“Normally a party cannot raise in subsequent proceedings claims or issues which could and should have been raised in the first proceedings. Equally, a party cannot, in my judgment, normally seek to appeal a trial judge’s decision on the basis that a claim, which could have been brought before the trial judge, but was not, would have succeeded if it had been so brought….It is not merely a matter of efficiency, expediency and cost, but of substantial justice. Parties to litigation are entitled to know where they stand.”
“…where that party has failed to comply with …a requirement…..to disclose in any assessment proceedings…”
“failed to provide information about a funding arrangement in accordance with a rule, practice direction or court order”
“31. The important misunderstanding that has occurred is that, if (i) there is a non-trivial (now serious or significant) breach and (ii) there is no good reason for the breach, the application for relief from sanctions will automatically fail. That is not so and is not what the court said in Mitchell: see para 37. Rule 3.9(1) requires that, in every case, the court will consider "all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application". We regard this as the third stage. 32. We can see that the use of the phrase "paramount importance" in para 36 of Mitchell has encouraged the idea that the factors other than factors (a) and (b) are of little weight. On the other hand, at para 37 the court merely said that the other circumstances should be given "less weight" than the two considerations specifically mentioned. This may have given rise to some confusion which we now seek to remove. Although the two factors may not be of paramount importance, we reassert that they are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered. That is why they were singled out for mention in the rule. It is striking that factor (a) is in substance included in the definition of the overriding objective in rule 1.1(2) of enabling the court to deal with cases justly; and factor (b) is included in the definition of the overriding objective in identical language at rule 1.1(2)(f). If it had been intended that factors (a) and (b) were to be given no particular weight, they would not have been mentioned in rule 3.9(1). In our view, the draftsman of rule 3.9(1) clearly intended to emphasise the particular importance of these two factors.”
“40. …Nor should it be overlooked thatCPR rule 1.3 provides that "the parties are required to help the court to further the overriding objective". Parties who opportunistically and unreasonably oppose applications for relief from sanctions take up court time and act in breach of this obligation. 41. We think we should make it plain that it is wholly inappropriate for litigants or their lawyers to take advantage of mistakes made by opposing parties in the hope that relief from sanctions will be denied and that they will obtain a windfall strike out or other litigation advantage. In a case where (a) the failure can be seen to be neither serious nor significant, (b) where a good reason is demonstrated, or (c) where it is otherwise obvious that relief from sanctions is appropriate, parties should agree that relief from sanctions be granted without the need for further costs to be expended in satellite litigation. The parties should in any event be ready to agree limited but reasonable extensions of time up to 28 days as envisaged by the new rule 3.8(4). 42. It should be very much the exceptional case where a contested application for relief from sanctions is necessary. This is for two reasons: first because compliance should become the norm, rather than the exception as it was in the past, and secondly, because the parties should work together to make sure that, in all but the most serious cases, satellite litigation is avoided even where a breach has occurred.”