“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.”
“Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”
“1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.”
“ . . . Article 7 of the Directive, like Article 36 of the Treaty, is intended to reconcile the fundamental interest in protecting trade mark rights with the fundamental interest in the free movement of goods within the common market: it follows that those two provision which pursue the same result, must be interpreted in the same way.”
“The condition of artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States, as laid down in the judgments in Case 102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 and in Joined Cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v Paranova[1996] ECR I-3457 , means that it is necessary, in order to determine whether the proprietor of a trade mark may, under national law, prevent a parallel importer of pharmaceutical products from replacing the trade mark used in the Member State of export by that which the proprietor uses in the Member State of import, to assess whether the circumstances prevailing at the time of marketing in the Member State of import make it objectively necessary to replace the original trade mark by thatused in the Member State of import in order that the product in question may be marketed in that State by the parallel importer.”
“[43] It follows that it is for the national courts to examine whether the circumstances prevailing at the time of marketing made it objectively necessary to replace the original trade mark by that of the importing Member State in order that the product in question could be placed on the market in that State by the parallel importer. This condition of necessity is satisfied if, in a specific case, the prohibition imposed on the importer against replacing the trade mark hinders effective access to the market of the importing Member State. That would be the case if the rules or practices in the importing Members State prevent the product in question from being marketed in that State under its trade mark in the exporting Member State. This is so where a rule for the protection of consumers prohibits the use, in the importing Member State, of the trade mark used in the exporting Members State on the ground that it is liable to mislead consumers. [44] In contrast, the condition of necessity will not be satisfied if replacement of the trade mark is explicable solely by the parallel importer’s attempt to secure a commercial advantage. [45] It is for the national courts to determine, in each specific case, whether it was objectively necessary for the parallel importer to use the trade mark used in the Member State of import in order to enable the imported products to be marketed.”
“54. Where, in accordance with the rules and practices in force in the Member State of importation, the trade mark owner uses many different sizes of packaging in that State, the finding that one of those sizes is also marketed in the Member State of exportation is not enough to justify the conclusion that repackaging is unnecessary. Partitioning of the markets would exist if the importer were able to sell the product in only part of his market.”
“55 In general - at least where the importer is doing no more than using in the importing State the mark used by the proprietor there for identical products - the necessity test will be satisfied in the case of rebranding, since in most circumstances rebranding is consistent with the essential function of the mark because it serves to avoid confusion.”
“To say that removing (or not applying) the original supplier’s mark to the goods amounts to an infringement would be absurd; ...”
“…there may exist on a market, or on a substantial part of it, such strong resistance from a significant proportion of consumers to relabelled pharmaceutical products that there must be held to be a hindrance to effective market access. In those circumstances, repackaging of the pharmaceuticalproducts would not be explicable solely by the attempt to secure a commercial advantage. The purpose would be to achieve effective market access.”
“29 The Court's judgment in Upjohn explains to some extent what is meant by “necessary.”
“[43] It follows that it is for the national courts to examine whether the circumstances prevailing at the time of marketing made it objectively necessary to replace the original trade mark by that of the importing Member State in order that the product in question could be placed on the market in that State by the parallel importer. This condition of necessity is satisfied if, in a specific case, the prohibition imposed on the importer against replacing the trade mark hinders effective access to the markets of the importing Member States. That would be the case if the rules or practices in the importing Member States prevent the product in question from being marketed in that State under its trade mark in the exporting Member State. This is so where a rule for the protection of consumers prohibits the use, in the importing Member State, of that trade mark used inthe exporting Member State on the ground that it is liable to mislead consumers. [44] In contrast, the condition of necessity will not be satisfied if replacement of the trade mark is explicable solely by the parallel importer's attempt tosecure a commercial advantage.” 30 Quite what the Court had in mind by a “commercial advantage”
“37 As to the necessity questions the court held: “2. Replacement packaging of pharmaceutical products is objectively necessary within the meaning of the Court's case-law if, without such repackaging, effective access to the market concerned, or to a substantial part of that market, must be considered to be hindered as the result of strong resistance from a significant proportion of consumers to relabelled pharmaceutical products”. 38 This is important—“a strong resistance from a significant proportion of consumers” is enough to count as a “hindrance.”
“The Court does not find that there is necessity for relabeling according to this. In that connection, it is pointed out that the fact that LAXOBERAL is most frequently sold at the recommendation of a doctor other health service personnel is not found to be comparable to the existence of a prescription practice that necessitates the products being sold under the same name. The fact that the defendant might be able to obtain higher sales of the products by marketing it under the name LAXOBERAL is not found to be tantamount to the defendant’s effective access to the market being prevented if the product is sold under the name GUTALAX.”
“ … that requirement is not fulfilled if the exchange of trade marks only is explained by the parallel importer’s wish to achieve a commercial advantage.”
“If the cheapest sources is a parallel imported product, [the pharmacist] will invariably choose this source of supply if such suppliers are available.”
“Q. Secondly, I remind you of your evidence yesterday, we don't need to turn it up, but it is at page 122 of the transcript. Your evidence was that if the cheapest source is a parallel import, a pharmacist would be more likely to choose the parallel import, do you remember that: "If the cheapest source is a parallel import, a pharmacist would be more likely to choose the parallel import." Do you remember saying that? A. Yes, correct. Q. I would suggest to you that that is an extremely effective marketing tool that you have at your disposal in order to incentivise pharmacies to take any new branded product? A. Are we talking about the unbranded prescription market or the branded prescriptions market that I created. Q. Let's take the unbranded prescriptions market first. A. In terms of the unbranded prescriptions market, the pharmacist would be driven by price, yes. Q. If you had a branded prescription Doncaster and a doctor prescribed it -- A. Yes. Q. -- I think your evidence is that the pharmacist would love to buy your branded product? A. They wouldn't be getting quite as good a price, to be fair, if it was my own branded product. Q. They would still be getting a very competitive price, because you are parallel importing the product? A. No, I would be in a monopoly position, they would get the price that they were offered, they would have no choice but to dispense my product, so they would get a monopoly price, they would get a very bad price.”
“Q. I think we can put that bundle E away. Looking at the picture of the white box I would imagine that the cost of changing Regurin to, for example, Doncaster XL would be almost zero? A. I mean the biggest cost would be throwing away all my boxes that have "Regurin XL" written on them and buying the new boxes with Doncaster. Q. But after that? A. There would be no difference in the price of repackaging as either, the cost of the income would be pretty negligible, I suspect.”
“Q. In cross-examination a moment ago, Mr Howe put to it Mr Banks what would happen if Doncaster put a brand say on a white box. He said that he thought that it could probably capture about 50 per cent of the market, or 50 per cent of generic prescriptions segment, would you agree with that? A. I guess there are two scenarios, one is if Doncaster Pharmaceuticals is the only parallel importer of the product or whether there are seven or eight parallel importers, which is probably the more likely scenario to be fair. Q. Let's just put to one side other parallel importers and you are the only parallel importer in town for the next six months. A. Excellent. Q. Yes, and you feel that if you rebranded that white box under Doncaster you could make a bit of a killing? A. I would have the opportunity to make a bit of a killing, it would all depend on the reaction of SEP to what I was doing in the marketplace. Q. I put it to you that as far as your concern competing with SEP, and the possibility of at least making a killing, you do have effective market access to the UK market? A. I have access to the prescriptions that are written generically, yes. Q. To be able to make a killing, I would suggest to you, you do have effective access to the UK market? A. My answer doesn't change, I would have the opportunity to make a killing in that part of the market, certainly. Q. You would have the opportunity to make a killing in that part of the market? A. Okay. Q. If, for example, it is decided that the prescriptions' side of it account for 70 per cent of the overall market, I suggest to you that you do have effective market access to the overall UK market, because you have a chance of making a killing in a segment which represents 70 per cent of the total market? A. I agree that I could make a killing in 70 per cent of the market, yes. Q. Sorry? A. I accept what you said, that I could make a killing in 70 per cent of the market, yes. Q. If you can make a killing in 70 per cent of the market, I suggest to you that gives you effective market access to the UK market. It must follow, from your evidence? A. I mean I don't disagree that I have access to the market.”