“If residential property values increase broadly in line with the economy at 1.5% over 2013 (which would seem broadly consistent with the Central Statistics Office data that prices in the Rest of Ireland (outsideDublin) rose by 0.7% over the first 6 months), maintain this rate in 2014 and then increase to only 1.75% in 2015 and 2% per annum thereafter until 2020 they will be some 15.4% higher at the end of 2020 than they are today.”
“illustrated with a simplistic residual valuation model how a small development of 10 houses might currently suggest a site value similar to agricultural land values. I have then shown that if house values increase by only 15% the site value might increase by a staggering 2000% (all other things being equal, including ignoring the fact that if values are rising sale rates may do so as well which would increase this differential even more).”
“Whilst I have no statistical or research data to support a projection I note that a modest recovery in prices over the next 7 years as outlined at 8.14 above could easily result in an increase in residential property values over the period of around 15%.”
“If this is correct, and this portfolio is broadly typical of many of those held by [NALM] then [NALM] is going to be dependent on market improvement if it is going to cover its acquisition and holding costs let alone provide a paper profit at the end of the anticipated period. This having been said, it is not inconceivable that the improvement in the residential market over the next 7 years of the order of 15% (as set out above) combined with an increased availability of finance will lead to an increase in the market value of residential development sites of the magnitude of these I have illustrated in my Appendix 6. If this was to happen then it could result in a substantial paper profit and sufficient, based on the acquisition costs to cover the nominal loan balances.”
“What is missing from the report…is any schedule or table which demonstrates that if there were increases in value, such as is anticipated hypothetically in the report and in Appendix 6, then that would in fact result in the sum outstanding being covered by the value of the Security either at the date when the statutory demand was served or at any other future date.”
“(1) Every court having jurisdiction for the purposes of the Parts in this Group [that is, the Parts of the Act relating to individual insolvency] may review, rescind or vary any order made by it in the exercise of that jurisdiction. (2) An appeal from a decision made in the exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of these Parts by a county court or by a registrar in bankruptcy of the High Court lies to a single judge of the High Court; …”
“5. I am able to assist in the preparation of a schedule of the type described by the judge at paragraph 18 of his judgment. Such a schedule was not incorporated into my report for several reasons. First, I am based in London and the preparation of such a schedule would have required physical inspection of the properties; this was simply not possible within the timescales set for production of the original report. Secondly, as I explained at paragraph 11.4 of my original report, the information provided to me by Edwin Coe LLP was unsatisfactory [in] terms of trying to have a comprehensive insight into the properties and their planning status. Thirdly, I am not an economic forecaster competent to provide reliable predictions as [to] the future performance of different segments of the Irish property market. In my original report I illustrated the volatility of development values in my Appendix 6. Just as development values have collapsed there is no logical reason why they should not recover. The main unknown is as to timing which as I have said I am not qualified to opine. However, if I am given forecasts for the future recovery of the relevant housing market together with a clearer insight into the properties themselves I should be able to estimate the impact this is likely to have on the development opportunities and the geared way in which their value is likely to increase. I am prepared to endeavour to obtain any economic forecasts on which a further supplemental report could be based (incorporating the appropriate schedule). 6. I fully anticipate that such an exercise of the individual properties will corroborate the underlying concept of the analysis at Appendix 6 of my original report.”
“4. [Mr Cahillane’s] valuer did not…as I understand it, have full access, whether because it was refused or otherwise makes no matter for the moment, to the relevant Irish properties. The result, it is said, is that the learned judge did not have before him the true picture of the potential value of the assets in respect of which [NALM] holds security. 5. I am not entirely convinced of that, but [counsel for Mr Cahillane] says that it is not just a matter of valuing individual properties, it is a matter of valuing them in the context of economic forecasts, the effect of which could be to increase considerably the value of the portfolio beyond the value of the individual properties. Furthermore, she relies on rumour (and I will put it no higher than that) that in fact [NALM] intends to sell its asset base. She points out that, if that is so, sooner or later one is likely to know the true value of the underlying assets rather than rely on valuations. 6. [Counsel for NALM] has, understandably, got no fixed instructions on that, but refers, equally understandably, to the fact that her clients have been trying to sell assets for a considerable time and have not succeeded in doing so. 7. One of the things that makes me twitchy, if I may put it that way, about [NALM]’s approach to today is its unwillingness to pin its valuations to the mast by simply saying that it will waive its security, or waive its security beyond a certain sum, which leads me to a suspicion that there may be something in what [counsel] argues on behalf of Mr Cahillane; so that, if he is able to put in the further evidence he now wishes to, he may well be given the chance to upset the findings of the registrar and the judge on appeal. 8. It seems to me that the consequences for Mr Cahillane in terms of prejudice, compared to the relatively small amount of prejudice to [NALM] from an interruption while this application is dealt with, favour giving Mr Cahillane the benefit if the doubt. For these reasons I will allow [Mr Cahillane]’s application to go forward.”
“In my judgment s.375(1) contemplates review, at first instance, of the exercise of jurisdiction at first instance. It would be surprising if it contemplated review, at first instance, of the exercise of appellate jurisdiction since, on its language, it would then permit a Bankruptcy Registrar (for instance) to review the decision of a High Court judge on appeal.”
“14….Any element of surprise which that might occasion would at least in my case be significantly be tempered by the fact that such a situation would appear to exist in the case of an application to set aside a bankruptcy order under s.282(1) of the Act. In any event, any sense of institutional discomfort can be overcome by a practice of adjourning the application to a judge of the appropriate court or level, as indeed happened in Appleyard. More fundamentally, I find myself unable to agree with the suggestion that such a result could be consistent with the language of s.375(1), which I read as contemplating review by a court only of an order made by it. The real question is rather to my mind whether the sub-section empowers an appellate court (in casu the High Court) to revisit an order which was made for the first time by it on appeal, which might include a positive order against the bankrupt refused by the county court or registrar as well as one setting aside an order made below- I can see no basis in the language of s.375(1) for distinguishing between these two possible situations. 15. In the context of s.375 as a whole and its distinction between first instance and appellate review, it appears to me to be at least fairly arguable that subsection (1) should be interpreted as restricted to the review by first instance courts of decisions made by them. Such a reading is however capable of producing results which some may regard as anomalous. In these circumstances I confess that my view on this point of statutory construction has wavered, and continues to do so. Ultimately, however, I am unable to say that in its result the decision of Briggs J. was clearly wrong in its result [sic], and it is therefore appropriate that I should follow and apply it.”