“Between at least3rd August 2008 , when the accounts for the year ended31st December 2007 were signed as approved, and cessation of trading on or around24th August 2009 , during which time he knew that the company was insolvent, Mr Cork allowed Landmark to trade at the risk, and to the detriment, of creditors generally, including taking unreasonable advantage of the forbearance of authors who were due royalty payments. As a consequence of continued trading, outside creditors increased from£244,780 at31st August 2008 to£314,262 at the date of administration. In particular: (a) Landmark’s accounts for the year ended31st December 2007 show an insolvent position, with net liabilities of£114,893 , and were signed as approved on3rd August 2008 . [I interpose to say that it was Mr Cork who approved those accounts as director of the company.] Draft accounts for the year ended31st December 2008 show a deteriorating position with net liabilities of£144,823 . [In cross-examination, Mr Cork told the court that he had prepared the draft accounts for the year ended31st December 2008 in about April of 2009] (b) As at31st August 2008 , the company’s management accounts show that Landmark was in arrears with payments to authors in respect of royalties in the total sum of£67,023 , with claims in this regard dating from 2001. On the same date, trade and expense creditor liabilities amounted to£123,026 , of which£76,423 was in excess of three months overdue for payment. (c) As at3rd August 2008 , the company’s bank account shows an overdrawn balance of£45,730 against an authorised overdraft of£47,000 , and the company as subject to additional financial monitoring by its bank at a cost of£100 per month. (d) At least 39 authors from the 108 who were due royalties from the company at administration were unable to pursue payment because they were not adequately informed of the extent of book sales or the amount of royalty payments due to them by Landmark. (e) Over the period31st August 2008 to25th September 2009 , Landmark’s indebtedness to trade and expense creditors increased from£123,026 to£147,185 . The liabilities due to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs increased from£7,005 to£30,951 ; and royalties due to authors increased from£67,023 to what is said to be at least£85,237 .”
“(e) The sum due to the directors in respect of their outstanding loan account decreased from£18,375 to£16,621 , and a payment of£3,000 was made to Mr Cork’s co-director, Mr Porter, in this regard on6th August 2009 .”
“As a matter of principle, it appears to me that it cannot be right that a director of a company involved in activities which justify a disqualification order against the director directly responsible for those activities can escape liability simply by saying that he knew nothing about what was going on. The court must inquire whether in the circumstances, the failure to discover what was going on was attributable to ignorance borne of culpable failure to make inquiries or, where inquiries were made, of culpable failure to consider or appreciate the results of those inquiries: if such culpability is established, then the court would have to go on to decide whether, in all the circumstances, the culpability was sufficient to justify the conclusion that the conduct of the person concerned was such as to make him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.”
“Each individual director owes duties to the company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his co-directors in supervising and controlling them. A proper degree of delegation and division of responsibility is of course permissible, and often necessary, but total abrogation of responsibility is not. A board of directors must not permit one individual to dominate them and use them.”
“It was of the greatest importance that any individual who undertakes the statutory and fiduciary obligations of being a company director should realise that these are inescapable personal responsibilities. The appellants may have been dazzled, manipulated and deceived by Mr Griffiths but they were in breach of their own duties in allowing this to happen. They can count themselves fortunate to have received the minimum period of disqualification and to have had the benefit of immediate orders under section 17 of the Act.”
“It was well established on the authorities that causing a company to trade, first, while it is insolvent and, secondly, without a reasonable prospect of meeting creditors' claims was likely to constitute incompetence of sufficient seriousness to ground a disqualification order. But it was important to emphasise that it would usually be necessary for both elements of that test to be satisfied. In general, it was not enough for the company to have been insolvent and for the director to have known it. It must also be shown that he knew or ought to have known that there was no reasonable prospect of meeting creditors' claims.”
“When does unwitting naivety transcend into gross incompetence”
“Against this background it was all the more important that the respondent should have before him an accurate picture from time to time of the assets and liabilities of the company, of the profitability of the company, and of the cash flow projections for the immediate future. How else could any reasonable decision be made as to whether continued trading from that point of time onwards would be at the risk and expense of creditors or not? I have looked in vain through the evidence to find any clear indication that at any relevant time there was before the respondent any intelligible financial picture upon the basis of which such a reasoned decision could be made.”
“…there are occasions when disqualification must be ordered even though, by reason of the director’s recognition of his previous failings and the way he has conducted himself since the conduct complained of, he is in fact no longer a danger to the public at all. In such cases it is no longer necessary for the director to be kept ‘off the road’ for the protection of the public, but other factors come into play in the wider interests of protecting the public, that is a deterrent element in relation to the director himself and a deterrent element as far as other directors are concerned. Despite the fact that the courts have said disqualification is not a ‘punishment’, in truth the exercise is little different from any sentencing exercise. The period of disqualification must reflect the gravity of the offence. It must contain deterrent elements. That is what sentencing is all about, and that is what fixing the appropriate period of the disqualification is all about. What Mr Justice Vinelott (in Re: Pamstock Limited) called ‘tunnel vision’, ie concentration on the facts of the offence, is necessary when considering whether a director is unfit. In relation to the period of disqualification, the facts of the offence are still obviously important, but many other factors ought (and in reality do) come into play.”