleagues regularly to discuss the details of operations. Mr Kagalovsky also travelled to Ukraine and held numerous meetings there with TVi’s management, employees, and journalists in connection with managing and operating TVi. [372] … Defendants offered no credible evidence that Mr Gusinski, [NMHC] or NMDC violated any duty of care…… For example, while Mr Gusinski and his representatives were involved in [IVL], TVi rose from the 47th-ranked broadcaster in Ukraine to the 14th-ranked broadcaster in a little over one and a half years. TVi, in which the partners had invested around$24 million to develop, was worth nearly$57 million at that point in time.”
“[192] Mr Kagalovsky always understood that [IVL] would be licensing content from companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski, including NMDC, and that other companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski, such as Overseas Media, would be providing services to [IVL]. [193] Mr Brown [Mr Kagalovsky’s nominee], who executed agreements on behalf of [IVL] also understood that NMDC and Overseas Media were affiliated with Mr Gusinski. [194] Mr Kagalovsky approved of all the agreements that Mr Brown signed on [IVL’s] behalf, including all agreements with companies affiliated with Mr Gusinski. Mr Brown understood that all the agreements between [IVL] and any company affiliated with Mr Gusinski had been agreed to by Mr Kagalovsky and Mr Gusinski. [195] Mr Gusinski actively sought Mr Kagalovsky’s approval for any related-party transactions. For example, Mr Gusinski sought Mr Kagalovsky’s approval for all films sold by Mr Gusinski’s companies to [IVL] for broadcast on TVi. [198] … Mr Kagalovsky also received drafts of the agreements with Overseas Media before they were executed. Mr Kagalovsky also had access to all the contracts [IVL] entered into with any company affiliated with Mr Gusinski. [199] Additionally, Mr Gusinski credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky received information about the shares and ratings that NMDC programs achieved in similar markets or channels. [200] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that before Mr Kagalovsky approved license agreements between [IVL] and NMDC, Mr Gusinski provided him with copies of NMDC’s license agreements with other broadcasters in Ukraine so that he could review the prices NMDC was charging. Mr Kagalovsky admitted that he regularly discussed with Mr Gusinski the pricing for content aired on TVi. [202] Mr Gusinski credibly testified that Mr Kagalovsky was personally involved in selecting the television content that TVi licensed from NMDC and other content providers…. [219] The services provided by Overseas Media were also on cost-plus basis, as agreed. The Production Services Agreement contains a schedule that delineates the up-front and recurring costs that Overseas Media incurred, and that [IVL] would be reimbursing. [221] Defendants have offered no competent evidence that Overseas Media charged [IVL] excessive prices for its services. [IVL] advised in a letter dated September 12, 2008: “We can advise that we are satisfied with the quality of programming as well as production and broadcast services that you provide us with.”