“The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court - (a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; (b) that the statement of the case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or (c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order.”
“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if – (a) it considers that - (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or (ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.” (a) it considers that - (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or (ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
“But counsel for the plaintiffs emphasises that this is an application to strike out the plaintiffs' cause of action. It is well established that one should only do so on the ground that the cause of action is time-barred if it is a clear case. He submits that the question when the plaintiffs possessed sufficient relevant knowledge is a question of fact which is not appropriate to be decided at this stage. I agree. In my view this is a matter which must be investigated at trial. Whether it is done by way of a preliminary issue is a matter which may be decided hereafter.”
“…that knowledge, for the purposes of section 14A of the 1980 Act, meant knowing with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ; that knowledge that the damage was attributable, in whole or in part, to the acts or omissions of the defendant alleged to constitute negligence within section 14A(8) meant knowledge in broad terms of the facts on which the claimant’s complaint was based and of the defendant’s acts or omissions of knowing that there was a real possibility that those acts or omissions had been a cause of the damage…”
“The relevant date was not when Mr Haward first knew he might have a claim for damages. The relevant date was an earlier date, namely, when Mr Haward first knew enough to justify setting about investigating the possibility that Mr Austreng's advice was defective.”
“225. It is clear from Haward v Fawcetts…that the key to ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of section 14A is knowing facts with sufficient confidence to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ… Knowledge that the damage was ‘attributable’ in whole or in part to the acts or omissions of the defendant alleged to constitute negligence within section 14A(8)(a) means knowledge in broad terms of the facts on which the claimant's complaint is based and of the defendant's acts or omissions.”
“It must also be known that there is a real possibility that those acts or omissions were a cause of the damage. The first of these tests concerns the degree of certainty required before knowledge can be said to exist. The second concerns the degree of detail required before a person can be said to have knowledge of a particular matter in the context of the requirements of section 14A(8)(a), the question of attributability.”
“Your client suggests that they [the bank] did not and have never acted as financial advisers to our clients. Our clients’ understanding is that the position is to the contrary and that your client and all and any financial advisors were inexorably linked when the product in question was both offered and sanctioned by your client and its advisors to our clients.”
“Where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either - (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”
“The wording ofsection 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 in my judgment is such that a narrow interpretation is necessary. In order to give relief to the plaintiff any new fact must be relevant to the plaintiff's ‘right of action’ and is to be contrasted with a fact relevant, for example, to ‘the plaintiff's action’ or ‘his case’ or ‘his right to damages’. The right of action in this case was complete at the moment of arrest. No other ingredient was necessary to complete the right of action. Accordingly, whilst I acknowledge that the new facts might make the plaintiff's case stronger or his right to damages more readily capable of proof they do not in my view bite upon the ‘right of action’ itself. They do not affect the ‘right of action’, which was already complete, and consequently…are not relevant to it.”
“Johnson, the Mirror Group Newspaper case and The Kriti Palm are clear authority, binding on this court, for the following principles applicable to section 32(1)(b) of the 1980 Act: (1) a ‘fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action’ within section 32(1)(b) is a fact without which the cause of action is incomplete; (2) facts which merely improve prospects of success are not facts relevant to the claimant’s right of action; (3) facts bearing on a matter which is not a necessary ingredient of the cause of action but which may provide a defence are not facts relevant to the claimant’s right of action.”
“It is plain that, on a conventional application of the ‘statement of claim’ test, that is to say as formulated in Johnson, the Mirror Group Newspapers case and The Kriti Palm, none of those four points provides a ground for postponing the limitation period under section 32(1)(b).”
“This letter appears to have been calculated to put Mr Martin off the scent; and it did. Bearing in mind a fiduciary's duty to disclose his own wrongdoing, this letter amounted to deliberate concealment.”