“No relief [which might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression] is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.”
“In my view section 12(3) calls for a similar approach. Section 12(3) makes the likelihood of success at the trial an essential element in the court’s consideration of whether to make an interim order. But in order to achieve the necessary flexibility the degree of likelihood of success at the trial needed to satisfy section 12(3) must depend on the circumstances. There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicant’s prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently favourable’, the general approach should be that courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the court he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at the trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10 and any countervailing Convention rights. But there will be cases where it is necessary for a court to depart from this general approach and a lesser degree of likelihood will suffice as a prerequisite. Circumstances where this may be so include those mentioned above: where the potential adverse consequences of disclosure are particularly grave, or where a short-lived injunction is needed to enable the court to hear and give proper consideration to an application for interim relief pending the trial or any relevant appeal.”
“Unfortunately, our first attack is hard to mitigate. It seems unfeasible to prevent an adversary from gathering two authentication traces. Furthermore, this attack exploits weaknesses in the course of the cipher’s design - e.g. the size of the internal state. It would require a complete re-design of the cipher to fix these weaknesses. To that purpose, lightweight ciphers, like grain, and so on, have been proposed in the literature and could be considered as suitable replacements for the Megamos Crypto. On the positive side, our first attack is more computationally intensive than the attacks in section 6 and 7, which makes it important to take the aforementioned mitigating measures in order to prevent the more inexpensive attacks.”
“More advanced car diagnostic tools like AVDI and Tango Programmer offer functionality that goes beyond ‘legitimate’ usage. These devices are able to [access?] the onboard computer memory, recover the dealer code and add a new blank transponder to the car. For this the tools do not require a genuine key to be present, but they do need physical access to the car […] The diagnostic tools use the Megamos Crypto authentication functionality to speed up the process of adding new transponders to the car. For this the tool needs the Megamos Crypto algorithm to compute valid authentication attempts. We would like to emphasise that none of these tools is able to recover the secret key of a transponder or perform of crypto-analysis. In fact, within the legitimate auto industry Megamos Crypto is believed to be unclonable.”