"i) Deciding whether an equity has been raised and, if so, how to satisfy it is a retrospective exercise looking backwards from the moment when the promise falls due to be performed and asking whether, in the circumstances which have actually happened, it would be unconscionable for a promise not to be kept either wholly or in part: Thorner v Major[2009] UKHL 18 , [2009] I WLR 776 at [57] and [101]. ii) The ingredients necessary to raise an equity are (a) an assurance of sufficient clarity (b) reliance by the claimant on that assurance and (c) detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance: Thorner v Major at [29]. iii) However, no claim based on proprietary estoppel can be divided into watertight compartments. The quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance; reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and whether there is a distinct need for a "mutual understanding" may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood: Gillett v Holt[2001] Ch 210 at 225; Henry v Henry[2010] UKPC 3 ;[2010] 1 All ER 988 at[37]. iv) Detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances: Gillett v Holt at 232; Henry v Henry at [38]. v) There must be a sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted. The issue of detriment must be judged at the moment when the person who has given the assurance seeks to go back on it. The question is whether (and if so to what extent) it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the person who has given the assurance to go back on it. The essential test is that of unconscionability: Gillett v Holt at 232. vi) Thus the essence of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result: Jennings v Rice[2002] EWCA Civ 159 ;[2003] 1 P & CR 8 at [56]. vii) In deciding how to satisfy any equity the court must weigh the detriment suffered by the claimant in reliance on the defendant's assurances against any countervailing benefits he enjoyed in consequence of that reliance: Henrv v Henry at [51] and [53]. viii) Proportionality lies at the heart of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and permeates its every application: Henry v Henry at [65]. In particular there must be a proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which is its purpose to avoid: Jennings v Rice at [28] (citing from earlier cases) and [56]. This does not mean that the court should abandon expectations and seek only to compensate detrimental reliance, but if the expectation is disproportionate to the detriment, the court should satisfy the equity in a more limited way: Jennings v Rice at [50] and [51]. ix) In deciding how to satisfy the equity the court has to exercise a broad judgmental discretion: Jennings v Rice at [51]. However the discretion is not unfettered. It must be exercised on a principled basis, and does not entail what HH Judge Weekes QC memorably called a "portable palm tree": Taylor v Dickens[1998] 1 FLR 806 (a decision criticised for other reasons in Gillett v Holt)."
"We tried our very best to [sort it out of court], and the last resort was one of estoppel to try and put my father's wishes of keeping the farm as a whole."
"Notwithstanding the very substantial (and mostly IHT free) value of the farm compared to their other assets (of which they provided a list) it is their firm intention that Stephen (now a Partner in the business) should have the farm and House although already they know that Julie is not happy with that potential inequality and will disapprove of it. Recognising the possibility that Stephen might choose not to keep the farm and that Julie would consider that result to be even more unfair we talked generally about methods that might be adopted to ensure she had a share of such proceeds if sold within a certain time following the death. However no conclusion was reached and they decided that, at least pro tem, they would keep the arrangements as simple as possible and just hope that did not happen. Whilst PM [Pamela] would not expect to go on living in Manor Farm House (Stephen would take it over) she would want somewhere to live (the cottage?) hence account of that might need to be taken in RJM [Roger's] Will (on reflection it could be covered by the residue and/or NRBDT [Nil Rate Band Discretionary Trust]. By reference to the combine[d] 'non-farm' assets, the cottage to be left to Julie/Andy in any event, there would be approx 300K gross and it was agreed that pro rata Julie should have 100K, each of her children 75K and 50K to Stephen's daughters ... that would be done by shares rather than amount. .. Then I went through my usual NRBDT routine .... That would be included in both Wills."
"Essentially form of Will is okay and they agree with the shares in 6(b). She gave me the extra details to complete the blanks. Notwithstanding that I had understood it to be an essential point of our discussion she was concerned by the "
"By moving the specific "farm gift" to operate only on death of survivor that would leave him/her in control of that asset value as long as was desired but with a probability of a zero, or very small, IHT value for the agricultural property there would always be the facility for it to go into the NRBDT if at the time of the first death the circumstances of the survivor had become such that he/she did not want to take the benefit of the farm. Again the point was made that the "paper" value of the respective benefits to each part of the family is very disparate but Roger was adamant that was "right" as the property had passed down the farming "generations" and he considered that should continue regardless of comparative values. (Whilst no comment was made I did have in mind the like situation of Richard the nonfarming brother). Although again passing mention was made that it would be somewhat unfair if quite soon after inheritance Stephen sold up and thus did not maintain the family succession but (following the previous discussion) there was no suggestion that they would want to try to guard against that, at least not until they had much more time to ponder and Geoff's situation clarified as, obviously, that will have a bearing on the future farm structure."
"Spent afternoon at Julie's redrafting Neil Barber's letter to Stephen."