“32 Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake (1) … where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, … (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; … the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the … concealment …or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it… (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.”
“14A. Further, in the premises it is to be inferred that the defendant acted in deliberate breach of fiduciary duty in (a) deliberately withholding from the claimant the information and advice and deliberately failing to take the steps pleaded in paragraph [14] above (b) deliberately preferring the interests of Mr Consett and/or Cairncastle to the interests of the claimant… (c) continuing to act once an actual conflict of interest had arisen.”
“ … plainly the deliberateness of a breach of duty can rarely, if ever, be determined in advance of the question whether there was a breach at all. In the case of an amendment pleading such a breach as a cause of action after expiry of the primary limitation period, that would normally mean leave to amend should be refused. That can readily be seen in a case where the plaintiff seeks to raise a new case of breach of contract, rebutting limitation by the suggestion of deliberate breach; but there the deliberateness would not be an essential element of the breach. The position is less obvious where the deliberateness of the breach is an essential element of the cause of action and is therefore pleaded as such as part of the substantive claim; for in such a case without the deliberateness the claim will fail anyway and the limitation defence adds nothing. …there appear to be difficult questions… as to what "deliberate commission of a breach of duty" would mean and involve in the present case. These would include such questions as precisely what kind of mental state is included in the adjective "deliberate" and what that would amount to in the present case. Does this require consciousness that the conduct is in breach, or recklessness as to whether it is in breach or alternatively, consciousness that the conduct is in some way wrong or recklessness as to that? Or is it sufficient that the acts are intentional without reference to their quality as breaches of duty? ”
“23 As I have explained, in enacting the 1980 Act Parliament substituted "deliberate concealment" for "concealed fraud". This is a different and more appropriate concept. It cannot be assumed that the law remained the same. But reference to the old law explains why Parliament enacted section 32(2) and did not rely on section 32(1)(b) alone to cover the whole ground. With all reference to fraud or conscious impropriety omitted, there was an obvious risk that "deliberate concealment" might be construed in its natural sense as meaning "active concealment" and not as embracing mere non-disclosure. Section 32(2) was therefore enacted to cover cases where active concealment should not be required. But such cases were limited in two respects: first, the defendant must have been guilty of a deliberate commission of a breach of duty; and secondly, the circumstances must make it unlikely that the breach of duty will be discovered for some time. 24 Given that section 32(2) is (or at least may be) required to cover cases of non-disclosure rather than active concealment, the reason for limiting it to the deliberate commission of a breach of duty becomes clear. It is only where the defendant is aware of his own deliberate wrongdoing that it is appropriate to penalise him for failing to disclose it. 25 In my opinion, section 32 deprives a defendant of a limitation defence in two situations: (i) where he takes active steps to conceal his own breach of duty after he has become aware of it; and (ii) where he is guilty of deliberate wrongdoing and conceals or fails to disclose it in circumstances where it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. But it does not deprive a defendant of a limitation defence where he is charged with negligence if, being unaware of his error or that he has failed to take proper care, there has been nothing for him to disclose.”
“… if a fiduciary is properly acting for two principals with potentially conflicting interests he must act in good faith in the interests of each and must not act with the intention of furthering the interests of one principal to the prejudice of those of the other... I shall call this "the duty of good faith." But it goes further than this. He must not allow the performance of his obligations to one principal to be influenced by his relationship with the other. He must serve each as faithfully and loyally as if he were his only principal. Conduct which is in breach of this duty need not be dishonest but it must be intentional. An unconscious omission which happens to benefit one principal at the expense of the other does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, though it may constitute a breach of the duty of skill and care. This is because the principle which is in play is that the fiduciary must not be inhibited by the existence of his other employment from serving the interests of his principal as faithfully and effectively as if he were the only employer. I shall call this "the no inhibition principle." Unless the fiduciary is inhibited or believes (whether rightly or wrongly) that he is inhibited in the performance of his duties to one principal by reason of his employment by the other his failure to act is not attributable to the double employment. ”
“Finally, the fiduciary must take care not to find himself in a position where there is an actual conflict of duty so that he cannot fulfil his obligations to one principal without failing in his obligations to the other: see Moody v. Cox and Hatt[1917] 2 Ch. 71 ; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Smith (1991) 102 A.L.R. 453. If he does, he may have no alternative but to cease to act for at least one and preferably both. The fact that he cannot fulfil his obligations to one principal without being in breach of his obligations to the other will not absolve him from liability. I shall call this "the actual conflict rule." ”
“By instructing him to act for them, the purchasers must be taken to have authorised the defendant to complete the report without which the mortgage advance would not have been forthcoming; and to complete it truthfully. The defendant was required by the society to report on the purchasers' title as well as to confirm the absence of any further borrowing. The two stood in exactly the same case. The defendant would not have been in breach of his duty to the purchasers if he had disclosed the facts to the society any more than if he had reported a defect in their title.”